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ABSTRACT 
This thesis critically assesses the political operation of Peace Parks in Southern 
Africa. The notion that Transboundary Protected Areas (TBPAs) can act as vehicles 
for peace has become an important argument for their promotion in post-Apartheid 
Southern Africa. Co-operation in TBPAs has been envisaged to generate international 
friendship and understanding, for which reason TBPAs are more commonly referred 
to as 'Peace Parks'. This notion lacks substantiation however. Concentrating upon the 
South African- Mozambi c an-Zimb abwean Great Limpopo Park, this research 
demonstrates that Peace Parks do not necessarily promote peace and can, indeed, 
generate additional conflict. In poverty-stricken Southern Africa with its legacy of 
contested colonial borders, an important motivation driving the Peace Parks agenda is 
the notion that they will generate sustainable development and more open border 
policies. However, the domination of national (governmental) interests, insufficient 
community consultation and problematic cross-border flows hinder the achievement 
of these objectives. An important underlying cause is that co-operation in Peace Parks 
has come to both reflect and feed existing power inequalities in the region, making 
such parks arenas for resistance and conflict. Finally, where TBPAs do generate 
international friendship and increased cultural understanding at the ground level, the 
top-down nature of the decision-making process limits the ability of these positive 
social effects to influence international relations. Frequent cultural clashes and 
nationalistic sentiments and rivalries further limit the positive political aspects of 
Peace Parks. Nevertheless, more cross-border co-operation has certainly been 
achieved and co-operation in Peace Parks is a learning process. The development of 
conflict mediation mechanisms and reflective monitoring and evaluation procedures 
could strengthen the peace-building potential of Peace Parks. On the other hand, 
Peace Parks are bound to remain vulnerable to wider regional political constraints. 
The development of management strategies that seek to anticipate and contain the 
effects of political instability is proposed. 
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1: Peace Parks and Transboundary Conservation: Setting the 
Scene 
1.1 Introduction 
The number and profile of 'Peace Parks', or Transboundary Protected Areas (TBPAs), 
have multiplied and escalated over the last two decades, particularly in the developing 
world, as have their goals. This development has, however, not been accompanied by an 
assessment of whether the environmental, developmental and especially the political 
outcomes of Peace Parks match this heightened profile. Coupled with the issue of 
whether Peace Parks have 'delivered the goods' is the issue of how to theorise Peace 
Parks in terms of the wider literature. This thesis aims to make a contribution to both 
areas, by studying the political aspects of Peace Parks in Southern Africa. This chapter 
provides insight into the scientific and social rationale for the research and, linked to this, 
outlines what the research sets out to achieve. 
Four years into a new millennium the realisation of world peace and successful 
international co-operation continue to be listed by many as the top priorities of our time. 
This is not surprising. We live in an age where terrorism has become a household word, 
and where peace has become even more fragile and elusive. Furthermore, challenging 
earlier optimistic predictions in the 1990s that the emergence of a "borderless world" 
(Ohmae, 1990) was imminent, conflict over territory and borders continues to fuel much 
of today's political conflict. No wonder, therefore, that there is so much talk of the need 
for cross-border co-operation and peace, and of the necessity to find non-violent solutions 
for conflicts. ' 
In the meantime, concern over the state of our natural environment continues to grow. In 
spite of several costly global conferences such as the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development (Rio de Janeiro, 1994), the 1997 Kyoto Conference on 
Climate Change and the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development 
(Johannesburg), which were geared towards tackling the issue, environmental problems 
seem to be increasing, not lessening. Some gloomily speak of an 'environmental crisis' 
1 The world's first University for Peace, entirely aimed at discovering ways to further world peace, 
bears witness to the importance of this phenomenon within academic circles (University for Peace, 
2004). 
'k 
? I. 
(Brown, 2003; Hollander, 2003). Ongoing loss of the earth's biodiversity due to pollution 
and increased population levels are considered particularly alarming indicators of this 
trend (Terborgh, 1999). It is perhaps not surprising that environmental concerns have 
become increasingly linked to the pursuit of peace. Absence of conflict is an important 
condition for effective biodiversity conservation (Westing, 1993; Dudley et al., 2002), 
and so is international co-operation. Since 'nature knows no boundaries', it is often only 
through cross-border co-operation that environmental problems can be tackled. Peace and 
international co-operation clearly facilitate effective environment management. However, 
it has now also become increasingly recognised that this link may work the other way 
around: namely that the pursuit of cross-border environmental co-operation can be used 
to foster peace, by means of the international co-operation it stimulates (Brock, 1991: 
413). It is this notion that underlies the notion of Peace Parks, including those in Southern 
Africa. 2 
1.2 Setting the scene: Peace Parks and their rationale 
Peace Parks constitute conservation areas that "straddle the boundaries of two or more 
countries" (Duffy, 1997) and which are collectively managed to varying degrees, by the 
countries involved. Moreover, an explicit aim of their establishment is to "confirm, 
strengthen or re-establish good relations with a neighbouring state" (Shine, 1997: 39). 
The origin of Peace Parks is usually traced to the establishment of the US-Canadian 
Waterston Glacier Park in 1932.3 In the 1980s the World Conservation Union JUCN) 
started officially to promote the notion of Peace Parks for all conservation areas on 
international boundaries. Since then the concept has quickly gained in importance. In less 
than a decade, the number of adjacent conservation areas more than doubled: there were 
59 existing and potential border parks in 1988; by 1998 there were 136 straddling 112 
international borders in 98 countries (see Table 1.1). 
2 In this thesis 'Southern Africa' refers to South Africa and its neighbouring countries: Botswana, 
Namibia, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Swaziland and Lesotho. As will be explained in more depth in the 
next chapter, it is in this geographical area where plans for Peace Parks are at the most advanced stage. 
3 In addition to ecological considerations, the park was created as an enduring monument "to the long- 
existing relationship of peace and goodwill between the people of and Governments of Canada and 
United States" (Acts of Parliament in the US and Canada, quoted in Shine, 1998: 37). 
2 
Table 1.1 Overview of growth in internationally adjoining protected area complexeS4 
per region 1988-1998 
Regions Adjoining 
Protected Area 
Complexes 
Protected aret Proposed 
Complexes 
3-country 
complexes 
1988 1998 1998 1998 1998 
Europe 20 45 154 26 6 
Africa 20 34 123 12 9 
Asia 7 25 76 12 3 
Central and South America 7 24 93 15 6 
North America 5 8 42 4 0 
Total 59 136 488 69 27 
Source: Adapted trom Zbicz (1999). 
The geographical range of Peace Parks also expanded. Originally a concept functioning 
exclusively in the global North, the notion of Peace Parks was increasingly 'exported' to 
the South in the post-Cold War era, facilitated by the ending of many conflicts in the 
global south. Table 1.2 lists some of the TBPA initiatives undertaken in the early 1990s. 
Table 1.2 Progress and political impact of TBPA initiatives in post-conflict areas in 
early 1990s 
Countries involved TBPA Progress Changes in quality of 
international relations 
following Peace Park 
initiative 
Costa Rica/Nicaragua Sf-a-Paz Moderate Relations remain tense 
Costa Rica/Panama La Amistad Moderate Relations remain tense 
Turkey/Greece Not Named (NN) Slow Still tense 
Bosnia/Serbia-Montenegro NN Negligible Still tense 
Papua/New Guinea/Indones NN None Still tense 
Jordan/Israel NN Negligible Still tense 
Israel/Palestine NN Halted Increasingly hostile 
North/South Korea NN Halted Still hostile 
Source: Brock (1991); Hearns (1997); Westing (1993,1998a); Zbicz (1998). 
4 Protected Areas Complexes comprise not just protected areas, but also other types of nature reserves. 
3 
Although one of the last regions to embrace the Peace Parks concept, the most far- 
reaching Peace Parks plan, both in a spatial sense and in terms of the aims involved, is 
currently being developed in Southern Africa. Stimulated by the quick improvement in 
relations between South Africa and neighbouring countries following the end of 
apartheid in 1994, the notion of Peace Parks has quickly gained momentum in this 
region. The Southern African Peace Parks Plan 5 encompasses the establishment of six 
TBPAs between South Africa and its neighbouring countries (Figure 1.1). 
Zimbabwe 
Naimbia 
Botswana 
Mon 
South Africa sotho Lýl 0 () 
N 
1) Ai-Ais/Pdchtersveld TBPA 
2) Kgalagadi TBPA 
3) Lmp op o/Shashe TBPA 
4) Great Limp op o TBPA 
5) Lub omb o TBPA 
6) M aluti/Drakensb erg TBPA 
Figure 1.1 The Southern African Peace Parks Plan 
The first Peace Park to be established was the Kgalagadi Park between South Africa and 
Botswana in 2000, whilst the Mozambican-South African part of the Great Limpopo 
Park, which involves Zimbabwe as well, is already partially connected by means of 
5 The 'Southern African Peace Parks Plan' is not a term in official use. When referring to the six 
designated TBPAs on South Africa's borders, the South African Department of Environmental Affairs 
and Tourism (DEAT) speaks of TBPs and TFCAs, for example, partially because the term 'Peace 
Parks' is closely associated with the PPF (Jones, Interview, 2003). The PPF does speak of Peace Parks 
in Southern Africa, but in doing so refers to the whole SADC region. As this thesis concentrates on the 
planned TBPAs between South Africa and neighbouring countries, as the most advanced ones (Van 
Amerom and BUscher, 2005) the term 'Southern African Peace Parks Plan' will be used in this thesis. 
4 
wildlife corridors to permit joint administration. The remaining four TBPAs are in 
various stages of progress. 6 
The creation of Peace Parks on vast areas of privately, state and community-owned land 
in a region prone to conflict over land has various rationales. Firstly, such Transboundary 
Natural Resource Management (TBNRM) initiatives are motivated by the notion that 
bigger parks will facilitate biodiversity management, allowing for the restoration of 
traditional wildlife migration routes. Secondly, the creation of such 'superparks' is 
expected to stimulate eco tourism. On this basis, Peace Parks have been promoted as an 
important means to further economic growth in Southern Africa's marginalised 
borderlands. Through Community-Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) 
policies, the economic gains of increased eco-tourism are promoted as benefiting local 
communities.. Finally, TBPAs are expected to act as vehicles for peace. This notion has 
two main premises. The social processes of cross-border co-operation in parks have been 
identified as a means of generating international friendship and understanding (Hanks, 
2001; ITTO/I[IJCN, 2003). Also, the creation of TBPAs has been identified as an 
excellent means to solve border conflicts diplomatically (Thorsell and Harrison, 1990: 
58). Table 1.3 displays some of the main terminology used in relation to transboundary 
conservation in Southern Africa. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, given the many predicted benefits of Peace Parks, TBPAs in 
Southern Africa have attracted a heterogeneous collective of actors. These include 
national governments, national and international donors and NGOs including the World 
Bank, the IUCN, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and 
the Southern African Peace Parks Foundation (PPF) as well as local communities. The 
co-operation between this diverse grouping of actors is often presented as relatively 
unproblematic. The interests of the participating actors are perceived to be 
complementary in character (Anon., 2004). Furthermore, each actor is seen to benefit 
equally from participation, creating a 'win-win situation'. 
6 Appendix I outlines the key characteristics of each TBPA. 
5 
Table 1.3 Typologies of transboundary conservation initiatives 
Concept Description 7 
Transboundary Protected Conservation area that straddles the boundaries of two or more countries i 
Area (TBPA) involve some level of common management by the countries involved. 
Main aims: biodiversity protection, eco tourism, cultural heritage. 
Peace Park (PP) TBPAs that in addition to the 'common' goals associated with TBPAs (see 
above) explicitly aim to confirm, strengthen or re-establish good relations 
between the states involved (Shine, 1997: 37). Prevention/solution of 
tensions over disputed boundaries and the safeguarding of biodiversity areas 
from military activities constitute also important aims (Sandwith et al., 2002; 
Shine, 1997: 37). 
Peace Parks Concept (PPQ The notion that TBPAs can act as vehicles for peace. " 
Transfrontier Park (TFP) A TBPA/Peace Park with wildlife conservation as the prime focus, which is 
managed as one integrated unit. National boundaries and other human 
obstacles are usually removed so that animals can roam freely (adapted from 
DEAT, 2003). 
Transfrontier Conservation A TBPA/Peace Park where the different component areas have different form 
Areas (TFCAs) of conservation status, including private game reserves, communal natural 
resource management areas and hunting concession areas. Fences and roads 
may separate the various parts (Adapted from DEAT, 2003). 
Transboundary Natural Any process of co-operation across boundaries aimed at increasing the 
Resource Management effectiveness of attaining biodiversity conservation goals or other natural 
(TBNRM) resource management objectives, including through sustainable usage of 
natural resources, for both conservation objectives and to promote socio- 
economic development. 9 
CBNRM (Community- Method of natural resource management that aims to advance community 
Based Natural Resource involvement in the management and/or benefits of protected areas. 
Management) 
7 The phenomena of conservation areas straddling international boundaries are known under different 
names. This table defines the most commonly used concepts and terms in Southern Africa. 
8 The 'Peace Parks Concept' is not a term in official use. However, the notion of Peace Parks and the 
idea that TBPAs will lead to peace are at the heart of the Peace Parks concept's rationale. 
9 The term TBNRM was introduced in publications by the Biodiversity Support Programme (a joint 
initiative of the WWF, the Nature Conservancy, the World Resources Institute and USAID) which 
defined it as "any process of co-operation across boundaries that facilitates or improves the management 
of natural resources to the benefit of all parties in the area concerned" (see for example Griffin et al, 
1999: 1). However, it is hard to determine if transboundary environmental co-operation benefits all the 
parties concerned or whether this is just the formal policy objective. This definition moreover leaves out 
the "very important aspect of socio-economic development and the issue of sustainable use" (Sandwith, 
2002: 21). For these reasons this thesis has sought to interpret the term in a more extensive manner. 
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1.3 The Rationale for the Research 
The concept of Peace Parks has become highly influential in shaping perspectives on the 
political aspects of TBPAs. Perhaps because people tend to be positively predisposed to 
possibilities for peace and increased animal welfare, the Southern African Peace Parks 
project has attracted wide and highly favourable press coverage, including beyond the 
region (Warburton-Lee, 1999; Van der Linden, 2000; Godwin, 2001; Bittorf, 2002; 
Süddeutsche Zeitung, 2002; Pabst, 2002; Michler, 2003). 
The belief that Southern Africa's TBPAs will be successful and deliver positive political 
outcomes, boosting regional stability and peace, is so great, that - before Southern 
Africa's TBPAs are even operational - it has led to a revival of the interest in the concept 
of Peace Parks as a conflict resolution mechanism. Even a seasoned politician like Nelson 
Mandela declared: "I know of no political movement, no philosophy, no ideology, which 
does not agree with the peace parks concept as we see it going into fruition today. It is a 
concept that can be embraced by all" (Mandela, 2001). 10 Far-reaching claims by both 
politicians and environmentalists that TBPAs will work as 'Peace Parks' helping to bring 
about a much yearned for 'African Renaissance"' (Landsberg and Komegay, 1998; Van 
Amerom and Biischer, 2005) seem, if public rhetoric is anything to go by, valid. 
This dissertation will argue that, altogether, the Peace Parks concept represents more of 
"a dream" (Draper et al., 2004) than a realistic outlook on the political aspects of TBPAs. 
The notion of Peace Parks implicitly requires idealised images of the working of power 
and politics. The following assumptions or beliefs underpin the concept: 
* Institutions are efficient actors working in the collective interest of the people 
they represent 
Unequal relationships between actors in general need not affect democratic 
decision-making at the project level 
0 Organisations are coherent groups that share the same interests 
10 Nelson Mandela made this statement at the ceremony marking the relocation of elephants of the 
South African Kruger Park into the Mozambican Coutada 16 Park (now renamed the Limpopo National 
Park) in the context of the creation of the Great Limpopo TBPA on the 4 th of October 2001. 
11 The pan-Africanist 'African Renaissance' notion has been promoted by South African president 
Thabo Mbeki as a means to promote African unity and peace. Two important components of this 
concept are a return to African cultural values as well as an intensive interstate co-operation within 
Africa to tackle poverty and to strengthen its position in the world. 
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0 States exercise full control over their borderlands 
9 The interests pursued by the actors are those that are officially expressed 
Participation in co-operation is always voluntary (as opposed to being pressured 
by another party) 
0 Politics is a transparent process 
* There are enough resources to share 12 
In reality, these political factors are likely to be absent or only partially in place. As a 
direct consequence, the presence of a political and socio-economic environment receptive 
to/supportive of the creation of TBPAs is by no means a given. The absence of such 
favourable political conditions means that TBPAs are as likely to create conflict as 
consensus and understanding, as is confirmed by the ongoing research on TBPAs (Draper 
& Wels, 2002; Hughes, 2003; Sotho and Munthali, 2003; Fall, 2003a). The failure to 
question the existence of these parameters has the effect of virtually depoliticising the 
whole TBNRM project. Instead, a highly one-sided picture emerges in which the 
potential positive political aspects of TBNRM feature highly but which glosses over or 
insufficiently recognises the pitfalls and conflicts of such management. More academic 
research on the political aspects of Peace Parks is imperative. This project aims to do so 
with regard to TBPAs in Southern Africa. 
In achieving this aim, the dissertation focuses particularly on the interaction between 
regional politics and the social dynamics in TBPAs. To be able to understand the 
rationale behind this research focus and appreciate its scientific and social relevance it is 
necessary to examine the underpinning concepts of and empirical findings on TBPAs. 
This exercise requires engagement with three different clusters of literature, starting with 
the policy literature on TBPAs. Perspectives on TBPAs have been greatly shaped by the 
'optimistic outlook' on the political working of TBPAs presented in such promotional 
literature. Furthermore, to test the validity of the PPC as an analytical tool for assessing 
the political working of TBPAs and to gain more insight into the political issues that 
might accompany the creation and management of TBPAs, empirical findings on the 
performance of TBPA initiatives preceding the Southern African Peace Parks plan will be 
considered, by means of an exploration of relevant academic or 'critical literature' in this 
area. Altogether, academic studies can be said to represent a 'doubting' view on the 
Peace Parks concept, questioning its validity. Thirdly, to assess to what extent identified 
12 These assumptions and their limitations will be explored in more depth throughout the thesis. 
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obstacles to the peace-building potential of TBPAs may also feature inthe Southern 
African policy context, an overview will be given of emerging findings on the political 
aspects of TBPAs in Southern Africa. 
1.4. Existing literature on TBPAs: origin and focus 
For a policy concept of global importance that is promoted as a means to foster peace, the 
body of literature on the political aspects of TBPAs is very thin, consisting largely of 
policy documents. The literature can be broadly divided into two categories, notably the 
'promotional' and the 'critical' literatures, which respectively employ an 'optimistic 
outlook' and a 'critical outlook' on TBPAs: 
A) The 'promotional literature' encompasses a diverse body of publications issued by 
organisations involved in the promotion of TBPAs, such as the World Conservation 
Union JUCN), United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP), the World Bank, the 
World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) and, since 1997, the South African-based PPF. Papers on Peace 
Parks in academic journals by environmentalists (see for example Westing, 1998b; Zbicz, 
1999; Hanks, 2001) working for these organisations are another component of the 
4promotional literature'. Reflecting the roles of these organisations, it is perhaps not 
surprising that the views promoted by this literature, including those on the political 
working of TBPAs, are generally highly positive. Partly as a result of the myriad 
organisations that seek to promote it, the notion that TBPAs can act as vehicles for peace 
has also been introduced under other labels. Even when not using the term 'Peace Parks', 
the literature on TBPAs largely envisages the political working of TBPAs along positive 
lines as stimulating regional stability and peace (Braack, 2002a: 16). In Southern Africa, 
the online publications of the Biodiversity Support Programme Oointly published by 
USAID, the World Bank and the WWF) that promote the notion of 'Transboundary 
Natural Resource Management' (TBNRM) are of particular relevance (Griffin et al., 
1999: 3,5). As such, there is little difference between the assertions in the Peace Parks 
concept and in TBNRM (Wolmer, 2003). On the other hand, the latter literature has 
increasingly strong reservations against the notion that TBPAs will by definition act as 
Peace Parks (see for example Van der Linde et al., 2001 ). 13 
" So do policy assessments of the IUCN Regional Office Southern Africa (ROSA) (Katerere et al, 
2001; Jones and Chonguita, 2001; Mohamed-Katerere, 2001) and InVVEnt (including InVv'Ent, 2002; 
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B) The 'critical academic literature' consists mostly of academic studies on the co- 
operative processes involved in the creation or management of a given TBPA. Not all the 
studies within this category explicitly question the optimistic outlook of the promotional 
literature on the political aspects of TBPAs. However, the findings generally present a 
critical view. For the purpose of this thesis, the critical academic literature will be 
considered in two parts: academic studies on the political performance of TBPAs outside 
Southern Africa and academic works studying the Southern African Peace Parks plan. 
Having outlined some key features of the literature on the political aspects of TBPAs, 
summarised in Table 1.4, the 'optimistic view' on TBPAs in the promotional literature 
will be considered. 
1.5. The optimistic view: perspectives on the political working of TBPAs 
in the promotional literature 
Several ways in which TBPAs can deliver positive political aspects, that is fostering 
regional stability and peace, have been envisaged in the promotional literature. In 
essence, these can be traced to three interlinked premises. It is believed that the 
establishment and subsequent management of TBPAs can contribute to: 
Increased international trust, understanding and reconciliation, or more simply 
put, international friendship (McNeil, 1990; Thorsell and Harrison, 1990; Blake, 
1993; Goldblatt, 1993; Weed, 1994; Sandwith, 2001) 
Reduced conflict (McNeil, 1990; McManus, 1994, Westing, 1993,1998a; Griffin 
et al., 1999) 
* Increased international co-operation in other policy areas and at numerous 
geographical scales (Thorsell, 1990, Rarnutsindela and Tsheola, 2000) 
InWEnt, 2003), a German development agency, which started to provide assistance to the Southern 
African Peace Parks project later on. 
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Table 1.4 Categories of literature on the political aspects of TBPAs 
Category Nature of literature Outlook Leading beliefsl observations Emerging 
Research 
needs 
Promotional - Policy documents Optimistic TBPAs will work as vehicles * Test key notions 
literature research published by for peace, by reducing PPC 
IUCN, EUROPARC, conflict/promoting international 
UNEP, the World Bank, friendship between states. 
WVv'F, USAID, INwent 
and the Peace Parks 
Foundation. 
- Academic articles 
environmentalists 
advocating Peace Parks 
Critical - Academic studies on Doubting Individual TBPAs may Expand research 
academic existing TBPAs or TBPA occasionally work as vehicles base to include 
literature initiatives for better international relations, conflict potential 
but on whole PPC lacks 
empirical backing: TBPAs are 
not only often affected by, but 
may also add to/introduce 
conflict. 
- Academic studies on Sceptical TBPAs in current set up in Need to consider 
TBPA initiatives in Southern Africa carry high political dynamics 
Southern Africa conflict potential and could TBPAs at micro 
undermine peace, by promoting level and wider 
preservationist and economic regional political 
agendas of (white) national and dynamics 
international business and 
conservationist elites at expense 
rights of local communities. 
Also high potential for regional 
tensions, but this issue is as yet 
relatively under-researched. 
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The PPC also has a fourth premise, notably the notion that TBPAS will not produce 
conflict or add to existing conflict. Perhaps because such an outcome would undermine or 
destroy the peace-building potential of TBPAs, this notion is implicit and it has received 
little or no thought. Moreover, the other three premises are often merely noted, rather 
than critically examined. Whilst it is clear that conflict reduction, increased international 
friendship and more co-operation can foster peace, it is far less clear how exactly TBPAs 
promote these conditions. Figure 1.2 displays the rationale behind the PPC graphically. 
Figure 1.2 The rationale of how TBPAs become Peace Parks 
Where no more direct explanations are offered, literature drawing attention to the 
presupposed potential of TBPAs to act as vehicles for peace frequently refer to an article 
by McNeil (1990) (see for example Griffin, 1999; Koch, 1994: [1] 36-37). McNeil (1990: 
2), however, merely points out that TBPAs have "an unrealised potential for reducing 
international tensions and for creating conditions, which make peace more likely". He 
also claims that "improved prospects of peace" constitute "inevitable secondary effects" 
where the parks result in improved natural resource management and in "the protection of 
indigenous minority people" (McNeil, 1990: 25). Finally, he seems to view the peace- 
building capacities of TBPAs as working relatively independently of the political context 
in which they function, his position being that "the creation and management of protected 
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areas need not wait for peaceful conditions nor for agreeable partners on both sides of a 
border 
... these parks can precede, lead to, and result in, as well as help to maintain, peace 
among nations and communities" (McNeil, 1990: 25). While confirming the notion that 
TBPAs may foster peace, McNeil's article goes little way towards explaining or 
supporting these claims. 14 Nevertheless, it is possible to draw some common assumptions 
and key themes from the general literature. 
Increased security 
TBPAs are perceived to promote security in various ways. Firstly, inter-state co- 
operation in TBPAs is predicated to foster 'environmental security" 5 (Westing, 1993, 
1998a), by helping states to peacefully negotiate competing demands on shared natural 
resources like water, and promote more sustainable natural resource use (Tevera and 
Moyo, 2000; Halle et al., 2002). This is alleged to significantly reduce the possibility of 
inter-state armed conflict over these resources (Tevera and Moyo, 2000; Halle et al., 
2002). Although TBPAs do not necessarily contain those natural resources over which 
competition is the fiercest, the notion that TBPAs will prevent inter-state conflict over 
precious natural resources has been increasingly used by conservationists to argue its 
case, especially in developing countries (McDowell 16,1998: 24-25). Sandwith et al. 
(2001), for example, recommend that joint anti-poaching patrols in TBPAs could also be 
used to combat other forms of transboundary crime. Thirdly, it has also been claimed that 
TBPAs can protect "indigenous minority people" (McNeil, 1990: 25; Westing, 1993), but 
this notion is, again, little explored and substantiated. 17 
14 An overview is given of the various political circumstances in which TBPAs have been established 
to either reduce conflict or promote peace, but this does of course not constitute proof that these parks 
have indeed had positive political outcomes. Relatively little is said on the 'how' of the process. 
15 The notion of 'environmental security' is grounded in the belief that human-induced environmental 
pressures may seriously affect national and international security and that they will increasingly do so 
as a result of growing population numbers (http: //www. libr@U. utoronto. ca/pcs/thresh/threshl. htm) and 
particularly over scarce resources like water. The pursuit of environmental security has increasingly 
become a part of the formal security policies of states (Nathan & Honwana, 1995: 5). However, the 
notion of environmental security seems often subjected to other state interests (Grundy-Warr and 
Rajah, 1997), and the linkages between "environmental decline and conflict, and between resource 
scarcity and political instability" (Grundy-Warr and Rajah, 1997: 150) are weak and, generally, indirect 
(Ayoob, 1995: 10 quoted in Grundy-Warr and Rajah, 1997: 150). 
16 In his capacity as IUCN Director-General. 
17 Sandwith et a]. (2001: 19-21), further explore this topic, listing concrete guidelines for "Involving 
and benefiting local people" (p 19). It remains however unclear why the involvement of indigenous 
people is considered particularly important (p. 12). Furthermore, the right to establish TBPAs, 
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Settlement of boundary disputes 
One of the most important ways in which TBPAs are expected to promote peace is 
through their perceived capacity to ameliorate inter-state conflict over disputed 
borderlands (Griffin et al., 1999, see also McNeil, 1990; McManus, 1994; Rairnutsindela 
and Tseola, 2000). By offering an alternative to military presence in the borderland, 
TBPAs are thought to encourage demilitarization of sensitive border areas (Brock, 1991: 
413). Westing (1993,1998a) envisages on this premise a Peace Park between North and 
South Korea, as a first step towards reunification, in place of the current buffer zone 
between the countries. Such agreements will be difficult to achieve however. 18 
TBPAs could also play an important psychological role in post conflict border areas, 
encouraging rapprochement between former belligerent countries. Dr. Anton Rupert, the 
head of the PPF envisages that the creation of a TBPA on a partnership basis, implying 
equality with the victorious party, makes it easier for the subjugated government to avoid 
"loss of face" in accepting defeat. This would in turn reduce tendencies for revenge and 
retaliation (Rupert, Interview, 200219). Furthermore, the international credit that former 
belligerent countries are likely to receive for jointly setting up a Peace Park, could, in 
combination with expected eco-tourism benefits, be used by the governments involved to 
'sell' the new border settlement to their citizens as a triumph (Rupert, Interview, 2002). 
Thorsell (1990b) also perceives the very act of agreeing to co-operate as a giant step 
forwards in the building of goodwill between countries (Thorsell, 1990b: 58). Co- 
operation in Peace Parks is thought to be most beneficial, however, when it promotes 
intensive and large-scale inter-state contacts. 
Enhancing inter-state communication and contacts 
including in areas inhabited by local communities, is taken for granted, and assumed to go ahead 
regardless of the outcomes of community consultation processes, thereby undermining the negotiating 
power of this group. 
18 Advocates of Peace Parks had arranged for some preliminary and informal discussions on a Peace 
Park between scientists from these two countries, who indicated their enthusiasm. However, upon 
hearing of these discussions, the North Korean government forbade its scientists to attend any fur-ther 
meetings, stating that they undermined national safety (Anonymous source, Interview, IUCN). Later on 
the North Korean government did indicate support for the idea, but withdrew this soon thereafter 
(Westing, 1998a). 
" An overview of interview dates and positions of interviewees is provided in Appendix 11. 
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TBPAs are expected to generate better international relations, by means of their 
perceived capacity to boost cross-border co-operation at the inter-state level, including 
in policy areas unrelated to TBPAs (Ramutsindela and Tsheola, 2000: 201). This notion 
reveals a strong belief that the international co-operation in TBPAs will by nature deliver 
satisfactory results for the countries involved. This expectation is sometimes underpinned 
by functionalist insights perceiving environmental co-operation, as a type of 'low 
politics' being a relatively easy form of international co-operation (Brock, 1991). More 
generally, international co-operation is simply assumed to deliver positive political 
outcomes bringing nations closer together per se. This notion is visible in the 
RJCN/WCPA's definition of Peace Parks, ranking co-operation alongside peace as policy 
goals: 
Transboundary protected areas ... are dedicated to ... the promotion of peace and 
cooperation. Peace and cooperation encompasses building trust, understanding and 
reconciliation between nations, the prevention and resolution of conflict, and the 
fostering of cooperation between and among countries, communities, agencies and 
jparks. html . other stakeholders. http: //Www. iucn. orRIthemeslwCpalthemLlpaLksl 
It is seen as desirable, if not essential, that co-operation embraces the highest possible 
levels, as "this will .... promote confidence-building measures 
between states. " (Heams, 
1997: 229). Two main ways in which co-operation in TBPAs can promote increased and 
higher-level contacts between countries are envisaged. Firstly, the 'trickle up' effect 
implies that the cross-border friendship and understanding generated through cross- 
border co-operation at the parks level will eventually 'trickle up' to the highest 
governmental levels (McNeil, 1990: 37; Hamilton et al., 1996). The ability of low-level 
co-operation between parks to eventually generate the governmental support and 
involvement necessary for TBPA creation is often accepted as a given. McNeil (1990: 
36) for example suggests it is not necessary to "wait for peace" or even "for a partner" in 
inducing TBPAs. Secondly, extending the 'trickle up' effect horizontally, it has been 
envisaged that once national governments co-operate on TBPAs they will find the 
benefits of this co-operation to be so great that it will have a 'spill-over effect' into other, 
more contested policy areas. Thorsell argues on this basis that co-operation on 
conservation between Turkey and Greece in the Evros River "may pave the way towards 
settlement of more contentious issues" (Thorsell, 1990b: 58). Echoing new insights on 
CBNRM (Buckles, 1999) and reflecting the increased involvement of non-state actors in 
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TBPAs, co-operation between communities in a cross-border context and the 
involvement of NGOs is sometimes also perceived to build better international relations, 
as is also reflected in the IUCN/WCPA's definition of Peace Parks (see previous page). 
Economic Linkages 
The notion that the economic interests of states in Peace Parks will bind them together 
and serve as a disincentive for conflict is another important argument underpinning the 
concept of Peace Parks. It is claimed that TBPAs literally 'pay off for countries, by 
increasing eco-tourism revenues. Shared interests in maintaining or further expanding 
this eco-tourism base would allegedly ensure that states will want to continue cooperating 
in a TBPA. Because TBPAs tend to increase levels of economic interdependency 
between countries, this notion is furthermore thought to be self-perpetuating. 
With its interests intertwined locally with that of its neighbour(s), a country would act 
against its self-interest to provoke conflict with neighbour(s), and endanger economic 
gains. It could also be argued that because of its earlier investments in a TBPA a state's 
withdrawal from a TBPA will be costly and therefore a last resort (Combrink, Interview, 
2002). Whilst this line of reasoning is quite logical, it problematically views the 
development of the parks as occurring largely in isolation from other political processes 
influencing the quality and nature of inter-state relations. 
Regionalisation 
TBPAs are also seen to foster peace, through their ability to stimulate regionalization or 
even regional integration. One way in which TBPAs are expected to do so is through the 
increase in economic and infrastructural inter-dependency as outlined above. The cross- 
border contacts at various levels and communication that TBPAs stimulate are 
furthermore expected to establish regional identities and interests, internalise norms, 
operationalise routine international communication, and marginalise the acceptability of 
the use of force, thereby promoting regionalisation (Zbicz and Green, 1998: 204; Brock, 
1991: 421). Experiences in Europe, however, indicate that the potential of and scope for 
TBPAs depend upon the speed of regionalisation, more so than the other way around 
(Rossi, 1990: 71; Stein, 2002: 18). Nevertheless, TBPAs could contribute to 
regionalisation and, are increasingly promoted for that purpose, especially in the 
developing world. 
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1.6 A lack of evidence 
Having discussed the rationale behind the PPC, it is time to study its applicability. On the 
basis of the reasoning outlined in the previous section, the political working of TBPAs is 
expected to follow and produce favourable political patterns resulting in increased 
regional stability and peace. Whilst it is conceded that the creation of TBPAs can be 
difficult, because of, amongst other reasons, "competing interests for the same land" and 
the "engagement of sovereign states" (Westing, 1998: 91 and Fall, 1999: 252), the PPC 
predicts that all or nearly all TBPAs, regardless of place and political context, will deliver 
positive political outcomes fostering peace and regional stability. McDowell (1998) 
expresses this view when asserting that "TBPAs usually work" [emphasis in original] and 
that they "justify the label Peace Parks" apart from a few exceptions (McDowell, 1998: 
24). This claim lacks substantiation. The promotional literature often merely announces 
TBPAs to be Peace Parks in the literal sense of the word, for the simple reason that they 
have been designed to promote such an aim, or these TBPAs are implicitly suggested to 
work along these lines. Frequently mentioned examples include the Si-A-Paz 20 Park and 
the La Amistad Park in Central America (McNeil, 1990) whilst European TBPAs are also 
implicitly suggested to have worked as Peace Parks. Over time, regardless of actual 
performance, the working of such a TBPA as a Peace Park often becomes 'received 
wisdom'. 
More in-depth (case) studies on the political performance of individual TBPAs indicate, 
however, that the political working of TBPAs can rarely be assumed to work along the 
lines of the PPC, but are often conditional on external political factors. Proceedings of an 
IUCN/PPF conference on "Protected areas as a vehicle for international cooperation" 
(1998) list various articles considering the political performance of TBPAs. Significantly, 
many identify great constraints to the peace-building potential of TBPAs in practice, 
including weak legal and institutional frameworks (Shine, 1998: 37-48), problematic 
security situations and lack of finances in post-conflict areaS21 and a lack of tangible 
benefits for local communities (Katerere, 1998: 67-74). In assessing TBPA planning 
between Cameroon, the Congo and the Central African Republic, Gartland (1998: 242- 
247) identifies an absence of domestic stability, as well as a lack of homogeneity in 
20 Literally translated as "Yes to Peace". 
21 See for example Lanjouw and Kalpers (1998: 163-172) and Seale (1998: 83-88) on TBPA potential in 
the Great Lakes region. 
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policy outlooks on both sides of the border, and dissimilarity in economic conditions as 
key obstacles to TBPA construction. In drawing attention to the need for the creation of a 
Peace Park between North and South Korea, Westing (1998: 234-241), a main instigator 
of the Peace Parks concept, also testifies to the limiting impact of conflict and hostile 
governmental relations upon the creation of Peace Parks. 
Many more articles stress the positive political working of TBPAs in line with the PPC, 
confirming their potential for fostering international trust and regional stability (Zbicz 
and Green (1998); Brunner (1998: 93-116) and Cerovsky (1998: 117-120) on TBPAs in 
Eastern Europe; and Castro-Chamberlain (1998: 49-60) and Godoy (1998: 248-253) on 
Central America). However, these optimistic claims are often contradicted by academic 
assessments of TBPAs' performance. Table 1.2 also indicates major constraints to the 
working of the PPC, reviewing progress and tangible political effects of various TBPAs 
which were established to reduce conflict. The next section summarises the academic 
insights and findings on the performance of existing TBPAs or TBPA initiatives in 
regions other than Southern Africa. For analytical reasons, the overview will concentrate 
on critical accounts of TBPAs displayed as 'flagship TBPAs' in the promotional 
literature. Before considering studies of TBPAs in a particular regional context, the 
review will first outline the findings of more general enquiries into the political working 
of TBPAs. 
1.7 The doubting outlook: empirical findings on TBPA construction and 
functioning 
When regarded in their entirety, academic empirical findings on TBPA practice tend to 
question the validity of the PPC, demonstrating instead how the performance of TBPAs is 
context-dependent and how TBPAs are often endowed with considerable conflict 
potential. 
The most optimistic account is offered by Zbicz (1999). Providing an overview of the 
various levels of co-operation in TBPAs worldwide and the political factors influencing 
this process, Zbicz's PhD thesis gives considerable credence to the PPC. Although it also 
identifies significant constraints to its operation, this work confirms the idea that co- 
operation in TBPAs can make a significant contribution to peace, by fostering 
international understanding and friendship. Based on questionnaires sent out to a wide 
range of park managers, the work portrays TBPA co-operation as a highly valued and 
18 
appreciated exercise, with the potential to establish better international relations. Zbicz 
perceives the peace-building potential of TBPAs to be often limited by a lack of high 
level political support for TBPAs, preventing informal co-operation at the parks level 
from turning into a formalised TBPA, allowing for joint management of a given area. 
Sovereignty concerns are often used to explain this lack of political support, but Zbicz 
notes that these often merely function as "propaganda used to justify exploitation of 
shared natural resources" since TBPAs do not necessarily require the relinquishment of 
sovereignty, "willingness to cooperate in management decisions and monitoring" (p. 94) 
being sufficient. Zbicz observes, however, how even in unfavourable political situations 
where states use territorial sovereignty as arguments against cooperation in TBPAs, 
"cooperation is still occurring. The bulk of it may still be at the lowest levels, but some 
has proceeded to even the highest levels" (p. 94). Altogether Zbicz is optimistic about the 
prospects for co-operation in TBPAs and their ability to deliver positive political effects. 
Although acknowledging that there is no conclusive evidence as yet, Zbicz accepts the 
peace-building potential of TBPAs as a given that merely needs more time to develop 
(see also Zbicz and Green, 1998: 204). Zbicz bases her findings however largely on the 
opinions and perceptions of park managers and rangers. Cognisance has to be taken of 
the fact that as relatively low-level operators who are interested in maximising 
conservation benefits, this interest group tends to greatly favour cross-border co- 
operation, compared to other and potentially more influential actors like politicians. The 
lack of face-to-face interviewing and further field-research, introduces the risk that 
difficulties in co-operation at the parks level and more sensitive issues remain unreported. 
Brock (1991) and even more so Koch (1994), present a more critical outlook on the PPC, 
although both stress the potential of TBPAs to build peace. Highlighting that conclusive 
evidence for the concept has not been provided thus far, Brock (1991) questions the 
notion that Peace Parks can work as relatively independent variables in international 
politics, and urges stakeholders to keep "expectations within bounds when it comes to the 
possible spin-off effects of ecological cooperation for peace" (p. 414). Koch (1994) 
underscores these concerns, arguing that the renewed outbreaks of inter-state conflict in 
borderlands where Peace Parks have been established suggest that the working of TBPAs 
as vehicles for peace cannot be assumed (Koch, 1994: 40). Unfortunately, Koch's work 
does not further assess the underlying reasons for this phenomenon, merely using this 
observation to caution against manipulation of the PPC by conservationists seeking the 
speedy advance of the creation of protected areas in post-conflict borderlands areas, at the 
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expense of community land rights, under the pretext of promoting peace (Koch, 1994: 
41). 
Heams (1997) provides more insight into the limited ability of TBPAs to foster peace in 
post-conflict areas. Reviewing progress in Central America's Peace Parks plan 22 as a 
means of assessing TBPAs opportunities in the South China Sea, 23 Heams' study (1997) 
indicates that effective co-operation between former adversaries in TBPAs often 
continues to be problematic, in spite of formally signed agreements. Contradicting 
predictions that Central America's TBPAs work as vehicles for peace and foster regional 
24 stability (McNeil, 1990; Weed, 1997), Heams finds that a lack of equitable funding 
mechanisms, disparity in interests and capacities in promoting the TBPA between 
countries, and historical inertia have significantly hampered progress with Central 
America's Peace Parks Plan, with the notable exception of the Panama-Colombian 
Dari6n-Los Katios Park. Heams notes for example with regard to the Si A Paz Park 
(Nicaragua-Costa Rica) and the La Amistad Park (Costa Rica-Panama) how: 
Even though both political will and conservation incentives promote cooperation 
within the Si A Paz International Peace Park, the lack of a stable funding source and 
a favourable historical inertia have impeded any real cooperative initiatives. The La 
Amistad Biosphere Reserve suffers not so much from a lack offunding or historical 
inertia as from a lack of political will. The necessity for andlor benefits from joint 
management structures are not readily evident to the governments, and consequently 
little cooperation occurs (1997: 236). 
As a result of the absence of these conditions, many planned TBPAs have failed to 
materialise. This includes the proposed linkage of the Rio Coco Bosawas Biosphere 
Reserve in Nicaragua with the Rio Pldtano Biosphere Reserve in Honduras, where lack of 
enthusiasm and confidence on the parts of the governments and local communities 
hampered co-operation (p. 232). Another and highly significant constraint to effective 
22 Part of the designated 3,200 km long Meso Central American Biological Corridor, supported by the 
1989 Central American Convention for Environmental Protection. See Burnett (1998) for more details. 
" There are also maritime TBPAs. Blake (1997) offers more detail. 
24 This notion has been particularly promoted with regard to the Sf-a-Paz Park and the La Amistad 
Park. 
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TBPA co-operation in the Americas has been "unresolved border claims" (p. 244), as 
reflected in the limited progress made on natural resource management between 
Guatemala and Belize, due to "continued border skirmishes" (p. 244). 
Hearns' findings also point to the possibility of TBPAs turning into a new source of 
conflict, by stimulating competition and highlighting policy differences between 
countries. Whilst it was hoped "that eco-tourism would unite regional cooperation in 
transboundary resource management in Central America" it turned into "a source of 
contention in the Si A Paz where Nicaragua feels left out of a growing trade", the TBPA 
being relatively difficult to access from that country (1997: 234). 25 Conversely, the Costa 
Ricans have condemned the Nicaragua government for allowing its farmers to settle on 
its side of the TBPA, placing the watershed at risk (Hamann, 1993, quoted in Heams, 
1997: 233). Although he remains optimistic on the options and extension of the Central 
American Peace Parks plan, Hearns (1997) concludes that the chances for formalised 
TBPAs will be small in regions that continue to be dominated by a "bellicose history 
between states" and "militarisation" (p. 245). For this reason he foresees few chances for 
TBPA development in the South China Sea. 
Duffy's research on the political aspects of Peace Parks in Central America, with its 
focus on the "politics surrounding Peace Parks in Belize" (2001: 2)26 also demonstrates 
that, far from being straightforward, the creation of TBPAs in Central America 
constitutes a long and problem-ridden process, the political outcomes of which are still 
unresolved (Duffy, 2001). Focusing on the problematic nature of borderlands in the 
developing world, Duffy observes how "even if arrangements for Peace Parks in Central 
America are to be successfully negotiated, and appropriate management structures put in 
place" effective function of these parks might be difficult to achieve. (Duffy, 2001: 41). 
Whilst international conservation agencies and national governments aspire to extend 
their control over these areas by means of TBPAs, local actors often seek to resist this 
25 Similar problems besieged co-operation between Kenya's Maasai Mara National Reserve and 
Tanzania's Serengeti National Park, with Kenya standing accused of taking most advantage of eco 
tourism at the expense of Tanzania, by allegedly luring their lions over the border with bush meat. 
Some level of co-operative management was maintained however (Thorsell, 1990) and a new initiative 
has been started to form a TBPA (Muhanga, Interview, 2002; Mwanauta, Interview, 2002. 
26 The outcomes of this research were first displayed in a conference paper in 2001, which was 
consulted for this PhD (see also Bibliography). They will also be published in 2005 in the Review of 
International Studies under the title: 'The Politics of Global Environmental Governance: The Powers 
and Limitations of Transfrontier Conservation Areas in Central America'. 
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influence. In areas characterised by lucrative smuggling and all sorts of other cross- 
border "illegal and unregulated" transactions (Duffy, 2001: 4) and often inhabited by 
communities seeking to 'withdraw' from the central government, the creation of Peace 
Parks tends to be unwelcome and resisted (Duffy, 2003). Adding another layer of 
complexity, interests in such illegal transboundary flows are found at the highest 
governmental levels, as a result of which governments may covertly seek to frustrate co- 
operation in Peace Parks, under the cloak of fear of loss of sovereignty (Duffy, 1997; 
Singh, 2000; Duffy, 2001). In reality, TBPAs extend governmental control in 
borderlands, allowing governments to attract foreign funding for increased patrolling, to 
establish infrastructure and other measures which increasingly connect the borderland to 
the central state. In promoting greater governmental control in areas thus far 
characterised by "dysgovemance" (Duffy, forthcoming), TBPAs might promote 
increased political stability in the borderlands they cover. On the other hand, Duffy's 
research on the Zimbabwean-Mozambican Chimanimani TBPA (2002) illustrates, like 
Singh's (2000), how authoritarian governments might seek to suppress the rights of local 
communities generally not supportive of their regime by means of their increased 
presence through TBPAs. In such a scenario the creation of TBPAs could spark off 
armed resistance, thereby undermining political stability and peace. 
The notion that problematic regional and borderland contexts can make it more difficult 
for TBPAs to exercise their presumed potential to 'build bridges across boundaries' 
should not divert attention from the fact that troubled relations at the micro level of 
TBPA co-operation can also be an important inhibiting factor. Experience with TBPAs in 
the European Union illustrate that transboundary co-operation at the parks level often 
functions within its own constraints. As a highly regionalised political entity 
characterised by generally amicable inter-state relations, Europe can be said to provide an 
ideal regional context in which to set up TBPAs. Feeding into a favourable environment, 
the peace-building effects of TBPAs could in theory therefore be used to an optimum in 
this region. However, experience with TBPAs in Europe indicates that even in relatively 
favourable political circumstances TBPAs may generate significant conflict and tensions. 
Stein, the co-ordinator of EUROPARC, a European NGO stimulating and supporting the 
expansion of the TBPA concept in Europe, identifies a "lack of respect for other cultures 
and cultural misunderstandings" as a key obstacle to effective and successful 
transboundary environmental co-operation in Europe (Stein, Interview, 2002; see also 
Stein, 2002: 18). 
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Fall's research (2003a, 2003b) on TBPAs in Europe confirms this notion. Fall assesses 
co-operation in five European TBPA initiatives, notably the Polish-Slovakian Tatry/Tatra 
Biosphere Reserve, the Czech-Polish Krkonose/Karkonosze Biosphere Reserve (both 
established), and the designated Romanian/Ukraine Danube Delta Biosphere Reserve, the 
Polish/Slovakian[Ukrainian East Carpathians Biosphere Reserve and the German/French 
Pfdlzerwald/Vosges du Nord Biosphere Reserve. Frequently, clashing cultural 
perceptions and differing national priorities hamper these TBPA initiatives. Fall 
illustrates, how different cultural perceptions and prioritisations, for example, can easily 
obstruct both the joint mapping of the reserve in question and the creation of a coherent 
management unit; the two most crucial stages in land planning in a transboundary context 
(2003b: 96). Two out of five TBPAs never managed to reach agreement on joint 
mapping, including the German-French Pfdlzerwald/Vosges du Nord Biosphere Reserve, 
which while "originally designated on the basis of a common zonation, no longer shares 
one" due to "different understandings of zonation" (2003b: 97). Illustrating the 
differences in outlook the German park manager notes how "In France, they also want to 
protect all cultural heritage in core areas, 'so in their core areas you may find such castles- 
but this is impossible in Germany" (quoted in Fall, 2003b: 97). The creation of a coherent 
management unit is even more complex due to administrative problems such as differing 
legislative networks and conceptualisations of positions of authority between countries. 
Inter-agency co-operation within a given country may also pose problems, where the 
organisations involved pursue competing policies (p. 99). In spite of these complexities, 
common management of TBPAs is often encouraged without much further thought being 
given to these complexities and possible solutions. 
The findings outlined above indicate grave limitations to the core predictions of the Peace 
Parks concept. This includes the expectation that TBPAs will not produce new or 
aggravate existing conflicts. Three problematic political issues stand out, which are 
mutually interlinked. Firstly, in a context of regional tensions, co-operation in TBPAs can 
easily become affected by these tensions and further add to them. This risk seems 
especially great in post-conflict regions with an ongoing high conflict potential. 
Secondly, and as a direct consequence, the presupposed 'bottom-up effect' through which 
the assumed positive political outcomes of co-operation in TBPAs would foster better 
international relations and peace often does not come about. Finally, co-operation at the 
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micro level is often a higWy complex process as a result of different outlooks on co- 
operation and clashing interests. 
Having reviewed the experience with TBPAs in regions besides Southern Africa, 
questions arise regarding the extent by which the observed political patterns might also 
apply to the Southern African Peace Parks plan, and as such would need to be actively 
considered as part of the research focus. To facilitate this analysis, it is useful to briefly 
consider some key political characteristics of the Southern African region that are likely 
to interact with the political performance of its TBPAs. This will also help us understand 
the findings of academic research on TBPA performance in Southern Africa. 
1.8 The political context of TBPAs in Southern Africa 
Considering Southern Africa's political context, and the nature of the setup of TBPAs in 
Southern Africa, it seems likely that, rather than only delivering positive political results 
in line with the PPC, the Southern African Peace Parks plan will be confronted with one 
or more of the constraints identified in the TBPAs discussed above. In spite of the return 
of peace to the region and the regional co-operation South Africa and its neighbours 
pursue in the Southern African Development Community (SADC), Southern Africa 
remains a region with a relatively high conflict potential (Van Nieuwkerk, 2000). The 
considerable power inequalities between South Africa, as the region's dominating 
economic and military force, constitute a source of tension (Od6n, 1998) while low 
democratisation levels in the region often promote political instability. In states with a 
relatively high number of white settlers, limited access to land for the black majority is 
also a source of potential conflict (Bradshaw and Ndegwa, 2000). Moreover, 
conservation constitutes a highly contested practice in the region, as a result of the 
relative shortage of land. Finally, the varied and relatively high number of organisations 
and actors all forward different local, national, regional and international interests and 
often employ very different notions and worldviews of development which hamper the 
presupposed 'peaceful-co-existence' within TBPAs (Fakir, 2003: 3). Transboundary 
conservation in Southern Africa therefore takes place in a relatively difficult context and 
it seems likely that TBPAs might both be affected by, and produce, bi-lateral and regional 
conflict. 
However, TBPAs will have dynamics of their own and predetermined views on their 
political performance need to be avoided. The Kgalagadi Park seems to have had positive 
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political effectS27, strengthening ties between South Africa and Botswana, thereby living 
up to its expectation as a Peace Park. The apparent success of the Kgalagadi Park and its 
swift establishment is often used by proponents of Peace Parks in Southern Africa to 
justify the creation of Peace Parks in the region in general. However, this conclusion is 
problematic. Firstly, while the Kgalagadi seems so far to have been successful in 
fostering better international relations, the application of CBNRM strategies, a vital 
component of Peace Parks in the Southern African context, has been highly problematic 
with increasing conflict between the indigenous Bushmen and South African park 
authorities (Interview, Grossman, 2003). This phenomenon furthermore is not limited to 
the Kgalagadi Park, but is a general feature of Southern Africa's Peace Park plan. 
Secondly, the Kgalagadi Park has been established in uniquely favourable circumstances. 
Unhindered by great disparities in wealth or foreign policy outlooks, ties between South 
Africa and Botswana are, on the whole, very cordial and there is a record of intensive co- 
operation. Thirdly, co-operation between park authorities in the Kalahari goes back 
several decades and a transfrontier park was already de facto in existence. These 
facilitating factors are largely absent in Southern Africa's other five designated Peace 
Parks, which'are in various stages of development. 28 Consequently, these are endowed 
with considerable conflict potential. 
1.9 Academic findings on Southern Africa's Peace Parks plan: The 
sceptical view'9 
In studying the political aspects of Southern Africa's Peace Parks plan, most academic 
research has thus far concentrated on the problems surrounding the implementation of 
CBNRM policies, and the underlying causes of these problems, usually drawing upon the 
27 Perhaps due to the strong focus on CBNRM policy implementation within academic studies on the 
Southern African Peace Parks Plan (see next section), the effects of the creation of the Kgalagadi Park 
upon the quality of Botswana-South African relations has been seldom studied. My interviews with key 
actors in this process, including Modishe (2002) and Jones (2002) confirm however claims by 
proponents of Peace Parks that the Kgalagadi plays a positive role in promoting good relations between 
Botswana and South Africa. After initially tough negotiations over the redistribution of tourism income 
(Van Amerom, 2002), consensus was soon reached and the TBPA agreement acted out, in the process 
of which relations between the actors involved seemed to have strengthened (Modishe, Interview, 
2002). 
28 Section 2.10 in the next chapter provides additional details. 
29 It is beyond the scope of this chapter to present a comprehensive overview of emerging conflicts in 
the Southern African Peace Parks plan. The remainder of the thesis will explore this issue in more 
depth. For now, this chapter will list some of the main findings and discuss the way and extent in which 
these have been researched. 
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Great Limpopo Park, the second-to-be Peace Park, as a case-study. Although recognised 
as important, the interaction between TBPAs and regional politics has remained relatively 
understudied. 
Studies of TBPAs in Southern Africa have so far particularly concentrated upon the fate 
of local communities within Peace Parks, highlighting the following issues: 
e The procedures for community consultation and participation in TBPAs are often 
mere window dressing (Katerere et al, 2001; Mayoral-Philips, 2001; Steenkamp 
and Grossman, 2001; Draper and Wels, 2002; Hughes, 2002) 
* TBNRM tends to be a top-down process in which more powerful interests such as 
the state, international NGOs and the private sector tend to dominate 
(Ramutsindela and Tsheola, 2000; Katerere et al. 2001: 55; Hughes, 2002; Singh 
and Van Houturn, 2002) 
* Lack of democratisation and mismanagement at a local level frustrate CBNRM 
Sustainable funding for Peace Parks is lacking whilst advocates of Peace Parks 
are falsely presenting tourism as a 'panacea' for local development JUCN, 2002), 
using unsubstantiated and overly optimistic estimates of tourism income (Katerere 
et al. 2001; Spenceley, 2002) 
* Communities, especially those living in borderlands destined for Peace Parks with 
no formal title to their land may actually suffer from TBNRM through loss of 
access to land or even direct loss of their land (Steenkamp, 2002; 111JCN, 2002; 
Refugee Research Project, 2002). 
As a result, TBNRM has been increasingly criticised as a movement that "represents a 
resurgence of the protectionist expansionism of the conservationists that to some extent 
had been curbed by the new discourse around community-based conservation and 
political realities in post colonial Africa" (Katerere et al., 2001: 60). 
While the impact of global actors and the South African white establishment on TBPAs 
has been an important research focus within the framework of academic studies on 
Southern Africa's Peace Parks, the ways in which TBPAs affect and are implicated by 
inter-governmental relations in the region have been relatively neglected. 
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In explaining the difficult conditions under which CBNRM programmes in Southern 
Africa operate, the disproportionate influence of a powerful alliance between global and 
white South African actors (Draper and Wels, 2002; Singh and Van Houtum, 2002; 
Mischer et al, forthcoming) within Southern Africa's Peace Parks has been well 
established. The South African based Peace Parks Foundation (PPF), a private-sector 
initiative, is often not only seen to mediate the interests of the global conservation 
establishment (Singh and Van Houturn, 2002; Buscher et al., forthcoming), but has also 
been identified as promoting, often covertly, white South African and Western business 
interests, using privatisation as a means to secure access to valuable land and tourism 
prospects (Ramutsindela and Tsheola, 2000; Draper and Wels, 2002; Hughes, 2002). 
Based upon an article by Ellis (1994) and later Koch et al. (1998) another popular theme 
running through the academic research on TBPAs continues to be the notion that the 
Southern African Peace Parks plan may serve the political interests of white interest 
groups, especially conservative Afrikaners, seeking to secretly secure a future homeland 
(Ramutsindela and Tsheola, 2000; Draper and Wels, 2002) in easily defended borderland 
areas. The former membership of the PPF's chairman, Anton Rupert, of the secret 
Afrikaner Broederbond movement as well as the employment of former colonial or 
apartheid officers as game wardens are seen as problematic within this context 
(Ramutsindela and Tsheola, 2000: 204-206). Whereas in the initial stages a reasonable 
preposition, this scenario now seems increasingly unlikely, due to mentality changes 
amongst conservative Afrikaner game wardens, many of whom have been laid off to 
make room for black personnel (Ellis, Interview, 2001; Koch, Interview, 2001). What is 
more, these concerns sometimes detract attention from the important role of regional 
politics in TBPAs, and vice versa. Many of the studies that suggest that TBPAs represent 
a "continuation of the colonial struggle for control of territory and land resources" tend to 
downplay the impact of African governments in the process, which are seen as either 
powerless puppets (Ramutsindela and Tsheola, 2000) or as mere agents of powerful 
colonising forces (Van Houtum and Singh, 2002). It is perhaps for this reason that the 
interface between TBPAs and regional politics has remained relatively understudied, in 
spite of the importance of this factor upon the functioning of TBPAs. 
The interaction between regional politics and TBPAs has received attention in several 
studies. However, these works merely highlight patches within a larger sea of challenges 
related to interstate co-operation within Peace Parks. Researched areas include the 
relation between Peace Parks and sovereignty (Duffy, 1999; Singh, 1999; Van Amerom, 
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2002) and the implication of power inequalities between South Africa and its partner 
countries (Sotho and Muthali, 2001). Linked to this, it has been argued that Peace Parks 
seem to aggravate existing tensions related to South Africa's perceived Big Brother role 
in the region. Fakir (2000) furthermore indicates that the strategic and economic 
importance for states and other groups of the borderlands in which TFCAs are inserted, 
raise a whole number of additional political issues, related to border security, competition 
over valuable minerals and access to land. 
1.10 Emerging research needs 
To obtain more of an insight into the social and political realities in which Peace Parks in 
Southern Africa both operate, and by which they are influenced, it is imperative to 
connect the functioning of Peace Parks to the wider geo-political context. There is 
particularly a need to consider how wider political processes at the bi-lateral and 
regional level are influencing the social processes in Peace Parks and vice versa. At the 
same time, bi-lateral co-operation at the grassroots level, such as between park authorities 
and civil servants, will also influence the quality of regional co-operation. The Peace 
Parks concept predicts that the social outcomes of grassroots TBPA co-operation are 
highly positive and will have a spread effect to regional relations through a 'bottom-up' 
process. For some TBPAs this seems, indeed, to apply. Therefore, the interface between 
wider regional politics and TBPA construction is far from linear. A two-way approach is 
therefore proposed, whereby constraints and incentives at both the inter-governmental 
and grassroots level are actively considered in relation to one another, as displayed in 
Figure 1.3. 
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Figure 1.3 Research focus of the thesis 
This analysis is guided by the following research questions: 
e To what extent is the fulfilment of the policy goals of TBPAs facilitated or 
hampered by economic and political processes at higher political levels and the 
interests deriving from these with regard to the spatial organisation and usage of 
land in borderlands? 
9 What are the tensions between environmental and political goals of African states 
in their borderlands? How are these resulting policy objectives influenced and 
mediated by the involvement of non-state actors in the process, including NGOs 
and local communities? 
* What are the goals and interests of the various stakeholders in transboundary 
conservation and how are these mediated? 
9 To what extent and under what circumstances do the social processes involved in 
the creation and management of TBPAs stimulate amicable bi-lateral. relations, 
thereby furthering regional stability and peace? 
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To illuminate these research questions, a combination of literature research, semi and 
unstructured interviews, participation in governmental workshops and discourse analysis 
have been undertaken. The methodology structuring the research is outlined in more 
depth in Chapter 4. 
Aims 
In addition to the direct objectives of the thesis, as surnmarised in the above-described 
research questions, this thesis has a number of broader aims and goals. 
A) TBPA related goals 
Contribute to knowledge of the peace-building potential of TBPAs 
By offering more insight into the conflict potential inherent in TBPAs and the underlying 
causes for this, the research aims to provide more insight into the extent to which TBPAs 
can work as vehicles for peace and the circumstances under which this function can be 
achieved. This may appear paradoxical. However, policies and adaptive management 
strategies to eliminate these constraints and optimise the peace building potential of 
TBPAs can only be developed if political constraints are known and accounted for. The 
need for a more balanced outlook on TBPAs through more critical, academic research on 
the actual political functioning of Peace Parks, as a means to avoid unnecessary or 
counter-productive establishment of TBPAs, has also been increasingly emphasised by 
'first hour' advocates of the PPC (Hanks, 2002: 32). A list of policy recommendations in 
the thesis's conclusion will be an important step towards this goal. 
Add to policy insights on TBPAs 
By contributing to more knowledge on the regional political working of TBPAs and how 
this is affected by various economic and political phenomena, as a relatively understudied 
aspect of TBPA creation in Southern Africa, the research aims to add to the existing and 
growing database on TBPAs in Southern Africa. 30 Furthermore, by providing insight into 
policy solutions that could or have been provided in the Southern African context, this 
case study of TBPAs in Southern Africa will also prove informative for people working 
in existing TBPAs. Finally, knowledge of the problems and opportunities of TBPAs in 
30 See for a good overview the TBPAs Research Group, 2004 
(http: //hdgc. epp. cmu. edu/misa/TBPA. htm). 
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Southern Africa will provide an insight in the suitability of TBPAs in different 
geographical and social settings, rather than incorrectly assuming that the concept can be 
used for any purpose and in any given context (see also Petermann and Braack, 2002) 
Facilitate insights on Peace Parks as development tools 
The view that Peace Parks can function as mechanisms of development has been rather 
uncritically taken on board by development agencies. A good example is that Peace Parks 
now officially qualify for development aid by means of national lottery donations in the 
Netherlands, one of the biggest sponsors of Peace Parks in Southern Africa. However, 
more information is needed as to what Peace Parks can and cannot do - the efficiency of 
aid to Peace Parks must be examined. The notion that Peace Parks will alleviate poverty 
can be selectively used by conservationists as a means to generate funding, after which 
the funding will be used for the most part for conservation aims rather than for direct 
assistance to local communities as might be the assumption of the constituency of the 
development agencies supporting Peace Parks. 
Wider scientific goals 
Peace Parks operate at a wide range of geographical scales and involve many different 
policy aspects. Consequently, this study will also make a contribution to the following 
wider areas: 
0 Globalisation 
In providing an insight into the activities and impact of international NGOs and agencies 
upon TBPAs in Southern Africa, this study can contribute to our understanding of how 
the natural environment is implicated in and affected by globalising processes and how 
environmental issues affect globalisation debates. 
* Regionalisation 
Case-studies of TBPAs, as a transboundary phenomenon par excellence, can highlight the 
ways in which political events at the national scale may be affected by spill-over effects 
and, more generally increased interconnectedness between countries. As such, this study 
can contribute to a more holistic outlook on African politics, given that national political 
events in Africa are often a product of wider regional developments, but often continue to 
be studied in isolation of their wider regional context (Mamdani, 2001: xii-xiii32). 
Conversely, this study can provide more insight into the ways in which the political 
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considerations of a given country may affect processes of regionalisation, as well as the 
feasibility of TBPAs as instruments for regionalisation. 
9 Borderland studies 
This research can increase understanding of the ways in which TBPAs can foster or 
discourage social and economic contacts and integration at a borderland level. TBPAs are 
often advocated in Southern Africa on the grounds that they promote better relations at 
the borderland level, both between local communities and nation-states (Moyo, 1996; 
Hanks, 2001). However, this claim has been relatively little researched, in spite of the 
increased attention given to the role of environmental co-operation upon cross-border 
relations within the growing volume of borderland studies (Hocknell, 2001). 
1.11 Thesis outline 
The thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2, entitled The emergence of the Peace Parks 
Concept in Southern Africa, explores the historical and social context of Peace Parks. 
Linked to this, it indicates how the justification for Peace Parks in Southern Africa is 
closely interwoven with their capacity to deliver socio-economic development as well as 
a means to further transboundary political and economic co-operation and integration. 
Chapter 3, entitled Conceptual Framework, outlines the theoretical framework of the 
thesis. It provides a critical analysis of the two key elements that together comprise 
TBNRM: sustainable development and transboundary co-operation. By means of an 
engagement with political ecology and literature on the operation of borders and 
transboundary politics it highlights internal inconsistencies in both the notions of 
sustainable development and transboundary politics. Chapter 4, Methodology, provides 
an overview of the methodological considerations and strategies underlying the thesis. It 
describes fieldwork activities in detail whilst also discussing data analysis strategies. 
The subsequent three chapters list the main empirical findings of the research. Chapter 
5, Peace Parks and Development, highlights the political nature of TBNRM as a 
development project, through a critical analysis of Community Based Natural Resource 
Management policies within Peace Parks. It demonstrates how in practice conservation 
and development interests collide or conflict, and how the spatial requirements of Peace 
Parks, including the dropping of boundary fences and harmonisation of land use 
introduce new areas for land-use competition. Having looked into the sustainable 
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development component of Peace Parks, Chapter 6 -Peace Parks and Border Politics- 
looks at the political complexities raised by the changes that Peace Parks aim to introduce 
in the existing operation of boundaries. It discusses how the removal of border fences by 
means of Peace Parks often induces conflict as a result of vested interests in the existing 
location and operation of national boundaries, on the side of states and other stakeholders 
in Southern Africa's borderlands. Chapter 7, Pride and Prejudice: Nationalism and 
Cultural Differences in Peace Parks, takes us to the micro level of the institutional 
settings in Peace Parks. It indicates that organisational and personal self-interest often 
interferes with the official goals of Peace Parks. The main findings of the thesis as a 
whole are summarised in Chapter 8, General Conclusions. Future areas for research are 
identified alongside some practical recommendations for policy making in Peace Parks. 
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2. The Emergence of the Peace Parks Concept in Southern 
Africa 
2.1 Introduction 
As was made clear in chapter one, a key notion underlying the Peace Parks Concept 
(PPQ is that Transboundary Protected Areas (TBPAs) can foster peace and political 
stability by promoting environmental co-operation across boundaries. The expected 
contribution that transboundary conservation can make towards peace is therefore an 
important element in the promotion and justification of Peace Parks anywhere in the 
world. The precise ways in which the notion of Peace Parks are further conceptualised 
and operationalised into policy design will be guided by local factors, including the 
national and regional policy objectives of the countries involved in a given Peace Park 
initiative, geographical -environmental circumstances, prevalent attitudes towards 
conservation and available finances. 
This chapter provides an overview of the various contexts in which the Peace Parks 
concept has evolved in Southern Africa. This will allow us to disentangle and recognise 
the various interests, discourses and perspectives that have become tied up with the 
concept of Peace Parks in Southern Africa over time. This in turn provides a useful 
background from which the political functioning of Peace Parks as outlined in later 
chapters can be understood and analysed. The chapter is divided into two main parts. The 
first part offers a historical overview, discussing the evolution of conservation in 
Southern Africa, and important political developments shaping the prospects for 
transboundary conservation in the region up to the end of apartheid in 1994. This 
knowledge enables us to understand and appreciate how the concept of TBPAs became 
moulded into that of Peace Parks in the post-apartheid era and the related consequences 
for policy design. This topic is explored in the second half of the chapter. 
Reflecting new policy priorities in Southern Africa, transboundary conservation 
initiatives, previously nearly solely informed by conservation objectives, became linked 
in the post-apartheid period to a quest for socio-economic development and pan 
Africanist discourses promoting free cross-border traffic within Southern Africa. This 
shift ensured that Peace Parks could become a post-apartheid policy item, in spite of an 
initial unpopularity of conservation in the new South Africa due to its colonial 
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associations. Contemporary global discourses also influenced the policy design of Peace 
Parks, mainly through the involvement of foreign donors. However, whilst the linkage of 
transboundary conservation with development and regional integration objectives was 
instrumental in the acquisition of political support for Peace Parks, it has also increased 
the number and types of expectations that Peace Parks need to fulfil. This is problematic 
as both sustainable development and transboundary co-operation constitute highly 
complex policy areas. Before exploring this argument in more depth, it is worthwhile to 
briefly survey some key ecological and geographical characteristics of the Southern 
African environment and how these relate to the quest for transboundary conservation. 
2.2 TBPAs and the Southern African context 
Southern Africa's wilderness base has long constituted a prime area for conservation 
efforts, both at a regional and global level. Africa hosts some of the most species-rich 
areas in the world (Greennature, 2002). On a global scale, Southern Africa can be called 
particularly rich in biodiversity (biological diversity). South Africa alone contains almost 
ten percent of the world's bird, fish and plant species and over six percent of its mammal 
and reptile species (Collins, 2004). Furthermore, a large part of the Big Five' and other 
'charismatic' animal species such as giraffe and zebras, all unique to Africa, reside in 
Southern Africa. A wide variety of landscapes and climatic conditions (Resource Africa, 
2004) produce rich and diversified ecological spaces in the region. Southern Africa hosts 
deserts, savannas, forests, grasslands, mangrove swamps, wetlands, mountain ranges and 
marine habitats. 2 Southern Africa's natural assets attract millions of tourists each year. 
Ecotourism has become highly important for Southern African economies. Although 
tourism makes up a relatively small percentage of the GNP of most Southern African 
countries (see Table 2.1), it constitutes an important provision of employment (WTTC, 
1999), and foreign exchange earnings. Parks where the 'Big Five' reside are particularly 
popular as ecotourism destinations. South Africa's Kruger National Park is the most 
popular wildlife attraction, receiving over a million visitors a year (DEAT, 2004). 
1 The 'Big Five' is a colloquial term used to denote the African elephant, the rhino, buffalo, lion and 
cheetah. 
2 Many of which have been listed as World Heritage Sites, including the Victoria Falls 
(Zimbabwe/Zambia), the Okavango Delta (Botswana), St Lucia (South Africa), and the 
Maloti/Drakensberg mountain range (Lesotho/South Africa). 
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Table 2.1 Share of tourism in GNP, export earnings and employment rates of Southern 
African countries 
Anivals % of GNP % of exp, % in to 
in thousands of people (Tourism economy) earnings (touri employment 
economy) (tourism 
economy) 
2000 1999 2004 1999 2004 1999 2004 
(Source: WI (estimates (forecasts 
-, 2003) WTTO, WTTO, 
Country 2004) 2004) 
Botswana 1,104 12.0 9.7 7.9 9.2 10.1 6.4 
Lesotho 186* 4.9 6.4 5.7 7.1 5.8 13.6 
Mozambique n. a. 9.4 n. a. 7.1 n. a. 10.1 n. a. 
Namibia 560* 20.9 9.5 6.9 14.1 15.1 7.9 
South Africa 6,001 8.2 7.4 8.5 11.1 7.3 13.3 
Swaziland 284 8.8 6.5 6.4 3.4 8.4 14.6 
Zimbabwe 1,868 12.4 4.3 1.8 3.9 8.5 9.2 
* 1999 
Source: World Travel and Tourism Council (1999: 21). 
Africa's wild animals have become internationally known and cherished. International 
conservation agencies like the WWF, the African Wildlife Foundation (AFW) and Cl 
receive annually millions of US dollars in donations, mostly collected in the North, for 
the preservation of African animals such as rhinos and elephants. Compared to the 
Western world where due to fast industrialisation, urbanisation, large scale cultivation 
and hunting there are little uncultivated 'wilderness' areas left, Africa is still endowed 
with relatively 'unspoilt' tracts of land. As a result, it has come to represent a last 
'Garden of Eden' for many nature lovers in the West and is often perceived as something 
belonging to all humanity (Anderson and Grove, 1987). However, continued access to 
this Eden is far from secured. Rising population levels in Africa coupled with increased 
pressure for crop and herding land are alleged to induce land degradation and soil 
erosion, whilst also threatening the survival of Africa's wildlife by decreasing their 
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natural habitats through increased human encroachment and by poaching. 3 As a result, 
conservation of African wildlife is often presented as urgent and the safeguarding of even 
more land for conservation in the context of soaring population levels as a 'race against 
the clock' (Singh et al., 1998; Brown, 2003). Under the influence of globalisation, this 
"danger discourse" has become expanded from the single nation to a multi nation or 
global level (Singh and Van Houturn, 2002: 258) 
Today, over two million square kilometres in Africa are set aside as Protected Areas, 
representing seven percent of Africa's total land surface (US Geological Survey, 2004). 
This makes Africa the continent with the highest proportion of land allocated to Protected 
Areas. Furthermore, the percentage of land devoted to conservation is generally on the 
rise, including in Southern Africa (see Table 2.2). 
Table 2.2 Land reserved for Protected Areas in Southern Africa 1993/2003 
Country Total Land Area 
(1000 ha) 
Percentage of land 
reserved for PA 
1993 2003 
Botswana 39.076 17.2 18.5 
Lesotho 3,035 0.2 0.2 
Mozambique 80,159 4.5 8.4 
Namibia 82,429 12.6 13.6 
Swaziland 1,736 2.3 3.5 
South Africa 122,104 5.2 5.5 
Zimbabwe 39,076 7.2 12.1 
Source: Koch (1994: 11); World Resource Institute (2UU4). 
' Such neo-Malthusian viewpoints go centuries back and were for long accepted as self-evident, but are 
now increasingly questioned (Leach, 1996). 
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However, not all of these conservation areas are effective. Many of Africa's protected 
areas have failed in "protecting the biodiversity they encompassed at proclamation" 
(Hanks, 2002: 58). 4 Due to a lack of funds, civil wars, human encroachment, and 
commercial poaching in which sometimes government factions are actively involved 
(Gibson, 1999; Duffy, 2000) the state of many of Africa's protected areas is dire (Hanks, 
2002: 58) and some parks merely constitute 'paper parks'. The conservation insights that 
informed the first stage selection of conservation areas have also been increasingly 
questioned. Some protected areas are not necessarily located in areas that can make the 
greatest contribution to conserving species whilst others comprise areas "too small to 
contain populations large enough to sustain most species" (Hanks, 2002: 58). Linked to 
this, it has been increasingly argued in conservation circles that whilst the (increased) 
reservation of land for conservation is important, in order for conservation measures to be 
truly effective it is essential to link existing conservation reserves to create bigger areas. 
The creation of Transboundary Conservation Areas (TBCAs) is seen as a key instrument 
in reaching this objective, reflecting the growing popularity of bioregionalism in 
conservation circles. 
2.3 The ecological rationale for TBPAs 
The ecocentric bioregionalism discourse (Duffy, 2002b; Fall, 2003b) has its roots in 
conservation biology (Wolmer, 2003) and maintains that effective conservation requires 
the creation of large-scale conservation areas, big enough to incorporate a 'bioregion'. A 
bioregion encompasses a geographical area defined by natural boundaries such as a river 
or particular landmarks, which accommodates enough of the original evolutionary and 
ecological forces to constitute a particular ecosystem. 5 It is argued that where ecosystems 
are too shattered, the long term attrition of certain species will be hard to prevent, whilst 
the loss of a certain ecosystem element is likely to induce a ripple effect leading to the 
loss of yet another species (Braack, 2000: 5). To break this vicious chain, conservation 
attempts should, according to bioregionalist insights, no longer be aimed at the 
4 As will be explained in more depth later, it is for this reason that support has grown for more progressive 
conservation models aimed at benefiting local people. 
5 An ecosystem comprises in turn "a dynamic set of living organisms (plants, animals and micro organisms) 
all interacting among themselves and with the environment in which they live" (Canadian Forest Service, 
2003). What constitutes an ecosystem is however contested, as it lacks precise boundaries (Canadian Forest 
Service, 2003), making the delineation of a given bioregion problematic, a notion which is often little 
acknowledged by the conservationists supporting this view (Fall, 2003b). 
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preservation of a particular species, but at the ecosystem as a whole. To reach this 
objective the creation of bioregions across political boundaries is seen as essential 
In spite of their often relatively large size, few national parks in Africa are large enough 
to host an ecosystem, favouring link-ages with adjacent national parks over the borders, or 
other types of nature reserve (Braack 2002a). Another main rationale for transboundary 
conservation is that larger areas with no national boundaries could benefit the 
conservation of migratory animal species. This argument seems particularly valid for 
Africa, which has several mammals requiring large areas to accommodate their seasonal 
transmigratory movements (Hanks, 2001). The removal of national boundaries where 
these impede their movement could hence assist the conservation of these species (Hanks, 
200 1). 6 It is also believed that TBPAs would help reduce poaching, by harmonising the 
various national anti-poaching laws in the process of cross-border co-operation. Poaching 
control is an important concern in Africa, and especially so with regard to endangered 
animals like rhinos. Various ecological arguments have thus been presented in favour of 
the creation of TBPAs in Africa. 
Geographical circumstances facilitate the creation of TBPAs in Africa. Nearly one-third 
of all African boundaries contain a national park on one or both sides (Griffiths, 1995a: 
357) with nearly 40% of the continent's national parks being located on or adjacent to 
international boundaries. The potential for TBPAs particularly features in Southern 
Africa. In addition to National Parks and other officially proclaimed Protected Areas, 
Southern Africa hosts a wide range of nature reserves, which include hunting concession 
areas, privately owned game farms and increasing numbers of community-owned nature 
reserves and community areas for sustainable use. A fair proportion of these are located 
in borderlands. Very large TBPAs can be created in Southern Africa by linking protected 
areas across boundaries with other types of nature reserves (Griffin et al., 1999). 
However, whilst Africa's ecological and geographical circumstances represent enabling 
conditions for the creation of large-scale TBPAs, unfavourable political circumstances 
have long inhabited this process. Before exploring these political factors, it is first useful 
to consider the history of conservation in Southern Africa in more depth. 
6 On the other hand, "it does not follow that migration behaviour will automatically be aroused when the 
barriers are lifted" (Braack, 2002a: 14). See also section 8.5. 
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2.4. The history of conservation in Southern Africa: Tracing the roots of 
transboundary conservation 
Conservation in Africa is not a contemporary phenomenon, but has its roots in colonial 
times, when large numbers of wildlife vanished as a result of rifle hunting (Braack, 
2002a). The linkage with colonialism has shaped conservation ideologies and the image 
of conservation amongst native Africans in today's Southern Africa (Hughes, 2002). It 
was in Southern Africa, starting off with South Africa, where wildlife conservation 
policies were first initiated in Africa, in the I 9th century. 7 By that time wildlife 
conservation had become urgent. The introduction of large-scale hunting with rifles by 
white settlers, enabling for a greater number of wildlife kills per hunt with relatively little 
risks to the hunter, had greatly diminished wildlife numbers (MacKenzie, 1988; Braack, 
2002a). This "killing spree" (Koch, 1994: 3), left several species extinct, including the 
quagga (a zebra species) and blauwbok (blue antelope), and many others endangered. 
Whole herds of wildlife had also vanished due to Rinderpest, a viral veterinary disease, 
which arrived in Southern Africa in 1895 (Braack, 2002a: 11). In the meantime, the 
continued conversion of land into pastures for cattle ranching or for cropping diminished 
the space available for wildlife, although some animal species profited from these 
changing circumstances (Grossman et al. 1999: 29, quoted in Koch, 1994: 3). The fast 
diminishing numbers of wildlife and resulting limitations upon hunting became a growing 
concern and the plight of Africa's wildlife was internationally publicised. For example, a 
report by the Times of London states: 
It is necessary to go far into the interior to find the noblerforms of antelope, and still 
further if the hunter wants to pursue the elephant, the rhinoceros, or the giraffe. It is 
perfectly clear that very soon those animals, unless something is done to prevent their 
extermination, will be stamped out as completely as the dodo (Report in the Times of 
London, quoted in Bonner, 1993: 39-40). 8 
7 In the pre-colonial period there may also have been conservation efforts in Southern Africa. Shaka Zulu 
is, for example, alleged to have set up a royal game reserve in the Umfolozi district of Zululand in the 
1820s (Carruthers, 1995: 7), an assumption that is however questioned by Brooks (2000). On the whole, 
conservation efforts appear to have been highly exceptional or non-existent in pre-colonial times, perhaps 
because at this stage wildlife was still abundant. This overview of the history of conservation therefore 
starts with colonialism. 
8 Bonner does not give a date but research into the Times archives suggests that this statement would have 
been made around 1880. 
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Under mounting public pressure the first nature reserves were established in the late 19 Ih 
century. The most important ones include the South African Hluhluwe/Umfolozi 
Reserves (1897) and the Sabi Game reserve (Braack, 2002a: 11). The latter also served as 
the foundation of Africa's first National Park, the Kruger Park, established in 1926 
(Carruthers, 1995). The London Convention on the Preservation of Fauna and Flora in 
their Natural State, held in 1933, further stimulated the gazetting of National Parks or 
other forms of strict nature reserves (De Klemm & Shine, 1993, quoted in Braack, 
2002a). By the turn of the 20th century several National Parks had been proclaimed in 
Southern Africa, with countries further north soon following suit (Braack, 2000). Over 
time, the land set aside for wildlife conservation further increased. However, wildlife 
conservation in Africa occurred at great social cost. In the process of creating National 
Parks and other Protected Areas, colonial authorities and later Africa's newly 
independent governments banned indigenous hunting methods and evicted local 
inhabitants residing upon land now reserved for conservation, often without any 
compensation (MacKenzie, 1988). 9 
Significantly, interest soon grew in cross-border conservation. Conservation efforts in 
colonial times often took place in borderlands, where land tended to be less fertile and 
hence less in demand by farmers, including white commercial farmers, a relatively 
powerful interest group. The remnants of this historical pattern are still visible, with many 
protected areas being located in borderlands (see Figure 2.1). In direct consequence, the 
creation of transboundary conservation reserves was quickly considered. Inspired by the 
example of the creation of a nature reserve on the USA-Mexican border (Draper and 
Wels, 2002), the Portuguese ecologist Gomes de Soussa first raised the idea of a 
transboundary park in 1936.10 De Soussa advocated a linkage between the South African 
Kruger National Park with ad acent portions of land in Mozambique (Braack, 2000: 5), in i 
9 The Makuleke were forcefully removed from their villages in the Kruger National Park for example. 
Whilst the apartheid legislation in South Africa facilitated such removals from a legal perspective, the 
forced removal of communities from parks is part of a wider pattern in Africa, and occurred both under 
colonial administrations and independent black governments. Consequently, protected areas are often 
looked upon with hostility by the surrounding communities (Gibson, 1999). 
10 Belgium proclaimed the Albert Park between its then Ruanda-Urundi state and the Congo in 1925. Van 
der Linde et al. (2001) refer to this as Africa's first transboundary park. However, these two countries were 
claimed by and de facto ruled from Brussels. Since this research interprets a transboundary park as a park 
between two or more different countries it therefore does not recognise the Albert Park as the first TBPA 
initiative. 
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Figure 2.1 Protected areas in Affica 
Source: Based on Singh et al. (1998: 1). 
addition to other parks between Mozambique and its neighbours. " Meanwhile, in South 
Affica Jan Smuts established the Dongola Wildlife Sanctuary in the 1940s (Draper and 
Wels, 2002), with the intention of linking it with adjacent conservation areas in then 
Bechuanaland and Rhodesia to create a TBP (Marshall/Sapa, 2004). However, under 
pressure of a powerful lobby of white commercial farmers, the South Affican Nationalist 
Party government revoked the proclamation of the Dongola Reserve upon coming to 
power in 1948 (Carruthers, 1995), whilst also vetoing South African participation in de 
Soussa's envisaged transboundary park. Plans for cross-border parks had to be shelved 
until the arrival of more favourable political times. These surfaced only with the end of 
apartheid in South Aftica, more than 60 years later. Although wildlife conservation soon 
11 Subsequently, in 1973 an article was written by an academic named Clarke who proposed a linking of the 
GNP, Coutada 16 and KNP with St Lucia Game Reserve by way of the Lubombo Mountains, Maputo 
Elephant Reserve, Tembe Elephant Reserve and Ndumu and Mkuze Game Reserves (Anon., 2001). This 
plan may now be realised through today's plans for the Great Limpopo and the Lubombo SDI and the 
proposed eventual connection between the two. 
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became a key priority of the South African government (Carruthers, 1995), new political 
developments in the region would obstruct the formation of a border park between 
Mozambique and South Africa, as well as other potential TBPAs in South Africa's 
borderlands, for many years. The next section considers this issue in more depth, 
highlighting the troubled relations between South Africa and neighbouring countries 
during the apartheid years and resulting impediments to the creation of TBPAs. 
2.5 Where elephants fight it is the grass that suffers: Obstructions to 
transboundary conservation during the apartheid era 
The maintenance of racial segregation and apartheid in South Africa until 1994 12 against 
a backdrop of decolonisation in Southern Africa greatly complicated the formation of 
border parks between South Africa and neighbouring countries. This was because it 
initiated hostile relations between South Africa and its neighbours, resulting in armed 
violence and relatively closed boundaries, which in turn impeded options for cross-border 
co-operation and conservation. Ghana's political independence from Britain in 1957 
marked the beginning of a process of decolonisation for Africa. Southern Africa resisted 
this 'tide of history'. Relatively long after most African countries had become 
independent, white minority rule continued in most Southern African countries (see also 
Table 2.3). By the 1970s Angola and Mozambique were still ruled by Portugal. Today's 
Zimbabwe was still called Rhodesia and ruled by the white Smith regime. Furthermore, 
South Africa governed South West Africa 13 . South Africa therefore still found itself 
largely surrounded by like-minded white governments at this stage, forming a security 
shield between South Africa and newly independent African countries further north. On 
the other hand, and much against South Africa's wishes who had intended to incorporate 
these countries (Thompson, 1990: 214), Botswana, Swaziland and Lesotho had all 
obtained independence from Britain between 1966 and 1968. Lesotho and Swaziland 
were, however, too small to pose a military threat to South Africa, whilst sparsely 
populated Botswana opted for a foreign policy of neutrality. 
Although in theory an option, the creation of TBPAs was little a possibility in this period. 
Even though the status of South Africa's white neighbours had not yet changed, the seeds 
12 It is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss the South Africa's Apartheid policies. See Thompson 
(1990), Beinart (1994) and Ross (1999) for good overviews of this topic. 
13 Today's Nanfibia. 
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for independence were already sown, with black liberation movements waging guerrilla 
wars for independence in each country, often operating from the bush. As a result, the 
white minority governments did not control all areas of the country, and especially not 
conservation areas. Furthermore, within a relatively short time span all of these regimes 
were dismantled and replaced by the former guerrilla movements, which had a profound 
effect upon the nature of relations between South Africa and neighbouring countries. 
Table 2.3 Time frame of ending of colonial rule in Southern African states 
Country Year of Independence 
Angola 1975 (November) 
Botswana 1966 (September) 
Lesotho 1966 (October) 
Mozambique 1975(June) 
Namibia 1990 (March) 
Swaziland 1968 (September) 
Zimbabwe 1980 (April) 
By the 1980s all of South Africa's neighbouring countries were controlled by black 
governments, usually comprised of the former independence movements, with the 
exception of South-West Africa. This change profoundly affected South Africa's regional 
position. The remaining white South African government suddenly found itself 
surrounded by hostile black governments aiming to end its apartheid policies, which 
underpinned its power. Reflecting their ideological background, South Africa's 
neighbours actively supported the ANC and other South African resistance movements in 
their struggle for a democratically ruled South Africa. Furthermore, these new black 
majority governments adopted Marxist/Leninist doctrines, challenging South Africa's 
capitalist orientation and aspirations. These changes greatly affected South Africa's 
security position. ANC and PAC freedom fighters could now find refuge over South 
Africa's borders and were supplied with weapons from there. The overthrow of 
previously white minority regimes in adjacent countries also provided a significant 
morale boost to the struggle against apartheid inside South Africa (Price, 1991: 52). The 
stationing of Cuban troops in Mozambique and Angola, which had developed close ties 
with the ANC, seemed to increase the threat of a military attack (Price, 199 1). 
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Partially in response to the perceived militant threats from beyond its boundaries with 
radiating effects to resistance movements inside, Pretoria embraced a new regional policy 
of "cooptive domination". By "forcing its neighbours to recognise South Africa's 
hegemony in regional affairs" (Price, 1991: 93) South Africa sought to "neutralize the 
effects of the regional transformation" (Price, 1991: 93). 14 
Attempts by Pretoria to re-assert its regional economic hegemony have also been 
identified as an important motivation (Adedeji, 1996). 15 Price (199 1) identifies three main 
elements to South Africa's 'cooptive domination' policy, which is more generally 
referred to as 'Destablisation' (Dzimba, 1998) 
1) Direct military attack - military cross-border incursions by air and by land 
2) Destabilization - military and financial support to insurgence movements in 
neighbouring countries, particularly RENAMO in 
Mozambique 
3) Economic pressure 16 - border closures, withholding of goods and outstanding 
customs payments, strategic control of employment 
options inside South Africa (Price, 1991: 93) 
Table 2.4 lists the various ways in which Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique and 
Zimbabwe were each affected by the measures outlined above. South Africa was never 
attacked in response by neighbouring countries, although support continued to be given to 
the ANC, now often covertly. Instead, conflict tended to be concentrated in the 'Frontline 
14 According to Price (1991) the goal of South Africa's regional policies was not necessarily to get rid of 
neighbouring governments but to weaken them. A key objective was to force neighbouring states into 
signing treaties of nonaggression. In the 1980s several of these were signed, in 1982 for example with 
Swaziland and in 1984 with Mozambique. Pretoria also sought to establish diplomatic ties with 
neighbouring countries, not the least because such alignments could help undermine international 
sanctions. In Lesotho South Africa allegedly supported Major General Justin Lekhanya's successful coup 
against the then Prime Minister Chief Jonathan in 1986. Where Jonathan followed an anti-South African 
course and actively supported the ANC, culminating in a South African blockade of Lesotho's borders in 
1986, Lekhanya adopted a pro-South Africa stance. 
15 Southern Africa's neighbours and countries further north had combined efforts in the Southern African 
Development Co-ordination Conference, with the primary aim of reducing their economic dependence on 
South Africa, the region's main supplier of manufacturing and other goods, by establishing favourable 
trade regimes amongst themselves and by attracting foreign aid (Dzimba, 1998: 32). On the whole this 
objective failed. 
" Pretoria applied economic pressure on the basis of its dominant economy. Its access to the sea further 
added to South Africa's economic leverage over its land locked neighbours (Hodder et al., 1997). 
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States' through armed confrontations between government troops and South African 
supported or instigated rebel groups. South Africa's cross-border raids and the presence 
of insurgence movements in neighbouring countries had major security implications for 
Southern Africa's borderlands, affecting the room for manoeuvre for conservation. 
Table 2.4 South Africa's imposition of Regional Hegemony 
Country Military Attack Destabilization Economic Pressure 
Botswana Delayed Customs 
Union payments 17 
- Limitations to use of 
South African railway 
network 
Lesotho - Commando raid on ANC - Support for Lesotho - Border closure 198 1, 
houses 12/82 Liberation Army 1984,1986 (economic 
- Commando raid on ANC blockade) 
houses 12/85 - Delayed Customs 
Union payments 
- Cutting of electricity 
supplies 
- Limitations to se of 
South African railway 
network 
- Restriction of South 
African tourists 
Mozambique - Air strike against ANC houses - Support for RENAMO 
1979 - Restrictions on 
5/83 (reduced level of support migrant labour in 
after Nkomati treaty in 1984) South Africa, 
- reduced use of 
railroad and ports 
- Cutting of electricity 
supplies 
Swaziland - Reduction export 
opportunities to South 
Africa 
- Restriction of South 
African tourists 
17 The Southern African Customs Union (SACU) between South Africa, Lesotho, Swaziland, Botswana 
and later Namibia is administered by South Africa who therefore also distributes the revenue. 
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Zimbabwe - Commando raid on airfield 7/8 - Support for Super-ZAPU - Petrol cut off, rail 
- Commando raid 8/82 (1987-1988), support for delays 
- Commando raid 5/86 Zimbabwe Ndebele dissidents - Reduction export 
1979-81 opportunities 
- Restrictions on migra 
labour 
, Murce: adapted trom Price (1991: 93) and Dzimba, (1998: 36-37). 
Militarization often greatly affects wildlife and the management of protected areas 
(Dudley et al., 2002). The Southern African situation proved no exception to this rule. 
The armed conflicts beyond South Africa's borders often greatly affected nature reserves 
across South Africa's border, reducing the opportunities for cross-border conservation. 
The threat of violence made these areas highly unsafe, hindering the enforcement of 
conservation measures whilst poaching by increasingly hungry and destitute civilians 
increased. Armed violence also had collateral effects on wildlife when animals were 
killed or maimed by land mines, or accidentally shot during armed confrontations or 
burnt when armed factions set the bush on fire. Moreover, poaching became an important 
means of supporting and sustaining the armed conflict. To feed themselves soldiers and 
guerrilla fighters often lived off bush meat. In Mozambique, RENAMO started to 
undertake lucrative ivory and rhino hom poaching, to finance the acquisition of South 
African arms in Mozambique (Ellis, 1994; Potgieter, 1995). With the help of factions of 
the South African army, ivory and rhino horn was smuggled up to Nairobi, alongside 
arms and drugs, to be shipped to Asia. The demand for ivory from Mozambique was so 
great, that ivory and rhino horn poaching started to be carried out on a massive scale, in 
which also factions of the Mozambican army and Zimbabwean troops stationed between 
Beira and the border became involved (Koch, 1994: 17). As a result, in many places in 
Mozambique elephants and rhinos became extinct (Koch et al., 1998). Ivory and rhino 
horn poaching also constituted a main problem in Namibia, where the Southern African 
Defence Force supported by armed Namibian factions loyal to South Africa also engaged 
in it (Anon., 1997; Cock, 1998: 6). 
Although not directly drawn into the armed conflict and hence little harmed in terms of 
maintenance of their wildlife numbers and biodiversity, conservation areas on the South 
African side of the borders were also affected by the conflict in ways that inhibited 
transboundary conservation. South Africa had turned its boundaries into fortresses to 
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contain the armed conflict outside its boundaries and to reduce 'spill-over' effects in the 
fon'ns of crime and economic and political refugees. This was especially the case with the 
Mozambican border. Free cross-border traffic associated with TBPAs was therefore 
impossible. Moreover, although its wildlife conservation continued to be effective and 
successful in overall terms (Ellis, 1994), South African conservation areas were also 
affected by the confrontations between the South African Defence Force (SADF) and its 
enemies. To guard its borders and to prevent cross-border attacks from ANC bases over 
the border, certain land within national parks and other conservation areas in South 
Africa's borderlands was used by the South African Defence Force (SADF) for "testing 
weapons, training specialist military personnel, training private armies, and sometimes 
served as a springboard to destabilise neighbouring countries" (Anon., 1997). An illegal 
army base was, for example, set up in the National Kruger Park (Ellis, 1994) and arms 
were smuggled to Renamo in Mozambique. The absorption of national parks into 
political and military conflicts between South Africa and neighbouring countries 
therefore significantly curbed opportunities to engage in transboundary conservation, by 
negatively affecting conservation practices and/or the possibilities for cross-border 
interaction. 
This is not to say that no form of transboundary conservation anywhere along South 
Africa's lengthy borders was possible. Some important foundations were laid and further 
developed in the area of transboundary conservation, in areas with low levels or an 
absence of violence. However, where armed violence did not exercise great constraints 
on transboundary conservation, South Africa's 'pariah position' prevented the translation 
of transboundary conservation initiatives into reality. The level of armed conflict between 
South Africa and its neighbours differed considerably according to country, place and 
time. Whilst Mozambique was torn by its internal civil war fuelled by South Africa, in 
other places armed invasions and conflict occurred on a much smaller scale and not on a 
structural basis. Furthermore, in spite of the declared hostility by South Africa's 
neighbours, towards South Africa's apartheid regime, co-operation still occurred, out of 
economic self-interest or for fear of repercussions. For example, South Africa, Botswana, 
Lesotho and Swaziland co-operated in the Southern African Customs Union (SACU). 
This was especially the case since 1983 when Pretoria embarked on a policy of selective 
destabilisation and diplomacy, in which relatively moderate states such as Swaziland, 
Botswana and later Lesotho were offered economic incentives to encourage more co- 
48 
operation with South Africa (Dzimba, 1998: 39-40). Furthermore, informal 
transboundary conservation between game wardens from Botswana's Gemsbok Park and 
South Africa's Kalahari Park, which had started from 1910, continued virtually 
uninterrupted and was further built upon (Modishe, Interview, 2002). Furthermore, the 
plan for a cross-border park between Lesotho and South Africa (what is now the 
Maloti/Drakensberg project) was drawn up in this period between the South African Kwa 
Zulu Natal province and Lesotho (Sandwith, Interview, 2002). 
Still, even in places where circumstances were favourable enough to allow for 
transboundary conservation initiatives to take place, it was not until South Africa 
obtained black majority rule that the establishment of TBPAs became feasible. Relations 
between South Africa and its neighbouring countries remained strained and conflict 
ridden until a beginning was made with the demise of apartheid from 1990 onwards. 
Although the Gemsbok/Kalahari parks functioned as a de facto transboundary park with 
no border separating the two parks, it only became politically feasible for the Botswana 
government to formalise this co-operation as a Peace Park after the ending of apartheid 
(Modishe, Interview, 2002). In the case of the Maloti/Drakensberg Park with Lesotho, 
strained governmental relations were less of a problem; being virtually installed by South 
Africa the then Lesotho government was pro-South African in outlook. However, the 
necessary funding for the project was difficult to find, with foreign donors shying away 
from investing in South Africa as part of the UN sanctions whilst the two military coups 
in Lesotho' 8 and resulting political instability also delayed the process (Sandwith, 
Interview, 2002). In spite of the above-described political constraints, the interest in 
transboundary conservation remained alive throughout the region. This is also reflected in 
the fact that at the first meeting between Zimbabwe's President Mugabe and South 
Africa's Foreign Minister Botha in 1993, called to highlight a rapprochement between the 
two countries, the issue of transboundary cooperation around conservation issues across 
the Limpopo River featured prominently on the agenda (Koch, 1994: [chapter 2]: 1). 
Altogether, the apartheid era greatly delayed the development of TBPAs in Southern 
Africa. 
18 Having ousted Chief Jonathan (see also footnote 14) in 1986, Prime Minister Lekhanya was himself 
overthrown by Colonel Elias Tutsoane Ramaema in 199 1. 
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2.6 The twilight zone: Opportunities and constraints for Peace Parks in 
the post-apartheid era 
By the 1990s political patterns in Southern Africa had profoundly changed. With the 
release of ANC leader Nelson Mandela in 1989 a new political era in which apartheid 
would be formally abolished had come into sight. In this period of transition South 
African support to insurgence movements in other countries was stopped, which 
combined with the ending of the Cold War, brought peace to the once war-tom region. 
The civil war in Mozambique ended in 1992. In 1994 South Africa's first democratic 
elections were held and Mandela became South Africa's first black president. 
Furthermore, reflecting the fast improvement in their relations, South Africa and its 
neighbouring countries started to work towards the creation of a joint political and 
economic union, the SADC, based on its predecessor, the Southern African Development 
Co-ordination Conference (SADCC). These developments removed the previous 
obstacles to the establishment of TBPAs: armed violence, hostile international relations 
and the border cordon between South Africa and neighbouring countries. Anticipating 
these developments, conservationists and environmentalists picked up existing plans for 
transboundary parks in the early 1990s. At several levels discussions between 
Mozambique and South Africa were being opened on the possibilities for a Transfrontier 
Park. On 27 May 1990, Dr Anton Rupert, the President of WWF-South Africa met with 
Mozambique's President Joaquim Chissano to discuss the possibility of a transboundary 
park between "some of the protected areas in southern Mozambique and their adjacent 
counterparts in South Africa, Swaziland and Zimbabwe" (Peace Parks Foundation, 2004). 
The Mozambican Department of Forestry and Wildlife had also picked up de Soussa's 
idea and successfully co-opted the World Bank, which financed a feasibility study on the 
opportunities for transboundary conservation for Mozambique in 1994 (Grossman and 
Laforte, 1994; Munthali, Interview, 2001). In the meantime, negotiations were opened 
between South Africa and Botswana regarding the formalisation of the co-operation in 
the Gemsbok-Kalahari Park. The profile of the planned transboundary co-operation 
between Lesotho and South Africa in the Maloti/Drakensberg area was also raised 
including through the increased involvement of the IUCN. Initially tense relationships 
between the South African and Lesotho governments, seen by the first as 'traitors' due to 
their loyalty to the preceding apartheid regime, complicated this situation however 
(Anonymous Source Kwa-Zulu Natal Nature Conservation Board, Interview, 2002). 
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Whilst the political transition in South Africa removed the previous limitations to the 
creation of Peace Parks, new ones were soon looming. The adoption of Peace Parks as a 
policy objective in post-apartheid Southern Africa is not as obvious as it may appear in 
hindsight. Although the ongoing interest in transboundary conservation at several places 
in the region offered a starting-point from which to develop a regional plan for Peace 
Parks, these initiatives were for the most part limited to the local level and operated in a 
context of limited capacity and funding. There often was some level of local 
governmental support, and sometimes on one side of the border ministerial support. 
However, to create TBPAs governmental support at the highest levels was arguably 
needed on both sides of the border. Whilst the quest for regional integration between 
South Africa and its neighbours following the ending of apartheid in South Africa 
created an enabling context for Peace Parks several socio-econornic and political factors 
in the post-apartheid era hampered the prioritisation of conservation as a policy objective 
by national governments. To be able to understand this predicament it is useful to take a 
brief look at some key economic and political characteristics of post-apartheid Southern 
Africa. In discussing these constraints and their consequences for the prospects of 
transboundary conservation in the early 1990s the focus will be on South Africa, as the 
region's main power and eventually driving force behind Peace Parks. 
2.7 The post-apartheid legacy 
The return of peace to the region endowed Southern Africa with bright new prospects. 
However, Southern Africa was also faced with several problematic political and 
economic characteristics. The main ones are listed below. 
1. Widespread poverty 
Although relatively well endowed with valuable minerals like gold, platinum, uranium 
and diamonds, Southern Africa ranked amongst the world's poorest regions in 1994.19 
The costly regional conflict during the apartheid years combined with a highly unequal 
distribution of resources and a culture of mismanagement and corruption (see below) can 
be identified as important causes for this phenomenon. In the region's richest country, 
South Africa, an estimated 51 percent of inhabitants lived below the poverty line in 1995 
(UNDP, 2004). Today, about one-third of the SADC population is estimated to live in 
19 It continues to do so today (World Resources Institute, 2004). 
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abject poverty (UNDP, 2004). Although agriculture is the main economic activity, the 
region is not self-sufficient. 20 Furthermore, Southern Africa has suffered from high 
unemployment levels, including in the more prosperous countries such as Botswana and 
South Africa, a problem aggravated by the demobilisation of former combatants. Rising 
population levels largely cancelled out the economic growth the region experienced since 
the ending of conflict. 
Southern Africa was also faced with new or aggravated social ills, in the form of a sharp 
rise in violent crime, facilitated by the illegal proliferation of small arms in the region and 
uncovered previous war material, rising corruption levels and an HIV AIDS epidemic 
(Vines, 1998; Webb, 1998; Beinart, 2001); exacerbating existing poverty levels. 
2. Unequal distribution of resources 
An important underlying cause for the high levels of poverty is the highly uneven 
distribution of resources in Southern Africa. South Africa is a case in point with half of 
its population living on just 11 percent of the National Income (Cashdan, 2002: 160). 
Other Southern African societies display similar patterns of uneven development, with 
small elites leading luxury lifestyles, whilst the majority of the population lives in 
poverty. Mismanagement and corruption at both national and local levels have 
furthermore hampered efforts to reduce poverty. The uneven distribution of resources and 
wealth means that the assets held by relatively affluent groups and sectors in society are 
also demanded by the have-nots, a situation which constitutes a significant potential 
source for conflict. 
The issue of unequal distribution not only plays a role within countries, but also has 
regional dimensions. Within the region, there exists a great imbalance between the 
economic weight of South Africa, the region's "economic giant" (Dieter, 1999: 9), and 
that of neighbouring countries, even when the latter are aggregated. The total sum of the 
Gross National Products (GDPs) of Southern Africa's neighbouring countries represented 
21 only 14.4 percent of South Africa's GDP in 2000 . Towards the end of apartheid the 
regional political economy was structured in such a way that the sharing of benefits and 
20 As large-scale famines that hit the region in 1992,1994 and 2002 painftilly demonstrated. 
21 This estimate is based on data from the WRI, 2004 
(htti): Hearthtrends-wri. org/country -profiles/index. cfm? theme=5&rcode=4) 
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costs in the regional economy seemed highly unevenly distributed, in a way that strongly 
favoured the South African economy. 
Ex- South African President Mandela characterises this position as follows: 
The regional economy that emerged under colonialism entrenched the domination 
of one country (South Africa) and incorporated other countries in subsidiary and 
dependent roles as labour reserves, markets for South African commodities, 
suppliers of certain services (such as transport) or providers of cheap and 
convenient resources (like water, electricity and some raw materials). South 
Africa's visible exports to the rest of the region exceed imports by more thanfive to 
one. This is a reflection of not just the stronger productive base of the South A ican 
economy, but of barriers of various kinds that have kept goods produced in regional 
states out of the South African market (Mandela, 1993: 90, quoted in Dieter, 1999: 
10). 
3. Fierce competitionfor land, due to a relative shortage offann land 
The issue of unequal access to resources comes to the fore in the highly unequal 
distribution of farm land. These divisions can be traced to colonialism and apartheid 
when through forced removals and dispossession land that originally belonged to black 
farmers was seized and given to white settlers. In South Africa, eight million black South 
Africans were concentrated on just 13 percent of the land, with 86 percent belonging to 
60,000 commercial farmers . 
22 Land redistribution programmes set up by post-colonial 
governments, often operating on a "-vyilling seller-willing buyer" (Wongibe, 2002: 19) 
23 basis, have been slow to yield results. The ANC aimed to redistribute at least 30 percent 
of white-owned land within five years upon coming into office, however less than one 
percent had changed hands by the year 2000 (Cliffe, 2000: 279). Consequently, in 
22 Through the Black Land Act of 1913 and the 1936 Black Trust and Land Act, white South Africans 
increasingly gained control over the land, until in the Black Trust and Land Act of 1936 a mere 13 percent 
of land was allocated to black people, constituting 80 percent of the population. The political rights of 
blacks could only be exercised in these areas, and these areas were destined to become 'independent' from 
the rest of white South Africa in due course. 
23 Various reasons for this policy failure have been identified including bureaucratic incompetence, lack of 
political prioritisation (Lahiff, 2001), complexities surrounding the verification of land claims (Bohlin, 
2001), unwillingness on the side of white farmers to co-operate (Pheko, Interview, 2001) and more 
generally the continued political power and influence of the groups currently controlling these resources. 
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especially South Africa, Zimbabwe and Namibia, there exists extreme land shortages and 
tenure insecurity for the black rural population. Table 2.5 illustrates this issue, displaying 
the massive differences in land ownership between white and black land owners in each 
of these three countries. Although these 'post-settler states' all formally adhered to a 
policy of national reconciliation, resource-based tensions and land conflicts along racial 
lines could easily aggravate racial tensions between whites and blacks in these countries 
(Maclean, 2001). Issues of race and ethnicity were central features of struggles for 
independence and black majority rule and the acquisition of land is seen by the majority 
of the black population as a key priority. 24 
Table 2.5 Land inequality in former white settler colonies 
Country Land per capita among whites compared to land per 
capita among blacks 
Namibia 300 times 
South Africa 480 times 
Zimbabwe 146 times 
Source: Van Wyk (2000) 
Due to an overall high population growth, competition for arable land also prevails in 
other parts of the region, including in mountainous Swaziland and Lesotho and and 
Botswana, 80 percent of whose land surface is desert. Table 2.6 displays changes in 
population levels and agricultural land use per Southern African country. Whilst there is 
still a relative abundance of land in Mozambique, the settlement of fon-ner refugees in 
conservation areas poses a problem (Culverwell, Interview, 2001). As a whole, Southern 
Africa has become a region characterised by a relative shortage of farm land, a situation 
which marks for many places a sharp reversal of pre-colonial trends when land was 
abundant and the labour to work it scarce (Hall, 1987: 69). 
The course of history in Southern Africa and resulting economic and social problems, 
called for and did evoke radically new policy priorities in the region. Initially, these 
seemed detrimental to, if not to outright threaten, the prospect of conservation in 
Southern Africa and therefore transboundary conservation. However, by turning the 
24 The fact that the productive sector is predominantly also in white hands, is a main contributing factor to 
this phenomenon. 
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concept of Peace Parks into a discourse for development and promoting it as a vehicle for 
regional co-operation and integration, proponents of Peace Parks successfully managed to 
make Peace Parks a post-apartheid concern and even to ensure that more, not less, land 
was reserved for conservation. 
Table 2.6 Changes in population levels and agricultural land use per Southern African 
country 
Country Total 
land area 
(1000 
hectares) 
Population 
(in thousands 
people) 
Average 
annual 
population 
growth rat, 
Cropland 
1999 
(1000 
hectares) 
% arable and 
fixed cropland 
of total land an 
1998 
% of 
irrigated 
land 
1999 
1950 2002 
Botswana 58,000 389 1,564 346 2.9 343.0 0.3 
Lesotho 3,035 734 2,076 325 2.3 325.0 0.3 
Mozambique 80,159 6,198 18,986 3,350 2.4 2,950.0 3.2 
Namibia 82,429 511 1,819 820 2.6 816.0 0.9 
South Africa 122,104 13,683 44,203 15,712 0.3 15,360.0 8.6 
Swaziland 1,736 264 948 
- 
180 0.4 168.0 38.3 
Zimbabwe 1 39,076 2,744 3,07T 1 3,350 3.7 3,080.0 3.5 
Source: Van Wyk (2000) and WRI (2004). 
Confronted with the array of challenging and problematic social and economic realities 
that faced Southern Africa in the mid 1990s as outlined above, and in line with historical 
developments, important socio-economic and political priorities in South Africa and other 
countries were: 
e Promotion of socio-economic development to eradicate poverty 
9 Redistribution of land 
9 Black empowennent 
0 Regional co-operation and integration along pan Afficanist lines 
Within this new policy framework there seemed initially little room for transboundary 
conservation. Particularly in South Africa conservation was highly unpopular with the 
masses, it being associated with social exclusion, colonialism and apartheid (Cock and 
Koch, 1991). A majority of ANC supporters, mostly poor black landless citizens, wanted 
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National Park land to be redistributed for farming. Two ANC researchers proposed in this 
context to open up parts of the Kruger National Park for cattle grazing (The Star, March 5 
quoted in Koch, 1994: 29-30). Finally, government capacity and financial means were 
limited and in order to allocate more funds for the pursuit of development, governmental 
funding for conservation was soon cut dramatically. In the meantime protected areas were 
increasingly 'under siege' from land invasions and encroachment whilst also facing many 
land claims by historically evicted ethnic communities. For example, the Makuleke, 
evicted from their land in the Kruger National Park in 1969, launched a land claim in the 
north of the Kruger Park (Steenkamp, 2002). A high turn over of personnel in SANPs as 
a result of affirmative action, led to a loss of experienced staff (Hall-Martin, Interview, 
2001; Braack, 2002a). The best times for conservation in South Africa seemed to be over. 
However, towards the end of the 1990s South Africa had accepted plans for six Peace 
Parks with neighbouring countries, increasing the land set aside for conservation in the 
region. Furthermore, this plan was largely instigated by a white conservationist; Dr. 
Anton Rupert. How was this possible? 25 It is hard to pinpoint one main causal factor. 
Rather, five factors operating at various geographical scales and working together in a 
mutually reinforcing way account for the acceptance of the Peace Parks concept in 
Southern Africa. 
1) The rise of community-based conservation 
2) The linkage of TBPAs with socio-economic development in Southern Africa 
3) The envisioning of transboundary conservation as a means for regional integration on 
pan Africanist terms 
4) International donor support 
5) Effective marketing of the concept of Peace Parks in South Africa 
These factors and the interaction between them will now be discussed. 
25 This question does not imply that the acceptance of the Peace Parks concept was largely due to political 
factors, and not to the merit of the concept itself. However, the concept of Peace Parks had to compete with 
many other plans and concepts to secure a place in the new 'policy spaces' that were opening up and 
created in the transition period. 
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2.8. Enabling strategies for the rise of Peace Parks in the post-apartheid 
era 
1) Combining communities with markets: the rise of the community based conservation 
paradigm 
At the beginning of this chapter it was outlined how conservation in Southern Africa had 
its roots in colonial times and how it was characterised by evictions and by the exclusion 
of local people. The presence of people in nature reserves, other than game scouts, was 
considered detrimental to conservation and nature something to be protected from human 
influence. In the wake of local resistance, conservation areas were set up on the basis of a 
'fortress model'. Militant game ranchers sought to protect the area against local hunters 
who had in the process been disgraced as 'poachers'. By the 1980s this 'fortress' 
approach was increasingly replaced by a new paradigm, which stressed that conservation 
had to benefit local people in order to be sustainable and successful. This discourse is 
known under various names, including Community Based Conservation (CBC) and 
Community Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) (Hulme and Murphree, 2001), 
with the latter being slightly broader in outlook (Turner, 2004). 
Reflecting the important role of narratives and paradigms in shaping policy (Roe, 1994), 
CBC was put forward as the "answer to failing conservation strategies in Africa" 
(BUscher et al., 2004: 1). Over time, it had become increasingly visible that 
notwithstanding all militarised measures, nature reserves in Africa could not adequately 
be protected from poaching and other forms of local encroachment. Arguing from the 
premise that if local people would have a stake in the protection of wildlife poaching 
incentives would fall, CBC linked conservation to local development. Where local people 
were previously envisaged as 'poachers', now they were seen as indispensable allies in 
the protection of wildlife conservation (Gibson and Marks, 1995) and their 'indigenous 
knowledge' became more valued. Righting the wrongs of the past by assisting local 
communities with development was sometimes also an important driving force for the 
notion that local people should benefit economically from wildlife conservation. 
Integrated Conservation and Development Projects (ICDPs) became popular tools in 
striving for CBC. By the early 1990s an estimated 50 ICI)Ps could be found in 20 African 
countries (Alpert, 1996). Zimbabwe's Communal Areas Management for Indigenous 
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Resources (CAMPFIRE) initiative became particularly famous (Murombedzi, 1999; 
Duffy, 2000). 
Partially as a result of the linage between conservation and development, the rationale 
underlying CBC reflected contemporary trends in development thinking, including the 
importance of de-centralisation, the notion of sustainable development and neo-liberal 
market thinking. Hulme and Murphree (2001) identify the following three premises to 
CBC or the "new conservation" (Hulme and Murphree, 1999). 
A) Decentralisation 
Identifying ineffective and corrupt African states as a key factor accounting for the 
failures in conservation and development planning (see also sections 3.2.5 and 3.3.4. ), 
CBC initiators proposed that conservation should become more rooted at the local level, 
involving the active involvement of 'local communities' in "land-use policy and 
management decisions" (Hackle, 1999: 727). Moreover, to facilitate the generation of 
economic benefits support grew for the notion that local people should be given 
proprietorship or ownership over wildlife resources (Hackle, 1999: 727) through 
consultative or active participatory measures. As such, CBC became also conceptualised 
as an important means for community empowerment (Mohan and Stokke, 2000). 
B) Sustainable development 
The widespread popularity of the notion of sustainable development (see also section 
3.2.1. ) undermined preservationist views, which seek to centralise nature's needs over 
those of humans. CBC is informed by the notion that "both conservation and 
development goals are achieved at the same time... " (Hulme and Murphree, 1999: 
279). This shift was influenced by 'New Ecology' insights that "environments are 
inherently dynamic and not simply moving towards a 'climax' or equilibrium 
position... " (Hulme and Murphree, 1999: 279) as well as the realisation that much 
conservation thinking constituted 'environmental imperialism' with western 
conservation objectives superseding African development needs (Anderson and 
Grove, 1987; Hulme and Murphree, 2001: 13,17). The conceptualisation of 
conservation as a form of development was furthermore significantly influenced by 
66neo-liberal thinking about the role of markets" (Hulme and Murphree, 1999: 279). 
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Free market thinking constitutes the third pillar underlying CBC (Hulme and 
Murphree, 1999: 279). 
C) Free market thinking 
The free working of markets is seen as the most effective way to mobilise the 
economic potential of conservation and ensure the support of local people, and in 
doing so ensure biodiversity protection (Katerere, 2002). Under influence of 
economic neo-liberal ideas, 'use it or lose it' became the new premium in 
conservation. The benefits that conservation areas are envisaged to attract through 
ecotourism have become a particularly important component of this strategy. 
The rise of CBC endowed conservation with a different image: instead of a colonial 
instrument promoting wildlife protection at the expense of local people's needs, 
conservation was now presented as a tool for development. This new way of 
envisioning conservation became a central feature in the promotion of TBPAs. 
2) Integration of transboundary conservation objectives with new development priorities 
in Southern Africa 
In the IUCN's early promotion of Peace Parks (Thorsell, 1990; Hamilton, 1996) the 
contribution that TBPAs can make through ecotourism earnings to sustainable 
development is mentioned as one of the many beneficial side effects of TBPAs. 
Reflecting its developmental context, in the conceptualisation of Peace Parks in Southern 
Africa the development potential of Peace Parks took front seat. Proponents of Peace 
Parks stressed how TBPAs could become a mechanism for economic growth, by bringing 
in much needed foreign currency and jobs through increased ecotourism opportunities 
(Fakir, 2000; Hanks, 2001). By creating larger wildlife areas TBPAs would multiply the 
income and jobs associated with ecotourism, it was claimed. Larger wildlife areas with 
more attractions in them would allegedly attract millions of ecotourists from all over the 
world. TBPAs moreover represented a 'clean' or environmentally friendly form of 
economic growth, feeding into the SADC's concern with promoting environmentally 
sustainable development that which would not endanger a given country's natural 
resource base (SADC, 2004). Finally, TBPAs were expected to fulfil their role as 
vehicles for sustainable development in the areas where this matters the most: Southern 
Africa's borderlands, some of the region's poorest areas. Linkage of the TBPA concept 
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with Southern Africa's regional integration objectives further strengthened the leverage 
of the TBPA concept as a means for development, whilst also opening up new 
opportunities. 
3) Promotion of TBPAs as a vehicle for more open border policies 
A second major theme in the promotion of Peace Parks in Southern Africa was the 
potential of TBPAs to promote regional co-operation and integration through their 
boundary removing aspects. This argument that Peace Parks should pursue some form of 
regional co-operation and integration underlies their creation in most regions (Thorsell, 
1990a; Heams, 1997; ITTO/IUCN, 2003). Supporters of Peace Parks stressed how 
collaborative management between neighbouring countries in the field of conservation 
could promote SADC's regional integration objectives, by encouraging a harmonisation 
of national policies in this field. Furthermore, the removal of border fences and other 
border obstacles which TBPAs were alleged to facilitate would support SADC's ultimate 
objective: the creation of a free trade area within the region. TBPAs were thus presented 
and increasingly perceived as important instruments to economic regionalisation. 
Reflecting post-colonial realities in Southern Africa, the concept of Peace Parks also 
became linked in this region to the envisaged ability of Peace Parks to facilitate the 
"reunification of divided local communities" across boundaries (Hanks, 2002: 31). This 
enabled a conceptualisation of Peace Parks along pan-Africanist lines (Hughes, 2003). 
Supporters of Peace Parks stressed how TBPAs would "rejoin areas" where 
transboundary ethnic communities were "divided by political borders imposed by 
colonial powers". Peace Parks were also said to help "preserve and maintain indigenous 
traditions, cultures and knowledge as well as to allow for transboundary community 
based natural resource management", which was often claimed to originate in pre- 
colonial times (Singh and Van Houturn, 2002: 258). In Thabo Mbeki's African 
Renaissance discourse, which currently shapes pan-African cooperative efforts such as 
the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) (Nabudere, 2002; Van Amerom 
and BUscher, 2005), the discrepancy between the distribution of ethnic groups over the 
continent and the ways in which national boundaries often cut through these, are 
identified as a key underlying reason for conflict in Africa. The preservation of traditional 
African knowledge and cultures is another central theme of the African Renaissance 
discourse, which also officially infonns South Africa's co-operation with neighbouring 
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countries. As a result of this coinciding of objectives, Peace Parks were soon envisaged 
and presented as key instruments for the African Renaissance (Van Amerom and 
Bijscher, 2005). 
4) Donor supportfor TBNRM 
Partially as a result of their involvement with community based conservation programmes 
in the region, international donors were receptive to the notion of TBPAs (Wolmer, 
2003). TBPAs seemed to represent "a good opportunity to expand these programmes 
further, both in terms of actual scale and policy goals" (Biischer et al, 2004). In 1996, the 
Global Environment Facility (GEF), donated through the World Bank a5 million US$ 
grant to Mozambique to support a 'Transfrontier Conservation Area Pilot and 
Institutional Strengthening Project" for which the testing of 'new approaches to exploit 
the synergies between conservation and community development in very poor areas 
where income earning opportunities are limited' was a key motivation (World Bank, 
1996,14). A more critical view is that community based conservation programmes have 
had very mixed results (Hulme and Murphree, 2001) and that international development 
and conservation agencies simply needed a new paradigm for policy action and the 
acquisition of funding (Wolmer, 2004). Whatever the reasons, following the World Bank 
intervention the creation of TBPAs in Southern Africa soon gained the support of a wide 
range of powerful international donors including USAID, the Ford Foundation, GTZ and 
the WWF (Singh and Van Houtum, 2002: 258). The development assistance that can be 
obtained for Peace Parks is an important factor accounting, in turn, for the support of 
governments (Ramudsindela, 2004). 
5) Effective marketing of the concept by the Peace Parks Foundation 
Within the continent as a whole, South Africa has been characterised by a strong NGO 
sector in the area of conservation (Koch, 1994). The South African branch of the WWF 
had for long played a leading role in this international conservation organisation (Bonner, 
1993; Ellis, 1994), under the auspices of then chairman Anton Rupert and executive 
assistant John Hanks. This network proved a fertile basis from which to promote the 
concept of Peace Parks in Southern Africa. To support the creation of TBPAs in Southern 
Africa, Dr. Rupert founded the Peace Parks Foundation (PPF) in 1997, in co-operation 
with Nelson Mandela and Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands, former chairman of the 
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VVWF- Using the existing conservation contacts of Dr Rupert and John Hanks as a 
starting point, the PPF greatly raised the profile of Peace Parks internationally. The PPF 
successfully attracted major international donors, like the German Development Bank 
KfW (Kredietanstalt flir Wiederaufbau) and USAID for the sponsoring of Peace Parks 
(Hanks, 1997). Considerable donations were also secured from the international business 
community and from the considerable private capital of Anton Rupert, the owner of 
South Africa's biggest business consortium. Access to capital provided the PPF with 
considerable economic leverage, allowing it to purchase land for TBPAs (Hanks, 1997). 
The PPF furthermore played an important role in the establishment of Peace Parks by 
offering technical expertise to governments. 
The PPF set out to promote the creation of seven Peace Parks between South Africa and 
neighbouring countries, which were later reduced to six (as displayed in Figure 1.1). To 
facilitate essential political support for Peace Parks, Anton Rupert and other PPF staff 
directly approached the presidents of South Africa neighbouring countries, which are 
now all honorary patrons of the PPF (Rupert, Interview, 2002). 
Over time several new TBPAs have been dreamt up, all over Africa. The Open Africa 
Initiative, a tourism organisation closely linked to the Peace Parks Foundation, has so far 
come up with the boldest and most encompassing vision of adjacent transboundary 
conservation areas, envisaging a green belt along the African continent nearly linking 
'Cape Town with Cairo'. Figure 2.2 displays this vision for the Southern part of Africa. 
These and earlier plans of the Peace Parks Foundation have however been criticised as a 
form of neo-colonialism (Singh and Van Houtum, 2002). Problematically, many of the 
areas destined for Peace Parks contained populated areas and were displayed on maps 
without prior consultation with local populations in these areas (Duffy, 2002b; Draper 
and Wels, 2002). The next section explores the organisational set up of Southern Africa's 
Peace Parks and discusses the advance of Southern Africa's Peace Parks to date. 
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2.9 The Transboundary Natural Resource Management Discourse 
The operational is ation of the PPC in Southern Africa is informed by the Transboundary 
Natural Resource Management (TBNRM) discourse, a concept developed by the World 
Bank. TBNRM refers to "any process of co-operation across boundaries that facilitates or 
improves the management of natural resources (to the benefit of all parties in the area 
ZAfR F' 
Figure 2.2 Map of 'The Peace Parks Dream' 
Source: Singh and Van Houtum (2002: 260). 
concerned)" (World Bank, 1996). In theory therefore TBNRM explicitly stimulates a 
wide range of transboundary conservation initiatives that do not necessarily have to 
include a National Park and can be community-driven (Griffin et al, 1999; Van der Linde 
-et al., 2001; Fakir, 2002). A Transboundary Natural Resource Management Area 
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(TBNRMA) focuses, for example, on community based natural resource management 
across international boundaries and is largely initiated by these communities (Mayoral- 
Philips, 2002; Chengeta et al., 2003). However, no TBNRMA has been set up so far in 
Southern Africa. An important underlying reason may be that contrary to TBNRM 
rhetoric (see Van der Linde et al., 2001: 7) a tradition of natural resource management 
between local communities across boundaries in Southern Africa is in fact largely absent 
(Grossman, Interview, 2001). 
The TFCA model is informed by the land use models used in Biosphere planning models 
(UNESCO, 2003). These distinguish a core zone, which is entirely devoted to 
biodiversity conservation, various buffer zones, allowing for various types of land use 
that can be relatively easy combined with conservation goals, and transition areas (see 
Figure 2.3). Transition areas could be agricultural areas. Local communities living in or 
nearby could allegedly profit from their proximity to the park by engaging in profit- 
generating activities, for example through ecotourism projects. In exchange they would 
make their land available for game. In doing so, the total land available for wildlife 
greatly increases, which is seen to assist in conservation, whilst the increase in size may 
also mean the total conservation area could host an entire ecosystem, turning it into a 
bioregion. 
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Figure 2.3 The Biosphere model 
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In addition to government owned land in the form of national parks or other nature 
reserves and community-owned land, TFCAs can also encompass privately owned land. 
In Southern Africa this mostly encompasses the involvement of white commercial 
farmers whilst NGOs like the PPF have also started to buy land and use it for 
conservation. National boundaries may furthermore mark great differences in land use 
between countries. Consequently, TBPAs often resemble a 'mosaic of land use' (Hanks, 
2000). Figure 2.4 displays the different types of land ownership in a TFCA. Significantly, 
Peace Parks in Southern Africa were initially for the main part conceptualised as TFCAs, 
but over time the accent moved to TFPS26, reflecting a growing adherence to conservation 
goals over sustainable development. 
Communal Landholders National Park Private Landholders 
(community-based State Land (game ranches, 
conservation) 
(facilitates partnership) multi-species land use) 
May include collaboration between landholders within one country 
TBNRM collaboration 
between landholders and 
managers in two or more 
countries. 
May include collaboration between landholders within one country 
Communal Landholders National Park Private Landholders 
(community-based State Land (game ranches, 
conservation) (facilitates partnership) multi-species land use) 
Figure 2.4 Land ownership and land owning parties in TBNRM 
Source: Griffin et al. (1999: 2). 
In most cases, the treaty also specifies the implementing agencies on the ground, such as 
South African National Parks. Where provinces fulfil a highly important and rather 
independent role, the tasks of these and their relations to the other national state agencies 
26 The reasons for this shift are discussed in Chapter Five. 
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involved may be laid out in subsidiary agreements to the treaty. As a result of other 
aspects involved in TBPAs there is also involvement of other specialist governmental 
agencies, such as customs authorities. NGOs are usually assigned a specific task, but their 
involvement is based upon separate negotiations with the various government parties in 
question. Participating local, communities have merely a consultative status. The 
organisational model of the Great Limpopo Park, displayed in Figure 2.5, is 
representative of that for most TBPAs. 
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Figure 2.5 Organizational diagram of the Great Limpopo 
Source: Braack and Greyfing (2002: 46). 
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2.10 Current status of Peace Parks in Southern Africa 
So far, one Peace Park has been established in Southern Africa with another five Peace 
Parks at some stage in the planning process. No longer hindered by the political 
constraints of the apartheid era, Botswana and South Africa formalised the de facto 
Gemsbok/Kalahari Park into a TBPA, launching the Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park on 12 
May 2000. Situated in the southern part of the Kalahari Desert, this park constitutes the 
largest conservation area in the Southern hemisphere with an area of almost 38000 km2. 
The park is managed by a Transfrontier Management Comm ittee consisting of the 
SANPs Board and the Botswana Department of Wildlife and National Parks (Africom, 
2000). The Great Limpopo TBPA between South Africa, Mozambique and Zimbabwe is 
scheduled to be the next TBPA to be opened. On 4 October 2001 a beginning was made 
with the transfer of elephants from the South African Kruger Park into the Mozambican 
Coutada 16 Park whilst in April 2003 two openings were made in the border fence 
between South Africa and Mozambique to create a wildlife corridor. However, it will 
take at least five years before the Great Limpopo can be opened for tourists (Grossman, 
Interview, 2002). 27 The other four planned TBPAs between South Africa and its 
neighbours are in various stages of progress (see Table 2.7). 
2.11 Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated how in order to secure sufficient political support, the 
concept of Peace Parks in Southern Africa has become conceptualised in a holistic way, 
whereby it has become explicitly linked to regional socio-economic development and pan 
Africanist discourses. Peace Parks only gained ground in Southern Africa from the mid 
1990s onwards, after many delays and in spite of many potential obstacles. Whilst 
Southern Africa can be considered highly suitable for the creation of TBPAs on the basis 
of ecological and geographical factors, up to the end of apartheid in South Africa in 1994 
political strife and violence halted the creation of TBPAs. Although the improvement in 
regional relations between South Africa and neighbouring states from 1994 onwards 
created an enabling context for Peace Parks, changing policy priorities in post-apartheid 
Southern Africa seemed to initially pose new obstacles for the creation of Peace Parks. 
However, by turning Peace Parks into a development discourse and by presenting TBPAs 
as a mechanisms for open border policies proponents of Peace Parks successfully 
27 Mainly due to security issues posed by the connection of these parks. This phenomenon is explored in 
Chapter 6. 
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managed to place Peace Parks on the post-apartheid policy agenda. Partially in response 
to the context of widespread poverty and land pressure in which Peace Parks in Southern 
Africa are created, Peace Parks were promoted and justified on the basis that they can 
promote socio-economic development by attracting ecotourism to the region. 
Furthermore, Peace Parks have been presented as solutions to the hardships of 
transboundary ethnic groups shattered over two or more countries and as means of 
fostering economic integration by removing boundaries. 
Table 2.7 Stages of development per Peace Park 
Name Participating Progress to date TBP TFCA Status Level of 
Countries border progress 
Kgalagadi Park South Africa Officially opened open Established 
Botswana (12 May 2000) 
Great Limpopo South Africa Treaty signed Wildlife Advanced 
Transfrontier Park/ Zimbabwe (9 December 2002) corridor (SA-Moz) 
Area Mozambique SA-Moz Medium 
(SA-Zim) 
Maloti-Drakensberg South Africa Memorandum of closed Fairly 
Transfrontier Lesotho Understanding signed Advanced 
Conservation (11 June 200 1), 
and Development subsidiary agreement 
Area 
Ai/Ais-Richtersveld South Africa Treaty signed closed Fairly advan. 
Park Namibia (I August 2003) 
Limpopo-Shashe South Africa Draft Memorandum of closed Medium 
TFCA Botswana Understanding 
Zimbabwe under discussion 
Lubombo TBPA/SDI South Africa Trilateral closed Medium 
Mozambique Protocol signed 
Swaziland (22 June 2000) 
On basis of these two social premises Peace Parks have also become linked to the pan- 
Africanist African Renaissance discourse. Reflecting the new thinking in conservation 
and development, the development component of Peace Parks has been conceptualised by 
means of CBNRM discourses. Combining the international dimensions of Peace Parks 
with Community Based Natural Resource Management across boundaries, the TBNRM 
discourse has come to inform Peace Parks in Southern Africa. As a result of the multiple 
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objectives and promises surrounding Peace Parks in Southern Africa the expectations 
surrounding them are huge. 
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3. Conceptual Framework 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a conceptual map of the research topic. In order to theoretically 
analyse the political aspects of Peace Parks, the chapter critically assesses the two 
6policy pillars' of TBNRM: sustainable development and transboundary co-operation 
and the political aspects surrounding these policy areas. As indicated in Chapter 2, for 
Peace Parks to maintain essential political support and deliver their various policy aims 
the delivery of environmentally friendly socio-economic growth and more open border 
policies are prerequisites. In the TBNRM discourse both policy areas tend to be 
presented as being relatively straightforward and unproblematic. An important 
underlying reason for this stance is that both policy areas and the interests of the actors 
surrounding these are perceived as complementary and mutually reinforcing, creating a 
4win-win situation'. This conceptualisation is however simplistic. 
Mainstream approaches to sustainable development (henceforth: SD), of which 
TBNRM is a product, tend to obscure the political nature of SD, downplaying the 
tensions that exist between the simultaneous pursuit of conservation and development 
and the ways in which SD policies may reflect or reinforce wider power imbalances 
between participating actors and other macro political constraints. A more holistic 
outlook which actively incorporates the importance of power relations and politics upon 
environmental and developmental practice is hence required. Furthermore, as this thesis 
focuses on natural resource management in a transboundary context, the political 
working of boundaries and borderlands and the ways in which these may affect 
transboundary co-operation needs to constitute another main area of inquiry. 
This chapter sets about constructing a conceptual framework for the research topic in 
the following way. The next section will first take a closer look at mainstream 
approaches to SD, and the ways in which these conceptualise the operation of power 
and politics. Concluding that these offer a too limited outlook on politics and power, 
the following section seeks to add to these perspectives by engaging with the insights 
offered by the field of political ecology. Political ecology actively incorporates and 
researches the ways in which environmental issues are shaped by economic and 
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political power hierarchies, using actor-oriented and multiple scale analysis and critical 
discourse analysis. Further building upon this framework and extending it to the realm 
of boundaries and borderlands, the third section considers the political nature of 
boundaries and, partially related to this, important social and political patterns in 
African borderlands, and the possible implications of these for inter-state co-operation. 
Combining the insights generated on sustainable development and transboundary co- 
operation, the concluding section of the chapter summarises some important analytical 
vantage points regarding the operation of politics and power in TBPAs. 
3.2 Sustainable development 
3.2.1 The mainstream approach 
The TBNRM discourse is largely a product and reflection of mainstream approaches to 
SD. One of the most popular terms of our time, it is not easy to define SD and the 
concept remains a contested one (Lele, 1991; O'Connor, 1994; Mebratu, 1998; Adams, 
2001). This lack of agreement over the meaning of SD has both brought about and is 
reinforced by a variety of policy approaches. Moreover, many approaches employ 
similar concepts and catchphrases which often overlap (Redclift, 1987; Kirkby et al., 
1995). 
Within this continuum of approaches however, it is possible to distinguish a 
'mainstream' outlook on SD (Adams, 2001). 1 This perspective is often taken to be 
articulated through the Brundfland Conu-nission's original definition of SD: 
"development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of 
future generations to meet their own needs" (WCED, 1987: 43). 'Needs' in the 
Brundtland definition particularly refers to socio-economic needs; poverty being 
identified as both a key cause and an outcome of environmental degradation. Economic 
growth, in an environmentally friendly or 'sustainable' form (Adams, 1995) is therefore 
identified as the main solution. Although containing plenty of ambiguities, a key 
characteristic of this mainstream perspective is its adherence to free market thinking 
1 Under the broad categorisation of mainstream SD thinking, approaches and emphasis will differ, 
reflecting the diversity of organisations involved. Accordingly, there is not a single uniform way in 
which the concept of politics is engaged with, supposing it is engaged with at all. However, some main 
trends are identifiable. 
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(Redclift, 1987; O'Riordan, 1991; O'Connor, 1994; Adams, 2001). As such it 
"promotes the idea that environmental problems can best be ameliorated by market 
forces" (Brosius, 1999: 278). Within the conservation sector these commercialising 
premises have been translated into the notion that conservation should "pay its way" 
(see McAfee, 1999). The belief in a 'cure-all' form of economic growth is further 
matched by a strong belief in the power of science, as a means to identify and solve 
environmental problems (Mebratu, 1998; Adams, 2001). This particular way of 
thinking about SD has become the most influential one, because it is supported and 
actively promoted by a mosaic of powerful international organisations. Multilateral 
donors like the Global Environment Facility (GEF), the UNEP and the World Bank 
subscribe to this discourse. So do most bi-lateral donors, including the UK's 
Department for International Development (DFID), the Dutch Directoraat-Generaal 
Internationale Samenwerking (DGIS), the German Gesellschaft ftir Technische 
Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) and USAID, and prominent environmental NGOs, such as the 
IIFJCN and the WWF. These organisations have a dominant role in the financing and 
design of conservation and development programmes in developing countries. As the 
continent that is most dependent upon development aid (World Bank, 2004) this 
situation applies particularly to Africa. 
The above-outlined characteristics of mainstream SD are evident in its latest orthodox 
guise, as promoted at the 2002 World Sununit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in 
Johannesburg, which was marked by a strong adherence to corporate, free market, 
capitalist, neo-liberal and rational planning principles (Bond 2,2003; UN, 2003). The 
2003 WSSD furthermore stressed the need for the formation of 'partnerships' between 
the state, the private sector, local communities and national and international NGOs as 
the way to implement SD (UN, 2003). 
3.2.2. Politics in mainstream SD 
The desirability and legitimacy of the goals of SID, including poverty reduction, 
environmental protection and co-operation based on partnerships, is widely accepted. 
The strategies and policies embraced by proponents of the mainstream SID discourse to 
2 Professor Bond is a long-standing critic of neo-liberal policies and the operation of multilateral agencies 
and globalisation processes more generally. 
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reach these objectives are, however, contested. The mainstream SD outlook has been 
variously criticised for its technocratic and managerial outlook (Adams, 1995; Mohan 
and Hickey, 2004); economic reductionism (O'Connor, 1994; Naughton-Treves and 
Sanderson, 1995; McAfee, 1999); its positivist outlook on science (Svirezhev & 
Svirejeva-Hopkins, 1998; Lomberg, 2001; Forsyth, 2003); elusive, imprecise language 
and definitions (U16,1991; Kirby et al., 1995; Mebratu, 1998); and a relative neglect 
of the role of culture and race in co-operation (Wels, 2000; Hughes, 2001). These 
proposed defects point to a more fundamental issue, notably a lack of engagement with 
politics and power. As a whole, mainstream SD thinking tends to employ a rather a- 
political outlook. This is perhaps not surprising. Managerial and technocratic outlooks 
implicitly rest upon the assumption that the external political environment will not 
interfere with policy. Issues of power, ideology and cultural values are subsequently 
sidelined (Johnson, 2000: 709). 
Such modernist outlooks introduce two basic weaknesses in the SD discourse, notably: 
eA tendency to insufficiently account for the problematic political environments in 
which SD projects often take place, especially in developing countries. 
eA tendency to downplay the role of power inequalities between actors 
These two shortcomings in turn result in an over-optimistic outlook on policy 
implementation, leading to: 
*A tendency to overlook or insufficiently recognise the conflict potential in pursuing 
SD 
eA tendency to view the operation of partnerships in over-optimistic terms and as 
unproblernatic. 
The next section briefly explores these issues. 
3.2.3. The policy-making context 
Managerial assumptions that project implementation can be undertaken in relative 
isolation from the wider political context are often based on a tacit assumption that the 
external political and socio-economic environment is either supportive of the proposed 
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policy interventions, or can be easily moulded. This view is often rooted in the 
modernist approaches to development and conservation dating from the 1950s and 
1960s. Adams (1995) observes, for example, how the naive political outlook of US 
conservation movements in the 1950s as surnmarised by Hays (1959) continues to 
inform, or be present, in certain slants of mainstream SD thinking. Having as its 
essence "rational planning to promote efficient development and use of natural 
resources" these conservationists envisaged the existence of a matching political system 
"guided by the ideal of efficiency and dominated by the technicians who could best 
determine how to achieve it" (Hays, 1959: 2). 
In practice, such a rational and supportive policy-making environment tends to be 
imaginary. Environmental governance is often characterised by high degrees of 
'uncertainty' and 'complexity' (Mehta et al., 2001). This phenomenon features 
particularly in the African context. The failures of modernisation development theories 
and programmes of the 1950s and 1960s accentuate this point. 3 Instead of the expected 
relatively stable, receptive and predictable political context, 4 projects were confronted 
with very different political realities. These include a relatively high frequency of 
limited capacity, corruption, political instability and armed conflict. These factors 
undermined development assistance, no matter how meticulously planned (Harrison, 
1981; Ferguson, 1990; Crush, 1995; Moore, 2001). 
Partially as a result, the socio-economic environment, characterised by widespread 
poverty, is equally problematic. Limited governmental capacity greatly constrains 
3 Modernisation models of the late 1950s/1960s confidently predicted that the recently politically 
independent countries in the South would swiftly catch up with their counterparts in the North. 
Identifying the persistence of 'traditional' societies as the key source of underdevelopment, the 
modernisation approach envisaged an evolutionary model of development for states, based on the one 
previously followed by Northern nations. Economic growth, particularly through industrialisation was 
seen as key way to reach 'modernity'. This process was perceived as being a relatively straightforward 
and simple one. Africa's deteriorating economic position bears witness to the inadequacy of these 
predictions. The continent's poverty levels were, overall, higher in the 1990s than in the 1960s (World 
Bank, 2003). 
4 The role of politics was not so much ignored, as underestimated in modernisation theories: just like the 
socio-economic environment, the political environment was thought to be highly malleable. Whilst this 
proved a pitfall, the awareness within modernisation theory that socio-economic and political 
development goes hand in hand remains an important insight. An in-depth analysis of the concept of 
political development and the key conditions for it remains an essential part of any development theory 
(Moore, 2001). 
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project implementation. The observed tendency within mainstream SID thinking to 
overlook the precarious policy environments in which SD projects take place is 
therefore a highly problematic one. Because socio-economic and political constraints 
are insufficiently recognised, chances for implementational success are easily 
overrated. 
3.2.4. Power imbalances and SD 
Insufficient engagement with the political and socio-economic contexts in which 
projects operate is also problematic for another reason. It downplays the important 
ways in which external power imbalances will cause or aggravate internal power 
struggles between the actors involved. This feature endows the mainstream SD 
discourse with an overly optimistic view on partnerships and their performance. 5 
The mainstream SD discourse generally maintains that partnerships are characterised 
by neutral democratic decision-making (Edmunds and Wollenberg, 2001). Each actor is 
seen to have a chance to promote its interests. However, just as feminist studies have 
shown how power relations in the private sphere cannot be considered in isolation from 
power distribution patterns in wider society (Walby, 1990; Jackman, 1994; Tilly, 1998; 
Townsend et al., 1999), so too would it be naive to assume that the functioning of 
environmental governance would not be affected by the overall nature of power 
distribution between the actors involved. 
One area in which this is particularly visible is community participation. The 
involvement of local communities in decision-making processes is an important aspect 
of the promotion of partnerships (UN, 2003). However, there tends to be a considerable 
gap between rhetoric and practice. Empirical analyses of community-based 
conservation programmes indicate the persistence of top-down patterns of decision- 
making (Neumann, 1997; Twyman, 1998; Agrarwal and Gibson, 1999; Cooke and 
Kothari, 2001; Steenkamp, 2002; Adams and Mulligan, 2003). Moreover, these studies 
point to structural power inequalities, notably between local communities on the one 
hand and national governments and large environmental NGOs or donors on the other, 
5 This inattention to power balances has been noted in other development contexts, e. g. Mawdsley et al. 
(2002). 
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as a main underlying cause (Cooke and Kothari, 2001). Generally speaking, the latter 
organisations possess a lot more power, having more finances and connections at their 
disposal (including with national governmental elites) and also better access to 
information (Few, 2001). This comparative advantage is often employed by these 
parties to curb the power of weaker parties such as local communities. On the other 
hand, local communities may have hidden agendas and use projects to strengthen their 
position, even when this violates their aims (Ogura, 2003). Some conservation projects 
seeking to create economic alternatives to poaching have been noted to unintentionally 
induce more poaching, for example because recipient local communities use the 
creation of donor-sponsored infrastructure to expand the local poaching trade (Gibson 
and Marks, 1995). Adding another layer of complexity, communities usually do not 
constitute homogeneous groups (unlike their portrayal in most mainstream SD 
discourses) (Agrawal and Gibson, 1999). This aspect tends to complicate the 
implementation of SD programmes, especially when these programmes are likely to 
favour one faction over another. 'Participatory' approaches can legitimise particular 
policies through providing a faqade of consensus based on assumptions of 'community' 
social coherence (Neumann, 1997). 
3.2.5. The 'good governance' approach 
The increased attention or emphasis on the need for 'good governance' within 
development thinking since the 1990s has highlighted the important link between 
policy performance and macro political factors. Influential international donors such as 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, with in their following 
USAID and other bilateral donors, have increasingly raised the profile of the necessity 
for a democratic and transparent political environment at the national level (Hyden, 
1992; Brinkerhoff, 2000). Having identified undemocratic and corrupt administrations 
as key obstacles to markets working to alleviate poverty, this has led to increased 
attention being devoted to 'good governance' and institution building. States that are 
perceived to exercise 'good governance' are now strongly favoured as the recipients of 
these donors' grants and loans. 
Whilst this policy has productively drawn more attention to the linkages between 
conservation projects on the ground and the nature of political and power dynamics in 
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wider society, it remains fairly limited as a way to conceptualise the role of politics and 
power in SD. One main reason is that this approach skims the surface of political and 
power relations relevant to SD. The existing official institutions of decision-making are 
the very institutions that donors engage with and furthermore use as a starting point of 
policy implementation. Furthermore, the donors themselves are part of the status quo 
and have a vested interest in its maintenance. The premises of the mainstream SD 
discourse, such as its emphasis on the free-market, are often closely intertwined with 
the economic interests and positions of the national elites, transnational organisations 
and corporations and mainstream environmental organizations that construct and 
reinforce it (Sklair, 2000: 20; Brosius, 1999). Partially as a result of these vested 
interests, the global political economy and associated structural power inequalities are 
relatively glossed over in mainstream SID. The working of SID in developing countries 
is however greatly affected and constricted by the nature of the wider political economy 
in which these programmes operate (Redclift, 1987). By taking the economic and 
political status quo for granted, instead of subjecting it to critical analysis, mainstream 
SD may reinforce economic and political marginality, as opposed to reducing it. 
3.2.6 The conflict potential of SD 
Perhaps the most important shortcoming of the approaches of the key institutions 
involved in promoting and implementing mainstream SID such as the World Bank, 
USAID, UNEP, GEF, RJCN and the WWF is their tendency to downplay the conflict 
potential inherent in SD. A scrutiny of some of the key texts on SD reveals several 
contradictions. The mainstream SD discourse is in itself a convergence of not always 
compatible concepts (Redclift, 1987; O'Riordan, 1991), some of which borrow from 
earlier, radical, alternative SD discourses (O'Riordan, 1991). 'Community 
participation' is a good example of this (Nas and Silva, 1999: 6). The initial merging of 
these originally radical concepts with its core neo-liberal discourse is seldom 
problematised in mainstream SD circles. However, the meanings of these discursive 
elements often have connotations that do not correspond with the free market rationale 
of mainstream SD. For example, whilst an important prerequisite of neo liberal market 
strategies is free movement of labour and capital, community participation programmes 
strongly aim to bring economic opportunities to localities and invest the capital there. 
Such contradictions leave the discourse ridden with conceptual tensions (O'Riordan, 
199 1; Adams, 200 1). 
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Ambiguous policy language within mainstream SD discourses often obscures these 
discrepancies. Key policy concepts that underpin the mainstream SD discourse, such as 
4community participation' and 'governance', 'partnerships' but also 'sustainability' and 
'development' lack a clear definition (Hewit de Alcantara, 1999: 126). This 
phenomenon enables an over-easy inclusion of several ideological and political 
standpoints and interests (Kirby et al., 1995). Problematically, the lack of agreement on 
the precise meaning of key concepts guiding the implementation of SD projects means 
that at least part of the agreement that binds the actors at the outset is in principle based 
on misunderstandings (Hajer, 1995). Over time, these misconceptions are likely to 
surface more and more. In order to be able to implement a project, the meaning of ill- 
defined policy concepts will have to be further detailed and decided upon. However, as 
a result of the actors' highly different cultural and economic backgrounds and 
affiliations, the interpretations of such concepts are likely to be very different. Thus 
actors may clash over how the policy concepts should best be operationalised. At the 
same time, such ambiguity can aid discussion and open new areas of thought on SD. 
Furthermore, the breadth of the banner of SD is such that many different parties can 
associate themselves with the concept, making it a helpful if not indispensable element 
in getting highly diversified parties 'around the table' to promote both conservation and 
development (UM, 1991). 
However, instead of optimistically expecting that the co-operation in SD will 
automatically lead to consensus, it would be more realistic to expect various forms and 
degrees of disagreement and even conflict, and to start working from that premise. Such 
a conceptualisation requires a more proactive engagement with the concepts of power 
and politics, than is common in orthodox thinking on SD (Brosius, 1999; Edmunds and 
Wollenberg, 2001). Moreover, the economic and political characteristics of developing 
countries should occupy a key position in such a research focus (Bonner, 1993; Adams, 
1995). 
This observation takes us to the next section, which discusses the premises of political 
ecology. Political ecology constitutes an academic critique of the de-politicising nature 
of mainstream SD thinking. Focusing on environmental policy-making in developing 
countries (Bryant and Bailey, 1997), political ecology offers some important conceptual 
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insights and instruments that help us to construct a more nuanced understanding of 
contemporary conservation programmes and projects in the South. 
3.3. Political ecology 
3.3.1. Introducing political ecology 
Political ecology (henceforth: PE) can be described as an inquiry into the political and 
social conditions "surrounding the causes, experiences, and management of 
environmental problems" (Bryant and Bailey, 1997: 1)6. PE is not a theory (Peluso, 
1992), political ecologists having largely "eschewed theory in favour of empirical 
analytical analysis" (Bryant and Bailey, 1997: 1). Instead, it constitutes a diversified 
research field, in which political ecologists have approached the subject through a 
plurality of purpose and flexible explanations (Bryant and Bailey, 1997). Within this 
broad framework some main trends and perspectives can, however, be distinguished, 
each highlighting different important political aspects of environmental policymaking. 
PE emerged as an attempt to explain environmental problems as a function of existing 
political and economic structures with a focus on the South. At the core (and origin) of 
PE lies an active engagement with political economy as proposed by Blaikie and 
Brookfield (1987). For them, PE 
Combines the concerns of ecology and a broadly defined political economy. Together 
this encompasses the constantly shifting dialectics between society and land based 
resources, and also within classes and groups within society itself (Blaikie and 
Brookfield, 1987: 17). 
Challenging neo-Malthusian notions and the prominence of neo-liberalism in 
environmental management discourse, this approach stresses that environmental 
problems are less the result of poor management and overpopulation than the result of 
political, economic and social inequalities. Underlying dominant economic and political 
patterns, which produce and reinforce poverty and political marginality are actively 
identified and assessed as a key part of the problem. In line with the wide and 
diversified range of political complexities raised by SD, the approach of Blaikie and 
6 Greenberg and Park (1994) and Forsyth (2003) also offer good overviews of PE. 
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Brookfield (1987) has been expanded upon by many other emerging focus areas in PE 
in the 1990s, including an actor-oriented approach, tracing actor interest at several 
geographical scales (Bryant and Bailey, 1997); examination of PE questions in the 
context of socio-econornic issues of gender, race, sexuality and class (Shiva, 1989; 
Rocheleau et al. 1996); research around a particular environmental problem (Thomas, 
1994); and exploration of political-ecological problems in a specific region (see for 
example Peluso 1992; Rigg and Stott, 1996). Meanwhile, the research focus has 
extended well beyond land degradation to include biodiversity protection, often with a 
focus on community-based conservation in sub Saharan Africa. Furthermore, 
transboundary conservation is a growing area of interest (Bryant, 1992; Rogers, 2002). 
3.3.2. The post-structural turn 
Whilst PE has never been informed by a single theory or understanding, in the research 
field as a whole it is possible to identify an increased shift from structural to a post- 
structural notions of 'situated knowledge' (Haraway, 1990). Political debates about 
how we know the environment and how different interests shape this viewpoint have 
thus increasingly gained recognition as an important area of analysis. Dryzek's (1997) 
discussion of 'environmental complexity', Peet and Watt's (1996) 'liberation ecology' 
and Leach and Mearns' (1996) insights into problematic 'received wisdom' in land 
degradation policies in Africa, reinforce this point about the importance of social 
constructionalism and discursive approaches to PE (Rogers, 2002). Subsequently, "a 
concern with tracing the genealogy of narratives concerning 'the environment', with 
identifying power relations supported by such narratives, and with asserting the 
consequences of hegemony over, and within, these narratives for economic and social 
development, and particularly for constraining possibilities for self-determination" has 
7 become a key feature of PE (Stott and Sullivan, 2000: 2). Engagement with 'dissident' 
or alternative discourses such as non-Westem ones constitutes another important 
analytical tool to imagine the policy reality differently and possibly in a more holistic 
way (see Escobar, 1999). 
7 Adger et al., (2001) distinguish three main areas of engagement in PE within this area of inquiry, 
notably research on the sociology of science and knowledge, the history of institutions and policies on 
environment and development, and the globalization of environmental discourses in relation to "new 
languages and institutional relations of global environmental governance and management" (Peet and 
Watts, 1996: 11, quoted in Adger et al, 2001: 682). Forsyth (2003) further extends this line of inquiry by 
applying political analysis to the field of ecology. 
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The pro-active questioning and reframing of accepted environmental discourses or 
'narratives' can act as an important tool to unwrap the underlying power relations and 
interests in environmental policy-making and make them more visible (see Thompson 
et al., 1986; Homewood and Rogers, 1987; Leach and Meams, 1996; and especially 
Roe's work on narratives and counter-narratives (1994,1995). These studies 
furthermore usefully focus attention on the limited capacity of powerful policy 
discourses to predict the course of events in a given policy area. Mainstream SD 
thinking is strongly linked to rational choice theory. This perspective 
Implicitly presupposes perfect access to information and wrongly assumes that values, 
culture and ideology can be rationalised, i. e. have a rational, neutral, value free basis 
that can be objectively detennined (KiAting, 2000: 14). 
However, the construction of policies is far less guided by objective truths and 
measurable indicators than is assumed in mainstream SD. For one thing, environmental 
science 'facts' tend to be highly contested and social and political factors frame them. 
Moreover, policy discourses and 'narratives' (Roe, 1994) tend to employ a universal 
outlook that allows for little variation between different localities. This is illustrated by 
the great power of mainstream global environmental discourses (Adger et al., 2001) in 
shaping environmental policy-making and action in Africa (Roe, 1995) at both the 
regional, national and local levels. Whilst a certain level of generalisation is 
unavoidable in order for policy action to occur (Roe, 1994), this problematically means 
that policy discourses are based on significant oversimplifications or 'storytelling' 
(Roe, 1994), and are constructed in isolation from the local, national and regional 
contexts in which they are to be applied. 
PE, with its strong emphasis on empirical analysis and location- specific research, is 
instructive in revealing such contradictions between a given situation as envisaged in a 
given policy discourse and the situation on the ground. As such, it usefully generates 
additional insights into the complexities of environmental policy-making that contribute 
to a more holistic picture. The incorporation of poststructuralist notions in actor- 
analysis furthers this capacity. As noted by Moore (1993), the structuralist legacy of PE 
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8 for a long time induced a rather predetermined outlook on local level conflicts. This 
focus resulted in a problematic monolithic portrayal of actors, with little attention to the 
diversified and complex interests and power struggles within these institutions or 
groups (Bryant and Bailey, 1997: 6; Moore, 1993: 381). Moreover, such analyses tended 
to be accompanied by rather rigid actor categorisations as 'villains' and 'heroes'. This 
resulted in problematic expectations of what a 'good' political ecology story should tell 
(Potts, 2000). The increased engagement with the political complexities of ecological 
interactions at the micro level proposed by Moore (1993) has been further taken on by a 
wide range of political ecologists (see, for example, the articles in Neumann and 
Schroeder, 1995). The rich micro politics that underlie and condition environmental 
conflict in the South (Bryant and Bailey, 1997: 6), and the ways in which these often 
contrast with global and international discourses consequently became an important 
theme and area of exploration within PE. Neumann (1997) encapsulates this outlook as 
follows: 
*A focus on local land users and the social relations in which they are entwined 
Tracing the linkages of these local relations to wider geographical and social 
settings 
Historical analysis to understand the contemporary situation 
The merits of this research focus as a means to explore the multi-level connections 
between local and global phenomena can be further enhanced through engagement with 
political processes at other geographical scales, including at the regional level (Bryant 
and Bailey, 1997: 6). Mohan and Stokke (2000) illustrate the importance of political 
forces and activities at the national and transnational level in shaping local politics and 
mediating global discourses. In order to obtain the most holistic possible picture it is 
therefore imperative to extend the research focus to include actors and political 
processes at geographical scales beyond the local one. Bryant and Bailey's (1997) 
research approach is based on these very premises, integrating multiple actors, scales 
and knowledges. 
8 This counts particularly for PE research in the 1970s to mid-1980s when economic determinism often 
prevailed (Bryant and Bailey, 1997: 6). 
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Bryant and Bailey (1997) focus on the interests and actions of the major players 
involved in conservation (local communities, the state, NGOs, international donors and 
private business). Within this framework of actors, the state occupies a key position, in 
recognition of the fact that in a development context the state remains powerful as a 
main provider of jobs and other economic goods and continues to have a pivotal role in 
structuring the actions of the other actors. 9 By allowing for an in-depth exploration of 
the interests of these actors and the strategies used by them to obtain their goals, the 
actor centrality in PE is instructive in obtaining more insight into the political agendas 
and interests dominating the conservation scene. 
The outcome of these power struggles is seen to be contingent and context-related. In 
line with its post- structuralist focus, power in this research approach is conceptualised 
in multiple ways. At one level power involves the ability to control resource access, 
involving control over other actors, and to determine which resources will or will not be 
allocated to certain projects. However, power can also involve controlling or directing 
discursive representations of environmental problems and subsequently required 
management strategies. Bryant and Bailey (1997) are careful to stress that the operation 
of power should not be viewed in absolutist zero-sum terms. Instead, power is a fluid 
concept and even relatively disadvantaged groups can resort to counter-strategies 
(Bryant and Bailey, 1997: 191). 10 As no actor is seen to have absolute power, alliances 
with other actors are common as a means to pursue common goals within 
environmental governance. 
9 This emphasis on the role and power of the state greatly suits this inquiry into transboundary 
conservation. As will be illustrated in more detail throughout this thesis, the nature of transboundary 
environmental co-operation endows national governments with particular power and capacities, as the 
main decision-makers on border allocation and management. 
10 Few's conceptualisation of such power struggles between relatively powerful foreign NGOs and 
national governments on the one hand and relatively disadvantaged local communities on the other in 
'containment' and 'counter-containment' strategies is therefore a more fruitful way of looking at power 
imbalances, as opposed to relatively rigid neo-Marxist views of the 1970s and 1980s. 
11 PE research suggests a tendency for 'natural' alliances between states and businesses on the one hand 
and grassroots; actors and environmental NGOs on the other as a result of their different positions in the 
capitalist world system. 
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3.3.3. Non-rational behavioural patterns 
In pursuing actor analysis and the power patterns between them, it is also important to 
critically question the 'rational' actor outlook that tends to inform mainstream SD 
thinking. Mainstream SD thinking has been informed by rational choice theory, 
viewing individuals as actors driven by the desire to fulfil their self-interests, which is 
viewed in terms of economic needs. It must not be assumed that actors are completely 
and consistently 'rational' in choice, that is that their behaviour is consistently informed 
and underlined by an optimisation of self-interest. The assumption that actors are led by 
6rational' interests and choices has various pitfalls. For one thing, comprehensive 
information enabling actors to make the best possible choice is frequently lacking (see 
3.3.2), with a given subject matter often attracting various and possibly contradictory 
findings and opinions. Furthermore, economic models based on rationality fail to 
incorporate the concept of "bounded rationality" (Simon, 1982). This notion states that 
organisations have multiple objectives in mind when making a decision, not just a 
single one. Consequently, organisations, like governments, will not be looking so much 
for the best, or optimal outcome, as for one that 'suffices' and can satisfy multiple 
objectives. Furthermore, selected policy directions are likely to reflect the outcomes of 
power inequalities and power struggles between various factions in the entity. The 
impact of this phenomenon is little incorporated in rational actor models, which merely 
focus on relational power, but with a neglect of "hidden" or structural power (Simon, 
1982). 
PE offers useful premises, especially with its discursive turn, from which to counter 
reductionist 'rational' actor views. Its focus on power inequalities, on inter-agency 
struggles and on the multiple layers and interests in organisations offer a useful 
foundation to engage in such an exercise. It would be useful to further extend this 
principle of diversification of interests to consider individual actors, an area that has 
been underplayed to date. Bryant and Bailey (1997: 189) helpfully focus more attention 
on the individual actor as the unit of analysis, stressing the disparities between the goals 
of organisations and the interests of the individuals working in these organisations. 
However, the notion of conflicting interests within individual actors and the ways in 
which this phenomenon shapes the negotiation of interests and power struggles in 
natural resource management have remained relatively understudied. 
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Rational actor models view human action as being led by (economic) self-interest. 
However, calculating self-interest is but one motivation driving human behaviour 
(Peters, 2002: 10-11). Psychological studies (Wilson and Brekke, 1994; Lee-Chai and 
Bargh, 2001) indicate that when co-operating, human behaviour will also be influenced 
by other goals such as a preservation of individual egos, the quality of inter-personal 
relationships, personality clashes, cultural outlooks and affinities and idealism. 
Consequently, individual behaviour in co-operation is unlikely to be motivated by one 
main interest or motive, but rather by several, potentially colliding ones. Adding 
another layer of complexity, the prioritisation of these various interests will in many 
cases be the result of subconscious processes in the mind; people will often not be 
aware of the underlying reasons for their decisions and behaviour (Wilson and Brekke, 
1994). The pursuit of 'self-interest' is therefore less straightforward than generally 
portrayed in rational actor theory, limiting the validity of the predictions of these 
models. 
Further engagement with these notions could usefully help to construct more holistic 
outlooks on the working of environmental governance. Partnerships hold an "exalted 
status" (Davies, 2002: 190), but there has been little evaluation of their activities (Nas 
and Silva, 1999; 2002: 190). More attention to decision-making processes in areas that 
are constructed outside the official procedures and structures of environmental 
governance, such as 'backstage negotiations' would be useful. Such processes play a 
large role in the functioning and outcomes of environmental governance but have been 
little studied so far. Furthermore, in informal negotiations the personal element is 
crucial. In tracing the politics of environmental policy-making, it is thus important to 
look beyond formal structures and processes of decision-making. This observation 
takes us to the next section, which discusses another important aspect of non-formal 
politics: illegal politics. 
3.3.4. Illegal politics 
Politics is a conu-non activity, not confined to politicians and their officials (Strange, 
1996: 12), but exercised at all levels of society. Through its concern with grassroots 
movements and community-based politics, PE actively engages with and incorporates 
this notion. Another area of politics that would be useful to consider is that of illegal 
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politics. 'Illegal politics' involves in this context the "criminal, illicit and illegal 
activities" brought about by "economic and political 'extra-state' shadow networks' 
that seek to influence a state's behaviour and policy-making through bribing and 
infiltration" (Nordstrom, 2000: 2). 12 The influential role of illegal politics in structuring 
world politics is increasingly acknowledged (Alexander and Caiden, 1985; Strange 
1996; Nordstrom 2000,2004). In Africa the overlap between such networks and official 
states tends to be particularly strong, to the extent that Reno speaks of a "shadow state" 
(Reno, 1995). Informal, ethnically based clientelist networks headed by 'Big Men' 
exchanging economic favours in exchange for political support lie at the basis of this 
system (Bayart, 1993; Reno, 1995; Bayart et al., 1999). 
Illegal politics greatly affect the course of natural resource management (Omara- 
Ojungu, 1992; Gibson, 1999; Robbins, 2000; Bfirgener et al., 2001). Murombedzi notes 
how community-based conservation in Africa is easily undermined by corruption 
(2003: 135). Gibson's (1999) research furthermore indicates that the success rate of 
conservation programmes tends to run considerably parallel to the ways in which their 
associated economic and other benefits are channelled to the benefit of 'shadow elites' 
(1999). 13 However, despite "widespread evidence of bribery and illegal exchange in 
natural resource management" (Robbins, 2000: 423), there is a continued silence on the 
issue "except as an afterthought, treating corruption as an exception to the rule" (rather 
than as an overall pattern) (Robbins, 2000: 424). This notion also applies to PE: 
although political ecologists frequently refer to corruption as an issue hampering 
conservation, this has thus far been little theoretically analysed. 
Having considered some of the key views of PE and suggested possible areas of 
expansion, the next section will now provide a discussion of the political aspecis of 
boundaries and borderlands. PE can be seen to offer many useful analytical tools from 
12 Nordstrom actually speaks of 'non-formal' or 'shadow' rather than 'illegal' political networks. 
However, the term 'non-formal' or 'shadow' politics can also refer to informal political actions that are 
not illegal or illicit in character, such as 'backstage negotiations' outlined in section 3.3.3. To prevent 
confusion I subsequently use the term 'illegal politics'. 
13 Where such political systems are marked by an absence of a functioning democracy a fulfilment of the 
socio-economic and political goals of sustainable development can become further frustrated. 
Problematically, given that the largely unfinished democratisation of local political systems is a dominant 
feature in Africa, (Mamdani, 1996) this issue is likely to play a role in TBNRM. 
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which to assess the operation of SD projects, including TBPAs. However, to adequately 
conceptualise the political dynamics of transboundary conservation, additional 
engagement with the nature of political aspects of boundaries and borderlands is 
necessary. When looking at the environment, PE conceptualises this as both a container 
of natural resources and social characteristics and patterns, with a lot of attention paid 
to the interaction between the two. However, owing to the presence of boundaries, the 
borderland environment has relatively unique features which in turn both affect and are 
an outcome of inter-state co-operation. In identifying political patterns and themes 
important to the second policy component of TBPAs, notably transboundary co- 
operation, an engagement with the political features of boundaries and borderlands, is 
therefore necessary. Far from static, these phenomena are very context-dependent and 
different contemporary impacts upon their functioning will therefore be considered. 
3.4 Transboundary politics 
3.4.1 Introduction 
The past decades have been characterised by an international trend towards cross- 
border co-operation and more open border policies, often as part of wider processes of 
regionalisation and globalisation. However, the continued political importance of 
boundaries often restrains the pursuit of these objectives. As the lines that demarcate 
and enclose state territory, the development and maintenance of boundaries have played 
a crucial role in establishing and maintaining a state's ultimate authority in a given area 
vis-ý-vis other states. As such, changes in the location or status of boundaries tend to be 
politically sensitive and difficult to negotiate, turning transboundary co-operation 
(henceforth: TBQ into a complex political exercise, including in the area of 
environmental issues, and in spite of a strong rationale for inter-state co-operation in 
this area. Before considering these issues in more depth, it is useful to pay some 
attention to the nature of boundaries and their political significance. 
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3.4.2 Boundaries: functions and influencing factors 
Boundaries and the nation-state exist in mutual dependence. Not only do states beget 
boundaries but, at the same time, boundaries outline a state's territorial sovereignty - 
thereby constituting a prerequisite for the existence of states (Agnew and Corbridge, 
1995: 84-85). A state's power is intimately associated with territory. Boundaries delimit 
that territory and define the geographical area and therefore the inhabitants that come 
under its rule. Boundaries are, moreover, simultaneously an expression and function of 
national identity (Conversi, 1995: 73-85; Hastings and Wilson, 1999). Since the late 
Middle Ages, the raison d'etre of the state has been its supposed representation of and 
guarding over the 'national interest' (Slowe, 1990: 57). Underlying the notion of the 
nation-state is an implicit assumption that 'nation' and 'state' coincide, with states 
allegedly representing and reinforcing the ethno-religious traditions of their subjects. 
Some have therefore claimed that the preferences of individuals within a given state 
territory would be to have their interests looked after by the state in question. As such, 
boundaries underpin a state's legitimacy, not just in the international system, but also 
within a given society (Litfin, 1998). 
Boundaries have an essential notion of inclusion and exclusion in them, "defining the 
area from which other authorities and people will be excluded unless they have the 
permission of the controlling authority" (Allott, 1999: 12). Only those people who are 
considered to be members of a particular state, through citizenship or other procedures, 
will have access to certain state benefits. Moreover, boundaries legitimise a state's 
exclusive access to the natural resources lying within its territory. This implicitly 
deprives other states and their nations from the free usage of these resources (Griggs, 
1995). Boundaries are furthermore significant for economic reasons because of the 
tariffs and trade barriers they represent (Slowe, 1990: 129). Table 3.1 displays some of 
the functions of boundaries graphically. Finally, as the markers of national identity, 
boundaries play an important role in creating and maintaining the dual categories of the 
Self and Other (Said, 1993). As such, boundaries "do not exist as separate and 
independent entities, but persist only to the extent that they are reinforced through 
social discourse and practice" (Morehouse, 1995: 53). 
Furthermore, the impact of boundaries will not only depend upon the ways in which 
boundaries are negotiated and demarcated but also upon the ways in which they are 
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thereafter maintained and managed. It is important to realise that in practice boundaries 
can be highly permeable. This observation is particularly valid in the African situation 
(Griffiths, 1985) where the financial resources required to effectively manage and 
guard often lengthy boundaries are frequently lacking (Minaar, 2001). Moreover, an 
overall dire economic situation incites corruption amongst often-underpaid border 
officials, facilitating illegal traffic (Coplan, 2001). Where the border separates 
ethnically similar groups, local people often have become masters in 'jumping the 
border' (Coplan, 2001) to preserve traditional social and economic interaction. 
Table 3.1 Types of boundary functions 
Function Why invoked 
Shell To establish a territorially based identity 
Net To establish control or jurisdiction of 
specified phenomena occurring within a 
defined space/territory 
Facilitator To establish or improve administrative 
efficiency in managing a defined area 
Barrier/Filter To prevent specified phenomena from 
crossing a boundary into a defined space 
Gate To restrict passage into a bounded space to 
those people or goods that have not met 
specified transaction criteria (e. g. payment 
of a tariff) 
Conduit/Gateway To allow passage into a bounded space 
from which various opportunities, services 
or goods can be accessed that are 
unavailable in places across the border 
Source: Morehouse (1995: 56). 
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3.4.2. Globalisation, regionalisation and the changing face of boundaries 
In recent times the function of boundaries can be said to have been considerably 
changed by globalisation and related processes. This has however not necessarily 
eroded their importance (Boon-Thong and Bahrin, 1998). Intensive regional co- 
operation to create regional trade zones uninhibited by internal boundaries between 
member states has increasingly gained prominence as a way of promoting international 
organisation, including in Southern Africa. The SADC undertakes regionalisation with 
the long-term aim of establishing open border policies between its member states 
(SADC, 2004). Furthermore, at the global level, an increase in 'economic and 
information globalisation' (Anderson, 1997) has undermined the barrier function of 
national boundaries, with states having relatively little power to regulate the non- 
nation-state bound movements of international capital and communications (Arrdn and 
Thrift, 1995; Held et al., 1999; Scholte, 2000), like the internet. At the same time ethnic 
groups pursuing self-determination, often in the form of armed resistance increasingly 
undermine the nation-state from 'below' (Agnew, 1997). 
The impact of these processes, sometimes called 'glocalisation' has been regarded by 
some as so influential that they would signal "the end of the nation-state" (Ohmae, 
1996), and the advent of the borderless world. International environmental co-operation 
can be seen as part of this 'erosion of the nation-state'. Due to the borderless character 
of nature and the transboundary impact of pollution and other environmentally 
unfriendly activities, effective care for the environment requires international co- 
operation (see French, 2000) at both a global and regional or bi-national scale. 
Furthermore, the power sharing with non-governmental agencies in environmental 
governance is seen to limit the room for manoeuvre of the nation-state (Litfin, 1998). 
Nonetheless, nation-states continue to be the most influential entities in mastering and 
dividing global space. This is reflected by the fact that treaties and policies often remain 
between states, and depend upon them for implementation and monitoring. 
Linked to this, the concept of national boundaries continues to remain "as potent as 
ever" (Blake, 1998: 76). It is true that 'glocalisation' has influenced the status of 
boundaries, but this has largely resulted in a change in their status and functions. Whilst 
globalisation may have undermined the 'barrier/filter' function of boundaries, many of 
its other functions (see Table 3.1) have remained, or even increased, in importance. 
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Furthermore, national boundaries may continue to be redrawn, but they are not 
disappearing. With the vanishing of former states such as the Soviet Union and the 
DDR from the world map many new ones have also surfaced: since 1990 23 new states 
and more than 40 new boundaries emerged. 14 Where the pursuit of alternative national 
and ethnic identities is successful, the nation-state becomes once more the preferred 
organisational and administrative unit (OTuathail, 1996). 
In addition, even where customs posts and border fences have been physically removed 
between countries to pursue open border policies, the intrinsic and symbolic function of 
boundaries as embodiments of national identity remain important. This is, for example, 
visible in the European Union where nationalism remains an important force in politics, 
including within and between the Schengen countries that have open boundaries with 
regard to each other (Bort, 1998). Significantly, the SADC intends to follow similar 
open border policies in the near future (www. s4dc. int). Finally, boundaries continue to 
play an important role in the economic realm. Whilst the international nature of capital 
flows has considerably undermined the nation-state as "an effective manager of the 
national economy", the nation-state remains an important conduit for investment 
(Boyer and Drache, 1996: 1). For one thing, commercial law has remained "resolutely 
statist" (Clapham, 2001). A multinational seeking to set up in a given country will only 
be recognised as legal in international law after having obtained formal permission of 
the state in question to do so. Boundaries therefore continue to play an important role in 
shaping economic and political transactions. 
It is perhaps somewhat paradoxical that national boundaries remain particularly 
important in Africa. African pre-colonial ways of spatial organisation show a 
remarkable overlap with contemporary ideologies and processes of deterritorialisation 
and 'shared spaces' (Griggs, 2000b). Models of fixed territories and the Westphalia 
model of territorial sovereignty only reached Africa when it was superimposed through 
colonialism in the late 19 th century 15 , and visibly established and maintained 
by means 
14 Personal communication [email], Martin Pratt, Director International Boundaries Research Unit, 
Durham, 2004. 
15 The Conference of Berlin (1884/1885) divided up most of sub-Saharan Africa between European 
nations. In demarcating boundaries, the existing settlement and mobility patterns of the indigenous 
population were largely disregarded (Touval, 1966; Davidson, 1992). 
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of national boundaries. As is illustrated in Figure 3.1, these boundaries coincide little 
with ethnic distributions on the continent. Consequently, a considerable number of 
ethnic groups have been separated between two or more nation-states. African national 
boundaries furthermore often greatly disrupt the seasonal movements of (semi) 
nomadic pastoralist and/or hunter-gatherer groups such as the Masai (in Eastern 
Africa), Tuareg (Western Africa) and the Bushmen (Southern Africa). 16 
However, in spite of the fact that national boundaries are only a relatively recent 
phenomenon in Africa, national boundaries over the continent as a whole have little 
changed since the end of colonial rule (Clapham, 2001). Pan African ideologies keen to 
address the socio-economic, cultural and other drawbacks associated with the post- 
colonial border heritage (Ola, 1976) have so far dramatically failed. In most cases fears 
of loss of sovereignty by national governments can be identified as the main obstacle. 
The nature of the nation-state in Africa (or rather the absence of a 'nation' or 
homogenous ethnic group in the state) plays an important role in this process. Whilst 
the general absence of coherent nationalities that coincide with state territory is one of 
the main incentives for the removal of national boundaries, ironically this situation may 
simultaneously stand in the way of boundary removal or even more open border 
policies. 
16 Miles (1994) explores this issue in more depth with regard to transboundary pastoralists in Nigeria. 
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Figure 3.1 Boundaries and ethnic groups in Africa 
Source: Griffiths (1995b: 92). 
States that lack legitimacy as a result of the absence of a strong national identity might 
well be more concerned with the preservation of territorial control, as another important 
aspect underpinning state sovereignty (Clapham, 1996). This makes "boundaries more 
important to them, and not less" (Clapham, 2001: 9). 1 7 The surrender of state power to 
both a supra-national entity or through decentralisation becomes in such a scenario 
quickly politically loaded. At the same time, African states have much to gain from 
regional economic integration; the removal of trade tariffs within a given region is 
17 At the same time, it was often the governing elites themselves that frustrated nation-building efforts 
in most parts of Africa, by exploiting ethnic differences in their competition for power, just as was 
common under colonial 'divide and rule' systems (Irele, 1998). On the other hand, the limitations that 
'artificial' boundaries exercise upon the development of a national identity within a given state should 
not be overrated. Nationhood is also dependent upon the organisation of the territorial state and a state 
has considerable power to manipulate the "transformations of ethnic connections and similarities into 
the affinities of nation-hood" and "generate" nationhood in that way (Slowe, 1990: 86; Knippenberg 
and Markusse, 1999). 
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thought to greatly boost internal trade (and in doing so lessen the dependency on 
expensive Western imports), whilst also attracting increased Western investment 
(Teunissen et al., 1996; SADC, 2004). There are furthermore strong imperatives for 
joint management of natural resources, and especially watersheds (Visser, 1989; 
Campbell, 1994). The relative scarcity of these resources coupled with increased 
pressures for their usage as a result of expanding human populations and/or 
industrialisation, means often that joint management of these resources is "not an 
optional extra" but "a matter of survival" (SADC, 1994). Furthermore, within such 
(envisaged) regional economic and environmental regimes, there is increased emphasis 
on the importance of decentralisation of power to the local level, echoing the insights of 
sustainable development ideologies with regard to the inclusion of local communities 
(see 3.2.4). 
However, the pursuit of open border policies in Africa, such as through the African 
Renaissance ideology currently being pursued by South African president Thabo Mbeki 
(Mbeki, 1998a; Mbeki, 1998b; Mulemfo, 2000) is often hindered by macro-political 
processes hampering such a move and/or realities on the ground that work against 
further permeability (Griggs, 2000a). These are all contributing factors determining 
whether boundaries represent barriers (Kristof, 1959; Nkiwane, 1997) or gateways 
(Herzog, 2000). Whilst international and local geo-political influences inform this 
process, the formal decision-making around border management takes place at the 
national level. After having considered the impacts of globalisation and before moving 
on to the borderland context, the next section will take a closer look at factors and 
motivations determining a state's border policies and how these are in turn an outcome 
of the interaction with adjacent states. 
3.4.3. The African inter-state setting 
As the ultimate decision-makers on boundaries and the actors that arguably stand to 
lose the most, the actions of states regarding their own boundaries and those of other 
countries are arguably the most influential factor determining the course and impact of 
boundaries. These processes themselves will reflect a state's foreign policy and position 
in the international system (Anderson, 1996), which is in turn shaped by amongst others 
military and economic strength and geographical components such as access to the sea 
and possibly size. 
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The continued existence of a state is intimately tied up with its ability to exercise 
(ultimate) jurisdiction over its territory. The desire of states to see boundaries having a 
security role, that is to prevent foreign invasion, is therefore a key concern in their 
management. As a legacy of colonialism, the legitimacy of boundaries in Africa could 
be questioned however. This holds particularly for those situations where boundaries 
cut across ethnic groups. Indeed, as Figure 3.2 displays, there are various 
internationally disputed boundaries on the African continent. Not surprisingly, 
irredentism is a frequent phenomenon. Furthermore, as noted earlier, due to budget 
constraints few governments in Africa are able to effectively police and guard their 
often long boundaries, and customs posts tend be understaffed (Hennop et al., 2001). 
Despite these constraining circumstances, a massive outbreak of armed inter-state 
conflict in Africa over disputed boundaries has not occurred. To avoid political 
meltdown and conflict, African heads of state formally accepted their colonial 
boundaries in 1964 and signed unto the Cairo Resolution of the Organisation of African 
Unity (Brownlie, 1979). 
The adherence to existing national boundaries by the Organisation of African Unity 
(OAU) has on the whole rather successfully prevented the breakout of large-scale 
conflict at the inter-state level. Although there have been various inter-state wars over 
boundaries (for example between Eritrea and Ethiopia) and continue to be, 70% of the 
18 border conflicts in Africa are resolved peacefully . On the other hand, the fact that the 
'artificial' nature of African boundaries has not been addressed and changed is often 
identified as a root cause of the high levels of political instability and armed conflict in 
Africa (Davidson, 1992), causing both secessionism and imperialism (Griffiths, 1995b). 
African borderlands are at the frontline of these actions. 
" Personal communication, Prof. Gerald H. Blake, founder and former director of the International 
Boundaries Research Unit, Durham, 2003. 
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Source: based on Downing (1980). 
Whilst the adherence to colonial boundaries ensured that the threat of a direct large- 
scale invasion by a neighbouring state has remained relatively low for the average 
African state, African governments are nonetheless often confronted with considerable 
security issues at their boundaries. The nature of governmental security concerns on the 
African continent tends to be shaped by the fact that the majority of African states 
constitute 'weak' or dysfunctional states (Jackson, 1990). 'Weak' refers in this context 
to the limited capacity and reach of the state system to effectively rule its citizens. This 
situation tends to be particularly prevalent in borderlands or the 'periphery', which is 
generally situated at great geographical distance from the seat of the central 
government in the capital. This lack of effective governmental control coupled with the 
96 
Figure 3.2: Disputed boundaries in Africa 
presence of porous boundaries can easily become highly problematic from a security 
perspective. The socio-cultural and physical characteristics of African borderlands 
contribute to this situation. The authority of central government tends to be particularly 
challenged in borderlands, whose populations may have more ethnic affinity with their 
neighbours over the border, than with the government in a distant capital. Such local 
resistance against the central state may take the form of armed resistance. Moreover, 
the physical features of African borderlands, usually characterised by relatively low 
population levels and the presence of vast areas of "wilderness" in which it is relatively 
easy to hide, make it a refuge and guerrilla base par excellence for dissident groups. 
The presence of boundaries may increase the attraction of borderlands as guerrilla sites. 
Cross-border smuggling of fire arms and other military equipment can help fulfil a 
guerrilla group's need for arms whilst the presence of a boundary may also offer it the 
possibility to flee over the border when pursued by government troops (Clapham, 
1996). The general high level of permeability of African boundaries facilitates such 
actions. 
The presence of rebel groups in its borderlands not only poses a threat to the state from 
within, but also easily opens the door to foreign intervention. By providing logistic and 
other support to rebel groups over the border, a state can increase its control over 
adjacent territory in a neighbouring state. Whilst not being directly faced with foreign 
invasion, such actions can be seen to undermine a state's boundaries in a more indirect 
way. Especially where there are great congruities in religion/political ideology between 
a dissident group in a given state and the neighbouring state, such a scenario may come 
into place. Where neighbouring states offer dissident groups the possibility of operating 
from their territory, thereby curbing the possibility of the central government 
eliminating these movements, violent inter-state conflicts may eventually break out. 
Even in a situation where relations between states are very cordial, security concerns 
may act against the pursuit of (more) open border policies. A peaceful state can be 
easily affected and destabilised by internal political unrest and armed struggle in a 
neighbouring state. Physical proximity coupled with porous boundaries makes 
neighbouring states highly vulnerable to negative "spill-over" effects in the form of 
(armed) refugees, arms smuggling and other resulting transboundary flows. Apart from 
high quality inter-state relations, overall relatively high levels of political stability in the 
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region tend therefore to be another main condition for the pursuit of more open border 
policies. 
3.4.4. The borderland context 
The restrictions that boundaries impose upon transboundary social and economic traffic 
are felt most strongly by borderland populations (Slowe, 1990: 28; Asiwaju, 1992; 
Miles, 1994; Coplan, 2001; Crush, 2002; Niehaus, 2002; Nugent, 2002). 19 This will 
especially be the case where there is a history of cross-border trade and strong social 
linkages over the border. Diverse patterns of trans-boundary interaction may occur, 
from confrontation and exclusion to co-operation, integration and inclusion (Blake, 
2000). The geographical distribution of political and economic power at a national level 
also plays a key role in the way the border is both perceived and used. This aspect is 
often important in Africa, where borderland communities tend to occupy a highly 
marginal economic and political position within the nation-state as a whole, with 
economic and political power being concentrated in the centre, not at the periphery. 
However, combined with the generally weak capacities and reach of the African state 
this often simultaneously means that the power of the central government can be 
limited or, in extreme cases, even non-existent over its borderlands (Jackson, 1990). 
Where ethnic identity with counterpart ethnic groups over the border supersedes the 
national affiliations of borderland populations, the barrier function of boundaries is 
likely to be greatly contested and resented. Political pressure for a removal of national 
boundaries or greater porosity is for these reasons seen to correlate to proximity to the 
border. 
This observation lies at the heart of a thesis which views the geo-political forces in 
borderlands, or the tool of 'sub-national micro-diplomacy' (Martinez, 1994a, 1994b; 
Asiwaju, 1992), as instrumental in stimulating a relaxation or removal of national 
boundaries. The unit of action in this approach is the border region. Observable 
geographic, demographic, cultural, economic and historic links between the 'sub- 
national areas' on both sides of an international boundaries would allegedly favour an 
international transboundary planning approach over a national one. This imperative for 
planning leads to political pressure from borderland populations upon their national 
19 On the other hand, borderland populations may also benefit from the presence of boundaries through 
the smuggling opportunities they offer. 
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politicians to pursue (more) open border policies. Such 'bottom-up' pressure is in this 
view seen to ultimately and rather directly influence decision-making at the national 
level (Hendrikson, 2000). 
However, reality complicates this scenario. 'Bottom-up' decision-making is easily 
hindered by the continent's overall low democratisation levels (Williams, 2002). The 
disparate ethnic identities that often exist between the elites in the centre and the 
periphery populations may further stifle the influence of borderland communities at the 
national level. Clientelist linkages between local communities and national politicians 
can play an important role in instigating 'bottom-up' decision-making, but these 
linkages tend to based on shared ethnicity (Bayart, 1993). Further aggravating the 
situation is that in cases where strong political tensions exist between the national 
government and a given borderland population, and especially so when this process is 
accentuated through the creation of armed resistance movements, national military and 
security policies will greatly obstruct an opening of the boundaries. Great economic 
disparities between countries may further complicate the situation. In that case, (more) 
open boundaries are likely to increase illegal labour migration, a situation that often 
causes tensions between the receiving country and the country of departure (see for 
example Crush, 2000). Moreover, in such a situation an opening of boundaries may 
also not be favoured by borderland populations, especially where illegal migration is 
coupled by high crime levels (Kynoch and Ulicki, 2000). Alternatively, removal of 
boundaries may actually hamper economic development in borderlands, where different 
price levels and product availability between two or more states stimulate cross-border 
trade. Partially as a result of the relatively important economic contribution of the 
'informal economy' in Africa, smuggling activities may moreover create powerful local 
interests in the maintenance of international boundaries. Furthermore, national identity 
is not necessary subjected to cross-border ethnic affiliations (Nugent, 2002). The 
position and influence of boundaries, as barriers or as conduits for transboundary co- 
operation can hence not be generalised. 
99 
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has provided a conceptual map of the research topic through a critical 
enquiry into the two elements that together make up the concept of TBNRM: SD and 
TBC. Whilst for analytical purposes these two policy areas have been separately 
considered, in reality they will closely interact, overlap and often be interdependent. 
When combining the findings on both SD and TBC, it can be concluded that the spatial 
reorganisation that TBPAs seek to imprint on borderlands is far from the apolitical 
project it is often presented to be. Together SD and TBC involve a wide range of 
competing interests and pressures upon borderlands situated at a wide range of 
geographical scales. Although SD (or sustainable land management more specifically) 
sounds appealing, the pursuit of SD is complex. Not only are mainstream SD discourses 
characterised by inherent conceptual contradictions, the pursuit of SD, especially in a 
development context, often takes place in unstable political environments and amongst 
great power inequalities. Furthermore, the economic interests of the actors concerned 
tend to differ, resulting in competing claims upon the land. The pursuit of "nature 
imagery" (Draper et al., 2004) in a transboundary context is furthermore complicated 
by issues of sovereignty and territoriality associated with boundaries as well as the 
unregulated nature of borderlands. This endows Peace Parks in Southern Africa with a 
relatively high conflict potential: the apparent panacea of TBNRM is actually build on a 
framework that is riddled with potential problems. Far from creating a 'win-win' 
situation for all whilst in the process also addressing past injustices (see section 1.2), a 
Peace Park may hence introduce or aggravate disagreements and tensions between the 
participating parties over the ways in which land is managed in the borderlands that it 
covers. 
Which interests prevail and at what point in time will be context dependent and 
determined by a complex interplay of highly diversified interests pursued by and within 
various groups at all geographical scales. Although states can be seen to play a key role, 
their decisions will be shaped by the interaction with other states and non-state groups. 
Adding another layer of complexity, actors may wear different hats at different stages 
or intervals in the process, for example because their interests in SD clash with their 
interests in more open border policies. Finally, preferences and priorities are likely to 
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change over time. Considering that decision-making in Peace Parks involves a wide 
range of actors, and scales, there is a need for actor-oriented and multiple scale 
analysis, as highlighted in the discussion on PE. It is thereby important that not only 
formally recognised stakeholders in Peace Parks are included, but all stakeholders, 
given the importance of informal politics. Furthermore, the interests and political 
processes at a multitude of geographical scales need to be perceived as existing in close 
interaction with social and natural processes in borderlands, as the 'central unit of 
action' for TBPAs. Although, using Castell's words, within the "space of flows" that 
determine decision-making in Peace Parks, global and national interests can be 
generally identified as particularly powerful and important, global conservation 
networks and African political elites can easily collide with local interests in what he 
calls the "space of places" (Castells, 1997: 123-4). Finally, mapping changes in the 
development of discourses on TBPAs and identifying whose interests are served by 
these can be an important way of tracing power dynamics in TBPAs (Van Amerom, 
2002). The next chapter demonstrates how these conceptual insights have been 
operationalised in the research design and information collection, providing an insight 
into the methodology underlying the research. 
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4. Methodology 
"Strict and rigid adherence to any method, technique or doctrinaire position may, for the fieldworker, 
become like a confinement in a cage. If he's lucky or very cautious, a fieldworker may formulate a 
research problem so that he will find all the answers he needs within his cage. But if he finds himself 
in afield situation where he is limited by a particular method, theory or technique, he will do well to 
slip through the bars and try to find out what is really going on " (Wax, 197 1: 10). 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the methodology of this research project. Any selected 
methodology is bound to have both advantages and disadvantages. A wide range of 
methodologies was considered for this research and out of this range a number were 
eventually selected. The chapter provides an insight into these selected 
methodologies and the motivations underpinning them and guiding their usage. It 
first explores some key methodological considerations that arise from an inquiry into 
politics in the context of conservation policies in Southern Africa and discusses how 
these concerns were translated into the fieldwork design. After this, the strategies and 
methods used to generate information are detailed through a narrative description of 
my fieldwork. The results of qualitative fieldwork do not just depend upon the modus 
operandi of data gathering, but also on the ways in which they are analysed and 
translated into the research write-up. This theme is further explored in the final 
section, which discusses the strategies for data analysis and representation. Before 
exploring the methodological issues mentioned above, it is useful to briefly consider 
the positionality of the researcher, as an issue that exercises great bearing on the 
research as a whole. 
4.2 Positionality of the researcher 
Researchers must acknowledge the various geographical, historical and social 
influences that shape their positionality, to avoid the "false neutrality and universality 
of so much academic knowledge" (Rose, 1997: 306). However, as is now 
increasingly acknowledged within the Social Sciences, the ways in which personal 
traits such as race, gender and age imprint upon research are far from fixed and are, 
therefore, open to contested interpretation (Rose, 1997). It is important not to 
generalise or simplify the impact of certain personal characteristics upon the research. 
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Bearing these limitations in mind, I will provide the reader with a brief personal 
profile and offer my impressions as to how my positionality affected the course of 
this research. 
I am a white Dutch female. At the time of my fieldwork, I was in my late twenties. 
My home town is called Enschede. It is located in what used to be - up to roughly 
1960 - one of the poorest regions of the Netherlands: Twente. Through my origin and 
upbringing I came to be fully aware of development constraints, but also resulting 
advantages in terms of greater available space for conservation, which accounts to a 
great extent for my current interest in sustainable development. Enschede being 
located along the Dutch-German border, and part of a 'Euregio' (Euroregion) I soon 
also became interested in development in a transboundary context, as well as in 
forging linkages across boundaries. I first heard about the concept of TBPAs in 1997 
when working in the Kruger National Park as a tour leader. My interest in TBPAs 
stems from that time. I felt excited about the plans to connect South Africa's Kruger 
Park with the then Coutada 16 Park in Mozambique from a tourism perspective, 
whilst the notion that TBPAs could help promote peace also greatly appealed to me. 
My academic interest was raised when, as a result of talks with game wardens and 
other officials, I became aware of the many political complexities surrounding the 
creation of Peace Parks, and found these had been little researched. Eventually, after 
having tried and secured funding, this interest culminated in registering for this PhD 
in 2000. 
My personal characteristics have in various ways influenced my research, not least by 
structuring access to respondents. Being Dutch' proved a facilitating factor in 
establishing links in South Africa. I found that as a result of the shared descent of the 
Dutch and Afrikaners, most Afrikaners were interested in meeting Dutch people, and 
the active role of the Dutch anti-Apartheid movement tended to be positively 
regarded by 'progressive' South Africans. As a native speaker of Dutch it was also 
relatively easy for me to understand and speak Afrikaans, further improving access to 
Afrikaans-speaking respondents. Meanwhile, my stay in England meant that I could 
relate well to 'British' South Africans with family ties and interests in Britain. I also 
passed as an 'easy' conversational partner, because of my knowledge of the tourist 
sector, parks and other places in (Southern) Africa, the result of my previous work as 
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a tour leader in South Africa and Swaziland. Previous travel and work experience 
elsewhere in Africa, including in Lesotho, Ghana, Tanzania and Malawi in both rural 
and urban settings, meant that I was relatively familiar with some important black 
African cultural norms and practices, although I was aware that here could be the 
biggest barriers. Interaction with people from a wide range of backgrounds was also 
facilitated by the fact that as an international student I have a rather diversified circle 
of friends and colleagues in terms of nationality, race, gender and age. In short, my 
Dutch background and international profile resulted in a varied cultural capital of 
which one or more characteristics were likely to appeal to Southern Africans of all 
sorts of backgrounds and aid interaction and integration. 
There was also a curious sense of 'home-coming'. In South Africa I felt very 
welcome; the majority of South Africans that I met were extremely hospitable and 
helpful. Moreover, despite vast geographical distances there were considerable 
overlaps in culture. ' Generally speaking, South Africans can be said to communicate 
in a rather direct and open way, which is also a main feature of Dutch culture. I also 
found that there are great overlaps between the South African and Dutch sense of 
humour, which often worked as an icebreaker during interviews. 2 
Perhaps due to these cultural affinities, race was a far less determining factor in 
shaping my positionality than I had expected on the basis of South Africa's Apartheid 
legacy and my earlier experiences as a tour leader in South Africa's tourism sector. 
My experience was that race and ethnicity continue to matter in post-Apartheid South 
Africa (as they do nearly everywhere! ), but not always in the way people might 
expect. Being white clearly endowed me with a distinguishable feature. However, I 
never encountered open hostility or racism from non-white respondents in the TBPA 
1 More so than for example with England, my place of study and in much nearer proximity to my 
country of origin. 
2 Due to space constraints, this account on positionality concentrates on South Africa as the most 
important country for my research. My research access in Mozambique, Swaziland and Lesotho, the 
other Southern African countries that I visited, was sometimes also aided by my social network and 
personal characteristics however. For example, through the international student network in Durham I 
had good friends in Swaziland. My knowledge of Spanish helped me in finding my way in 
Mozambique, where Portuguese is the main language. Moreover, the attendance at international 
workshops in the course of my research meant that I usually already had some valuable contacts in the 
TBPA scene in these countries by the time I visited them. 
104 
scene, including in South Africa where the record of white oppression was most 
formalised and only relatively recently abandoned. On the whole, I felt my whiteness 
played a much smaller role than I had initially expected. The conservation scene is 
often labelled as a sector characterized par excellence by racist attitudes. However, I 
found that on the whole people of all colours and races worked together remarkably 
well and that the sector was a lot more integrated than other areas of society in which 
I would move. This phenomenon may have facilitated my access, just as the overall 
great hospitality of Southern Africans of all backgrounds to European travellers. 
This is not to say that I do not acknowledge that my colour may have considerably 
influenced my access. Had I been black my reception might have been entirely 
different with some of my white respondents. 3 It could also be argued that a black 
African researcher might have found it easier to gain access to 'black' networks. On 
the other hand, just as with access to white respondents, the issue of access to 'black' 
networks for either black or white researchers cannot be generalised. It would be a 
mistake to think of colour as the decisive or sole factor, and leave ethnicity out. One 
would perhaps assume that there would be an almost natural strong sense of 'black 
brother- or sisterhood' amongst visiting black Africans and black South Africans. 
Unfortunately, reality is different. My black African friends from other Southern 
African countries would frequently complain of fierce discrimination and often open 
hostility by black South Africans (see also VaIji, 2003). In addition, I found that there 
were sometimes negative perceptions of black South Africans as being arrogant and 
unnecessarily bossy amongst other black Southern Africans, particularly in 
Mozambique and Lesotho. These aspects could have influenced a black researcher's 
access 4 to the TBPA scene. In short, an evaluation of race in relation to positionality 
in South Africa indicates various subtleties, making it impossible to draw absolutist 
conclusions. Whilst race undoubtedly was a factor in determining my positionality, its 
influence seems not to have been predominant nor by nature negative. On the other 
hand, possible resistance against working with a white researcher could have been 
3 On the other hand, some white conservationists felt that they were unfairly singled out as a target for 
criticism by white 'progressive' South African researchers because of their whiteness. Not being South 
African, it is doubtful if this phenomenon affected my research. 
4 Access refers in this chapter not only to obtaining interviews, but also to the acquisition of the desired 
information. 
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expressed in very covert ways, and the withdrawal of certain bits of information can 
therefore not be excluded as a possibility. 
My gender and age also shaped my positionality. The TBPA scene is heavily male 
dominated. If anything, the combination of being female and young seemed to endow 
me with a comparative advantage. Observations that young females tend to be 
considered relatively 'unthreatening' and possibly more "intriguing" or a better 
listening audience by older, more senior male respondents (Schoenberger, 1992: 217) 
certainly applied in my case, with the latter often adopting a protective role. On a less 
positive note, occasionally I had to deal with harassment or was initially not taken 
very seriously. A male researcher might not have had to confront these issues or less 
so. Being female often also facilitated the establishment of a rapport with fellow 
females in areas related to TBPAs, inducing a sense of sisterhood, perhaps because 
the TBPA scene is so male-dominated. My gender therefore often functioned 
positively. 
A researcher's positionality is also influenced by the socio-econornic characteristics 
of the environment in which she is working. What these socio-economic 
characteristics constituted was in my case highly context-related. South Africa finds 
itself on the crossroads; whilst the harsh living conditions of the majority of its 
population qualifies it as a developing country, it can be classed 'Westernised' on the 
basis of its highly developed economy. The nature of my work meant that most of it 
took place in the latter arena, though not exclusively. The majority of key policy and 
decision makers in TBPAs belong to elite groups; those groups in society that have 
relatively privileged access to economic resources which may be mobilized in the 
exercise of power or influence (definition based on Woods, 1998: 2108) .5 As such, 
many of the issues that can arise from doing fieldwork in development countries as a 
Western researcher (Devereux and Hoddinott, 1993) only marginally affected my 
research. 
However, from time to time I would also work in a typical 'Third World' context, for 
example when visiting and engaging with local communities and other economically 
marginalized actors. This moving between different socio-economic classes, 
5 Researching elites raises certain research challenges, for example in accessing information. The next 
section describing my fieldwork discusses this issue further. 
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combined with my own relatively privileged background as a Westerner, carries with 
it the danger of an 'elite bias'. This notion entails that the opinions of relatively 
articulate and well educated respondents are valued and highlighted more by the 
researcher than the insights of poorly educated respondents, leading to an under- 
representation or even omission of the latter's views. A researcher's greater 
identification with the views of the first group on basis of similarities in class or 
educational background is one possible cause. Whilst the danger of an elite bias is not 
limited to research in the South (Becker, 1967), arguably it is more profound in this 
context, due to bigger differences in educational backgrounds (if any at all) and 
cultural differences. Continued self-reflection upon the ways in which my 'multi- 
positionality' affected my behaviour with individuals from different social classes and 
the weight I attached to their opinions was an important means to try and avoid this 
methodological pitfall. 6 
4.3. Researching politics 
One aspect of fieldwork that is greatly shaped by an inquiry into politics is the choice 
of fieldwork location. As a result of its fluid and intangible nature, politics is a 
process that tends to be constructed at several geographical scales. Problematically, 
interactions between these scales are far from straightforward. Breman notes how "all 
sorts of relationship patterns tied to different social spheres do not synchronise vis-A- 
vis distribution, and are not constructed according to the simple patterns of hierarchic 
or concrete stratification ... space is as little uniform as are past and 
future" (Breman, 
1989: 130). One particular location or institution can therefore not be assumed to 
function as a micro-cosmos in which all these political processes gather (Breman, 
1989: 130). This notion certainly applies when considering policy-processes in Peace 
Parks. Reflecting the centralised nature of decision-making in TBPAs, the main 
parties and individuals rarely reside at the local scale where TBPA implementation 
takes place, but tend to be scattered all over the region, clustered around a number of 
main centres of decision-making and power. It would hence be fruitful to adopt a 
pluralist perspective towards political decision-making with a bearing upon TBPAs, 
6 Avoiding an elite bias is arguably particularly important in the context of researching conservation 
issues. In spite of the increased attention to 'indigenous knowledge', agenda-setting and decision- 
making, wildlife conservation continues to be largely informed by the so-called 'expert views' of 
conservation agencies and environmental consultants. 
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viewing it as occurring in a diversified political environment characterised by 
multiple centres or institutions of influence. The fieldwork then has to cover these 
power-distribution patterns as much as possible 
This makes it imperative that the fieldworker does not stay in just one or two 
communities for the entire fieldwork period, but engages in "multi-site ethnography" 
(Marcus, 1995). The fieldworker must be "mobile covering a network of sites that 
encompass a process, which is in effect the object of the study" (Marcus and Fischer, 
1986: 94). At the same time, it is usually only by spending a considerable amount of 
time at a particular place that the researcher can begin to distinguish and observe 
important social patterns and make relevant contacts. Reflecting these various 
concerns, a dual approach underpinned my fieldwork. I operated from two main bases 
of operation, from which various travels to other important sites for TBPA 
construction could be and were undertaken. 
Contrary to what may have been expected, I did not locate myself in one of the parks 
that constitute my case-studies. Gauteng (as the centre of decision-making in 
Southern Africa, including in Peace Parks)7 became my base of operation, from 
which I would then visit various sites in parks that would be part of a TBPA. 
Naturally, other Southern African countries play a major role in decision-making as 
well. As in South Africa, decision-making processes and the actors bringing these 
about tend to be concentrated in the capital. In addition to visiting parks on the other 
side of the border, I therefore also undertook visits to the capitals of the countries that 
play a role in the parks constituting my case study areas, notably Mozambique 
(Maputo), Swaziland (Mbabane) and Lesotho (Maseru). Finally, the Cape Town and 
Stellenbosch area constituted an important destination, comprising the headquarters 
of both the Peace Parks Foundation and the Southern Africa branch of Conservation 
7 Gauteng comprises a relatively small area in South Africa. However, it encompasses Johannesburg 
(Africa's largest city) and the capital, Pretoria. Furthermore, it has high levels of industrialisation and 
constitutes a major centre of international financial transactions and trade. For these reasons Gauteng 
has been called 'the beating heart of Southern Africa'. 'ne nature and structures of decision-making in 
TBPAs reflect this concentration of power, with many key decisions being taken in Gauteng. The 
presence of ministries, South African National Parks and other governmental bodies as well as the 
World Bank and important NGOs involved in TBPAs made Pretoria important as a fieldwork site 
whilst Johannesburg was important as the location of workshops and conferences, including the Earth 
Summit. Furthermore, the fact that the suburbs of Johannesburg constituted the place of residence for a 
substantial part of the TBPA 'elite' favoured spending time in Gauteng. 
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.8 leldwork sites 
International Figure 4.1 displays the research area with key fi 
indicated. Having identified how the study of a large-scale phenomenon like politics 
affects choices for fieldwork location and how this worked out in the case of my 
fieldwork, the remaining part of this section considers some important implications of 
researching politics for processes of information gathering and information- 
processing and the strategies developed to deal with these. 
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Figure 4.1 Map of the research area 
Source: Adapted from Lonely Planet (2004). 
8 At the regional level SADC would be a possibility. However, this would mean moving to Malawi 
(where the rotating headquarters were situated) with little opportunity to follow what was going on, on 
the ground. Moreover, SADC's role in TBPAs has so far been linUted. 
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Tracking the operation of politics in a given context such as Peace Parks is all about 
tracing patterns of power and influence. However, this is a far from straightforward 
process. As Cochrane observes "one measure of power may be the extent to which 
policy can be influenced or determined without it being clear who has exerted it" 
(1998: 2128). The full role or power of some actors may hence well remain hidden 
from the researcher, assuming they are identifiable at all. Consequently, access to 
actors and certain pieces of information will be complicated. Policy-making is often 
greatly influenced by decisions taken 'behind closed doors' whilst official discourses, 
for example as expressed in policy papers, generally do not reflect hidden agendas 
and power struggles. Because "power is such a complex phenomenon, it is extremely 
hard to capture its course through measurable indicators" (Devine, 1997: 146) and 
hence through questionnaires. This leaves open-ended interviews and observation, as 
the most feasible means to identify and illuminate power and political patterns 
(Devine, 1997: 146). 
However, an organization will usually discourage its employees to share information 
with outsiders that could potentially harm its image or goals. A respondent's 
willingness to dispense sensitive information may hence be limited or non-existent. 
This is likely to be especially true in an interview setting, where the exchange of 
information "becomes a conscious act", contrary to everyday interaction 
(Mohammad, 2001: 107). Problematically, such obstacles to accessing information 
tend to particularly feature in the first stage of the research, before trust-based 
relations between the researcher and the respondent have a chance to develop. 
Alongside the consultation of interview guides, 1. interviewed two experienced 
academic researchers specialised in the political aspects of conservation9 before 
leaving for Southern Africa to gain more insight into possible issues that might come 
up in accessing information. Their experiences and employed solutions greatly raised 
my awareness of strategies that could be employed to facilitate the acquisition of 
sensitive information. 
9 Dr. Steven Ellis (African Studies Centre, Leiden) and Dr. Rosaleen Duffy (Department of Politics, 
University of Lancaster). A former journalist and formerly the editor of Africa Confidential, Steven 
Ellis is specialised in uncovering sensitive political information, whilst also having engaged in research 
in conservation. Dr. Rosaleen Duffy specialises in politics & conservation, with a focus on TBPAs. 
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These include the application of a "crab-like" strategy in asking sensitive questions 
(Jeffrey, 2000: 1022) and probing. 'Purposeful listening' can also be used to attain 
sensitive information. Awareness of self-silencing or resistance to certain questions 
on the side of respondents can alert the researcher to the presence of a particular 
issue. Even where the respondent is unwilling to discuss this information there and 
then, knowing about the issue can be a great advantage. It can then be explored in 
interviews with other respondents, who may feel freer to discuss it on the basis of 
their different position or because of the assumption that the researcher knows about 
the issue already anyway. The set up of the interviews was kept flexible (see next 
section) and interviews were conducted in such a way that techniques that can be 
helpful in accessing sensitive information could be easily employed or incorporated. 
Where new interesting topics were raised or contradictions noted for example, the 
interview would continue on that 'avenue' rather than automatically jumping to the 
next question, if it was felt the first type of information could be quite critical. Also, 
where information was extremely sensitive and the respondent got visibly nervous, I 
would sometimes halt the note taking to encourage information-sharing. The data 
would then be written down immediately after the interview or when the respondent 
was answering another question, which was not central to the research. 
To encourage the sharing of sensitive information I took the conscious decision to 
refrain from tape-recording my interviews. I found that the presence of a tape- 
recorder significantly inhibited the sharing of 'charged' information, whilst for ethical 
reasons secret recording was not an option. 10 Recording interviews through note- 
taking renders full transcription of interviews impossible, however, with the risk that 
essential information may get lost. To limit this risk I developed several strategies to 
allow me to write faster, such as using abbreviations of frequently returning concepts 
or ideas. Furthermore, interview data would be typed out as soon after the interview 
as possible, to limit chances Of memory loss or misinterpretations. Finally, if I 
interviewed respondents more than once, I would start off the follow-up interview 
10 For example, it was only after I had switched off the tape recorder that one of my first respondents 
started to share relevant information, often contradicting his earlier, mere rhetorical, statements. At 
another occasion in the early stage of my fieldwork, my second-hand acquired tape recorder failed to 
work. My respondent confided afterwards that he would have felt extremely reluctant to share sensitive 
information if the tape recorder had been running. In the light of these experiences, I decided to refrain 
from tape-recording the interviews altogether. 
ill 
with a brief summary of the previous one, to check the accurateness of my 
representation of their views. " 
This discussion on accessing sensitive or secretive information would be incomplete 
without a discussion of the issues that are raised by research on illegal political 
activities. Actors involved in illegal activities will generally seek to remain hidden 
and cover up their activities. Attempts to uncover these actors and their activities may 
affect the researcher's safety (Jamieson, 2000) whilst limited funding and the time 
constraints of a Ph. D. have a constraining impact. Direct interaction with respondents 
involved in these networks is therefore rather difficult. Awareness and the recording 
of illegal activities is however significant in studying the course of Peace Parks. As 
will be explained in more depth in Chapter Six, the borderlands in which Peace Parks 
are inserted are host to a wide range of illegal activities that can easily affect or 
interfere with the functioning of Peace Parks. More indirect ways of information- 
gathering can, however, be used, including existing sources of evidence for illegal 
transboundary flows (Ellis and MacGaffey, 1996). Reports of the Institute of Security 
Studies on illegal border crossings and transactions (available at www. iss. co. za) 
proved particularly useful as well as policy documents by the Great Limpopo's 
Security Working Group. I also interviewed actors involved in the safeguarding of 
conservation such as game wardens and local police officers. These were often in a 
good position to comment on the operation of illegal flows within and around the 
parks, being confronted on a regular basis with the effects of illegal activities, for 
example in the form of poached elephants. They might also directly encounter some 
of the actors of the lower ranks of these criminal syndicates, such as poachers or 
smugglers, and often have access to a network of informants in the area. Discussions 
with journalists covering sensitive issues related to or touching upon conservation 
also provided me with good opportunities to acquire information. Still, due to the 
secret nature of these operations many dimensions are likely to go unnoticed. Since 
my research does not focus on transboundary illegal activities as an aim in itself, but 
on the ways in which their prevalence could affect the functioning of Peace Parks, 
acquaintance with illegal activities could however stay rather general. 
11 Additional measures that were taken to optimýise research validity are discussed later on, specifically 
in the conclusion. 
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Research on political issues raises some important ethical concerns regarding the 
ways in which sensitive information is extracted and used in the research. It was not 
always possible to be fully open about the aim of my research. To facilitate my access 
to respondents and information, I would often state that my research focused on the 
policy-making aspects of Peace Parks, to avoid using the phrase 'political aspects', 
the latter being a more loaded term. This was however the only situation in which I 
was not fully truthful about the research's objectives. What I did manipulate 
sometimes was my positioning towards the respondent, by manoeuvring between 
different roles: from researcher to interested ex-tour leader to friend. 12 In all 
circumstances the respondent was however aware that I was a researcher and what 
my research was broadly about. 
From an ethical viewpoint, the acquisition of politically sensitive information requires 
that the confidentiality of the respondent can be fully guaranteed where necessary. 
Since the researcher can easily underestimate the consequences of the revealing of 
someone's identity for that person's position or even safety, the decision-making 
power was vested in the respondent, not in the researcher. The research adopts the 
directive that no one is quoted unless (s)he has explicitly given permission to do so. 
Where the chances of recognition are high, the respondent's status and employing 
organisation is disguised, in addition to leaving out his/her name. These measures 
may appear somewhat drastic. England notes how "exploitation and betrayal are 
endemic to fieldwork" (England, 1994: 85). Furthermore, it could be argued that 
elites or other influential groups, to which the majority of the respondent can be 
counted, are very capable of protecting their interests. Hence they would not require 
the same level of protection from the researcher as do marginalised groups. Finally, 
obscuring the names of respondents makes the research less transparent, which can 
raise serious issues regarding validity. However, it was felt that concerns for the well 
being of the respondent should outweigh this disadvantage and that it would not be 
12 Especially in the latter case, the line between 'insider' and 'outsider' became bluffed, which was 
sometimes difficult to negotiate. Whilst keen to access information, I did not want to abuse a 
friendship. I therefore tried to limit my use of the 'friend' role as much as possible. However, the more 
I socially bonded with my respondents over time the more they would share confidential information 
with me, when discussing work pressures for instance. In some cases it was quite clear that the 
information was given on an impulse and in a moment in which my position as researcher was 
temporarily forgotten. This provided me initially with considerable ethical dilemmas. By speaking with 
my friends about this and ensuring them of confidentiality this issue was more or less resolved 
although it remained a delicate issue throughout the fieldwork. 
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morally responsible to favour certain groups of respondents over others (cf. Parry, 
1998). 13 
4.4. The rieldwork 
My fieldwork comprised two stages. The first one took place from June-October 
2001, whilst the second fieldwork period started in September 2002 and ran through 
to January 2003. The next two sections will discuss each of the two fieldwork phases, 
discussing the methods employed to further information gathering, and highlighting 
emerging research obstacles and the ways these were addressed. 
4.4.1 The first fieldwork period 
My first fieldwork period lasted roughly four months, from the first week of June 
until October 2001 and took place in South Africa, Mozambique and Swaziland. Its 
major objective was to identify the main political issues in TBPAs, and to smooth the 
path for the second fieldwork period, by establishing relevant contacts and identifying 
useful fieldwork sites. In order to reduce pre-determinism as much as possible, whilst 
allowing enough structure to provide a starting point for data collection and analysis, 
the information-gathering was informed by three objectives that were rather broad in 
outlook, as follows: 
* Identification of the main political issues, local, provincial, national and 
international, relating to the establishment and management of Peace Parks in South 
Africa 
* Exploration of the ways in which these issues impacted upon and were themselves 
influenced by the broader political economy of contemporary South Africa, both 
internally (for example in relation to post-Apartheid social and economic 
reconstruction and development) and externally (for example, in relation to the 
regional geopolitics of Southern Africa 
* Gaining insights into the different political and environmental discourses of the 
main institutional actors (amongst others local communities, (inter) national NGOs, 
13 This discussion of ethical issues is by no means exhaustive, nor can it be due to space constraints. 
Suffice it to say that as a general rule the British Sociological Association's Statement of Ethical 
Practice underpinned my approach (www. britsoc. co. uk/index. phi)? Iink- id=148& area--iteml). 
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private businesses, park authorities, governmental agencies) in terms of their 
environmental and political ideologies and goals 
Unstructured interviews were the most important research method, alongside 
observation. Attendance at workshops combined with field visits were the most 
important means of observation. These methods were further combined with other 
research techniques, including the analysis of policy documents, an acquaintance with 
relevant press reviews on TBPAs and recording data in a fieldwork diary. Table 4.1 
lists additional details as to the objectives and usage of these methods. 
Table 4.1 Main methods of data collection 
Method 
Qualitative interviewing 
Attend Workshops 
Fieldtrips and visits 
Objectives 
0 Acquisition of in- 
depth/insider information 
0 Gain direct insight 
into ways in which policy 
is made in TBPAs and 
which considerations 
underlie them 
Access policy makers 
from all over region 
0 Gain insight into 
physical/social realities at 
ground level 
0 Observation of 
physical aspects of parks, 
borders and borderlands 
Strategy 
0 Capture diversified 
range of viewpoints on 
TBPAs through semi and 
unstructured interviews 
with key actors in TBPAs 
Attendance at 
GKG workshop 
I June 2001 
GKG workshop Il 
July 2001 
'Parliamentarians for 
the Environment' 
conference, September 
2001 
9 InVY'Ent/IUCN/EURO 
PARC workshop 
November 2002 
0 Visits to Kruger 
Park/Coutada 16 area 
0 Golden Gate, Royal 
Natal Park, St Lucia 
0 National Parks in 
Swaziland 
Research Output 
0 Serni and unstructured 
interviews 
0 Notes, interview 
recordings, workshop 
proceedings 
0 Notes, interview 
recordings, photographs 
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0 Interview personnel 0 Borderland South 
on the ground, e. g. game Aftica - Lesotho 
wardens Borderland 
Swaziland-Mozambique 
Borderland South 
Africa- Swaziland 
Literature search Access 0 Library visits 0 Policy papers, 
documents/media 0 Newspaper search ministerial reports, press 
unavailable in Europe 0 Archive search articles 
0 Television 
documentaries/news 
broadcasts 
Fieldwork diary 40 Facilitate 0 Record important 0 Daily overview of 
interpretation fieldwork developments new developments/new 
data ideas/impressions 
0 Reflection upon 
positionality 
Using multiple methods has various advantages. Roe (1998) argues that taking social 
and political complexity seriously necessitates "the use of multiple methods and 
procedures for the complex issue in question" (Roe, 1998: 5). Although in Roe's 
version this notion merely relates to the implementation of development strategies, 
this observation can also be applied to data collection in this area. Increased 
efficiency in data gathering is but one advantage of such a 'triangulation' strategy. To 
optimise the benefits of triangulation, methods were often used in a complementary 
way, whereby one method would often be actively used to check or add to the 
information generated through another method. For example, the observation of 
people and decision-making processes in policy workshops on the Great Limpopo 
was an important way to determine which party had the strongest say in decision- 
making areas in the Great Limpopo and to observe the quality of relationships 
between the participating actors. These observations would add to infonnation 
obtained in interviews in which the importance of their own organisation and the ease 
of policy-making would sometimes be exaggerated by respondents. 14 
14 Nevertheless, the benefits of cross-checking data through 'triangulation' (i. e. the usage of different 
methods and comparison of the findings they generate to research a given phenomenon) should not be 
overestimated. Triangulation is not a panacea to guarantee validity especially when it is not 
accompanied by further critical reflection upon positionality, both that of the researcher and the 
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Fifty-two formal interviews were carried out. In addition to this, I had many informal 
chats with key informants that proved very informative. Appendix 1 provides the 
complete interview schedule whilst the most important participating organisations are 
displayed in Appendix H. Depending on the context and the respondents the 
interviews were either unstructured or semi-structured. 
The respondents involved people specialised in or directly affected by the creation of 
TBPAs in Southern Africa, such as: 
e Policyrnakers at local, national, regional and international level, including civil 
servants with Ministries of Environment and/or Tourism, South African National 
Parks officials, security officials and World Bank employees. 
e Actors belonging to other (potentially) influential interest groups, such as 
representatives and/or leaders of NGOs, local communities and private businesses. 
" Leading opinion-makers, such as prominent conservationists and ecologists. 
"A few members of informal groups, including 'sangomas' (witchdoctors) and 
ivory poachers. 
* Individuals working in the parks or along borders, such as game wardens, local 
police officers and customs personnel. 
As my research project looked at the South African Peace Parks concept as a whole, 
interviews were carried out with experts and interests groups from all six proposed 
TBPAs. However, to allow for a more in-depth focus, a particular case-study was 
made of the Great Limpopo Park, of which the South African-Mozambican part was 
(partly) opened during my stay in Southern Africa and which is the most important 
TBPA in terms of both land area and economic potential. Interviews usually lasted for 
about two hours and often covered a wide range of topics. The precise contents were 
dependent on various factors including the role of the organisation, new topics 
introduced by the respondent and earlier acquired information. To facilitate 
comparisons and rigour in interview analysis the interviews were connected by 
respondents. Ely et al. (1997: 35) argue that triangulation needs to be complemented with 
"crystallisation" which involves considering an issue from as many different perspectives or "angles of 
repose" as possible. Looking at an issue from various theoretical stands is one way to further 
crystallization. 
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common themes, derived from the three leading research questions (see section 1.10), 
but adapted to the respondent's positioning in TBPAs (see Figure 4.2). 
Earlier collected Function of Information 
information respondent/ goals of - added during 
organization interview 
Leading IF 
Research Sub-questions Identification of Further 
Questions for each of three possible interview specification: 
leading research questions and topics Follow up newly 
questions emerging themes 
and issues 
Identify net \nformation needs 
cross-reference cross-reference 
Figure 4.2 Developing and deriving interview questions 
Source: Based on Mason (1996: 52). 
In line with the identified case-study area my initial plan was to be based at a research 
centre close to the Kruger Park, namely Wits Rural Facility, ' 5 for the greatest part of 
the fieldwork. However, my point of entry was Johannesburg, where I had planned to 
stay a few days. This stay was soon lengthened because rather unexpectedly 
Johannesburg provided an excellent interview setting. In accordance with my 
inductive approach, my initial handful of respondents snowballed into a larger circle 
of main informants on TBPAs, most of who were based in either Johannesburg or 
nearby Pretoria. Moreover, my friend and landlord (introduced to me through the 
Durham network) not only worked as the head of a college specialising in the social 
aspects of conservation, but his house informally functioned as the centre for 
discussions on politics. His circle of friends encompassed people from all walks of 
life and (racial) backgrounds, which is still comparatively unusual in a post-Apartheid 
South African setting. Although these conversations were often informal and not 
15 Part of the University of Witwatersrand. 
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planned interviews, I was privy to insider information on ANC party politics and the 
current political climate in general, both in South Africa and in the wider region. My 
stay in Johannesburg constituted in many ways an excellent springboard for the rest 
of the fieldwork. 
My stay at Wits Rural Facility initially did not fulfil my hopes, mainly because of 
logistical complexities, but before I had time to despair the course of my fieldwork 
took several unexpected turns. The most welcome of these was my admittance to a 
three-day workshop, aimed at constructing a management plan for the GKG 16 , where 
most of the key decision-makers in Peace Parks were conveniently gathered. 
Participation in this workshop helped me to extend the geographical range of my 
work further than I could have hoped to have done in the light of budget and time 
constraints. Moreover, I was fortunate to have had unexpected access to private 
meetings dealing with sensitive security issues in relation to cross-border crime in the 
Great Limpopo area. Through the developed contacts, participation in this workshop 
also facilitated the attendance at other important workshops later on in my fieldwork. 
Meanwhile, in the course of the rest of my stay at Wits Rural Facility I became 
acquainted with Freddy, an NGO worker. With his excellent contacts in the Shangaan 
community 17 he was an important gate keeper. Gaining more insight into some of the 
views and local practice of the Shangaan is vital, because their code of ethics and 
their worldview is significantly different from that which forms the reasoning behind 
TBNRM, which is inclined to operate along 'rational' (read Westernised) premises. 
Moreover, as a transboundary community they are the main (although frequently 
unconsulted) occupants of the transboundary space and the way the park will function 
is partially dependent on the manner in which the Shangaan negotiate the space. A 
slightly unconventional aspect of my fieldwork included exchanges with individuals 
which 'good' society would deem rather shady. These individuals have been known 
to engage in illicit cross-border activities including poaching, arms smuggling and 
human trafficking. Conversations with people working for a local NGO involved in 
16 The Gaza/Kruger/Gonarezhou Park, commonly called the GKG, was the previous name for the 
Great Limpopo Park. 
17 The Shangaan belong to the wider Tsonga ethic group. Dispersed over Mozambique, South Africa 
and Zimbabwe, they inhabit the borderland that the Great Limpopo TBPA will cover. 
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helping former Mozambican refugees to return through the Kruger road network was 
also instructive in gaining more knowledge of local cross-border networks and how 
these could possibly affect the Great Limpopo. 
After leaving Wits Rural Facility, additional site visits were taken to Swaziland, 
Mozambique and the Cape Town/Stellenbosch area to talk to both governmental 
bodies and NGOs involved in TBNRM. Not only were the activities at the 
destinations of my travel important for my fieldwork. In the course of travelling I met 
some important gatekeepers to other networks relevant to TBPAs. The respondents 
they introduced me to, including former employees of governmental organisations 
working on TBPAs, were often amongst the most important ones in my research. My 
introduction to them as a friend of someone they were close to greatly facilitated the 
building of trust. 
Luckily, my stay in South Africa was just long enough to be able to attend the official 
elephant translocation from the Kruger Park into the Coutada 16 Park, in the context 
of the creation of the Great Limpopo. This high profile event, attended by amongst 
others Nelson Mandela and the ministers of tourism from Mozambique, South Africa 
and Zimbabwe, provided me with the chance to re-establish my contacts with key 
respondents and meet many new ones. This included persons who were normally not 
easy to approach, including Dr Anton Rupert, one of South Africa's wealthiest men 
and the founder of the Peace Parks Foundation, enabling me to interview him the 
following year. It also offered me the chance to observe the extent to which local 
communities were involved in the event. The observation that after their dance 
performance community members could obtain some sandwiches at the back of the 
tent in which the proceedings took place but not enter it was rather revealing for 
example. 
All in all the outcomes of my first fieldwork period can be considered satisfactory. 
The relatively smooth access to respondents greatly aided the fulfilment of the 
objectives guiding my information gathering. Having identified some of the main 
political issues and actors in Peace Parks, I felt I had a good basis for further study of 
the topic, by means of further literature research and the second fieldwork period the 
following year. Input of my supervisors and other experts on a compiled Fieldwork 
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Report listing the main outcomes of the research thus far and emerging new routes for 
research further aided me in this goal. A first fieldwork period moreover enabled me 
to establish important interview contacts that could be followed up at a later stage in 
case of absence or unavailability of the respondents the first time. 
4.4.2. The second fieldwork period 
My second fieldwork period started II months after the end of my first fieldwork 
period, from September 2002 until January 2003. Its set up did not significantly differ 
from the first fieldwork period. In-depth interviews with individuals were once more 
used as the main means of information gathering, in addition to attendance at relevant 
workshops, the analysis of policy documents and press reports and field visits. To 
keep track of the incoming information, changes in policy or action and my 
positionality in the field, I once more kept a fieldwork diary. This fieldwork period 
had three main aims. Firstly, I sought to further explore the main political issues in 
Peace Parks as identified during the first fieldwork period. Secondly, my renewed 
stay in Southern Africa would be used to test some propositions regarding the 
interface between politics and Peace Parks, which had emerged in the course of the 
analysis of the previous fieldwork data or in literature searches upon my return to the 
UK. Finally, identification of possible new issues and relevant processes also 
constituted an important goal. In addition to the Great Limpopo Park, the 
Maluti/Drakensberg TFCA was selected as a second case study area, to allow for 
comparative analysis. Furthermore, an analysis of the co-operation between South 
Africa and Lesotho in the Maluti/Drakensberg TFCA enabled me to consider various 
political factors relevant to Peace Parks in more depth. Relations between Lesotho 
and South Africa were relatively strained after the contested South African led SADC 
intervention in Lesotho (22 September 1998). Combined with South Africa's alleged 
intentions to secure access to the water resources in the Maluti mountains (Van Wyk, 
2000), and considering the great imbalances in size and power between the two 
countries, a case study of the Maluti/Drakensberg TBPA was considered potentially 
instructive in finding out more about the peace-building potential of TBPAs, the 
regional political economy and sovereignty issues related to Peace Parks. 
My base of operation was this time Pretoria. Unfortunately, the rise of crime in my 
former neighbourhood in Johannesburg (Yeoville) was such that staying there was no 
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longer an option. Moreover, the first fieldwork period identified the South African 
Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism (DEAT), South African National 
Parks (SANPs) and the Peace Parks Foundation (that also has an office in Pretoria) as 
one the most influential decision-making coalitions in Peace Parks. This favoured a 
stay in Pretoria as the location of these organisations. My status as a visiting scholar 
in the Geography Department of the University of Pretoria meant moreover that I 
could tap into the approach and knowledge of local academics working on related 
areas of research. More generally, it enabled me to access academic literature with a 
knowledgeable target audience consisting of experts or other interested parties. 
As a result of some important changes in the TBPA environment and beyond, gaining 
access to relevant information proved this time more difficult than expected. Partly as 
a result of Affirmative Action policies the turnover in the TBPA scene is relatively 
high, which meant that some of my key informants no longer worked in their former 
positions or had left the TBPA scene altogether. Negative publicity in the Southern 
African press on the release of the Kruger elephants without prior consultation of 
local communities in Mozambique and increasingly critical academic reports, meant 
that the management of the Peace Parks project was increasingly questioned. As a 
direct consequence I encountered a greater wariness than previously. This 
necessitated a less circumspect approach towards sensitive interview questions than I 
would normally use. Instead, on the advice of some of my closest and most key 
informants I adopted a bolder approach, stressing the social and scientific importance 
of being able to find out about policy failures as a way to improve TBNRM. I also 
added more weight to my promise of confidentiality by pointing out that disclosure of 
the sources of sensitive information would negatively affect my career prospects, both 
in academia and as a future consultant in TBNRM. Learning to speak and understand 
Afrikaans fluently was another new strategy I adopted. My stay on the University of 
Pretoria's campus, an Afrikaans speaking university, greatly helped in this respect. 
Although I had learned some Afrikaans before, my knowledge was for the most part 
limited to an exchange of greetings and small talk. Most of my Afrikaner respondents 
were more than willing to speak English. However, I soon found that speaking 
(initially broken! ) Afrikaans created a higher sense of informality and intimacy in the 
interviews. Moreover, when conversations took place during long car journeys or late 
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in the evening, the respondent was more likely to prefer to talk in his/her own 
language. 
In addition to the changes in the TBPA scene, developments in the wider regional 
socio-economic and political setting influenced my fieldwork. This was less in 
method than in direction. Many places in Southern Africa had fallen prey to famines, 
including in some parts of the planned TBPAs. Meanwhile, President Mugabe's 
controversial land redistribution programme in Zimbabwe now directly affected 
progress in the Great Limpopo. Informal settlements in the north of the Gonarezhou 
Park had been erected, with the tacit permission of the Zimbabwe authorities, in spite 
of Mugabe's assurances that the Great Limpopo would not be affected by the 
redistribution of land. Likewise, President Nujoma announced drastic land reforms 
for Namibia. Whilst the press and some members of the public would on the basis of 
these developments actively question the feasibility of TBPAs (see for example Mail 
& Guardian, 2002), these changes were little or not at all followed by shifts in policy 
in TBNRM planning. Broader national and foreign interests of South Africa and other 
countries seemed to act against an abandoning or major restructuring of earlier made 
plans. Moreover, a frequently found conviction amongst some of my respondents, and 
particularly amongst the co-ordinators of TBPAs, was that by means of careful 
planning and adaptive management methods, park administrators could contain 
negative political impacts and prevent these from directly affecting the park. The 
combination of these newly found political dynamics and the management responses, 
made me aware of the importance of making the interaction between TBPA policy- 
making at the micro level and wider political and economic changes, and vice-versa, 
a more central focus area of my research. I incorporated this new focus in my 
interview questions accordingly. 
Possibly as a result of my longer stay and further deepening of my relations with 
some trusted respondents, I also gained increased insight into the great role that inter- 
personal and inter-organisational relations play in shaping policy-making in Peace 
Parks. The TBPA scene can be identified as a highly divided one and is sometimes 
jokingly referred to as "being all about egos, not eco" (Grossman, Interview, 2003). 
Increased awareness of this factor further shaped my research design, through an 
additional focus on the social effects of the co-operation on the ground in TBPAs and 
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increased attention to the role of inter-personal relations in shaping co-operative 
processes. These adjustments in my research design and focus reflect how the usage 
of an inductive fieldwork approach can contribute to the building of informed and 
'grounded' theory, as was the intention. 
The development of my second term of fieldwork also bears witness to the great role 
that chance plays in directing fieldwork (Wels, 2000: 77-79). Unfortunately, I fell ill 
due to a parasite. The effects were already felt halfway into my fieldwork in the form 
of increased tiredness and susceptibility to minor infections. This meant that I could 
undertake less travelling that originally planned and particularly so to rural areas. In 
addition to the visits I had already paid to Mozambique and Swaziland, I visited 
Maseru, but not the Maluti Mountains in Lesotho. Attendance at an InVVEnt 
workshop at the Golden Gate Park (South Africa) had however fortunately enabled 
me to interview the most important Basotho policy-makers. My stay there also 
enabled me to view the Lesotho side of the future Park. Unexpectedly, my illness also 
affected my fieldwork in positive ways. My involuntarily long stay in Pretoria as a 
result of falling ill considerably deepened my contacts and friendships with some of 
my key informants in Pretoria. As a result, they increasingly disclosed sensitive and 
insightful information with me, for example regarding conflicts that emerged during 
closed meetings. Much of this information was highly important and would otherwise 
have remained inaccessible. 
4.5 Discussion 
This chapter has considered some of the main methodological aspects that arise from 
researching political patterns in Peace Parks in a Southern African setting. Moreover, 
how these aspects were translated into the fieldwork design and research practice has 
been outlined. The remaining part of this chapter will provide an insight into the 
strategies and considerations that have guided the analysis and usage of the fieldwork 
data. The discussion focuses particularly on the interpretation and usage of the in- 
depth interviews, as the most significant data collection method. 
Data analysis arguably requires three mutually complementary processes: data 
reduction (Miles and Huberman, 1994), data management and data interpretation 
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(Dey, 1993: 95). Following Harnmersley and Atkinson's (1983: 178) suggestions I 
first immersed myself in the data to identify important themes and patterns whilst at 
the same staying alert to contradictions and inconsistencies, such as colliding views 
by different actors on the same issue. Relevant observations and thoughts would be 
noted down in the margins of the texts under scrutiny. Where information was 
incomplete or unclear this would also be marked on the text. Unclear statements or 
observations would usually be checked by going back to the respondents, if possible 
in personIg or else by email or phone. Missing factual data would usually be filled in 
through a literature search. 
A loose form of coding was used to manage and categorise data. The assignment of 
codes to data can facilitate and structure the process of ascribing meaning to and 
categorising fieldwork data for usage in a thesis (Miles and Huberman, 1994: 56). 
The codes that I used reflected for the most part the themes of sections in my 
preliminary thesis outline, to which further sections were added with the 
identification of new subject categories, such as 'Informal Politics'. Each coding 
category was endowed with a different colour, after which small-sized stickers of the 
corresponding colour were used to mark interview and other texts. Coding procedures 
should be used with caution and flexibility. When using rigid sets of codes, precious 
information falling outside the developed categories may easily remain unused or go 
unobserved. Coding was therefore used in a flexible way and never replaced in-depth 
studying of the texts when looking for information. 
Due to its subjective nature, qualitative research raises several challenges to research 
validity. Information is not neutral, but "is constructed, or created, in specific social 
contexts for particular purposes" (Mosse, 1994: 499). As with the researcher, 
respondents' impressions and opinions will be shaped by their background and 
interests in the research area. Respondents' accounts are thus likely to give at least to 
some extent a distorted portrayal of events, even when unconsciously due to memory 
defects (Keeble, 2001). Furthermore, the corroboration of propositions will 
significantly depend upon a researcher's interpretation of the material. "We tend to 
18 Part of the data analysis was already undertaken in South Africa, with the advantage of still being 
close to the data and geographically, to my respondents. Data generated in the first fieldwork period 
could moreover be checked or added to during my second stay in Southern Africa. 
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make more of the evidence that confirms our beliefs, and pay less attention to any 
evidence that contradicts them" (Dey, 1993: 222). Miles and Huberman (1994) are 
even more cynical: "most people are rotten scientists, relying heavily on pre-existing 
beliefs, and making bias-ridden judgements" (quoted in Dey 1993: 222). The 
subjective nature of research therefore induces considerable risks of misinterpretation 
and misrepresentation of the data (Dey, 1993: 117). Clear-cut guidelines to measure a 
contested concept like validity are moreover lacking in the Social Sciences (Dey, 
1993). 
Various means were used to try and ensure as adequate an interpretation of the data as 
possible, of which the most important ones will now be discussed. To start with, I 
tried to prevent data misinterpretation and misrepresentation by actively considering 
which biases the research could produce and how these could affect data 
interpretation. Although the potential of biases was present throughout the research, 
three main ones can be identified. Firstly, the set up of the research introduced the 
risk of a 'South African bias'. I spent most of my time in South Africa and the 
majority of my respondents are South Africans. Even though my fieldwork certainly 
also looked into perspectives from 'across-the-border', this induces the risk of overt 
concentration on South African perspectives. Secondly, my research concentrated 
upon the political aspects of TBPAs at both the inter-ministerial and intra 
governmental levels. Although I also interviewed some community members and 
representatives, as a result of the research focus this group remained somewhat under- 
represented. Finally, the friendships I developed in the course of the research may 
have led to a 'preferential bias'. It cannot be eliminated that in some cases my 
perspectives may have been unevenly influenced by the views of befriended 
respondents, if only through the increased exposure to their views. 
Information-sharing with peers and other experts and information-checking were 
important methods used to try and optimise research validity. I actively compared 
perspectives and checked information with fellow researchers working on Southern 
Africa's TBPAs, including with researchers based in Mozambique and Zimbabwe, 
and specialised in the interaction between TBPAs and the welfare of local 
communities. Furthermore, some of the key findings of the research emerging from 
the data analysis were published in academic journals (Van Amerom, 2002; Van 
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Amerom and BUscher, 2005). This introduces the opportunity for the research results 
to be challenged (McDowell, 1998: 2144), including by my respondents whom I 
informed of the existence of the articles and who were provided with copies where 
desired. Individual respondents have also been approached to check whether their 
remarks and opinions were appropriately used in the thesis text, where there existed 
some level of doubt. 
Furthermore, in order to help determine the strength of a given observation or claim 
and the weight it could be accorded, including vis-a-vis other fieldwork-based claims, 
its origin and credibility would be critically asssessed. The level of authenticity and 
replicability of the corresponding "data bits" (Dey, 1993: 117) were, for example, 
actively considered whilst the amount of time between a given observation and its 
recording and the likelihood of bias were also taken into account (Alvesson and 
Skoldberg, 2000: 79). High occurrence of these factors may affect the validity of a 
given data bit. Table 4.2 displays some of the main guidelines used to promote data 
credibility. 19 The guidelines were flexibly used. Ultimately, the weight that was given 
to certain data would also be greatly deten-nined by how plausible they seemed in the 
light of the other fieldwork findings. 
19 All the criteria are derived from Alvesson and Skoldberg (2000: 79). Part of the guiding questions 
also come from Dey (1993: 224). 
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Table 4.2 Guidelines for critical reflection upon level of validity of data 
Implications 
Ctiteria Guiding questions for strength of 
claim (if high) 
- Is the observation genuine or fictitious? 
Level of - Is it based on the own observation, or on hearsay? + 
authenticity - How reliable are those making/reporting the 
observation? 
Level of replication - Have other people made or reported the same + 
observation? 
Criticism of bias - What are possible biases of the respondent and how can 
these have distorted interpretations? 
- What are possible biases of the researcher? 
- What motivations may have influenced how the 
observation was reported? 
Criticism of - How long after the observation was made was it 
distance recorded, and in which situation? 
Criticism of - Can other stories, which the reporting person has 
dependence/ listened to, possibly have influenced the structure or 
9narrative content of the report (and the following analysis)? 
contagion 
Having discussed my approach towards data analysis and the methods employed to 
try and optimise research validity, the eventual representation of the fieldwork data in 
the thesis needs consideration. Considering the set up of my research, in which 
interviews provided the bulk of the fieldwork data and in which case-studies were 
used to focus the research direction, two issues need particular consideration. Firstly, 
the ways in which interview data are constructed into theoretical concepts is 
important to consider (Baxter and Eyles, 1997: 506). To avoid quoting respondents 
out of context it was carefully considered for each quotation how representative it 
was of the respondent's overall viewpoints and if the interviewee would accept it as a 
reasonable sununary or expression of their views. Secondly, the usage of case-studies 
raises the question to what extent the data derived from these case-studies can and 
will be generalised into theoretical concepts. Typically, case studies provide a good 
way to explore certain social phenomena in more depth; however they do so within a 
given demarcated geographical setting. By comparing and combining the findings of 
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case-studies to other academic studies their generalisability can however be 
increased. In my research I also collected material on the various other TBPAs, 
making it easier to determine to what extent certain developments seem typical for 
the Southern African Peace Parks project or limited to a particular park. To avoid 
overstating generalisation of the findings of the case-studies to TBPAs as a whole 
would only be undertaken after careful consideration and if references to similar 
developments in other TBPAs or to the registration of such developments in the body 
of academic literature on the top could be made. 
Whilst the application of the above-described guidelines can help to increase validity, 
it would be a fallacy to believe that fieldwork data can tell an absolute 'truth'. For one 
thing, in spite of all efforts we can never be fully aware of, or articulate, our own self- 
positioning (Rose, 1997) let alone the positioning of our respondents. This awareness 
raises responsibilities as to how the fieldwork data are written up and represented. 
The rest of this thesis has been written bearing these issues in mind. Rather than 
establishing clear-cut truths and solutions, this thesis seeks to offer an overview of a 
wide range of perspectives on the political aspects of Peace Parks in addition to 
opening up new avenues for thinking and discussion. 
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5: Peace Parks & Development 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter considers the political aspects of the pursuit of development through 
Peace Parks in Southern Africa. The promotion of regional sustainable development 
is a key reason for the creation of Peace Parks (see section 2.8), and proponents of 
TBPAs present co-operation between countries on this basis as a relatively smooth 
and unproblematic exercise. The transformation of borderlands into 'zones for 
development' by means of TBPAs tends to be portrayed as an a-political project, 
merely involving the joining together of conservation areas in seemingly otherwise 
'empty' borderlands (Duffy, 2001), and the creation or extension of tourism facilities 
to cater for the influx of eco tourists. This optimistic view is for example expressed 
by Anton Rupert, the head of the PPF, when stating that the creation of the Great 
Limpopo "merely" requires the establishment of wildlife corridors and ecotourism 
infrastructure and the securing of space (Rupert, Interview, 2002; Rupert quoted in 
Sunday Times, 2003). Furthermore, the CBNRM component in Peace Parks is seen to 
ensure that local communities will support the creation of TBPAs. The set up of 
TBPAs in Southern Africa was hence initially portrayed as an exercise, which could 
effortlessly combine conservation and local development needs. Moreover, referring 
to the stipulations in treaties that TBPA construction will not involve a ceding of 
sovereignty for states, proponents of Peace Parks have emphasised that the individual 
parts of a TBPA will continue to fall under the jurisdiction of the government of the 
country in which it is located (Government of the Kingdom of Lesotho, 2001; 
Government of Mozambique, 2002; Mpasa, Interview, 2002; Africom, 2003). 
Together these viewpoints implicitly suggest that land harmonisation would -not be a 
significant issue, would pose few difficulties, and would not induce strife between 
countries. 'Land harmonisation' can in this context be defined as the process of 
merging, or bringing more into agreement with one an other, differing land uses 
across a given international boundary for the purpose of creating a TBPA, through 
adaptations in land use on both sides of the boundary or by adapting the land use in 
one of the countries concerned to resemble that of the neighbouring country. 
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By allegedly promoting shared economic interests in the development of TBPAs and 
the ecotourism income they are expected to generate, advocates of Peace Parks also 
claim that the joint pursuit of development through TBPAs will promote greater 
cohesion and integration between countries and to promote regional peace. This is 
reflected in the words of Valli Moosa (quoted in Keenan, 2000: 10), South Africa's 
Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism: 
The benefits of TFCAs will transcend national boundaries, much as the animals will 
as we open up migratory routes. I know of nothing else with the capacity to build as 
much solidarity andfriendship as TFCAs. They will be thefirst visible steps in thefull 
economic integration of the region. 
In practice, attempts to develop a TBPA and exploit its ecotourism potential are 
complex and often problematic and may cause considerable conflict between South 
Africa and neighbouring states. Two main conflict areas can be identified: 
1) Struggles related to a hannonisation of land use 
Whilst South Africa generally favours a preservation-oriented approach, many of its 
neighbouring countries have adopted a more 'relaxed' approach towards 
conservation, allowing for a sustainable usage of resources' and human habitation in 
their parts of the TBPAs. TBPAs increase inter-state interdependency by establishing 
or increasing infrastructural connections between countries and by promoting shared 
economic interests in the development of the area through ecotourism. 
This means that differences in land uses and administration between the territory of 
its neighbouring countries and that of its own could now harm South Africa's 
ecological and economic interests by threatening the welfare of its wildlife and/or by 
limiting its opportunities to exploit the TBPA's ecotourism potential. As the region's 
strongest state, South Africa is in the position to challenge and demand changes in the 
spatial organisation and administration of its neighbours' territory. As such, TBPAs 
may become a means through which South Africa can increase its say in 
1 This can for example involve the gathering of water and firewood, herbs for medicines and hunting 
(Kiss, 1990). 
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neighbouring territory. Its neighbouring states are however likely to resist South 
African intervention. They will have vested interests in the current land use and 
administration of their parts of the TBPA. Furthermore, states will generally resist a 
ceding of their sovereignty. For this reason, South African intervention is likely to 
produce fierce power struggles and to put considerable strain upon its relations with 
neighbouring countries. 
2) Competition over expected ecotourism benefits 
There is considerable competition amongst South Africa and neighbouring countries 
over the distribution of envisaged ecotourism benefits. The equitable sharing of 
benefits is the bottorn-line for the participating governments in Southern Africa's 
TBPAs (Braack, 2002a: 16). However, partially as a result of disparities in power and 
capacity between South Africa and its neighbours, it has proved hard to negotiate 
benefit sharing in TBPAs in an equitable way. 
Altogether, the sharing of costs and benefits in pursuing development in Peace Parks 
has generated considerable tensions between South Africa and neighbouring 
countries. Furthermore, the resolving of these issues largely in favour of the strongest 
state, South Africa, has evoked resentment and hostility amongst South Africa's 
neighbours. 
This chapter will explore these issues and tensions with a focus on co-operation 
between South Africa and Mozambique and Zimbabwe in the Great Limpopo Park, 
the most advanced TBPA after the already established Kgalagadi Park. With the 
South African Kruger Park attracting over a million tourists a year, the Great 
Limpopo is well placed to attract ecotourism. This is why it has become the 'flagship' 
of the Southern African Peace Parks project. It has, however, also become the first 
TBPA in which harmonisation of land use posed major issues and in which the 
sharing of ecotourism revenue has provoked fierce struggles between the participating 
parties. These issues moreover continue to be contested. Problematically, there is a 
high chance that struggles over land harmonisation and the distribution of the 
ecotourism benefits will also become an issue in other, currently less advanced 
TBPAs. 
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5.2 Disagreements over land use in the Great Limpopo 
5.2.1 Introduction 
In the course of developing the Great Limpopo, conflicting preferences regarding its 
administration and land use have increasingly created tensions between South Africa 
and Mozambique and, to a lesser extent, between South Africa and Zimbabwe. On the 
basis of its ecological and economic interests in the Great Limpopo, South Africa 
regards the continued presence of local communities in the Great Limpopo and the 
sustainable usage of natural resources as undesirable. Mozambique and Zimbabwe, 
who both host local communities on their territory in the Great Limpopo, have 
however vested interests in maintaining more flexible conservation regimes, which do 
allow for human habitation and hunting. 
Although occupying a minority position, South Africa has increasingly intervened 
with the design of the Great Limpopo. This testifies to the superior economic and 
political power position its holds vis-ý-vis its neighbouring countries. Firstly, to 
protect its economic and ecological interests, upon joining the Great Limpopo 
initiative South Africa consistently and ultimately successfully pushed for a 
downgrading of the initial TFCA concept to a TFP concept for the Great Limpopo, in 
which conservation supersedes other forms of land use. The size of the TBPA was 
furthermore significantly reduced. Secondly, South Africa has increasingly intervened 
with the administration and land use of the Mozambican part of the Great Limpopo, 
which has resulted in considerable tensions with Mozambique. Tensions with 
Zimbabwe over the harmonisation of land use in the Great Limpopo, which were for 
a long time kept to a minimum, seem now also on the rise. Before considering these 
issues in more depth, it is first useful to explore the Great Limpopo's institutional 
aspects and the rationale behind its creation. 
5.2.2. The Great Limpopo's rationale and institutional arrangements 
The Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park is a joint agreement between Mozambique, 
South Africa and Zimbabwe. As noted in Chapter Two its origins date back to the 
I 9th century, when a Portuguese ecologist, Gomes de Soussa, proposed that the 
Limpopo area, divided by English and Portuguese colonial administrations, should be 
managed as a TBPA. After the ending of apartheid the idea was picked up again by 
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the Mozambican National Directorate of Forestry and Wildlife (DNFFB), which 
proposed the creation of a TBPA between the Coutada 16 Park with the South 
African Kruger Park across the border. The Banhine and Zinave National Parks 
located further eastwards in Mozambique would also form a part, as well as private 
game reserves to the west of the Kruger Park. Over time Zimbabwe was also 
approached to join the initiative. Its Gonarezhou Park would join the TBPA by means 
of the Sengwe corridor (see Figure 5.1) 2. 
The TBPA initiative, then still referred to as the Gaza/Kruger/Gonarezhou Park, was 
first formerly recognised and given high level political support with the signing of the 
International Transfrontier Conservation Agreement between South Africa, 
Mozambique and Zimbabwe on 10 November 2000. During this occasion the three 
countries established a tri-national Ministerial Committee and a supporting Technical 
Committee 3, in which senior officials from conservation authorities in each of the 
participating countries had a seat (Braack, 2002b). By 2001 this organisational 
structure had been extended with amongst others several working groups, including a 
community working group on the South African side, and a National Steering 
Committees. The Great Limpopo's organisational structure is displayed in Figure 2.5. 
As Figure 5.1 indicates, joining the TBPA offers for each of the countries concerned 
some important opportunities to enhance their conservation and ecotourism profile. 
As a result of Mozambique's civil war (1978 - 1992), by the end of the 1990s 
wildlife in Coutada 16 4 had been severely depleted (see section 2.5. ). The area also 
lacks tourism facilities. South Africa's Kruger Park is on the contrary already a well- 
developed, leading tourist destination with a wide variety of wildlife, including the 
2 It was initally also envisaged that the Malipati Safari Area, the Manjinji Pan Sanctuary and the Sav6 
Valley and Chiredzi River Conservancies would join. The connection of the Gonarezou Park through 
the Sengwe corridor seems to be the main priority for now however, which might explain why these 
three areas are usually not displayed on maps of the Great Limpopo TFCA. 
3 Now replaced by an Interim Joint Management Board. 
4 Renamed the Limpopo Park on 4 October 2001. 
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popular Big Five (see also section 2.2). It suffers, however, from an overpopulation of 
elephants. 
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Figure 5.1 Map of Great Limpopo TBPA with characteristics of main 
joining conservation areas in 2001 indicated 5 
Source: Based on Schoon (2004: 23). 
Research at the University of Zimbabwe indicates that for 26 years the Kruger Park's 
elephant population consisted of 6000-8000 elephants. Today there are nearly 12 000 
' Then still called the Gaza/Kruger/Gonarezhou (GKG) Park. 
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(Mail & Guardian, 2004). The Kruger Park's elephant surplus causes significant 
environmental degradation, which could in due time threaten the survival of other 
animal species (Oliver, Interview, 2001; Pienaar, Interview, 2001). Elephant culling 
is however highly contested and likely to result in international condemnation, whilst 
attempts to put female elephants on the pill have had only limited success (Hall- 
Martin, Interview, 2001). 
Considering the nature of the limitations and strengths that both conservation areas 
display, their connection into a TBPA could benefit both countries. The translocation 
of South African elephants and other wildlife from the Kruger Park into adjacent 
territory in Mozambique could boost the Coutada 16's bio diversity levels, whilst 
South Africa could 'dispose' of its 'excess elephants' without attracting negatively 
publicity that might hamper ecotourism to the Park (Oliver, Interview, 2001). 
Furthermore, a connection to the Kruger Park could promote more tourism to 
Mozambique's Limpopo Park, now well off established 'tourism tracks' (Storm, 
Interview, 2001). The same counts to a considerable extent for Zimbabwe's 
Gonarezhou Park. Although poaching by army officials and even official 
conservationists posed and continues to pose major problems (Duffy, 1997), the 
Gonarezhou Park nevertheless incorporates a wide range of biodiversity. However, its 
ecotourism. potential has remained underdeveloped, partially a result of poor tourism 
facilities in the Park. At the first sight, the creation of the Great Limpopo therefore 
appears to constitute a 'win-win' scenario for all three countries involved (see also 
Figure 5.1). It was partially on this premise that the creation of the TBPA has been 
presented as a vehicle for regional integration and peace. The focus was thereby 
especially on South Africa and Mozambique, whereby the translocation of Kruger 
elephants to Mozambique's Coutada 16 was presented as a South African -'gift' to 
'pay back' Mozambique for its suffering during the apartheid years in order to heal 
these "old wounds" (Koch, 1994). This spirit is for example reflected in Nelson 
Mandela's jest during the first official elephant transfer into Mozambique in October 
2001. Mandela joked that the donation of these elephants to Mozambique meant that 
he had finally paid his lobola (bride prize) for Mozambican wife Graqa Machel. 
Considering the interests that each of the three countries has in joining the TBPA, it is 
perhaps not surprising that Ministers of Tourism Helder Muteia (Mozambique), Valli 
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Moosa (South Africa) and Francis Nhema (Zimbabwe) signed an International 
Agreement on the TBPA just 13 months after they had first considered the idea 
(Braack, 2002b), notably on 10 November 2000. However, there existed major 
disparities in land use and capacity between the three countries, as a result of which 
the connection of the individual parks and other conservation areas into a TBPA 
produced increasingly conflicting views regarded the desired forms of land use in the 
Great Limpopo. In spite of the progress made since then (see Table 5.1), and the 
sense of harmony that was given off during formal ceremonies, considerable tensions 
between South Africa and Mozambique and Zimbabwe developed in the course of 
creating the Great Limpopo as a result. 
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Table 5.1 ... Main developments in the Great Limpopo 
Event Countries involved Date Additional Comments 
Completion of Mozambique, South August 2001 Drawn up in policy 
management plan Africa and Zimbabwe workshops with 
relatively wide range of 
stakeholders, including 
from Great Limpopo 
working groups 
Translocation of Mozambique, South 4 October First large-scale 
Kruger elephants Africa 2001 translocation of 
into Coutada 16 wildlife: 25 elephants 
translocated from 
Kruger Park to Coutada 
16 
Signing of MoU Mozambique, South 23 October 
Africa and Zimbabwe 2001 
Formal acceptance Mozambique, South 30 April 
of Joint Africa and Zimbabwe 2002 
Management Plan 
by Technical 
Committee 
Signing of Treaty Mozambique, South 9 December 
Africa and Zimbabwe 2002 
Fence cutting Mozambique, South 11 Involved creation of 
ceremony Africa December three openings of 
2002 35km, 15 krn and 10 
km wide in Kruger Park 
fence 
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5.2.3. Differing land uses in the Great LiMPOPO 
Given the sheer size of this proposed TBPA (99,000 km2) it is perhaps not surprising 
that there exist a considerable disparity in land use and administration between the 
individual parts of the Great Limpopo (see Table 5.2). 
Table 5.2 Land use and status of main conservation areas in designated Great 
Limpopo TFP 
Country Main areas Status Human Land use 
in Great habitation 
Limpopo 
Initiave 
South Africa Kruger Park National Park Limited to a Conservation 
(SANPs few staff 
owned) villages 
Makuleke Contractual None Conservation. 
Region Park Commercial hunting 
possible on limited 
scale 
Mozambique Coutada 16 Hunting area 27000 Conservation, 
residents commercial hunting, 
crops (maize, beans), 
livestock 
Zimbabwe Gonarezhou National Park Conservation. Since 
Park land invasion by 
Chitsa community in 
2001 also subsistence 
agriculture and 
hunting in northern 
part. 
Sengwe Wildlife Subsistence 
Corridor Utilization agriculture, livestock, 
Area conservation, 
commercial hunting 
Differences exist particularly between South Africa's territory in the Great Limpopo 
on the hand, and the Mozambican and Zimbabwean parts on the other. These 
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distinctions can in turn be traced to different conservation regimes and land 
ownership systems. 
Whereas on the South African side preservationist land use dominates, Mozambique 
and Zimbabwe hosts on their parts vast communal areas in which local communities 
practice subsistence agriculture. Subsistence and commercial hunting also occurs in 
these areas. These differences in conservation regimes between South Africa and 
neighbouring countries were initially perceived to be relatively unproblematic. This 
was the case because in the original plan for the TBPA, as developed by 
Mozambique's DNFFB, the Great Limpopo was modelled as a TFCA. A TFCA 
allows for a multitude of land uses, in which consumptive use of natural resources 
and areas inhabited by humans areas may complement areas solely dedicated to 
conservation and tourism (see section 2.9). 
A TFCA model for the Great Limpopo was favoured by Mozambique and Zimbabwe, 
as this was considerable in line with their national priorities. It is relatively common 
and accepted that local communities can reside in Mozambique (see also section 7.3), 
as they do for example in Coutada 16 and in the Zinave National Park. Furthermore, 
Mozambique's TFCA secretariat was based in the Ministry of Agriculture, for which 
food provision from land is a central concern. This facilitated an approach towards 
conservation whereby the sustainable usage of natural resources by local communities 
was increasingly perceived to be compatible with wildlife conservation, rather than 
undermining its prospects (Anstey, 2001). Finally, the Mozambican government 
supported commercial hunting in Coutada 16, as an important foreign exchange 
eamer. Zimbabwe supported Mozambique in this policy position. Campfire (see 
section 2.8) encourages rural communities to manage, and benefit directly from 
wildlife on their lands, financially and in the form of meat. The selling of hunting 
concessions to wealthy tourists are important enabling means (Duffy, 2000; Jonga, 
Interview, 2002). Because of their firin attachment to Campfire, the removal of the 
Sengwe community from their lands in the Sengwe Corridor would legally be 
impossible. In addition, in 2000 President Mugabe started up a programme of radical 
land reforms. Landless black farmers and 'war veterans' were encouraged to occupy 
farms owned by white commercial farmers on the premise that they were entitled to 
land. To justify its controversial land reforms, the acquisition of rural support is 
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important for the Zimbabwean government. This makes it politically difficult for the 
Zimbabwean government to enforce the country's relatively strict anti-poaching laws 
in and around its National Parks (Anonymous Source Gonarezhou Park, 2001). Many 
rural residents aspire to access the land and natural resources within these areas 
(Gibson, 1999; Nielsen and Chikoko, 2002). Altogether, Zimbabwe had, like 
Mozambique little interest in a preservationist regime for the Great Limpopo. 
However, fearing that its wildlife would be poached in communal areas across the 
boundary and to protect its ecotourism interests South Africa consistently pushed for 
a replacement of the TFCA concept by a TFP model. In a TFP conservation and 
ecotourism are the prime land uses (Munthali and Soto, 2001: 7). These attempts 
were ultimately successful: During the second ministerial meeting on the TBPA, on 2 
May 2000, the Ministerial Conm-iittee abandoned the TFCA concept, at least on the 
short term, in favour of an initial focus on a much scaled down core GKG 
Transfrontier Park (De Vletter, Interview, 2001; Grossman, Interview, 2001). In this 
new set up, the GKG TFP would be limited to Coutada 16 in Mozambique (about 
I 1,000km2), the Kruger National Park with integrated private Game Reserves in 
South Africa (about 22,000km2), and the Gonarezhou National Park with the Sengwe 
Corridor in Zimbabwe (about 5,000km2) (see Figure 5.1). Furthermore the project 
became more preservationist oriented. The Transfrontier Park would be managed as 
an ITJCN category H protected area (Munthali and Soto, 2001). Protected areas within 
this category have as their prime objectives the protection of ecosystem integrity and 
the creation of "visitor opportunities". "Exploitation or inimical occupation ... of the 
area". (Munthali and Soto, 2001: 2) is however rejected. Although the exact 
interpretation of the I1JCN's Category H criteria is contested (Grossman, Interview, 
2003), the latter consideration paved the path for a discussion as to whether the stay 
of local communities in the Limpopo Park was still legitimate. Moreover, on the basis 
of its greater capacity and resources compared to Mozambique and Zimbabwe, South 
Africa successfully vied for the position of Lead Country for the TFp6, which made it 
responsible for ensuring sustained momentum and drive. This further strengthened its 
6 After this, co-ordinatorship would rotate, with every two years another country fulfilling the role of 
co-ordinator (Braack, Interview, 2001). 
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position to demand changes in land use in neighbouring territories, where these could 
potentially conflict with the conservation and ecotourism goals of the TBPA. 
5.2.4 South African intervention in Coutada 16 
South Africa started to particularly interfere with the administration of Mozambique's 
Coutada 16. It sought to moderate its land use in ways that would make it more 
harmonious with that of the Kruger Park. This prioritisation was influenced by the 
fact that Coutada 16 constituted the prime destination for South Africa's valuable 
Kruger elephants whilst South Africa also had considerable ecotourism interests in 
the area. Mozambique's relatively weak power position vis-a-vis South Africa, 
compared to Zimbabwe, can also be identified as an important reason. South Africa 
did not put pressure on Zimbabwe to change its administration or land use in its part 
of the Great Limpopo, even when progress on the Zimbabwean side came to a total 
standstill and when illegal settlers invaded the Gonarezhou Park. 
While Mozambique preferred to continue to permit local communities to reside in its 
Coutada 16 and allow commercial hunting in the area, South Africa put considerable 
pressure on Mozambique to gazette the conservation area as a National Park and ban 
human habitation and hunting in the context of creating the Great Limpopo. To 
understand how and why South Africa developed territorial interests in 
Mozambique's Coutada 16 as a result of its participation in the Great Limpopo, it is 
important to realise that there exist significant disparities in capacity between South 
Africa and Mozambique. South Africa's Kruger Park has a well-established and 
relatively effective management regime. As a weak state (Jackson, 1990) 
Mozambique has relatively little control over its borderlands, including over the 
conservation areas in these zones (Duffy, 1997; Singh, 2000). The Kruger National 
Park has well-trained and well-equipped rangers and scouts, as a result of which 
poaching is under reasonable control. On the Mozambican side, there had for long 
been a severe lack of capacity, funding and trained conservation staff. Human 
encroachment in the area increased and anti-poaching laws were only marginally 
enforced. Furthermore, government factions and the police in Mozambique, these 
days jokingly referred to as the 'Gangster's Paradise' on basis of widespread 
corruption practices involving the highest governmental circles (Vermeulen, 2003; 
Nordstrom, 2004), are extensively involved in poaching and illegal logging in 
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wildlife areas (Anonymous sources DNFFB, Interviews, 2001; Sanwild, 2004). There 
were hence considerable and realistic fears on the South African side that its ivory 
carrying elephants would be poached upon arrival in Coutada 16. There were also 
concerns that other South African wildlife might be killed to serve as 'bush meat' by 
the impoverished local communities in Coutada 16. These fears were confirmed by 
the alleged referral by the Coutada 16's communities to a designated 30 000 hectares 
sanctuary for incoming South African wildlife in the south of the park as "Valli 
Moosa7's take-away" (Lemmer, 2001). 
The presence of local communities in Coutada 16 also complicated the creation of 
wildlife corridors for a different reason. The likelihood of wildlife-human conflict in 
Coutada 16 would significantly increase with the entry of South African wildlife into 
Mozambique. Human settlements would now become increasingly vulnerable to 
attacks of wildlife on crops and humans. A possible solution would be to erect fences 
around communal areas to prevent wildlife from entering the settlements. However, 
this is often opposed by local community members and local NGOs which view it as 
a new form of "ecological Apartheid" (Munthali and Soto, 2001: 18; Grossman, 
Interview, 2003). Moreover, this policy option little reduced South African fears for 
the welfare of its elephants and other precious wildlife such as lions, as community 
members could still freely enter the Park from their residential areas. There was also 
another reason why South Africa pushed for the removal of Coutada 16's local 
communities. South Africa has a tacit interest in moving these communities out of 
Coutada 16, because they take up space that could also be used to build lucrative 
tourism lodges. To facilitate its administration and the generation of private sector 
investment the Great Limpopo is to be divided into several zones based on different 
types of land use in the TBPA. In this respect planning in the Great Limpopo 
considerably reflects the principles for a Biosphere Reserve (see Chapter 2). Endowed 
with beautiful scenery and a relatively high density of animals, the bank of the 
Shinguedzi River is perceived to be the best place in the whole of Coutada 16 to build 
tourism lodges. For this reason interested tourism developers, the majority of which 
are based in South Africa (see next section) have been eying up the area and lobby for 
7 South Africa's Minister of Environment and Tourism. 
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it to be designated a 'tourism development zone' (Theron, Interview, 2002; Van 
Amerom, 2002). 
However, at least 6000 Mozambicans reside on the Shingwedzi River bank, attracted 
by its fertile soil and water in an overall dry environment. To facilitate the 
harmonisation of land use between the Kruger National Park and Mozambique's 
Coutada 16 and to increase the latter's ecotourism potential, South Africa pushed for 
several adaptations to the status, administration and usage of land in Coutada 16. 
Oulined in an Action Plan in 2000, these included (DEAT, 2001b: 3; Munthali and 
Soto, 2001: 9): 
*A change in the status of Coutada 16 from a hunting'area to a national 
park 
* The development of a management plan for Coutada 16 
* The training of game rangers in and for Coutada 16 
e The development of a strategic plan for fencing Coutada 16' 
Furthermore, DEAT, SANPs, Kruger Park authorities and the PPF put increasingly 
pressure on Mozambique to remove its local communities in Coutada 16. 
These envisaged moderations to Coutada 16 did not go uncontested. Mozambiqan 
authorities did not object to turning Coutada 16 into a National Park and to develop a 
management plan for the area. However, Mozambique was unhappy with the 
requested removal of local communities in Coutada 16 and with South African 
demands that it should be fenced (Munthali and Soto, 2001). The Mozambican 
government perceived this as an interference with its sovereignty over the area 
(Grossman, Interview, 2003). Adding to its reluctance, Mozambique had been highly 
8 It was furthermore agreed that Zimbabwe would make a start with the integration of the Sengwe 
community into the TFP, fence the Sengwe Corridor, and identify and demine land mines where these 
were suspected. Also, the development of a joint management plan, and harminisation of legislation 
for the TBPA as a whole was proposed, whilst South Africa, Mozambique and Zimbabwe also 
commited themselves to develop an integrated regional tourism development plan (Munthali and Soto, 
2001: 9). 
9 South Africa stood very firm on this issue however, including because it perceives fencing as a 
necessary security measure to prevent an increase in transboundary crime in the Limpopo Borderland. 
The next chapter explores this issue. 
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unhappy with the exclusion of its Banhine and Zinave National Parks from the Great 
Limpopo TFP (see section 5.2.3). It was felt that South Africa merely sought to use 
Mozambican territory in the Great Limpopo as a depot for its surplus elephants, for 
which reason it was not very interested in taking on the Banhine and Zinave National 
Parks, as these areas do not border the Kruger Park. References by South African 
Minister of Tourism Valli Moosa and by the South African press (Koch, 1994) to the 
Gaza-Kruger-Gonarezhou Park as the "greater Kruger Park" (Keenan, 2000: 10) 
further fuelled Mozambican anger over South Africa's perceived domination of the 
process and suspicions that South Africa's involvement in the TFP constituted a form 
of "conservation expansionism" (Fakir, 2000: 1). South Africa's pressure on 
Mozambique to turn the Coutada 16 into a National Park and ban commercial hunting 
was furthermore perceived as hypocritical in Mozambique (Munthali and Soto, 2001), 
since South Africa had allowed the commercial hunting of two elephants and two 
buffaloes in the Makuleke held part of the Kruger Park, who had successfully 
demanded this concession from SANPs in 2000 (South African National Parks, 
2000). 10 
Finally, the resettlement of local communities that South Africa demanded, claiming 
that this was necessary for the Limpopo Park to become a National Park and for the 
Great Limpopo TBPA to become a successful tourism destination is highly contested 
in Mozambiquell. An important consideration hereby is that many of the settlers in 
Coutada 16 were displaced during the civil war. In the light of their former refugee 
status, it seemed morally unacceptable to force the inhabitants of Coutada 16 to leave 
their lands once more. From 2000 onwards, community members from the area that 
had fled to South Africa had furthermore been explicitly encouraged by the 
Mozambican government to return to their villages in Coutada 16, through a refugee 
resettlement programme (Koch, Interview, 2001; Simbine, Interview, 2001). Efforts 
to remove local communities from Coutada 16 were furthermore little compatible 
with the Mozambican law, which grant local communities residential rights after they 
10 Earning the conununity US$ 210 000. 
11 As well as amongst many NGOs and the progressive press in South Africa. 
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have lived in an area for over a decade (Munthali and Sotho, 2001). On the other 
hand, as local communities in Mozambique hold no direct formal titles to land, their 
removal from conservation areas is also not impossible, from a legal perspective. 
Proposals to remove local communities in Coutada 16 were particularly contested 
amongst DNFFB personnel, which, affiliated to the Ministry of Agriculture, was 
considerably interested in combining and integrating conservation programmes with 
local development needs and food security. In 2002 the Mozambican government 
replaced DNFFB's TFCA unit with its Ministry of Tourism's Conservation 
Department as the leading agency in the Great Limpopo. The increasingly important 
role of Mozambique's Ministry of Tourism in the Great Limpopo is both an 
indication and explanation of how Mozambique's ongoing agreement with South 
Africa's demands is considerably informed by a quest for the expected benefits from 
ecotourism. 
Coutada 16 has increasingly been modelled to resemble the Kruger Park's land use 
and administration, in line with the wishes of DEAT, SANPs and the PPF, South 
Africa's most powerful conservation parties. On 27 November 2001 Coutada 16 was 
proclaimed the Limpopo National Park. In accordance with the priorities of a 
National Park, land use became reserved for conservation and non-consumptive 
ecotourism. Furthermore, a start has been made with the training of wildlife scouts in 
the Park under the guidance of a South African park warden (Norman, 2004), whose 
salary is paid by the PPF. Finally, the Mozambican government has agreed to relocate 
the removal of the Limpopo Park's local communities to areas outside the Park. 
Mozambique co-operation with South Africa's proposal to hold a formal elephant 
translocation ceremony on the 4 th of October 2001, before Mozambique felt ready to 
do S012, further indicates South Africa's great say in the process (Grossman, 
Interview, 2003). The prospect that a preservationist regime in the Limpopo Park will 
considerably improve its ecotourism potential after connection to South Africa's 
lucrative Kruger Park considerably account for Mozambique's willingness to comply 
12 Many of the translocated elephants seemed not ready either. Within 10 days and rather unexpectedly 
the majority of the 25 released elephants left their new home and returned to the Kruger Park. 
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with the outlined South African wishes, including more contested ones (Grossman, 
Interview, 2003). 
Whilst conservation objectives may also play a role in determining Mozambique's 
preferences regarding the land use in its conservation areas, economic considerations 
have generally been to the fore. In 1996 the Mozambican government granted a 
concession to Blanchart Mozambique Enterprises, an American corporation headed 
by multimillionaire James Blanchard. Blanchard intended to transform a 234,000 
hectares area in Mozambique's Maputoland region, including 60 miles of pristine 
beach along the Indian Ocean and the Maputo Elephant Reserve, into a safari theme 
park, and to import groups of Bushmen to reside in it. 
This concession violated existing conservation arrangements in the area, including in 
the area of TBPAs. Mozambique had earlier agreed with South Africa to connect its 
Maputo Elephant Reserve with the South African Tuli Elephant reserve to create the 
Lubombo TBPA. Tempted by the millions of US dollars the planned 'Mozambican 
Disneyland' was alleged to generate in profits, the Mozambican government, which 
had obtained shares in the project from Blanchard, cancelled this agreement in favour 
of Blanchard's plans with the area however (Turton and Church, 1999). It was only 
when the investments of Blanchard Mozambique Enterprises did not materialise that 
political support for the plan was withdrawn. The willingness of the Mozambican 
government to bypass existing conservation arrangements to generate ecotourism 
income indicates the political preferences for land use in conservation areas in 
Mozambique are structured by the financial - rather than conservation - gains a given 
approach is likely to generate. 
Its interests in generating income from ecotourism have made Mozambique 
vulnerable to South African pressure. South Africa is Mozambique's "largest foreign 
investor" Standard Bank, 2004: 4), including in its tourism sector (De Vletter, 
Interview, 2003). The PPF's access to major amounts of foreign funding further 
contributes to South Africa's ability to influence decision-making in the Limpopo 
Park and Mozambique's willingness to concede. The South African based PPF 
presents itself as a neutral party, which as an NGO is not really linked to any 
government (Myburgh, Interview, 2001). In reality, the policy priorities of the PPF 
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and DEAT overlap, with both parties adopting largely similar preservationist 
positions. Both DEAT and the PPF are against the residence of local communities in 
Coutada 16, for example, are have tried to convince the Mozambican government to 
remove them from the area. The PPF's access to funding from the German 
Development Bank (KfW) and other funding and, linked to this, its direct 
involvement in the planning of the Limpopo Park, facilitated that the area be 
structured in line with the wishes of the PPF and DEAT. 
The PPF obtained in 2002 aC6 million grant from the German government to 
develop Mozambique's Limpopo Park (Peace Parks Foundation, 2002). As the 
implementing agency of the KfW funding, the PPF obtained half of the four seats in 
the Limpopo Park's Project Steering Committee, which supervises its creation, 
alongside two officials from Mozambique's Ministry of Tourism. This endows it with 
a considerable say in the process. In addition, to receive the international funding 
accessed by the PPF the Mozambican government had has to fulfil various conditions 
that promote a preservationist set up of the Limpopo Park. Firstly, in line with the 
PPF's wishes, the German KfW demanded that no hunting would be allowed in the 
Limpopo Park, thereby strengthening South Africa's position on this issue 
(Grossman, Interview, 2003). Secondly, a substantial part of the KfW funding has 
been allocated to the fencing of the Limpopo Park's eastern side. Finally, through the 
PPF, the KfW and the EU have together provided vast amounts of funding for the 
translocation of local communities in the Limpopo Park. The PPF also arranged 
major sponsorship for the elephant translocation ceremony in 2001 (see also Table 
5.3). The KfW's request that no hunting be allowed in the Limpopo Park, coupled 
with the funding made available for fencing, elephant translocation and the removal 
of local communities, is likely to account considerably for Mozambican compliance 
with the South African demands for changes in land use in the Limpopo Park. The 
available sponsoring for these activities is likely to have made their execution 
attractive to the Mozambican government for financial reasons. The available funding 
also made it more difficult for the Mozambican government to resist South African 
pressure, on the grounds that the finances for the requested spatial adaptations in the 
Limpopo Park were lacking. 
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While, or perhaps because Mozambique has eventually complied with South African 
demands to change its land use, relations between Mozambique and South Africa 
have continued to be characterised by considerable tensions. Firstly, there remains 
considerable unhappiness in Mozambique over South African requests to relocate the 
local communities in the Limpopo Park, which although presented as a voluntary 
exercise is in reality considerably forced (Grossman, Interview, 2003; Norman, 
2004). As outlined earlier, many Mozambicans feel that the moral ground to do is 
lacking, including government personnel (Anonymous Source DNFFB, Interview, 
2002). Mozambican officials are also weary about emerging negative international 
publicity On the plight of its local communities in the Limpopo Park, fearing this 
might result in international tourist boycotts to the Park (Anonymous Source SANPs, 
Interview, 2003). The 2001 release of Kruger elephants into the Limpopo Park 
without local communities being consulted or warned has received considerable 
criticism. There existed and exists a realistic chance that some of the elephants would 
head to community settlements nearby the river to drink (Hall-Martin, 2001), which 
could damage local crops and endanger human lives. For this reason, the translocation 
of elephants into Mozambique has been criticised and portrayed as an irresponsible 
action by South African and other media (see for example Hylton, 2002; Twee 
Vandaag, 2004). Contested community relocation programmes are likely to further 
13 attract negative publicity , given that the negative social effects of these are likely to 
be more profound and durable (De Wet, 2002). 
Secondly, the presence of a large number of South Africans on Mozambican soil is 
resented by some Mozambicans, who perceive it as "colonising behaviour" 
(Anonymous Source DEAT, Interview, 2002). The fact that most of the senior park 
officials in the Mozambican side of the Great Limpopo are South African Whites 
further adds to these feelings of discomfort. Combined with the eviction of native 
local communities from the area, the changing regime in the Limpopo Park is 
perceived by some as an introduction of apartheid to Mozambican soil. 
13 As they already have in a documentary by 'Twee Vandaag' (2004), a Dutch news programme. 
Considering that the Dutch WWF and the Dutch National Lottery are main sponsors in the Great 
Limpopo, the results of this publicity may have significant effects. 
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Table 5.3... Major funding sources for the Great Limpopo 
Organisation Amount in Recipient Party Purpose 
thousands of 
South African 
Rands 14 
KfW 65000 PPF/Mozambique Infrastructural development 
Limpopo Park 
EU 65000 Mozambique Resettlement local communities 
Diverse NGOs 10 Mozambique Dernining in vicinity of 
Limpopo Park 
Absa Bank 10 PPF Relocation of four elephant 
families 
South African 40 SANPs Extension of tourism 
government infrastructure in Kruger Park 
IUCN, the World Over 100 each South Africa/ Elephant translocation 2001 
Bank, Mozambique 
the Dutch WWF, 
NedBank 
Source: Peace Parks Foundation (2002), DEAT (2001 a). 
Furthermore, a new area of friction might emerge. With the increased migration of 
South African wildlife into Mozambique through openings in the Kruger Park's 
fence 15 , the question arises who is responsible and will pay for damage caused 
by the 
presence of wildlife in inhabited areas in Mozambique close to the Limpopo Park. 
South African and Mozambican authorities already disagree over the origin of 
14 One hundred South African Rands equalled on 22 December 2004 17.64 dollars. Please note that 
this list of funding sources for the Great Limpopo is far from exhaustive whilst the names of the donors 
for the funding that has been listed are not always given, as this information is not always freely 
available. 
15 As outlined in Table 5.2, in Dcember 2002 three openings were made in the Kruger Park's fence to 
allow for wildlife migration. Much wildlife also enters Mozambique through other openings in the 
Kruger Park's electrical fence, in which openings created by elephants or other animals are often no 
longer repaired (Collins, Interview, 2002). 
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undesired wildlife in communal areas in Mozambique, with each side accusing the 
other of having hosted the wild animals in question. According to Alfonso Madobe, 
head of conservation at Mozambique's Ministry of Tourism, wandering wildlife from 
the Kruger Park killed Mozambican cattle and injured people in 2001, including in a 
suburb of capital Maputo (Iol, 2001). Kruger Park authorities denied, however, that 
this wildlife has come from the Kruger National Park, suggesting they escaped from a 
more nearby game sanctuary nearby Maputo instead (iOL, 2001). More recently, in 
2004, migrating Kruger wildlife is alleged to have furthered the spread of veterinary 
diseases Mozambique's Magude and Moamba regions (Agencia de Informacao de 
Mocambique, 2004). When the perceived migration of Kruger Park animals into 
inhabited parts of Mozambique further increases as a result of the wildlife corridors 
with the Kruger Park Mozambican anger over the damage caused by this wildlife is 
likely to grow. In this context, provincial or central government authorities in 
Mozambique may approach South Africa for compensation for the damage this 
wildlife incurs. Kruger Park authorities are unlikely to be willing to pay for damage 
in Mozambique caused by wildlife that may not have originated from the Kruger 
Park. Disagreements between South African and Mozambican authorities over the 
settlement of damage claims hence have the potential to become a growing source of 
contestation in the near future, and could further fuel Mozambican dissatisfaction 
with South Africa's powerful position in the Great Limpopo. 
5.2.5 South African/Zimbabwean relations in the Great Limpopo 
While co-operation with Mozambique in the Great Limpopo has progressed, 
Mozambican-South African relations have become increasingly characterised by 
tensions and conflict. Zimbabwe has proved a "recalcitrant partner in the 
scheme"(Duffy, 1997: 446), but this has thus far little affected South African- 
Zimbabwean relations. The envisaged integration of the Gonarezhou Park to the 
Great Limpopo by means of the Sengwe corridor came to a de facto standstill. 
Contrary to what had been formally agreed, the Zimbabwean government failed to 
open formal consultations with the Sengwe community whose permission is required 
for the connection of the Sengwe Corridor. This made the Gonarezou Park's 
envisaged connection to the South African-Mozambican part of the Great Limpopo 
impossible. In the meantime illegal settlers moved into the Northern part of its 
Gonarezhou Park in 2001, "claiming the land as their natural birth right" (Nielsen and 
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Chikoko, 2002: 1). Despite formal pledges of President Mugabe to remove these 
settlers to South Africa and Mozambique as soon as possible (Anonymous Source 
DEAT, Interview, 2001; Olver, Personal Communication, 2001 16 ), these settlements 
were de facto allowed, conforming to the general aims of Mugabe's land reform 
programmes. Altogether, the political crisis in Zimbabwe has negatively affected 
conservation and tourism practices in Zimbabwe's designated part of the Great 
Limpopo (Ferreira, 2004). Zimbabwean stakeholders also ceased to come to many 
workshop meetings on the Great Limpopo, often due to a lack of sponsorship to do so 
(Jones, Interview, 2002). 
Zimbabwe's negligence in following up its commitments to the Great Limpopo did 
not evoke substantial criticism or actions from DEAT or other major South African 
conservation authorities. DEAT and SANPs consistently maintained that the political 
crisis in Zimbabwe and the settlements in the Gonarezhou Park would not affect the 
Great Limpopo (Molefe, 2002: 5). Even after it had become clear that Mugabe did not 
follow up his promise to remove local communities from the Gonarezhou Park and 
other commitments towards the Great Limpopo, Zimbabwe's position led to 
remarkably little friction with South Africa. Co-ordinators of TBPAs with Zimbabwe 
were merely told to just "go ahead without Zimbabwe" (Verhoef, Interview, 2002). 
This reflects how their wider geo-political interests may considerably shape the 
behaviour of states in TBPAs. Challenging pressure from powerful countries like the 
US and Great Britain, South African President Thabo Mbeki has been very reluctant 
to criticise Zimbabwe, a relatively influential state within SADC, for its controversial 
and violent land reforms and undemocratic practices. In accordance with South 
Africa's overall non-confrontational 'quiet diplomacy' approach to Zimbabwe, this 
policy was applied to the area of TBPAs (Anonymous Source DEAT, Interview, 
2002, Anonymous Source SANPs, Interview, 2002). 
16 In an official response (11 July 200 1) to a letter by a South African citizen, regarding her concerns 
that increased poaching levels in Zimbabwe would affect South Africa's wildlife when the Kruger Park 
would be connected to the Gonarezhou Park, Director-General of DEAT Chrispian Olver refers to 
Mugabe's assurances that local communities in the north of the Gonarezhou Park would be removed. 
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More recently, South Africa has however started to increase its demands that 
Zimbabwe adheres to its earlier commitment to joining the Great Limpopo and put 
the necessary infrastructure and procedures for community participation in place. 
South Africa's first priority in the Great Limpopo was to connect its Kruger Park with 
Mozambique's Limpopo Park. With this connection now being well under way, the 
attention of South African tourism authorities now seems to be turning to the still 
outstanding connection of the Gonarezhou Park into the Great Limpopo . 
17 if 
Zimbabwe continues to follow up its commitments regarding the Great Limpopo, its 
role in the Great Limpopo might receive increased criticism from South Africa. 
It is not just in the area of the harmonisation of land use that tensions have arisen 
between South Africa and its partner countries in the Great Limpopo. The sharing of 
the Great Limpopo's expected ecotourism benefits is also an important divisive 
factor. 
5.3 Tensions over the distribution of expected ecotourism benefits 
5.3.1 Introduction 
An equitable distribution of benefits can be identified as an important condition for 
ongoing harmonious co-operation between countries in regional development 
programmes (Kawango, 1998: 169). TBPAs are no exception, the equitable sharing of 
benefits and costs being the bottom-line for the participating governments (Braack, 
2002a: 16). South Africa and neighbouring countries differ considerably, however, 
over what an 'equitable' sharing of benefits entails. South Africa argues that the 
working of the free market as a main regulatory force will ensure that each country 
can more or less equally profit from the TBPA. Linked to this, it argues that each 
country should be entitled to keep the revenue from entrance fees to its own 
individual part of the TBPA. On the basis of its dominant position on the Southern 
African ecotourism market (Bennett, 2000), South Africa is however likely to benefit 
disproportionably from a rise in ecotourism to Southern Africa's TBPAs, unless there 
are mechanisms in place that explicitly ensure an equal distribution of benefits. In 
TBPAs, the joint sharing of entrance fees to the TBPA would be a main instrument to 
17 The next section offers additional details. 
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do so. For this reason, Southern Africa's neighbours generally contest South Africa's 
position, demanding instead that the sum of entrance fees to the TBPA as a whole 
will be jointly shared. Struggles over the division of ecotourism benefits to the TBPA 
may be further fuelled by perceived South African attempts to further increase its 
competitive advantage over neighbouring countries through the creation of new 
infrastructure facilitating access to the TBPA from the South African side. 
Competition over the future ecotourism income from TBPAs has thus particularly 
characterised and affected co-operation in the Great Limpopo. 
5.3.2. Southern Africa's tourism sector and the Great Limpopo 
An important motive for Mozambique and Zimbabwe to join the Great Limpopo, and 
to continue to support the initiative even after the TFCA concept had been replaced 
by a TFP concept against their wishes, has been the prospect that doing so would 
significantly increase their ecotourism benefits. However, Mozambique and 
Zimbabwe have grown weary that while they provide the bulk of land for the Great 
Limpopo, it will be mainly South Africa who will profit economically from its 
creation. South Africa maintains that the TBPA will considerably if not 
predominantly benefit Mozambique and Zimbabwe. However, its strong ecotourism 
industry combined with the fact that TBPAs are modelled on free market principles 
gives it indeed an important edge over its neighbours to access the ecotourism capital 
in TBPAs. 
In a context where there exist considerable differences between countries in terms of 
capacity and economic and political power it is difficult to ensure the distribution of 
benefits along equal lines in regional co-operative programmes, as the more advanced 
country will be predisposed to taking the greatest share. This is certainly the case with 
the distribution of ecotourism benefits in the Great Limpopo. Whilst it seems fairly 
certain that South Africa will considerably benefit economically from increased 
ecotourism to the Limpopo borderland, it is far less certain whether this will also be 
the case for Mozambique and Zimbabwe. Tourist numbers to the Kruger Park are 
expected to significantly rise on the basis of the TBPA concept, with tourists now 
being offered the opportunity to explore a bigger wildlife area, which includes several 
countries. This is reflected in the following statements of Valli Moosa (quoted in 
Keenan, 2000: 10): 
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Two jets a day that's what Virgin Atlantic's Richard Branson says he will need to 
cater for the massive tourist demand generated by a greater Kruger National Park 
stretching east into Mozambique and north into Zimbabwe. 
In the long term, the creation of the Great Limpopo TFCA would moreover allow for 
a more diversified tourism package, in which not only parks feature, but also 
Mozambique's beaches alongside the Indian Ocean. This 'parks & beaches' package 
is likely to attract more tourism to the Kruger National Park, offering tourists the 
opportunity to combine their 'safari experience' in Kruger with relaxing on the beach 
or exploring marine biodiversity in adjacent Mozambique (Nicholson, Interview, 
2001). 
Certainly in the initial stages before tourism infrastructure in the Limpopo and 
Gonarezhou Parks can be built or significantly extended, Mozambique and Zimbabwe 
are unlikely to experience a similar rise in tourists directly to their parts of the Great 
Limpopo. However, South Africa argues that its world-famous Kruger Park can in the 
early stages function as a springboard for increased tourism to all parts of the Great 
Limpopo. Once the TBPA is operational, Kruger Park visitors are expected to cross 
the boundaries into Mozambique's Limpopo Park and Zimbabwe's Gonarezhou Park. 
On these premises, South Africa argues that an increase in tourism to its Kruger Park 
would benefit the Limpopo borderland as a whole. 
These expected spill-over effects, in terms of tourists crossing the boundary, are little 
contested by Mozambique and Zimbabwe, and underpin their desire for co-operation 
in the TBPA. However, these countries question the extent in which they can 
economically benefit from such an influx in ecotourism to their territories. With 
tourism facilities being more developed in South Africa, tourists may prefer to be 
based in that country, and enter the Mozambican and Zimbabwean parts of the TBPA 
for just a day trip (Schoon, 2004: 19). In such a scenario they would spend most of 
their money on the South African side. This would mean that the creation of the Great 
Limpopo would significantly benefit South Africa, by allowing it to attract more 
sojourning tourists to its Kruger Park, but far less so Mozambique and Zimbabwe. 
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Initially, this prospect raised few tensions between South Africa and its partner 
countries. Mozambique and Zimbabwe implicitly assumed that entrance fees to the 
individual parts of the Great Limpopo would be all added up and then equally shared, 
as South Africa had done with Botswana in the Kgalagadi Park (Modishe, Interview, 
2002; Van Amerom, 2002). This would ensure that Mozambique and Zimbabwe 
would obtain a substantial amount of the ecotourism income generated in the Great 
Limpopo, even if a rise in ecotourism to the Great Limpopo would disproportionally 
benefit the Kruger Park. An increase in tourism to the Kruger Park with spill-over 
effects in the wider area of the Great Limpopo was therefore seen as creating a 'win- 
win' situation for all. 
5.3.3 Competition over future park revenues 
In the Great Limpopo, South Africa has however successfully maintained its position 
that each country would be entitled to keep its own revenues. Its lack of willingness 
to compromise in this area is considerably motivated by the fact that the Kruger Park 
is the region's most profitable tourist destination. Furthermore, whilst economic 
relations between Botswana and South Africa are relatively equal, in Southern 
Africa's other TBPAs South Africa is by far the most dominant economic player. 
This provides it with considerable leverage in negotiating the distribution of 
ecotourism benefits. 
Amidst the conservation areas that comprise the Great Limpopo, South Africa's 
Kruger Park is by far the most profitable of all, attracting almost one million visitors 
annually. Mozambique's Limpopo Park and Zimbabwe's Gonarezhou Park attract 
less than 15,000 visitors per annurn between them annually (Fakir, 2003: 18). The 
Kruger Park's popularity as a tourism destination has been the result of "100 years 
18 worth of infrastructure" (Fakir, 2003: 18) , whereas Mozambique and Zimbabwe 
have thus far hardly invested in tourism facilities on their sides of the Great Limpopo. 
With reference to these differences South Africa argued that it would be unfair if it 
had to share two-thirds of its Kruger Park's income with Mozambique and 
Zimbabwe. Much to Mozambique's and Zimbabwe's dismay, South Africa insisted 
18 The information ascribed to Fakir (2003) in this paragraph was provided in an editiorial footnote in 
Fakir's article by L. E. O. Braack (see Braack et al., 2003). 
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that "revenues should accrue based on the number of visitors to each component 
area" (Fakir, 2003: 18) and that each part of the TBPA would be responsible for their 
own investments and profit making. Arguing from free-market premises, South 
Africa furthermore maintained that this starting-point would give Mozambique and 
Zimbabwe an important incentive to create visitor attractions on their sides of the 
Great Limpopo (Fakir, 2003: 18), thereby speeding up the development of the TBPA. 
However, even if Mozambique and Zimbabwe would successfully develop tourism 
facilities on their side of the Great Limpopo and attract substantial tourism, chances 
are that much of the income generated by ecotourism on their territories would leak 
back to South Africa. Its dominant position on the regional tourism market, coupled 
with the fact that TBPAs are modelled on free market principles, gives South Africa 
an important edge over its neighbours to earn from ecotourism in TBPAs, even in 
adjacent territory. As is the case for most developing countries (Duffy, 2002), the 
tourism sector in Southern Africa, with the exception of South Africa, is largely in 
foreign hands. However, unlike most developing countries in Southern Africa it is not 
so much Western companies that own the major tourism lodges and are amongst the 
main tour operators in the country, but South African ones. This is particularly the 
case in Swaziland, Lesotho and, since the mid 1990s, also increasingly Mozambique. 
With the ending of apartheid in South Africa, the return of peace to the region and 
the opening up of Mozambique to the free market, South African tourism businesses 
have started to steadily develop and exploit Mozambique's ecotourism potential, in 
the process often damaging Mozambique's natural environment (Culverwell, 
Interview, 2001; Spenceley, Interview, 2001). Although Zimbabwe's tourism sector 
is more nationally owned, a considerable part is nevertheless in South African hands. 
In the absence of foreign investors, South African companies are likely to 
successfully claim the Limpopo National Park as new operational terrain, with tacit 
support of the South African government (Rupert, Interview, 2002). With the 
commercial sale of tenders in the Great Limpopo being regulated through free 
competition, chances are that the majority of these contracts will end up in the hands 
of powerful South African 'big business'. This could include areas now serviced by 
Zimbabwean or Mozambican national or local businesses (Munthali and Soto, 2001: 
24-25; Fakir, 2003: 20). The fact that existing contracts with regard to ecotourism 
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operations in these areas may be cancelled in favour of new arrangements in the Great 
Limpopo increases this risk. The Mozambican government suspended the trophy 
hunting operations organised by Gaza Safari LtD, which it had awarded a 15 years 
lease to undertake trophy hunting in Coutada 16 in 1996, shortly before the signing of 
the Agreement of establishing the Great Limpopo TFP in 2000 (Munthali and Soto, 
2001: 25). It has been suggested that the cancellation of the contract with Gaza Safari 
UD was an outcome of South African pressure (Anonymous Source SANPs, 
Interview, 2002). Gaza Safari is specialised in commercial hunting, but has expressed 
its willingness to adapt its profile to solely cater for 'game viewing' tourists. It now 
demands a monopoly to develop or outsource tourism activities in the Limpopo Park 
(Munthali and Soto, 2001: 25). On the other hand, foreign businesses can often only 
obtain governmental permission to do business in Mozambique after they have 
established partnerships with Mozambican firms. That way, Mozambique's private 
sector could still benefit from the Great Limpopo, even when major South African 
firms obtained the majority of the available tenders. The Mozambican businesses 
selected for such partnerships tend to be those with close ties to Mozambique's 
political elite however, within which there are in turn several competing factions. 
Consequently while privatisation and commercial ventures in the Great Limpopo 
might benefit some Mozambican interests groups, at the same time this might harm 
the economic interests of others by diminishing their ability to economically exploit 
the area by means of ecotourism. 
An altogether different scenario is also possible. In spite of great optimism, the Great 
Limpopo has had considerable problems attracting private sector investment with 
companies adopting a 'wait and see attitude' (Braack, Interview, 2001; Munthali and 
Soto, 2001). It is not unlikely that the private sector will invest in the part of the TFP 
that offers maximum security and returns to their investments, which is generally 
perceived to be the South African side (Munthali and Soto, 2001: 24). Investors have 
been worried about the presence of firearms amongst local communities in the 
Limpopo Park (Sanwild, 2004) and generally shun Zimbabwe because of its political 
and economic crisis. A concentration of investments on the South African side would 
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severely diminish the opportunities for Mozambique and Zimbabwe to exploit the 
ecotourism potential of their areas in the Great Limpopo. ' 9 
Considering the characteristics of the Southern African tourism market, it would 
appear that Mozambique and Zimbabwe stand to gain relatively little from their 
participation in the Great Limpopo, compared to South Africa. This will be 
particularly the case in the short term, when their investment costs may still be higher 
than their returns from ecotourism, as the latter will take its time to develop. In such a 
scenario the "disadvantaged partner states may feel that their parks are merely 
complementing the business of the most developed park" (Munthali and Soto, 2001: 
24), which is likely to raise significant tensions and reduce their willingness to 
continue to co-operate. In this context, South African activities that improve tourism 
access to the Great Limpopo from South Africa have become contested. 
Attempts by South Africa to facilitate tourism access to its side of the Great Limpopo 
has added for many Mozambican and Zimbabwean participants to their suspicions 
that South Africa seeks to and will benefit the most from the creation of the Great 
Limpopo, even at the expense of its 'partners'. South African plans in 2001 to extend 
its Nelspruit Airport, located closely to the Kruger Park, were viewed with suspicion 
by Mozambique and Zimbabwe, who saw these plans as confirmation that South 
Africa sought to further improve its competitive advantage on the tourism market 
over Mozambique and Zimbabwe. Direct and frequent flights from Johannesburg 
International Airport can land at the Skukuza Airport within the Kruger Park and at 
the larger Hoedspruit International Airport further north of the Kruger Park (see 
Figure 5.2). Private games reserves in the Sabi Sand Reserve to the west of the 
Kruger Park, such as the Mala Mala Reserve (indicated by 'black huts' in the centre 
of the map displayed in Figure 5.2) also have airstrips where flights from 
Johannesburg land (Go2Africa. com, 2003). 
19 On the other hand, Mozambique has attracted considerable donor funding to help finance the 
upgrading of the Limpopo Park. Part of this finance could be used for road creation and other measures 
likely to improve the attractiveness of the area as a site for investment by private companies keen to 
exploit its eco tourism potential. This will take considerable time however. 
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As such, the Kruger Park can be reached relatively easy by air from within South 
Africa. Until 2003, it was however not possible to fly directly to the Kruger Park 
from Europe or other regions where many of the future international tourists of the 
Great Limpopo are likely to reside. This situation opened up considerable 
opportunities for Maputo International Airport, located close to the Great Limpopo, to 
try and become a main entry gate for international tourists to the Great Limpopo. 
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Figure 5.2: International airports nearby the Kruger Park's southern part 
Source: http: //mala-mala. go2africa. conVmala-mala-reserve/mala-mala-travel. asp 
It has the advantage of being closely located to the Great Limpopo, and, unlike South 
Africa's major international airport, Johannesburg International Airport20, it did not 
have a troublesome reputation. Upgrading Maputo airport would take considerable 
time however. It has only one international flight connection, notably with Lisbon, 
whilst investors to upgrade the airport still had to be found. Considering the limited 
capacity of the Maputo airport, and the time needed to expand it, the creation of a 
major South African international airport nearby by the Kruger Park was likely to 
vitally harm the prospects for Maputo Airport to position itself as the Great 
Limpopo's major international 'air gate' (Awkright, Interview, 2001; De Vletter, 
Interview, 2001). 
20 Which some international tourists seek to avoid, on the basis of Johannesburg's reputation as the 
'murder capital'. 
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In this context, South African plans in 2001 to modemise and extend its Nelspruit 
Airport, located relatively closely to the Kruger Park, were not received very well by 
Mozambique, which accused its partner of seeking to undermine its economic 
opportunities in the Great Limpopo. South Africa claimed, however, that the plans for 
an extension of its Nelspruit Airport had been on the agenda for a long time, were 
unconnected to the Great Limpopo and would not affect Mozambique's ability to 
generate tourism. Moreover, South Africa eventually abandoned its plans to 
modernise and extend Nelspruit airport, and even downgraded it to a domestic airport. 
This action little appeased Mozambique however. This was because instead of 
extending the Nelspruit Airport, South Africa had decided to build a brand new 
international airport even closer in the vicinity of the Kruger Park: The Kruger- 
Mpumalanga International Airport (PMG, 2003), which opened on 20 January 2003. 
A major aim of its creation is to enable tourists from Europe to fly directly to the 
Great Limpopo (Rupert, Interview, 2002; Ramutsindela, 2004: 68), the same market 
as Maputo Airport had hoped to generate tourism from. Consequently, the creation of 
the Kruger-Mpumalanga Airport is likely to have caused even more friction with 
Mozambique than an extension of the Nelspruit Airport, whose creation is not linked 
to the Great Limpopo and which is located less close to the TBPA, would ever have 
done. 
An equal distribution of park revenue would significantly counter Mozambican and 
Zimbabwean fears that South Africa would benefit the most from the Great Limpopo 
and reduce anger over perceived attempts of South Africa to ensure such an outcome. 
It would ensure that Mozambique and Zimbabwe could reap substantial benefits from 
their participation in the Limpopo Park, even in the initial stage before investments in 
their ecotourism infrastructure would pay off. It is for this reason that Mozambique 
and Zimbabwe have not fully abandoned their claims on an equal distribution of park 
revenue. Mozambique and Zimbabwe have de facto accepted South Africa's policy 
position since 2001, when conflicts with South Africa regarding the sharing of park 
revenue first arose. It is noticeable, however, that procedures regarding the sharing of 
ecotourism revenue are absent in the Great Limpopo's Treaty (Government of the 
Republic of Mozambique, 2002), even though the need for these was recognised at an 
early stage in the process (Anon. b, 2000). This signifies that South Africa and 
Mozambique and Zimbabwe continue to disagree over the division of entrance fees to 
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the TBPA. South Africa is unlikely to comprise however. It now legitimises its 
position by pointing to the fact that Mozambique does not adhere to an equal division 
of costs and benefits of operations either. Mozambique has received substantial 
amounts of aid for the development of the Limpopo Park, which it does not intend to 
share with its partner countries in the great Limpopo (see also Table 5.3). South 
Africa, on the contrary, has to bear the costs of ecotourism development on its side of 
the Great Limpopo largely by itself. Furthermore, Kruger Park staff has provided 
Mozambican colleagues over the boundary with expertise, equipment and wildlife for 
free. South Africa maintains on this basis that Mozambique already benefits 
substantially from its participation in the Great Limpopo, without having made major 
investments. Many Mozambican stakeholders in the Great Limpopo argue, however, 
that this assistance promotes South Africa's conservation and ecotourism needs as 
least as much as Mozambique's, if not more (Grossman, Interview, 2001; Vieira, 
Interview, 2002). 
In the disagreements over the sharing of costs and benefits regarding ecotourism 
development in the Great Limpopo Zimbabwe has also increasingly become targeted. 
As indicated in section 5.2.5, Zimbabwe has not followed up its commitments 
towards the Great Limpopo, which for long attracted little criticism from South 
Africa. However, Zimbabwe's failure to create the necessary tourism facilities in and 
enable tourism access to its Gonarezhou Park seems to be increasingly contested by 
its partners. South African and Mozambican tourism authorities recently criticised 
Zimbabwe for its lack of commitment to co-operate and help fulfil the TBPA's 
ecotourism promise. Zimbabwe argues, however, that it as very limited funds to do 
so, as most international donors have shunned Zimbabwe since President's Mugabe 
contested land reform policies (Jonga, Interview, 2002). On the other hand, 
Zimbabwean tourism authorities claim that despite these obstacles a start has been 
made with road development, electrification and an extension of communication 
facilities, to facilitate the attraction of private sector involvement and investment in 
extending tourism facilities in the Gonarezhou Park (Chikanga, 2004). Investment 
security is an important consideration for any investor. In this context, it is 
questionable to what extent this is a realistic prospect (Warner, Interview, 2002). 
Zimbabwe's tourism numbers have steadily declined as a result of its political crisis 
and there are still no linkages in place between the Gonarezhou Park and the 
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Mozambican and South African parts of the Great Limpopo. This makes it unlikely 
that the Gonarezhou Park will in the nearby future become a main entry route to the 
Great Limpopo. With Mozambique and South Africa seeming to fear that 
Zimbabwean inability to successfully market Gonarezhou as part of the TBPA will 
limit tourism to the TBPA as a whole, such a development could increase tensions 
with its partner countries. 
5.4 Alienation of local communities 
The creation of TBPAs has important implications for local communities residing in 
or around TBPAs. This has certainly been the case with the Great Limpopo. 
Resistance against the Park at a local level is growing, because the park has thus far 
little involved and benefited local communities, contrary to rhetoric that local 
communities would be key actors in and the main beneficiaries of the creation of this 
TBPA. Community participation has merely been a form of window-dressing 
(Mayoral-Philips, 2001; Steenkamp and Grossman, 2001; Draper and Wels, 2002; 
Hughes, 2002; Refugee Research Project, 2002). To facilitate community 
participation, community forums, one per country, would represent the needs and 
wishes of local communities living in or nearby the Great Limpopo. However, for 
long such a community forum was only in place on the South African side. 21 
Moreover, the powers of this community forum have been significantly limited by the 
fact that their advice and permission does not need to be obtained prior to decision- 
making in the TBPA (Van Amerom and Btischer, 2005). Moreover, community 
forum leaders frequently obtain details concerning governmental plans and activities 
in the Great Limpopo at the last moment. This further limits their possibilities to 
influence the decision-making process (Nkatini, Interview, 2001). In addition, not all 
community groups feel that the forum, which represents many different ethnic 
groups, adequately represents their needs. This is particularly the case for the 
Makuleke. Although they are landowners in the TBPA 22 , the Makuleke are only 
represented in the 'common' community forum. However, the Makuleke often have 
21 Mozambique has one since 2004. 
22 The Makuleke own 22 000 hectares in the northern part of the Kruger Park, in an area between the 
Levuvhu and Limpompo Rivers, known as the Pafuri Triangle which they manage jointly with SANPs. 
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on the basis of their differing attachment to the Great Limpopo different interests than 
neighbouring communities in its creation and operation (Makuleke, Interview, 2001). 
For this reason, they demanded a place in the Great Limpopo's Technical Committee, 
which DEAT declined. 23 
In addition, and perhaps more importantly, the argument that local communities 
would economically benefit from the Great Limpopo, in the form of a share in 
ecotourism income and/or increased employment, has not materialised. Contrary to 
expectations, the Great Limpopo is still not operational. It is also doubtful if and to 
what extent local communities could really benefit from a rise in tourism to the Park 
in the future. For one thing, the income needs to be divided among many people. An 
estimated six million people live in the areas bordering the Kruger Park to its south 
and west alone. This makes it difficult for any financial benefits flowing back to local 
communities to truly make a difference, although carefully targeted allocation and 
spending might be able to make a local difference to selected groups. Furthen-nore, it 
has become increasingly recognised that the initial estimates that the Great Limpopo 
would generate millions of tourism dollars to be used to promote local development 
and job creation were overly optimistic (Spenceley, Interview, 2001). Local 
communities are furthermore not legally entitled to a specific share of the Great 
Limpopo's ecotourism income, which significantly affeqs their power to negotiate 
access to revenues (Collins, Interview, 2001). Privatisation policies in the TBPA may 
furthermore undermine employment prospects. For example, in 2001 660 employees 
were retrenched as part of the Kruger Park's privatisation strategies (Wildnet Africa 
2001). The majority of them were unskilled workers from neighbouring communities 
(Themba, Interview 2001). In an area where there is not much opportunity for other 
employment, the impact of these job cuts has been considerable. Having been 
promised or envisaged access to significant amounts of tourism income and jobs as a 
result of the Park's creation, a growing number of local community members living in 
the Kruger Park's vicinity feel betrayed (Peddle et al., 2003). 
23 Faxed letter of DEAT Director-General Crispian Olver to Mrs. D. Gilfillan (Legal Resources Centre, 
Johannesburg), the legal representative of the Makuleke Community (29 August 2001). 
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Altogether, for the local population, the economic advantages of the TBPA do not 
appear so great. "Living with wildlife" (Kiss, 1990) often incurs significant costs for 
cornmunity members, with wildlife damaging crops or killing cattle, whilst human 
lives may also be under threat (Themba, 2001). Moreover, the Park prevents 
community members from accessing and using natural resources within the Park such 
as water and wood or will do so in the near future (Riri, Interview, 2001; Erasmus, 
2003). As such, the conservation objectives of a TBPA may considerably undermine 
prospects for local development. In the meantime, most of the funding generated for 
its creation has been spent on translocating wildlife or building park infrastructure. As 
a result of the lack of community consultation and tangible economic benefits local 
support for the TBPA is steadily decreasing (Erasmus, 2003; Grossman, Interview, 
2003, Metcalfe, 2003). 
Not surprisingly this is particularly the case in Mozambique. The proclamation of the 
Limpopo National Park, the influx of elephants in their communal areas without 
advance warnings, and the fence cutting ceremony (see Table 5.1) all took place 
without prior consultation of the local communities that reside in the Limpopo Park. 
Furthermore, they now face eviction from their lands. Whilst they have been 
promised considerable benefits in return, these may not fully compensate for the 
suffered loss of land. In a country with one of the world's worst corruption records in 
Africa (Gastrow and Mossem, 2002), compensation funds may not even reach these 
communities. Whilst protests have thus far been limited in scale, and subtle in nature, 
local resistance might in future increasingly obstruct the Park (Migdal, 1974). At one 
local meeting, several leading community members proposed to block the roads with 
burning logs to prevent park vehicles getting access. 'Everyday resistance' such as 
theft and poaching also increased (Norman, 2004). 
Growing local resistance against the Great Limpopo constitutes a main threat to its 
development perspectives. Considering that tourists are generally wary of visiting 
places with low levels of security (Peddle et al., 2003), armed local resistance in 
Mozambique could significantly affect the Great Limpopo's ecotourism prospects. 
On the South African side, growing dissatisfaction amongst the Makuleke with the 
TBPA could prove a major obstacle. The Makuleke have considerable legal 
opportunities to try and withdraw their land from the TBPA (Gilfillan, Interview, 
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2002). It is not unthinkable that they may choose to do this. In addition to concerns 
that their rights are insufficiently represented, the Makuleke have been dissatisfied 
with the assistance they receive from SANPs to develop their part of the future 
TBPA. For example, in 2001 their area was excluded from overall road reconstruction 
works that were undertaken in the Kruger Park, after severe floods damaged the 
northern part of the Park (Chitepo, Interview, 2001). An attempted withdrawal by the 
Makuleke from the TBPA would have major consequences for the creation of the 
TBPA or its operation, as their Pafuri Triangle connects the Kruger Park with 
Mozambique's Limpopo Park. 
Similar areas of conflict as those discussed with regard to the Great Limpopo may 
also surface in Southern Africa's other designated TBPAs. 
5.5. Land harmonisation and distribution of ecotourism income in 
other TBPAs 
It is not just in the Great Limpopo TBPA that South Africa's conservation regimes 
and preferences differ from those of neighbouring countries. Whilst thus far conflicts 
over land harmonisation have been most pronounced in the Great Limpopo, the 
potential for these in other TBPAs with inhabited parts seems considerable. Powerful 
South African environmental bodies such as SANPs, the PPF and DEAT 24 generally 
argue that the protection of landscape and wildlife should be central, as these natural 
assets allegedly constitute the main attraction for tourists (Van der Waldt, Interview, 
2002). The case study of the Great Limpopo indicates that this position is likely to 
result in South African demands for a resettlement of local communities where they 
reside in adjacent territory designated to join a TBPA with South Africa. 
Problematically, this is the case on the Lesotho side of the Maluti/Drakensberg, whilst 
in the Lubornbo TBPA the Shewula community resides on the Swazi side. Finally, as 
24 Sometimes supported in this position by international conservation NGOs, as is the case with the 
IUCN in the Maluti/Drakensberg. 
166 
a result of land invasions on the Zimbabwean side in the Limpopo/Shashe there are 
now many illegal settlements on that side of the TBPA. 25 
On the other hand, these TBPAs are designated as TFCAs, which allow for multiple 
land use and the residence of local communities in TBPAs. In practice, the division 
between a TFP and a TFCA in terms of land use may be loosely applied, including in 
TBPAs without wildlife corridors. As the preceding case study of the Great Limpopo 
indicated, the creation of wildlife corridors may be a key instigator for demands for 
land use harmonisation favouring a preservationist approach. For example, South 
African conservation parties involved in the Maluti/Drakensberg campaign for a 
removal of local communities on the Lesotho side, whose residence is seen to 
endanger the delicate eco system of the area (Derwent et al., 2001; Warner, Interview, 
2002). The creation of Lesotho's first National Park, the Sehlabathebe Park, in 
January 2002 in the area, is seen as a major first step to achieve this goal. 
Moreover, the set up of TBPAs in Southern Africa aim for and require relatively far- 
reaching forms of integration between countries, unlike for example TBPAs in the 
Northern Hemisphere, which tend to be separately managed. As Table 5.4 
demonstrates, the creation of TBPAs can involve several levels of integration. 
Although it is important to acknowledge that there may be significant differences in 
administration and management between TBPAs, Peace Parks in Southern Africa 
generally fall into the most far-reaching categories (levels 4 and 5 in Table 5.4), 
because joint administration and management is aspired. While countries officially 
maintain their sovereignty over their territory, 26 the notion of joint management 
clearly enables a country to discuss and demand chances in the land use in the 
territory of their neighbours, especially when the country in question is more 
powerful than its counterpart(s). 
25 This however unlikely to raise conflict in the short term since Zimbabwe's participation in this 
TBPA has been halted for an unforeseen period due to the political and economic crisis in that country 
(Verhoef, Interview, 2002). Given that no communities reside on the Namibian side of the Ai- 
Ais/Richtersveld, this issue is also unlikely to play a role in that TBPA. 
26 The Great Limpopo Treaty stresses for example how: "the sovereign rights of each party shall be 
respected... and no party shall impose decisions on an other' (Government of Mozambique, 2002: 8). 
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On the other hand, in the TBPAs discussed above, the resettlement of local 
communities may put less stress on inter-governmental relations than in the Great 
Limpopo. Swaziland has strict conservation laws in place whilst the Lesotho 
government is also considerably inclined to adopt a preservationist stand, partially 
because it is keen to maximise ecotourism benefits from the area (Groenewald, 
Interview, 2002; Sandwith, Interview, 2002). At the same time, Swaziland, as an 
absolute monarchy, has a very different governmental system than South Africa. This 
could lead to conflicts over user rights in TBPAs (Van Amerom, 2002), with the 
special hunting rights of Swaziland's royal household being unacceptable to South 
Africa in relation to the international agreement on the TBPA. Furthermore, Lesotho 
fiercely resists South African meddling with its affairs (see also Chapter 8), which 
could complicate the harmonisation of land use, as this usually involves some ceding 
of sovereignty (Van Amerom, 2002). Conflicts over land harmonisation in Southern 
Africa's other planned TBPAs may, as in the Great Limpopo, be added to or 
reinforced by conflicts over the sharing of ecotourism between the states involved. 
The absence of procedures to regulate the distribution of park revenue in these 
TBPAs hint that the sharing of ecotourism benefits constitutes, as in the Great 
Limpopo, a contested issue between South Africa and neighbouring countries. 
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Table 5.4 Possible levels of co-operation between internationally adjoining 
protected areas 
Phases of transboundary Levels of co-operation Characteristics of each co- 
interactions between internationally operation level 
adjoining protected 
areas 
0. No co-operation - Hostile or conflict situation 
- No communication 
Information exchange 1. Communication - Sharing information 
- Communications between 
administrators 
- Low-level meetings 
- Possibly the duty the notify 
re: actions which might have 
transborder effects 
Mutual consultation 2. Consultation - Both sides agree to consult 
the other onset items 
- Duty to consult re: potential 
transborder threats 
- Consultation before action 
Active collaboration 3. Collaboration - Regular meetings 
- Programmatic co-operation 
such as joint research, search 
& rescue, tourist facilities 
Harmonisation of 4. Co-ordination - Participating countries 
planning acknowledge ecosystem as a 
single unit 
- Equal levels of protection for 
both/all protected areas 
- Joint Advisory Committee 
- Co-ordination of planning 
between the two protected 
areas 
integration of planning 5. Full co- - Co-ordinated management 
operation/International - Joint protected area 
ecosystem-based protection 
management - Joint long-range planning for 
two protected areas/ecosystem 
as a unit 
Source: Based on Zbicz (1999: 138). 
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5.6 Conclusion 
Through a case-study of the Great Limpopo, this chapter has indicated that whilst a 
key motivating factor underpinning their co-operation in Peace Parks, the joint pursuit 
of sustainable development in TBPAs may cause considerable tensions between 
South Africa and neighbouring states. The increased interdependency that TBPAs 
create by promoting transboundary flows of wildlife and tourists through increased 
cross-border infrastructural connections increases the stakes that countries have in the 
administration and spatial organisation of the territory of their neighbours. Where the 
latter does not fit a given state's agenda, it may try and influence the spatial 
organisation or administration of neighbouring territory. This will be particularly the 
case when one of the countries involved is significantly more powerful, as is the case 
with South Africa within Southern Africa. However, South Africa's neighbouring 
states will generally resist such intervention attempts because of vested interests in 
the land use that is in place and to protect their sovereignty. Even where they do 
comply with South Africa's wishes, South African pressure to follow certain 
pathways is likely to cause considerable resentment. 
Conflicts over the distribution of ecotourism income in TBPAs further increase the 
likelihood that the pursuit of socio-economic development through Peace Parks 
becomes a source of conflict between South Africa and neighbouring countries. An 
important reason for the continued participation of South Africa's neighbouring 
countries in Peace Parks, in spite of perceived South African dominance of the 
process, is the prospect that joining their conservation areas with South African ones 
will considerably raise their ecotourism prospects. As the country whose ecotourism 
base is already well developed, including in its conservation areas in borderlands, it 
would harm South Africa's interests to share its ecotourism on an equal basis with 
neighbouring countries however, for which reason it is unwilling to do so. This policy 
position is however highly contested by South Africa's neighbours for whom it is 
difficult to start generating substantial ecotourism benefits from TBPAs if they cannot 
share in the ecotourism income generated on the South African side. An important 
underlying reason is that the majority of tourists are likely to mainly sojourn in South 
Africa as a result of its superior tourism facilities and tourism access to the TBPA. 
Furthermore, a considerable amount of the ecotourism income that is generated on the 
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territories of South Africa's neighbouring countries is likely to leak back to South 
Africa, whose businesses dominate the regional tourism market. If TBPAs will, 
contrary to the pan-Africanist rhetoric surrounding the Southern African Peace Parks 
project, exacerbate economic differences between South Africa and neighbouring 
countries, struggles over the sharing of ecotourism are likely to continue. When 
already connected to the TBPA in terms of infrastructure and tourism investments, 
withdrawal will be costly for countries, although this is possible in legal terms. 
Another layer of complexity is added by the fact that local communities have also 
been promised a share in the economic benefits of TBPAs. Especially where 
communities have had to vacate their land, or where they cannot use it as they please, 
failure to ensure that they substantially share in ecotourism income introduces the 
risks that TBPAs will lack local support and that they could be undermined 'from 
below'. Problematically, optimistic estimates regarding the millions of income that 
TBPAs would allegedly attract and their employment options are increasingly 
recognised as being exaggerated whilst thus far most of the funding donated to 
TBPAs has been used for conservation purposes, rather than local development. This 
induces TBPAs with considerable conflict potential. 27 
The pursuit of open boundaries, the second main policy area of TBPAs, may 
considerably add to or aggravate inter-state conflicts in TBPAs. Initially presented as 
a binding element, the pursuit of more open boundaries has increasingly become a 
divisive factor between South Africa and neighbouring countries, adding to existing 
sentiments that South Africa is trying to play 'Big Brother'. It may furthermore fuel 
local resistance against TBPAs. The next chapter explores this issue. 
27 This prospect is explored in more depth in the thesis's General Conclusions. 
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6: Peace Parks and Border Politics 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the political aspects of the pursuit of open boundaries between 
South Africa and neighbouring countries within their TBPAs. As indicated in Chapter 
Two, Southern Africa's Peace Parks were widely expected to "bring down the fences" 
(Michler, 2003), to create "unimpeded movement of animals and people... across 
previous "no-go" international boundaries" (Peddle et al., 2003). The pursuit of more 
open boundaries in Southern Africa's TBPAs was initially perceived as a process 
promoting increased regional integration and better relations between South Africa and 
neighbouring countries. As noted in the preceding chapter, unimpeded cross-border 
access for wildlife and tourists in TBPAs is expected to increase the economic benefits 
that South Africa and neighbouring countries can derive from ecotourism in their 
borderlands. More open boundaries could also assist in intensifying social ties between 
these countries through the co-operation involved and by allowing for the 
"reunification" of ethnic communities in borderlands which are now distributed over 
two or more Southern African countries (Hanks, 2002: 3 1). 
Drawing upon pan Africanist notions, the pursuit of more open boundaries in Peace 
Parks was initially presented as a relatively straightforward process. Proponents of 
Peace Parks emphasised the 'artificial' nature of Southern Africa's boundaries (Hughes, 
2003; see also section 2.8) that were drawn up in colonial times and their disruptive 
impacts upon social and economic flows in the region. With the ending of hostilities 
between South Africa and neighbouring countries in the post-apartheid era, political 
obstacles to the pursuit of open boundaries in Southern Africa seemed to have 
vanished. The pursuit of open boundaries in TBPAs was hence envisaged as a project 
that could occur within a relatively short time span. South Africa's Minister of 
Environmental Affairs & Tourism (Moosa) voiced this optimism, for example, when he 
announced in 2000 that the Great Limpopo's fences could be dropped as early as 2002 
(Moosa quoted in Keenan, 2000). This has, however, not proved possible. 
As a result of its differing economic and political positioning in the region, South 
Africa's interests in boundary management in TBPAs often differ considerably from 
172 
those of its neighbours. As the country which suffers most from cross-border crime, it 
does not always serve South Africa's security interests to remove fences and customs 
posts along the international boundary to the TBPA's outskirts, to allow for free cross- 
border traffic within the TBPA. Coupled with the increased cross-border infrastructural 
connections that TBPAs promote such an action could promote a sharp rise in crime in 
and through the borderland. South Africa may hence want to maintain the boundary 
fence in TBPAs where this risk is prominent. These differing priorities regarding 
boundary management in TBPAs can cause friction between South Africa and its 
partner countries in TBPAs, when the latter continue to adhere to the creation of free 
cross-border access within the TBPA, as a means to stimulate its ecotourism industry. 
South Africa's interests in containing cross-border crime may also induce or reinforce 
(see previous chapter) South African interference in the spatial organisation of the 
territory of its neighbour. Such a development will usually further strain relations with 
the neighbouring state. It is not always South Africa that may have an interest in 
keeping the boundary relatively closed however. 
South Africa's neighbouring states, and especially those with significant economic 
interests in the export of red meat, may also be wary about removing boundary fences 
and customs posts. Where these serve as important veterinary disease checks, a removal 
of boundary fences could result in a transmission of wildlife diseases through the influx 
of South African infected wildlife. This reluctance to remove boundary fences out of 
concern for veterinary disease transmission could produce strife in instances where 
South Africa is eager to remove internal boundary fences to create wildlife corridors. 
In addition to creating new conflict, the pursuit of more open boundaries in Southern 
Africa by means of Peace Parks may also reinforce existing tensions, in areas where the 
boundary location is contested. Countries with territorial claims on South Africa may 
seek to use the negotiations on boundary management in a TBPA as a means to raise 
renewed claims for a re-alignment of the boundary in their favour. The strategic 
interests of states usually preside over environmental and economic interests in TBPAs 
(Van Amerom, 2002), for which reason South Africa is unlikely to agree to adapt the 
boundary, however. 
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Altogether, the pursuit of more open border policies in Peace Parks can easily evoke 
friction and conflict. This will especially be the case when in mediating these 
conflicting interests in boundary management, South Africa's interests dominate. 
Where this is the case, resistance in neighbouring countries against South Africa's 
perceived Big Brother role in TBPA creation is likely to increase. Linked to this, it 
seems important that South Africa continues to refrain from pressuring neighbouring 
states to open their boundaries where they are reluctant to do so. With boundaries 
symbolising a state's independence from a neighbouring state, such interference is 
politically very sensitive. On the other hand, failure to create open boundaries may 
increase local resistance against TBPAs, since the promised uninhibited cross-border 
access in TBPAs is often highly important - in social and economic terms- for local 
communities in borderlands. Given these conflicting interests in boundary management 
in TBPAs, arrangements over boundary management are likely to generate conflict, in 
what ever form it is pursued. 
To understand the precise nature of the tensions and conflicts that the pursuit of more 
open boundary policies in Peace Parks can lead to, it is useful to familiarise ourselves 
more with the changes that Peace Parks seek to introduce to Southern Africa's border 
landscapes. To this end, the next section explores some key characteristics of Southern 
Africa's borderlands while the section following provides an insight into the changes 
that Peace Parks seek to introduce. After this, some of the security dilemmas raised by 
the creation of TBPAs are discussed. The fourth section considers how these security 
dilemmas have affected the behaviour of South Africa and neighbouring states 
regarding the pursuit of more open boundaries in TBPAs and with what consequences 
for their relations. This leads to a discussion of how outstanding boundary disputes 
between South Africa and neighbouring countries can affect their pursuit of more open 
boundaries. The conclusion surnmarises the chapter's main findings and reflects on the 
wider political implications of the observed political constraints for the pursuit of open 
boundaries in TBPAs. 
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6.2 Transactions and cross-border flows in Southern Africa's 
borderlands 
Bordering six countries, South Africa's 4,862 krn long' land boundaries (CIA, 2004) 
run through highly varied social and economic landscapes, from extremely thinly 
populated desert landscapes in the west to greener and more highly populated parts in 
the east. Whilst some of these borderlands host large deposits of minerals like 
diamonds and uranium, or valuable crops like sugar cane, others have poor soils, barely 
enough for subsistence. In short, the Southern African Peace Parks plan covers a highly 
varied patchwork of cultures, economies and social systems. Nevertheless, it is possible 
to identify some key factors that play a role in large parts of the Southern African 
landscape. As was outlined in Chapter Three (section 3.4.3), borderlands constitute 
unique geographical areas, due to their proximity to international boundaries. 
Borderlands in Africa often suffer from one or more of the following: 
" Smuggling and human trafficking 
" Increased vulnerability to spill-over effects of political unrest/violence in 
neighbouring countries 
" Increased vulnerability to armed insurgence, both from within the country and cross- 
border 
9 Claims upon territory by neighbouring states 
These pressures overall play a significant role in Southern Africa's borderlands, often as 
a result of the great economic disparity that exists between South Africa and its 
neighbours (with the exception of Botswana). The ways in which each of the above- 
outlined phenomena play a role in Southern Africa's borderlands will now be considered. 
1 Divided as follows: Botswana 1,840 km, Lesotho 909 km, Mozambique 491 km, Namibia 967 km, 
Swaziland 430 krn and Zimbabwe 225 km. 
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1) Illegal cross-borderflows 
South Africa's position as a relatively prosperous country in a region beset with socio- 
economic problems and political instabilities is likely to encourage human mobility and 
smuggling, leading to considerable pressure on South Africa's boundaries (Solomon, 
2003). South Africa's industrial goods are in great demand in neighbouring countries 
with a less advanced industrial base. 2 Furthermore, South Africa functions as a magnet 
for people from all over the region seeking employment or other forms of economic 
opportunity. These uneven demand and supply patterns have shaped the nature of cross- 
border traffic between South Africa and neighbouring countries, with industrial goods 
overwhelmingly going one way, and raw materials and people going the other (see Figure 
6.1). 
Industrial, conspMer goods, incl. stolen ones 0 
0 Botswana 
South 
Namibia Africa 
Zimbabwe 
Swaziland 
0 Op 
(illegal) iob seekers, goods/sub 
0 
: a: TateriaIs,, jl ktances 
Lesotho 
Namibia 
F 
igure 6.1 Dominant patterns in cross-border traffic between South Africa and its 
neighbouring states 
These transboundary flows are not necessarily problematic. However the fact that much 
of the traffic is illegal makes them so. Various powerful criminal syndicates specialise 
in the smuggling of stolen consumer goods from South Africa. Stolen vehicles form a 
2 Outside South Africa, only Zimbabwe has meaningful industrial capacity. The latter has however 
always been significantly lower than South Africa's and is increasingly affected by Zimbabwe's political 
and economic crisis. A shortage of petrol in the country moreover hampers the export of Zimbawean 
goods., 
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particularly important component of this trade. The goods that are 'exported' from 
neighbouring countries into South Africa, often along the same smuggling routes, 
constitute illicit products, such as dagga 3 (especially from Swaziland/Lesotho) and fire 
arms (especially from Mozambique). Illegal immigration to South Africa is another 
important component of illegal transboundary flows into South Africa. (Koetzer, 
Interview, 2001). Ivory and rhino horn smuggling also constitutes a problem in some 
areas. Where Southern Africa's borderlands host valuable mineral, including diamond 
deposits then gem smuggling may be a prominent feature of illegal cross-border traffic. 
Figure 6.2 depicts some of the areas where illegal activities are particularly prominent. 
2) Susceptibility to spill-over effects ofpolitical unrestlviolence and artned insurgency 
With most boundaries in the region being highly permeable, Southern African countries 
are vulnerable to spill-over effects in the form of refugees, armed violence, an increase 
in arms smuggling and other effects generated by conflict or political unrest in 
neighbouring countries (Van Nieuwkerk: 2000: 1; Gastrow, 2001). The effects of the 
political crisis in Zimbabwe on neighbouring countries in the form of refugees illustrate 
this phenomenon, as did events during the apartheid era (section 2.4). Although, thus 
far, large-scale political unrest and conflict has only erupted in Zimbabwe, most 
countries in Southern Africa are vulnerable to similar developments (Van Nieuwkerk, 
2000). For one thing, Southern Africa's continued susceptibility to the emergence of 
autocratic regimes and political unrest means that the possibility of armed insurgency in 
the region remains a real possibility. Borderlands are particularly vulnerable to the 
effects of anti-state guerrilla warfare. This is partly because of their evident proximity 
to the border, but it is also accentuated by the generally low population densities and 
large areas in which insurgents can seek refuge. As such, armed insurgency continues 
to feature as a distinct risk in Southern Africa's borderlands and thus influences border 
management (see also Table 6.1). 
3 The term 'dagga' is used throughout Southern Africa to refer to marihuana and hashish. 
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Table 6.1: Key security issues in South Africa's borderlands as identified by South 
African security experts 
Organised/Syndicated Cr International Other 
Gun running Inter-state conflict Natural disasters 
Drugs Insurgencies (rebels) 
Vehicles 
Illegal immigration 
Stock theft 
Poaching 
Illegal land settlement 
Smuggling 
Source: Peddle et al. (2003). 
3) Disputed boundaries 
As displayed in Figure 6.2, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland all have territorial claims 
in South Africaý, and demand a re-alignment of South Africa's boundaries in their 
favour. South Africa's boundary with each of these countries is legalised through 
international treaties signed in colonial times. However, South Africa's neighbours had 
no choice but to sign these treaties and sometimes to cede large tracts of land in the 
process, being unable to challenge South Africa's/Britain's superior military power. 
These circumstances make these treaties invalid in the eyes of the claimant states. In 
recent years, Swaziland and Namibia have increasingly urged South Africa to re-align 
their boundaries. 5 South Africa's valuable natural resource base further incites these 
territorial demands. For Swaziland and Lesotho the presence of respectively large 
numbers of Swazis and North Sotho on South African territory, a result of the boundary 
agreement, is also a main consideration (CIA Factbook, 2004). Such considerations 
inevitably deter the removal of boundary fences and customs posts promoted by the 
4 Of these three states, Namibia and Swaziland have launched formal requests to the South African 
government to revise the boundary. 
5 For which there initially seemed to be scope, after former President Mandela allegedly promised the 
Swazis, Basotho and Narnibians that South Africa would reconsider their border claims. This promise 
was, however, never followed up during his presidency. 
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proponents of Peace Parks. Before discussing these constraints in more depth, the ways 
in which Peace Parks can impact on the boundary landscape needs further discussion. 
6.3 Peace Parks and spatial changes in the border landscape 
To be able to appreciate the ways in which TBPAs may alter the border landscape it is 
first useful to consider a model of typical boundary interaction (Fig. 6.4. ) 
Poli'tical-legal- International boundary 
social differences discouragZ-ý3 
ntegration 
ý---giýo free movement of people 
Free movement of wildlife 
is hampered 
Border Border 
Post Post 
Country A Country B 
Road 
Unchecked cross-border flows 
Figure 6.3A: Model of international boundary interaction 
Source: adapted from: Peddle et al. (2003: 6). 
A boundary fence and customs post hamper free cross-border traffic for wildlife and 
humans alike from country A into country B, and conversely. 
Advocates of Peace Parks commonly envisage a very different situation, notably one in 
which there is unimpeded cross-border access for both wildlife and people (see Figure 
6.3B). 
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Figure 6.3B: The 'open boundary model' through TBPA linkage 
Source: adapted from: Peddle et al. (2003: 6). 
To this end, fences along the international boundary and associated border posts are 
removed (see figure 6.3B). Furthermore, a cross-border road network connecting the 
park is put in place, preferably providing access to various parts of the adjacent park. 
However, the pursuit of inhibited cross-border access in Peace Parks by means of the 
measures outlined above is often difficult to achieve. Especially in the light of the 
earlier outlined problematic characteristics of Southern Africa's borderlands, boundary 
fences may play an important role in: 
Restricting the uncontrolled movement of people from one country to 
another 
Restricting the movement of wildlife in compliance with 
government regulations to check the spread of veterinary diseases including 
bovine tuberculosis, Foot and Mouth disease, East Coast Fever, and 
Brucellosis from wildlife to domestic stock, or between domestic stock based 
in different countries. 
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0 Demarcating the international border between two countries 
Perhaps rather obviously, where boundary fences alongside an international boundary 
fulfil an important barrier or demarcation function a state may resist their removal for 
security or political reasons, even if it is involved in the creation of a Peace Park. That 
these powerful reasons for the maintenance of boundary fences should have been 
overlooked - or at least underplayed - by supporters of Peace Parks is surprising and 
demonstrates the extent to which the movement was initially detached from the 
political realities of the region. 
6.4 South African security interests and the pursuit of open 
boundaries 
In borderlands where this risk is prominent, fears of an increase in transboundary crime 
may affect South Africa's willingness to pursue open boundaries in its TBPAs, even if 
the removal of internal boundary fences has important ecological, economic and social 
advantages and continues to be desired by its partner country. Problematically, this is 
frequently the case. Because they are less affected by it, the containment of 
transboundary crime tends to be far less prioritised by South Africa's neighbours. 
Especially when the economic interests of the participating neighbouring state are 
hanned by a failure to create open boundaries in the TBPA, South Africa's refusal to 
continue to adhere to the pursuit of open boundaries may generate severe tensions. An 
assessment of the political consequences of the abandoning of the pursuit of open 
boundaries between the South African Kruger Park and the Mozambican Limpopo Park 
in the Great Limpopo, in favour of a boundary management model limiting uninhibited 
cross-border access to wildlife at just a few selected places, illustrates this point. 
Whilst open boundaries are generally favoured in Peace Parks, uninhibited cross-border 
access for wildlife and people is on first sight perhaps nowhere more beneficial to 
South Africa as in the Great Limpopo. As outlined in the previous chapter the creation 
of wildlife corridors with Mozambique is ecologically important for South Africa, as a 
means to dispose of surplus elephants. Furthermore, free cross-border traffic in the 
TBPA is expected to boost ecotourism in the borderland, of which South Africa stands 
to profit. Free cross-border access over the Mozambican-South African boundary 
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through the TFP would also be welcomed by Shangaan communities in the borderland, 
due to the close ties that exist between Shangaan in Mozambique and South Africa. 6 
For this reason South African policy makers in TBPAs, like their colleagues from 
Mozambique, initially enthusiastically supported a removal of the TBPA's internal 
boundary fence, which is the Kruger Park's eastern fence. Moreover, the customs post 
along the TBPA's internal boundary, located at Pafuri in the northern part of Kruger, 
was to be removed to the outskirts of the TBPA to allow for free tourism cross-border 
access within the TBPA. Until 2001 the main actors involved in TBPAs from the South 
African side were, however, DEAT, SANPs and the PPF which, in line with their 
priorities, approached the pursuit of open boundaries from a conservationist and 
ecotourism perspective. As far as security issues were considered, it was assumed that 
the erection of external boundary posts would be sufficient to prevent the TBPA from 
being penetrated by criminal networks involved in illegal cross-border trade. 
Upon being confronted with the risk of a significant rise in transboundary crime 
however, the South African government withdrew its support for the pursuit of an 
'open boundary model' with peripheral border posts (as displayed in Figure 6.3B). 
Instead, the South African Home Office maintained that the existing boundary fence, 
the Kruger Park's eastern fence, and border post remain in place, and even that 
additional border posts be established along the Mozambican-South African boundary 
inside the Great Limpopo to monitor tourism flows and handle security risks. South 
African security experts from the SADF, the South African Police and the Home Office 
predicted the emergence of severe security problems if the Kruger Park's electrified 
eastern fence was removed and a cross-border access road network built to provide 
unimpeded vehicle access to the adjacent Limpopo Park. The increased flow of vehicle 
traffic between the Kruger and the Limpopo Park generated by the increase in 
ecotourism would, it was feared, make it relatively easy for criminal syndicates 
6 This information was collected at a Shangaan cultural festival near White River, a South African town, 
on 8 August 2001. At the festival I spoke to Shangaan from both Mozambique and South Africa. My 
conversational partners emphasised repeatedly the close linkages that exist between these groups ("when 
our fellow brothers fled to our village from Mozambique during the war and asked the chief for 
permission to stay and for land he gave it to them even though land is scarce, for they are our relatives"). 
In addition, the desire for more direct and earlier cross-border access was frequently mentioned. 
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operating in the Limpopo borderland to smuggle stolen vehicles from South African 
into Mozambique. 
Disguised as tourists, smugglers could enter and exit the park in these vehicles. 
Suspected "hundreds" of arms caches in the Limpopo Park (Anon., 2001b), remnants of 
Mozambique's civil war, could furthermore stimulate the movement of illegal arms into 
the Kruger Park. Illegal migration from Mozambique might also increase 7. To contain 
illegal vehicle and arms smuggling through the Great Limpopo, South Africa's border 
control agencies fiercely opposed the removal of the Kruger Park's eastern fence. The 
Kruger Park's electrified fence serves as an important barrier against smuggling 
activities. 'Only' 150 to 300 vehicles are estimated to be smuggled monthly through the 
Kruger Park (Peddle, Interview, 2001). The main smuggling route for these goods 
between South Africa and Mozambique currently runs via the Lubombo Flats corridor 
between Ressana Garcia (Mozambique) and the Swaziland border, below the Kruger 
Park (see Figure 6.2). South African security officers feared that the creation of 
improved opportunities for smuggling through the Great Limpopo, through the planned 
unimpeded cross-border access for vehicles between the Limpopo and the Kruger Park, 
would mean that the main smuggle route be moved further north, to run through the 
Great Limpopo. A planned strengthening of security controls along the Swaziland 
border increased this prospect. To contain the risk, the SADF, South African Police and 
South Africa's Home Office opposed the removal of the Kruger Park's eastern fence 
and the Pafuri border post, in the north of the Kruger Park. Furthermore, they insisted 
on the creation of two extra border posts alongside the international boundary 
intersecting the Great Limpopo. 
The demands of these South African security agencies caused severe tensions with 
Mozambique. Unlike their South African colleagues, Mozambican border control 
officials did not perceive it necessary to abandon the planned 'open boundary model' 
for the Great Limpopo. They maintained that the creation of border posts on the 
7 This prospect was, however, felt to be less of an issue for the South African authorities. Security 
officers felt that migration through the Great Limpopo would be difficult to contain at the best of times, 
and that the presence of man-eating predators in the Kruger Park would continue to have a constraining 
effect (attended discussion of South African and Mozambican security experts during the GKG 
management workshop, July 2001. See also Peddle et al., 2003). 
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TBPA's outskirts and additional security checks would be sufficient to contain a 
possible increase in transboundary crime, as had been the case in the earlier established 
Kgalagadi Park, between Botswana and South Africa. Their Zimbabwean colleagues 
supported them in this position. 
In the Kgalagadi TBPA, wildlife and people can freely cross the international boundary 
into the adjacent Park. To check smuggling, the South African and Botswana border 
authorities agreed that visitors to the Park could only exit the park in the country from 
which they had entered it, unless they had a visa. To check tourism flows from and to 
the TBPA to prevent smuggling, Botswana and South African customs authorities 
erected two border posts on the periphery of the TBPA. Finally, some police officers 
were trained as customs personnel. Overall, these security measures have thus far 
proved sufficient to control a rise in transboundary crime. Referring to this example, 
Mozambican and Zimbabwean security personnel, as well as South African 
environmentalist and ecotourism interest groups, argue that the creation of peripheral 
boundary posts in the Great Limpopo would be sufficient to discourage an increase in 
vehicle and arms smuggling. They also maintain that the removal of the Kruger 
boundary fence would be safe, although increased patrolling in the area might be 
necessary. 
For their part, the South African Home Office argued, however, that the Great Limpopo 
is created and will function under very different and less favourable circumstances than 
the Kgalagadi Park, and that the creation of peripheral border posts and increased 
patrolling would be insufficient to check the risk of a rise in crime. From a security 
perspective, the Kgalagadi Park can be said to operate in extremely favourable 
circumstances, which discourage smuggling and other illegal activities. Relatively 
equal economic levels of development between Botswana and South Africa reduce the 
incentive for illegal cross-border trade and migration. Moreover, the hot and difficult 
desert environment, which (other than on tarred roads) can only be accessed by 4x4s, 
discourages travel off the road network within the TBPA. Vehicles can only enter the 
road network through two entrances. Finally, the estimated number of visitors to the 
Kgalagadi is 'only' 50,000 a year. Control of tourism and local traffic to and from the 
TBPA by means of external border posts is therefore relatively easy. 
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In contrast, effectively controlling the movement of visitors to the Great Limpopo 
solely by means of external border posts would be impossible for South Africa's border 
police and customs authorities. An important reason is that this TBPA can be accessed, 
including illegally, at multiple places, both from Mozambique and South Africa. 
Coupled with the fact that off-road travel is relatively easy in the Great Limpopo, this 
means that peripheral border posts could be easily bypassed by criminal elements. The 
Kruger Park has six entrance gates. Furthermore, the Kruger Park can be illegally 
accessed by road from the west, as no fences separate the private game reserves along 
its western boundary from the Kruger Park (see also Figure 6.4). 
The Kruger Park's western boundary is hence "highly porous" whilst Mozambique's 
Limpopo Park is not fenced at all. This means that smugglers could illegally enter the 
Great Limpopo by car from the Mozambican side "drive through the Kruger Park and 
exit into South Africa via the illegal transit through the private game reserves" (Anon., 
2001: 4). Moreover, at several places it would be possible for smugglers to leave the 
road network and drive to a previously arranged spot across the boundary to meet and 
exchange illegal goods and passengers with counterparts over the boundary (Koetzer, 
Interview, 2001). Smugglers could therefore easily avoid erected border posts on the 
TBPA's outskirts. Adding to the difficulties for South Africa's understaffed and under 
financed border police to control the movement of vehicles and their passengers inside 
the TBPA are the massive tourism numbers that are expected: over a million visitors 
each year. With the Mozambican police having even less capacity and being renowned 
for its linkages with criminal syndicates, co-operation with the Mozambican police was 
thought to address the problem only marginally. 
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Source: Based on map of the Peace Parks Foundation, 2003 
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For these reasons, the South African Home Office, the ultimate decision-making body 
regarding boundary management in South Africa, demanded that the Kruger Park's 
eastern boundary fence remain in place and two extra internal customs posts be erected 
in the Park. 
Mozambique, and to a lesser extent Zimbabwe, contested this policy position. For 
Mozambique, the creation of open boundaries was perceived as a crucial enabling 
factor in attracting tourists from the Kruger Park to the Limpopo Park. With an 
overwhelming majority of tourists expected to enter the TBPA from South Africa, and 
with the Limpopo Park currently being largely bereft of the 'Big Five', which are the 
major tourism attraction, the easiest possible cross-border access from South Africa for 
both animals and tourists would benefit Mozambique. Forcing tourists to go through 
border posts before they could enter Mozambique was seen as significantly reducing 
the attractiveness for tourists of entering Mozambique. It was also against the spirit of 
the TFP, which had already been marketed as a place where tourists could drive 
unimpeded from one country to the next, just like wildlife could freely move across the 
boundary. As such, Mozambique saw its envisaged ecotourism income from the TBPA 
at risk. 
Mozambique may also not have wanted to support the plans of South Africa's security 
establishment for a different economic reason. The illegal border economy is an 
important generator of income for Mozambique. Moreover, the Mozambican 
government is alleged to have direct interests in these smuggling networks, in which 
the president's son has been implicated (Anonymous Source, Mozambican Newspaper, 
2001). During a policy workshop in July 2001, aimed at the creation of a management 
plan for the Great Limpopo, the demands of the SADF, the police and the Department 
of Home Affairs, raised so much controversy that a special policy workshop on the 
issue was held in August 2001. During this latter policy workshop in Johannesburg, a 
compromise was eventually reached. However, Mozambique only accepted the 
proposal with much reluctance, as it overwhelmingly represented the demands of South 
Africa's security establishment. The accepted proposal stipulated that the boundary 
fence would largely remain in place, and tourist flows would be managed through two 
internal border posts, which were established alongside the roads that would be created 
in the TBPA to connect the Kruger with the Limpopo Park. To this end, the existing 
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Pafuri border post between Mozambique and South Africa would be extended, from 
which tourists could in the future continue to Zimbabwe, through the existing 
Sango/Eduardo Mondlana Border Post between Mozambique and Zimbabwe. 
Furthermore, a second border post would be created at Giroyondo (see Figure 6.4), to 
facilitate tourism between the Kruger Park and the Massingir Dam. Mozambique could 
then choose to locate their equivalent border post at the same site or at Massingir. 
In recognition of the need to create wildlife corridors in the TBPA, South Africa's 
security agencies agreed that small openings could be made in the Kruger Park's fence 
to allow for the migration of wildlife. However, this would only be permitted in 
locations where the terrain was relatively inaccessible, such as in parts of the Lubombo 
Mountains, reducing the chances that the 'wildlife corridor' could unintentionally 
become a smuggling corridor. Figure 6.5 displays this 'selective calendar model'. 
Figure 6.5 The Great Limpopo's 'selective calendar' model: removal of parts of the 
boundary fence to allow for wildlife and tourist corridors with maintenance of 
internal border posts 
Source: Adapted from: Peddle et al. (2003: 6). 
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To placate Mozambique and Zimbabwe, and South African proponents of the 'open 
boundary model 8, the agreement also expressed continued commitment to the removal 
of internal boundary fences in favour of the creation of peripheral ones. No date was 
specified, however. Although Mozambique was relatively satisfied with the 
opportunities offered for wildlife migration, and with the fact that the 'open boundary 
model' remained part of the planning, it nevertheless saw the policy changes in a 
negative light. The lack of a final date could mean that the 'open boundary model' 
might never become a reality in the Great Limpopo. Combined with the postponed 
connection of its Banine and Zinave Parks to the Great Limpopo (see section 5.3) to an 
unspecified future time, Mozambique felt that its interests were far less prioritised and 
less represented than South Africa's in the Great Limpopo. Additional security 
demands by South Africa stipulating that the Limpopo Park be fenced to control and 
limit access, and that the settlements in the Limpopo Park be removed (because they 
were seen as ideal bases for illegal activities and hiding places for smugglers and 
poachers), further strained Mozambican- South African relations. As outlined in Chapter 
5, Mozambique perceived these demands as undermining its interests in, and its 
sovereignty over, its borderland. On the other hand, South Africa's emphasis that the 
maintenance of high levels of security in the TBPA would, ultimately, benefit 
Mozambique's ecotourism prospects by limiting the risk that tourists might be mugged 
or hijacked in the TBPA, as happened earlier in the Kruger Park, did help to assuage 
Mozambique's disappointment. 
6.5 The pursuit of open boundaries & fears of veterinary disease 
spread 
The pursuit of open boundaries in TBPAs may not only promote a rise in transboundary 
crime, but may also induce a spread of veterinary disease. Contrary to the increase in 
transboundary crime, the spread of veterinary disease is less a concern for South Africa 
than for some neighbourin g countries, especially those with vested interests in the red 
meat industry. Consequently, in the Great Limpopo with Zimbabwe, and in the 
8 Other than security officials, most South African representatives at the policy workshop did initially not 
see a need to abandon the pursuit of open boundaries in the TBPA. 
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Lubombo TBPA with Swaziland, South Africa has been willing to pursue open 
boundaries, but neighbouring countries have not. 
This reluctance on the side of Zimbabwe and Swaziland to pursue open boundaries in 
TBPAs, and the resulting delays in the connection of their National Parks and/or nature 
reserves with those of South Africa, have thus far not led to significant tensions. This is 
possibly because the countries in question have not outright refused the pursuit of open 
boundaries. The political and security interests of South Africa discouraging the pursuit 
of open boundaries in these TBPAs might also play a role. As the planning of these 
TBPAs becomes more advanced, different priorities regarding the management of their 
boundaries between South Africa and the partner country in question might well 
become more pronounced and cause conflict. These issues will be explored with a 
focus on the Great Limpopo and the Lubombo TBPA, where fears of transmission of 
veterinary disease have significantly hampered the envisaged creation of unimpeded 
cross-border access. 
Fears of a transmission of veterinary disease from South Africa accounts for the 
considerable delays in connecting Zimbabwe's Sengwe Corridor with South Africa's 
Kruger Park (Wolmer, 2003; Schoon, 2004) (see also section 5.2.5). Although 
Zimbabwean border authorities did not object to the creation of unimpeded cross- 
border access with South Africa (see previous section), Zimbabwean veterinary disease 
specialists from the Ministry of Agriculture opposed a connection of the Gonarezhou 
Park and Kruger Park, by means of the Sengwe Corridor (observation during GKG 
management workshop, 2001). Wildlife in the Kruger National Park and other South 
African parks are suspected of carrying various diseases that could be transmitted to 
cattle. Zimbabwe feared that the increased influx of South African infected. buffaloes 
into its Gonarezhou Park, might re-introduce Bovine Tuberculosis into the country. 
Furthennore, it feared for a transmission of Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD), "one of 
the most contagious animal diseases" (World Organisation for Animal Health (OiE)), 
2004). By 2001 Zimbabwe was still FMD free, in contrast to South Africa. The re- 
introduction of FMD into Zimbabwe would cause the country significant economic 
losses. The most important market for Zimbabwean beef was the European Union, 
where the import of red meat is only allowed from countries that have been tested FMD 
free. 
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For this reason Zimbabwe's veterinary disease specialists resisted the connection of the 
Gonarezhou Park to the Great Limpopo "without further measures" (GKG workshop, 
2001). The preventive measures considered during the GKG management workshop in 
2001 and proposed by South Africa and Mozambique were, however, found to be 
insufficient or impossible. A ban on keeping cattle in the Sengwe Corridor was 
considered. However, Zimbabwe's veterinary specialists felt that even such a far- 
reaching measure, providing this was legally possible at all, would be insufficient: even 
the presence of a few domestic animals or pets could help transmit FMD from South 
African wildlife into Zimbabwe. Banning these animals would be even more difficult to 
supervise. The only adequate measure would be to relocate the Sengwe Community and 
fully fence the Corridor. However, as indicated in Chapter 5, this was unacceptable to 
the Zimbabwean government. South Africa did not share this policy position. It felt, 
however, like Mozambique that the ecological and ecotourism benefits of the 
connection of the Gonarezhou Park by means of the Sengwe Corridor into the Great 
Limpopo outweighed possible veterinary disease threats. South Africa also risked 
exposure to veterinary disease from neighbouring countries through the creation of 
wildlife corridors. For example, in the Great Limpopo South African disease specialists 
feared a transmission of Rabies from Mozambique. 
Overall, however, South Africa has far less to lose, compared with Zimbabwe. 9 It is not 
a big exporter of red meat, and even imports 15% of its total consumption. In addition 
to Zimbabwe, Swaziland also stands to lose considerably from a transmission of 
veterinary disease from South Africa, for which reason it has similar reservations as 
Zimbabwe against the pursuit of open boundaries in TBPAs. 
Fears of a transmission of veterinary disease from South Africa, especially FMD, have 
constrained Swaziland's willingness to pursue open boundaries in the Lubombo TBPA. 
With its boundary fences and border posts functioning as important barriers against the 
9 Its concerns for veterinary disease transmission from Zimbabwe are likely to have grown with a 
massive outbreak of FMD in Zimbabwe, which threatens to infect the whole of the region, as the 
Zimbabwean government lacks the financial means or political will to vaccinate its wildlife against FMD 
(BBC, 2003). 
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spread of veterinary disease into the country, Swaziland is reluctant to remove its 
boundary fences in the Lubombo TBPA. As in many other parts of Southern Africa, 
cattle embody wealth to the Swazis, and beef exports to the European Union, with its 
strict regulations regarding FMD free meat, are of growing economic importance. FMD 
was re-introduced into the country in September 2000, through contacts between South 
African and Swazi cattle (Swazi farmers had illegally crossed the boundary into South 
Africa's Kwa Zulu Natal province). After having successfully eradicated the disease, 
Swaziland is keen to avoid renewed exposure from migrating wildlife from South 
Africa and Mozambique. 
Mozambique and South Africa are not unsympathetic to Swaziland's concerns. 
However, the South African PPF argues that the removal of the TBPA's internal fences 
in favour of external fencing would mean that the transmission of wildlife diseases 
could be sufficiently contained, if not more effectively. Vaccination measures could 
ensure that the TBPA would be a 'veterinary disease free zone'. Swaziland would, in 
this scenario, not just have fences and control posts alongside its international boundary 
to protect it from incoming veterinary disease from South Africa and Mozambique, but 
a vast buffer zone in the form of the whole TBPA (Myburgh, Interview, 2002). 
These arguments have thus far failed to convince Swaziland to agree with a removal of 
its boundary fences in the Lubornbo. For the above-outlined scenario to work, the 
park's external boundary fences would have to be impenetrable, which is difficult to 
achieve, especially in parks with large mammals like elephants, which frequently 
trample or otherwise break through fences. Where wildlife would escape into adjacent 
communal farming areas they could still pass on diseases to cattle (Reilly, Interview, 
2002). Secondly, communal farming settlements will be incorporated into the TBPAs. 
As mentioned earlier, the presence of livestock or even a few domestic animals in a 
TBPA introduces considerable risks from a wildlife disease control viewpoint 
(Zimbabwean veterinary disease specialist, Interview, 2001). 
These continued reservations in Swaziland and Zimbabwe have not, however, led to 
major tensions with South Africa, in spite of the plans to create open boundaries in 
these TBPAs. A possible explanation may be that whilst South Africa is little deterred 
by risks of veterinary disease spread, it has tacit political interests in delaying a 
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connection with Zimbabwe and Swaziland, undermining its enthusiasm to pursue open 
boundaries. For economic and security reasons it would serve South Africa not to open 
the boundary with Zimbabwe, at least until political stability has returned to the country 
(Burger, Interview, 2001). If anything, its border with Zimbabwe has become more 
closed. Since the political crisis in Zimbabwe South Africa has sharpened its visa 
requirements to discourage an influx of illegal Zimbabwean immigrants, looking for 
work and security in South Africa. A heightened guarding of South Africa's borders 
also obstructs the pursuit of open boundaries with Zimbabwe in the Great Limpopo. To 
protect South Africa in the case of an outbreak of political violence in Zimbabwe 
(Burger, Interview, 2001; Van Wyk, Interview, 2002) SADF troops have still not left 
their base in the Madimbo Corridor, located closely to the Zimbabwean boundary, as 
previously arranged. 10 In the Lubombo TBPA such safety considerations could also 
play a role. Although Swaziland has for long been one of Africa's most stable 
countries, opposition against the undemocratic and spending-happy Swazi King is 
growing and political analysts fear for an outbreak of violence. Nevertheless, this 
prospect is unlikely to deter South Africa to want to pursue open boundaries in the 
Lubombo TBPA. Given that Swaziland is a much smaller and weaker country than 
South Africa, in such a scenario South Africa might simply choose to enter the country 
to try and re-establish order", rather than closing its boundaries and adopt a 'wait and 
see' attitude. High levels of transboundary crime, in the form of the smuggling of stolen 
vehicles, arms and dagga, and persistent government failures to bring it under control, 
may explain South Africa's reaction. It is, however, difficult to determine the impact of 
these South African strategic and security concerns given that these have been little 
openly discussed. 
In future, Zimbabwe's and Swaziland's reluctance to pursue open boundaries in their 
TBPAs with South Africa may become a source of tension between South Africa and 
neighbouring countries. In 2001 and to a lesser extent in 2002, most of South Africa's 
energy was focused on the connection between the Mozambican and South African 
parts of the Great Limpopo. The Lubombo TBPA received little South African interest. 
10 The Madimbo Corridor is on the list of areas in South Africa to be joined to the Great Limpopo TFP. 
" As it did in Lesotho when political violence beset that country in 1998. 
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So did the connection with Zimbabwe in the Great Limpopo. However, active 
involvement with the Lubombo TBPA has been resumed since 2002 (Rogues, 
Interview, 2002) and South Africa has invested considerable sums in the Lubombo SDI 
(see section 6.7.3), of which the Lubombo TBPA is a major component 12 . It is therefore 
likely to want to see it become operational in the near future. Recent conflict with 
Zimbabwe over the delays in connecting its Gonarezhou Park to the Great Limpopo 
(see section 5.3.3), may indicate that South Africa may also start exercising political 
pressure on Zimbabwe to create open boundary access between the Zimbabwean-South 
African parts of the Great Limpopo. Considering that such a connection represents a 
considerable security risk for South Africa, and that Zimbabwe is a relatively powerful 
neighbour, this criticism is likely to remain limited, however. 
6.6 Boundary disputes & the pursuit of open boundaries 
6.6.1 Introduction 
In borderlands where the location of the boundary is contested, the pursuit of open 
boundaries in Peace Parks may cause considerable conflict between South Africa and a 
neighbouring state. Where South Africa perceives the pursuit of open boundaries 
merely as a technical matter unrelated to existing boundary disputes, its neighbouring 
states may turn it into a political matter, whereby progress in this policy area is linked 
and made conditional to a resolution of the boundary conflict in their advantage. 
Considering that states generally prioritise their territorial and geo-political interests 
over their environmental and economic interests in TBPAs (Van Amerom, 2002), South 
Africa is likely to refuse to link the negotiations over boundary arrangements in TBPAs 
to wider negotiations over the location of the boundary and to comprise in the latter 
area. The resulting stalemate is likely to hamper negotiations over more open 
boundaries in TBPAs and to negatively affect relations between South Africa and 
neighbouring countries. As the latter has not achieved its aim, resentment is likely to 
increase. South Africa is likely to perceive the actions of the neighbouring country as 
illegitimate 'blackmail', which may induce anger. Economic interests in transboundary 
co-operation may bring the states close enough again to resume their negotiations over 
12 See footnote 26 in Chapter Two. 
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free cross-border access within TBPAs. As long as the boundary dispute continues to 
affect wider relations between South Africa and its neighbours, progress in the area of 
boundary management in TBPAs is likely to remain vulnerable to disagreements over 
the boundary, however. This section will explore these issues with a focus on the Ai- 
Ais/Richtersveld, the first TBPA where the pursuit of open boundaries became linked 
to and hampered by tensions over the location of the boundary. The potential impact of 
South Africa's boundary disputes with Lesotho and Swaziland upon the pursuit of open 
boundaries in the Maloti/Drakensberg and the Lubombo TBPA will also be assessed. 
6.6.2 The Namibian-South African boundary dispute 
A substantial part of the nearly 1000 km-long international boundary between Namibia 
and South Africa intersects the Ai-Ais/Richterveld Park. The boundary is located along 
the northern bank of the Orange River, which divides the Namibian and South African 
parts of the TBPA (see Figure 6.6). This agreement originated in colonial times. Using 
its military supremacy, Britain pressured the Germans 13 into agreeing to a boundary 
that is today very unfavourable to Namibia. South Africa has adhered to this agreement 
ever since. This is much to Namibia's dismay, which insists that the boundary should 
be in the middle of the Orange River, as is common international practice 14 . 
13 The then colonial powers of respectively South Africa and Narnibia. 
14 Personal communication [email], Martin Pratt, Director International Boundaries Research Unit, 
Durham, 2004. 
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Figure 6.6 The Orange River separates the Ai-Ais and the Richtersveld Parks 
Source: DEAT, 2003 (htti): //www. southafrica. info/ess-info/sa glance/sustainable/sanarnibia-park. htm). 
The boundary dispute is "managed" (CIA, 2004); both countries are committed to 
finding a peaceful resolution. Nevertheless, and contrary to other Namibian claims 
upon South African territory 15 , the boundary dispute has proved difficult to settle. 
Disagreements over the boundary location continue to flare up and to strain relations 
between the two countries (Barnard, 1994; Graig, 2001). 
A factor complicating a resolution of the boundary conflict is the presence of valuable 
natural resources in, and on the banks of, the Orange River (Jones, Interview, 2002). 
These include major diamond deposits at the river mouth, and also fish and grazing 
land on islands in the Orange River. Namibia and South Africa exercise overlapping 
claims upon these resources. When South Africa still ruled Namibia, it exercised 
sovereignty over the whole river, which is very wide in places. During this period 
South Africa granted mineral rights to South Africa's mining companies to exploit the 
area's valuable diamonds, and land rights to the river's islands to the local communities 
in and around the Richtersveld. Under pressure from these beneficiaries, South African 
15 On I March 1994, following three years of bi-lateral negotiations, a South African-Namibian dispute 
over ownership of Walvis Bay, a coastal enclave, and 12 offshore islands was resolved, when South 
Africa returned these areas to Namibia. 
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governments have generally been unwilling to release South Africa's access rights to 
these natural resources. Access to land and diamonds in what it perceives to be 'its' 
side of the river and river mouth is a key motivation for Namibia's request for boundary 
re-adjustment, however. Adding another layer of complexity, Namibia maintains that 
during the two presidencies preceding that of President Mbeki, South Africa had agreed 
to review the boundary. The premature ending of De Klerk's administration and delays 
during the Mandela regime meant, however, that the process of identifying what had to 
be demarcated was never completed (Graig, 2001). Namibia demands that these tacit 
commitments be followed up. President Mbeki, for his part, does not feel bound by 
these never formalised arrangements of his predecessors. Moreover, South Africa is 
alleged to have formally decided that the boundary would not be adjusted during his 
first presidency, notably in July 2000 (Graig, 2001). 
The creation of the Ai-Ais/Richtersveld Park initially progressed relatively rapidly and 
in isolation from tensions over the location of the boundary. From a geographical 
viewpoint the South African and Namibian parts can be relatively easily connected. The 
Ai-Ais and the Richtersveld Park are adjacent and, with the boundary separating them 
being little demarcated with fences, already de facto connected in many places. 
Especially in the dry season, when the Orange River separating the Richtersveld from 
its Namibian counterpart (see Figure 6.5) tends to dry up, uninhibited pedestrian and 
wildlife cross-border access is a reality. Furthermore, there are no major security issues 
constraining the creation of unimpeded cross-border access for animals and people 
alike within the TBPA. An MoU on the Park was signed on 17 August 2001 
(Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2003). However, with the emergence of renewed 
tensions over the boundary, political support for the Park dwindled on the Namibian 
side, complicating the further detailing and finalisation of the MoU into a treaty. 
Two months after the signing of the MoU on the Ai-Ais/Richtersveld the boundary 
issue flared up again with Namibia demanding an adjustment. South Africa refused to 
discuss the location of the boundary once more, claiming that during a presidential 
summit in 2001, Thabo Mbeki and Sam Nujoma had already agreed on the boundary's 
present location, for which reason the boundary dispute had not come up since. 
Namibia countered these assertions and claimed that it had raised its concerns regarding 
the location of the boundary in discussions between the ministers of trade on a project 
198 
around the Orange River later in the year (Graig, 2001). These renewed tensions 
between Namibia and South Africa over the boundary increasingly obstructed the 
ongoing negotiations on the creation and formalisation of the connection of the Ai-Ais 
Park with the Richtersveld Park. 
In the process of co-operating Namibia demanded, prior to the completion of the Peace 
Park treaty, that the boundary should be re-aligned towards the middle of the river. The 
Ai-Ais/Richtersveld incorporates a substantial part of the contested South African - 
Namibian border along the Orange River (see Figure 6.7). Furthermore, many of the 
key South African players in the Ai-Ais/Richtersveld Park, such as the Ministry of 
Mining and Natural Resources, are also major players in the boundary conflict. This 
overlap increased the likelihood that Namibia would link negotiations on the TBPA to 
the outstanding boundary dispute. Moreover, by increasing South Africa's dependency 
on Namibia, the involvement in the Ai-Ais-Richtersveld provided Namibia with some 
leverage to re-negotiate the location of the boundary with South Africa. While Namibia 
has an interest in developing ecotourism to its Ai-Ais Park by means of the TBPA, the 
Ai-Ais/Richtersveld is particularly driven, and desired, by South Africa. Nairnibia 
provides most of the land for the Peace Park, however (4326 km2 from a total 5921 
km2). The involvement of the South African PPF also made it attractive for Namibia to 
try and politically exploit its participation in the TBPA. As an NGO, the PPF has no 
major say in the boundary dispute. However, Anton Rupert, its founder and head, can 
exercise considerable influence in this area, because of his involvement with Transhex, 
a powerful South African mining company which he founded. Now headed by his son, 
Anton Rupert still owns a substantial number of shares in the company and Transhex 
actively supports the creation of the TFP. By refusing to further co-operate with the 
TFP Namibia could use its participation in the Park as a means of pressurising the 
Rupert family to give up its resistance to a revision of the boundary. Protecting its 
exploitation rights to diamonds in the area, Transhex fiercely opposes a settlement of 
the boundary dispute to Namibia's advantage, and lobbies the South African 
government accordingly. 
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Figure 6.7 Map of the Ai-Ais/Richtersveld 
Source: PPF (2004). 
South Africa, by means of DEAT, resisted the Namibian demand however. It refused to 
link the discussions on the boundary arrangements in the TBPA to wider discussions on 
the location of the boundary. In response, the Namibian government in mid 2002 "put 
on hold" all plans regarding the TBPA (Namibian official in confidential 
correspondence with SANPs official). Namibian officials involved in the negotiations 
on the Peace Parks were explicitly instructed by their superiors not to organise or attend 
any meetings on the creation of the TBPA "until further notice" (Namibian Park 
official, Interview, 2003). South Africa did not respond to these actions however. In 
fact, DEAT officials denied there was a dispute over the boundary in the TBPA, given 
that Namibia had "at no stage" launched such a request "through the appropriate 
channels", or even at earlier meetings at ministerial levels on the TBPA. Furthermore, 
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DEAT perceived Namibia's behaviour as "unacceptable blackmail" (Anonymous 
Source, DEAT, 2002). 
In spite of the lack of South African concessions regarding the position of the 
boundary, the Namibian government eventually eased its resistance and negotiations on 
the TBPA were resumed. Three years after the signing of the MoU, the treaty for the 
Ai-Ais/Richtersveld was eventually signed on the l't of August 2003. Missing out on 
the economic advantages of cross-border co-operation generated by the TBPA was an 
important factor in Namibia resuming transboundary co-operation with South Africa on 
the Peace Park. Namibia's withdrawal of support in the Ai-Ais/Richtersveld delivered 
no results whilst Namibia has considerable ecotourism interests in a linkage of its 
relatively underdeveloped Ai-Ais Park to the more advanced and better known 
Richtersveld Park. Economic interests in transboundary co-operation in other policy 
areas also stimulated a rapprochement between the two countries. Hostile relations 
meant that lucrative marine diamond mining plans had also to be delayed. Relatively 
recently discovered gas reserves in the area moreover increased corporate pressure on 
both governments to bypass the boundary dispute and come to a workable agreement. 
Prospects of gain from gas finds in the borderland seem to have fuelled Namibia's 
willingness to co-operate with South Africa in spite of the outstanding boundary 
dispute. It is also interesting to note that the treaty of the Ai-Ais/Richterveld was signed 
following a period of intensive negotiations over the shipping of gas between the two 
countries. Just a few days after Namibia and South Africa signed the Ai- 
Ais/Richterveld treaty, an agreement over shipping gas was signed, on the 5th August. 
Moreover, as part of this agreement the countries committed themselves to negotiate on 
other policy areas, including environmental ones. 
However, as long as the boundary dispute remains unresolved, transboundary co- 
operation and the pursuit of open boundaries in the Ai-Ais/Richterveld is likely to 
remain a tension-ridden area. This is reflected by the fact that in spite of the formal 
opening of the Ais/Richterveld Park, the pursuit of open boundaries has still not 
succeeded. From a technical viewpoint, it is now possible to cross the Orange River by 
means of the traditional 'pontoon' installed for that purpose at Sendelingendrift on the 
western boundary of the Ai/Ais/Richtersveld (Dentlinger, 2003). However, Namibian 
and South African immigration authorities have still not put the "administrative 
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procedures in place" (Dentlinger, 2003) that would legalise cross-border access. 
Considering the relatively long time that passed between the signing of the MoU and 
the treaty, this is remarkable. Furthermore, no definite date has been set for the 
resolution of these issues. Considering that the Park has been formally declared open 
and that there are no major security constraints preventing the connection of the two 
parks, these delays are remarkable. The failure to reach agreement on a name for the 
Park, in spite of plans to develop one, also hints at remaining tensions. The Ai- 
Ais/Richtersveld, a combination of the names of the two participating National Parks, 
has only been taken on as a temporary name, just as Gaza/Kruger/Gonarezhou was the 
Great Limpopo's temporary name. Given that Namibian-South African relations are, 
overall, cordial apart from the boundary issue, these disagreements could indicate that 
relations in the Ai-Ais/Richtersveld have remained tense as a result of the unresolved 
boundary dispute. Even after cross-border access has been formalised and the Ai- 
Ais/Richterveld Park is operational, the Namibian-South African boundary dispute may 
obstruct the pursuit of open boundaries in the TBPA. 
6.6.3 Boundary disputes and the pursuit of open boundaries in other TBPAs 
This above case study of the Ai-Ais/Richtersveld indicates that where the international 
boundary in a Peace Park is disputed, the pursuit of open boundaries in the TBPA may 
be easily affected by tensions over the location of the boundary between South Africa 
and neighbouring countries. Problematically, there are boundary disputes in half of the 
TBPAs comprising the Southern African Peace Parks Plan. In addition to the Ai- 
Ais/Richtersveld, the boundary in the Lubombo TBPA and the Maloti/Drakensberg is 
contested, as result of outstanding boundary disputes between South Africa and 
respectively Swaziland and Lesotho (see Table 6.3). 
Although disagreements over the boundary have not yet flared up in the Lubornbo 
TBPA or in the Maloti/Drakensberg, or at least not in a detectable way, this may well 
occur in the near future, when negotiations over the pursuit of open boundaries are 
more advanced. It is noticeable that in both the Lubornbo and the Maloti/Drakensberg 
an international treaty still has not been signed. Whilst this delay may be an outcome of 
various factors, the dispute over the location of the boundary is likely to have played a 
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constraining role. Considering that anti-South African and strong national sentiments in 
Lesotho have already affected negotiations on the Maloti/Drakensberg 16 , it seems likely 
that Lesotho's territorial demands upon South African territory might be raised in the 
process of negotiating the Park. Lesotho requested as early as 1962 in the United 
Nations (Coplan, 2001: 94) a return of land "usurped by Afrikaners during the Basotho- 
Boer wars of the , 9th century" (Pule and Matlosa, 2000) in the Free State. 
Table 6.3 Claims upon South African territory 
Country Area claimed South African province 
Lesotho Free State 
Namibia Upper half of Orange River Northern Cape 
Swaziland KaNgwane Kwa Zulu Natal 
Swaziland Ngavuma Kwa Zulu Natal 
Swaziland Nsikazi Area Mpumalanga 
Province 
Source: Brownlie, 1976; UN IRIN, 2003; CIA Handbook, 2004. 
Whilst no formal claims have been launched in the post-apartheid era, the boundary 
dispute continues to be an important political issue (Pule and Matlosa, 2000). There 
exists great bitterness in Lesotho over the ANC's lack of conunitment to the alleged 
promise of Mandela to return part of the territory in the Free State claimed by Lesotho. 
Lesotho declined an offer by the preceding white apartheid regime to adjust the 
boundary in its advantage, contrary to Swaziland's royal ruler who was keen to go 
along and reduce support to the ANC in the process. 17 On the other hand, Lesotho has 
not launched a formal claim with the South African government to review the 
boundary, unlike Namibia and Swaziland. Furthermore, the Maloti/Drakensberg being 
a TFCA, free cross-border access is not necessarily a policy objective, reducing the 
16 The next chapter explores this issue in more depth. 
17 Kwa Zulu Natal successfully legally challenged this deal, however, so that Swaziland never saw its 
territorial claims fulfilled (Griffiths and Funnell, 1991). 
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possibility for Lesotho to use its continued participation in the Maloti/Drakensberg as a 
means to pressure South Africa into a revision of the international boundary. 
This is, however, not the case in the Lubombo TBPA, where connection of the various 
national parts by means of removing boundary fences is a primary purpose. 
Furthermore, Swaziland has become increasingly vocal in stating its territorial claims. 
As such, insiders expect the boundary issue to become part of the Peace Park 
negotiations at some stage and some claim that this has already been the case 
(Anonymous Source, Consultancy involved in Lubornbo TBPA, 2002; UN IRIN, 
2003). With South Africa showing no signs of wanting to concede to the Swazi 
demand, this disagreement may start to play a constraining role upon further progress. 
There are rumours that Swaziland seeks to use the creation of the TBPA as a means to 
reclaim its territories in South Africa. To this end, Swazi chiefs in South Africa, who 
are loyal to the Swazi King would launch land claims in parts of the TBPA, from which 
their communities were once forcefully evicted. Once the South African government 
has granted them this land, these chiefs would allegedly try and give the Swazi King 
ultimate ownership (Mpumalanga Consultative Group on Land, 2003). Now the owner 
of land inside South Africa, such a transaction would make it easier for the Swazi King 
to try and relocate the boundary further into South Africa. It is doubtful that this 
construction could work, given that South African chiefs have only limited political 
power and ownership rights. However, if these rumours are true they indicate the 
willingness of the Swazi government to use the creation of the Lubombo TBPA to gain 
access to Swazi territories in South Africa. If anything, the involvement of the South 
African government in the Lubornbo SDI, of which the Lubornbo TBPA is a part, is 
likely to constrain South African willingness to revise its boundary with Swaziland. 
After having invested millions of US $ in new highways and the Greater St. Lucia 
Wetland Park, destined to join the Lubombo TBPA, it is unlikely to want to see these 
territories end up in the hands of Swaziland. 
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6.7 Conclusion 
The planned removal of boundary fences in Southern Africa's TBPAs has proved a 
complicated policy area, which is endowed with considerable conflict potential. As the 
country that suffers economically and socially the most from transboundary crime in 
the region, it would harm South Africa's interests to pursue the open boundary model in 
TBPAs prone to transboundary crime. Neighbouring countries may, however, want to 
adhere to the planned removal of internal boundary fences to allow for free tourists 
flows, when these are expected to have a stimulating effect on the economy in their 
borderland. In such a context, the South African change of mind regarding the pursuit 
of open boundaries may cause considerable tension with the neighbouring country in 
question. Where South Africa furthermore demands and pushes through changes in the 
spatial set up of the territory of its neighbour to safeguard its security interests, such as 
the erection of fences around the Park and the removal of local communities, these 
tensions may be further aggravated. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, the opposite 
scenario, whereby South Africa does want to pursue open boundaries but its 
neighbouring countries are reluctant out of fear of a transmission of veterinary diseases 
from infected wildlife, has not led to major conflict. South African political and 
military considerations, which also argue against the pursuit of open boundaries in 
these TBPAs, may be an important reason. Finally, the pursuit of open boundaries may 
cause considerable conflict in TBPAs where neighbouring states want to use the 
negotiations on boundary management in the TBPA in question to re-open discussions 
on the boundary's location with the hope of redrawing the boundary to their advantage. 
Prioritising its geo-political interests over its environmental and economic interests in 
TBPAs, South Africa is unlikely to fulfil these requests, however. Remaining 
disappointment and resentment on the side of the 'claimant' state may mean that the 
pursuit of open boundaries remains a politically sensitive and conflict-prone area, even 
when co-operation continues. 
The complexities and conflicts related to the pursuit of open boundaries may have 
important consequences for the wider co-operation of South Africa and neighbouring 
states in TBPAs. Where boundary management arrangements primarily reflect South 
Africa's interests, the impression of neighbouring countries that South Africa is trying 
to play Big Brother will be confirmed. This might make future co-operation more 
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difficult. Given that boundaries in many ways symbolise a state's sovereignty, it seems 
in this context crucial that South Africa continues its current policy, and exercises 
patience where neighbouring states are reluctant to remove boundary fences, rather than 
to exercise direct pressure. On the other hand, where the pursuit of open boundaries in 
TBPAs is obstructed by the political considerations of states, local resistance against 
them may grow. An important motivation for local communities to support or to accept 
the creation of TBPAs, alongside the promise that TBPAs would create income and 
employment, was the prospect that TBPAs would promote uninhibited cross-border 
access. Transnational communities, in particular, like for example the Shangaan in the 
Great Limpopo and the Nama in and around the Ai-Ais/Richtersveld, welcome such a 
development, as interaction with their counterparts over the boundary is very important 
to them. However, where this is achieved at all, security concerns have meant that free 
cross-border access in TBPAs has been increasingly reserved for wildlife and tourists 
and not for local people. Security considerations of South Africa may moreover 
stimulate a removal of local communities from the TBPA and the erection of new 
fences, hindering access to the Park, as has happened in the Limpopo Park. Finally, 
where local communities are entitled to freely move across the boundary, as is for 
example the case with the South African San in the Kgalahari Park and most likely also 
for the South African Nama community in the Ai-Ais/Richtersveld, only the South 
African side is inhabited. Free cross-border access in TBPAs has, therefore, not led to 
the promised 'reunification of local communities' in Southern Africa. Considering that 
the economic benefits of TBPAs have been lacking for local communities or will take 
more time than expected to be realised, the overall failure to secure uninhabited or at 
least facilitated cross-border access for Southern Africa's transnational communities 
may further undermine local support for Peace Parks. Given the wide range of 
conflicting interests involved in the pursuit of open boundaries, it is perhaps inevitable 
that this policy area will evoke considerable conflict and remain contested. 
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7: Pride and Prejudice: The role of Nationalism and 
Cultural Differences in Peace Parks 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter considers the political aspects of 'everyday co-operation' in TBPAs 
in Southern Africa, with an emphasis on the tensions and conflicts this can create 
between the various actors involved. Due to the transboundary context in which it 
takes place and the involvement of a multitude of governmental and non- 
governmental organisations, Peace Parks involve the co-operation of actors who 
can be relatively diversified on the basis of their cultural origin, national interests 
and institutional attachments. Although cultural, national and institutional 
differences can complicate co-operative processes (Paasi, 1996; Wels, 2000; Fall, 
2003a, 2003b) proponents of TBPAs nevertheless perceive co-operation in Peace 
Parks in highly optimistic terms. The opportunities for cross-border contacts and 
communications that TBPAs permit are claimed to "bring people together" 
(Hanks, 2002: 34) and produce or increase international friendship and 
understanding between the participating parties. Furthermore, as was explained in 
section 1.5, envisaged 'trickle up' effects are expected to positively affect 
relations at the highest inter-state levels (see also Figures 7.1 A and 7.1 B). 
However, this optimistic outlook over-emphasises the positive political aspects 
that Peace Parks may possibly create whilst the tensions and conflicts that 
interaction in TBPAs may also generate are largely bypassed. In reality, bi- 
national and cultural tensions and friction characterise Peace Parks in Southern 
Africa', with often detrimental effects on policy making and implementation. 
1 'Cultural conflict' is a rather loose container of conflict explanation which can disguise a lot of 
other important issues. Cultural conflicts may be overlain with other conflicts that have their 
roots in issues of class, education, language and so on (Dahrendorf, 1959; Kaschula and 
Anthonissen, 1995; Back, 1996). It is beyond this chapter to fully explore the extent to which 
cultural conflicts are linked to such other issues. However, where cultural conflicts are seen to be 
linked to or caused by other factors this will be noted. Furthermore, to further contextualise 
'cultural conflict' between South Africa and its neighbours in TBPAs it will be situated in the 
wider economic and historic contexts shaping co-operation in Peace Parks. 
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Because of the cross-border context in which it takes place, cross-border 
interaction in TBPAs can easily evoke and be hampered by bi-national 
competition and cultural conflicts and prejudices (Gangster et al, 1997; Fall, 
2003a). Existing cultural prejudice and national competition are furthermore 
easily reinforced when there are considerable imbalances in economic capacity 
and power, as is the case between South Africa and neighbouring countries. 
Moreover, where prolonged contacts and communication in Peace Parks do result 
in friendly relations at the project level, the political impact of these upon wider 
international relations tends to be relatively limited, due to the hierarchical 
structure of decision-making in TBPAs. 
Figure 7.1 A Picture used to illustrate claim by proponents of Peace Parks that 
cross-border contacts in TBPAs will create international friendship and 
understanding Source: Hanks (2002: 34). 
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Figure 7.1B Originally focussing on relations at the parks level, notions that 
transboundary co-operation in TBPAs will promote international friendship and 
understanding have been increasingly applied in the Southern African context to 
include the upper echelons of political power, as illustrated in this picture of 
South African president Thabo Mbeki and his Botswana counterpart, Festus 
Mogae, taken during the opening of the Kgalagadi Park (2000). 
Source: Hall-Martin and Modishe (2003). 
In reviewing the dynamics of co-operation in TBPAs, this chapter will first pay 
attention to dominant views in Peace Parks rhetoric on bi-lateral collaboration. 
The second section provides insight into the limitations of these expectations. It 
discusses various examples in which bi-national collaboration in Southern 
Africa's Peace Parks has produced and been undermined by cultural clashes and 
2 misunderstandings. The third section highlights how previous conflicts between 
2 Forms of cultural tension are unlikely to be limited to the inter-state level. Given the rich ethnic 
and racial composition of most Southern African states, these issues could be as pronounced and 
perhaps even more so at the intra-state level, as Wels' (2000) work, for example, shows with 
regard to inter-racial co-operation in Zimbabwe's conservation sector. However, as this chapter 
sets out to critically exarnme the notion offered by the proponents of TBPAs that the cross- 
border contacts in TBPAs will produce increased cross-border friendship and understanding, its 
focus will be on the role of cultural tension at the inter-state level. 
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South Africa and neighbouring countries during the apartheid era and persistent 
economic disparities between them may further increase the likelihood of cultural 
conflicts and their effects upon co-operation. The last section considers how bi- 
national relations may further develop in a context where there has been 
considerable cultural friction. 
7.2. Optimistic conservationist andpan-Africanist outlooks on co- 
operation in TBPAs 
Proponents of Peace Parks emphasise how the increased cross-border contact and 
communication will enhance international friendship and understanding. 
However, with the advancement of dialogue and co-operation in TBPAs in 
Southern Africa, cultural conflicts and nationalist sentiments have come to 
increasingly hamper co-operation. An important underlying reason is that 
participants from different countries will often enter the process with different 
cultural mindsets and values. This increases the likelihood that the co-operating 
nationalities will have different wishes and expectations regarding the co- 
operation, which may lead to misunderstandings and conflict. When persistent, 
the resulting cultural struggles may increase cultural prejudice, and increase 
nationalist sentiments rather than decreasing them. This is because national 
affiliation generally supersedes identification with a regional identity in TBPAs, 
meaning that cultural struggles and misunderstandings can easily reinforce 
national divisions (Fall, 2003a, 2003b). In spite of the presupposed 'neutral' 
nature of transboundary environmental co-operation and the emphasis on a shared 
Southern African cultural identity, Peace Parks in Southern Africa are not exempt 
from this risk. Partially as a result of their different colonial histories, different 
racial and ethnic compositions, and also different economic status, significant 
cultural differences can be detected between South Africa and its neighbours. 
Proponents of transboundary co-operation often present environmental co- 
operation as a relatively 'neutral' and straightforward policy terrain compared to 
other, more "politically charged" (Anon., 2000) 'higher politics' arenas, such as 
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security. It is furthennore stressed that countries have strong mutual interests in 
managing shared natural resources which implicitly suggests an overlap and 
similarity in interests in this area. Hamilton et al. sum up this view in their 
assertion that "protected areas that share common borders share common 
problems" (1996: 1). This would suggest that it would be relatively easy and 
straightforward for the co-operating nationalities in Peace Parks to find 'common 
ground', binding them. However, even between adjacent countries sharing natural 
areas which are largely similar in natural features on both sides of the boundary, it 
may, in fact, be difficult to construct shared policy outlooks, as is required for 
successful and far-reaching transboundary environmental co-operation (Fall, 
2003a). What countries perceive as environmental priorities and worth conserving 
may differ between countries, due to different cultural traditions and outlooks on 
conservation. 3 As noted in Chapter 1, France and Germany, for example, differ 
significantly in their opinions of what a TBPA should involve. While for the 
French the notion of conservation can also include cultural heritage, for the 
Germans it is generally limited to nature conservation (Fall, 2003b: 97). 
Pointing to the 'artificial' nature of their national boundaries, proponents of Peace 
Parks in Southern Africa stress the existence of a common African cultural 
heritage. Linking these presupposed cultural communalities to the shared natural 
spaces between South Africa and its neighbours, advocates of Peace Parks create 
the impression that co-operation in TBPAs will be straightforward and little 
hindered by cultural struggles along national lines. For example, at the official 
translocation of South Africa's Kruger elephants into adjacent Mozambican 
territory the South African Minister of Tourism and Environmental Affairs Valli 
Moosa emphasised how Mozambique, Zimbabwe and South Africa "share a rich 
history; our people have the same roots" and then underpinned this notion by 
making reference to their shared natural spaces: "we have the same river, the 
Limpopo, giving life to the plant and animal kingdoms in our countries"4 . The 
3 In addition to reasons that are related more to 'higher politics' , such as differing strategic 
interests of states in their borderlands, and colliding economic interests in TBPAs. 
4 Observed in my capacity as an invitee to the elephant translocation ceremony in October 2001. 
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rooting of shared regional cultures and regional identities in 'nature' rather than in 
race or ethnicity furthermore enables that not just black Africans, but also white 
and Asian inhabitants of Southern Africa whose linkage to the land does not 
precede colonialism, can share in this presupposed common regional identity 
based on shared 'Africaness' (Draper and Wels, 2002). This construct downplays 
the conflict potential between South Africa and its neighbours, considering that 
the majority of personnel of the environmental and conservation bodies involved 
in Peace Parks on the South African side are Whites, who, under the previous 
regime, often held antagonistic relations with black Africans across the border 
(see section 2.5). 
Initiators of Peace Parks suggest that this construct of shared Africaness has been 
little affected by the 'artificial' national boundaries drawn under colonialism (Van 
Amerom and BUscher, 2005). During the 'fence cutting ceremony' in December 
2002 in the Great Limpopo, Mozambique's Minister of Tourism Fernando 
Surnbana heralded the removal of the border fence between the Kruger Park and 
Mozambique as a victory of African unity over the attempts by South Africa's 
previous apartheid regime to separate the people of Mozambique and South 
5 Africa (DEAT, 2002). In addition, proponents of Peace Parks point out that 
transboundary communities already engaged in TBNRM well before colonialism 
(Griffin et al., 1999; Van der Linde et al., 2001: 7). Frequent references are also 
made to the shared cultural traditions and heritage of participating transnational 
ethnic communities. Altogether, such references give credence to the notion that 
the co-operation in TBPAs between South Africa and neighbouring countries is a 
logical if not 'natural' continuation of past practices, which were merely 
interrupted by colonialism. Combined with the fact that the presupposed cultural 
conimunalities between South Africa and its neighbouring countries are linked to 
and seen as reinforced by their shared natural spaces, this creates an impression 
that it is regional affiliations which will dominate co-operation in Peace Parks, 
rather than national affiliation. Altogether, the above-outlined references to a 
presupposed shared African heritage and shared cultural norms by proponents of 
5 Of which, however, only very small sections had been removed. 
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Peace Parks suggest that cultural clashes and misunderstandings and national 
sentiments will not, or only marginally, affect transboundary conservation in 
Southern Africa, it being a 'natural' outcome of pre-colonial traditions and 
structures. 
7.3 Cultural dimensions of conservation outlooks 
Whilst it is certainly true that in Southern Africa cultural differences are not 
necessarily mainly linked to and defined by the concept of 'the nation-state' 6 there 
nevertheless exist considerable cultural differences between South Africa and 
neighbouring states that may affect their co-operation in TBPAs. For one thing, 
contrasting views on that which constitutes 'good conservation practice' in parks 
can partially reflect different cultural mindsets towards conservation, based on 
different histories and traditions of conservation. As Chapter 5 highlighted, 
Mozambique and South Africa differ considerably in their conceptualisation of 
what the Great Limpopo TBPA should look like. While the Mozarnbicans 
generally prefer a conservation model allowing for human inhabitation of parks 
and agricultural land use, South Africa fiercely rejects this idea. These clashing 
preferences over what a protected area should involve 7 appear rooted in the 
different conservation models pursued in colonial times and under apartheid in 
these countries. The Portuguese colonisers of Mozambique became involved 
much later and were on the whole less active than their counterparts in South 
Africa in the area of wildlife conservation (Anstey, 2001). While the South 
African Kruger Park was established in 1926, the Banhine and Zinave National 
Parks across the boundary were only gazetted in 1972. Furthermore, and contrary 
to South Africa's traditions, economic exploitation, for example through timber 
6 National boundaries drawn under colonialism rarely coincided with ethnic and cultural 
boundaries (see also section 3.4). In combination with the presence of many different racial 
groups, 'nation-state' can therefore not be assumed to be a surrogate for culture. It is, however, 
one important defining factor. 
7 South African conservation authorities generally perceive this concept as being incompatible 
with the sustainable usage of resources and oppose the presence of human settlements in these 
conservation areas. For Mozambican conservation authorities the two are not necessarily in 
conflict. 
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concessions in conservation areas, rather than preservationist attitudes tended to 
inform Portuguese conservationist practice in Mozambique (Black and Schafer, 
2003: 2-3). The Banhine and Zinave National Parks were originally designated as 
hunting areas ('coutadas') for example. The Coutada 16 area was not gazetted as a 
National Park until after independence. Furthermore, the Portuguese did not 
necessarily perceive human habitation of conservation areas as irreconcilable with 
conservation goals (Anon., 2001: 15-16), contrary to the South Africans who 
evicted local communities in the process of creating national parks. 
Post-colonial conservation practises in Mozambique show a strong "element of 
continuity" (Black and Schafer, 2003: 4) with these pre-colonial practices of 
conservation, as they do in South Africa (Steenkamp and Grossman, 2001; 
Steenkamp 2002). For Mozambique, economic exploitation and the human 
habitation of conservation areas continue to be seen as compatible with 
conservation practice (Anstey, 2001: 80-81; Munthali and Soto, 2001; Black and 
Schafer 2003: 4) (see also section 5.2.3 and 5.2.4). Although South Africa's post- 
apartheid ANC government has formally adopted a less preservationist approach 
than its predecessors, preservationist attitudes towards conservation continue to 
inform conservation practice, as reflected in South Africa's adherence to a 
preservationist model of conservation in its Peace Parks with neighbouring 
countries (Steenkamp and Grossman, 2001; Hughes, 2002). 
The impact of cultural differences between South Africa and neighbouring 
countries is not limited to different ideals as to what the 'end product' should look 
like. Different cultural values and norms between South Africa and its neighbours 
can also result in conflicting views of what constitutes 'good co-operation 
practice'. This is problematic. Where the expectations regarding 'good co- 
operation practice' of a given nationality are not being met by their partners, 
tensions and distrust may erupt. However, because culture consists of unwritten 
codes, participants in TBPAs will frequently not be aware of their counterparts' 
differing expectations and views regarding the ways in which the co-operation 
should be conducted. This means that even in a situation where the parties 
involved enter the process with considerable goodwill, cultural misunderstandings 
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and conflicts often arise. 8 Tensions surrounding co-operation in the 
Maloti/Drakensberg illustrate this phenomenon. 
7.4 Cultural misunderstandings and strife in Peace Parks 
Relations between the Basotho and the South African delegations in the 
Maloti/Drakensberg were put under significant strain by a cultural 
misunderstanding. Policy workshops on the Maloti/Drakensberg frequently last 
for two days while their location tends to alternate between Lesotho and South 
Africa. During one of the two-day workshops held in Maseru in 2002 the Basotho 
delegation amicably urged their South African counterparts to sojourn in Lesotho. 
While this proposal was partially offered for practical considerations, the travel 
distance to Lesotho being relatively long for some South African participants, 9 the 
invitation also symbolised a gesture of goodwill and friendship. The Basotho 
perceived the overnight stay of the South Africans as an important means to 
further strengthen ties with their partners. However, declaring that their close 
proximity to Maseru did not require them to stay over in Lesotho, South African 
delegates from the adjacent Kwa-Zulu Natal province declined the Basotho 
invitation. The rejection of their friendly offer infuriated the Basotho, who 
interpreted it as a sign of disrespect and even racism and who perceived that the 
Kwa-Zulu Natal Nature Conservation Board (KZNNCB) was driven by "hidden 
agendas" (Anonymous Source Ministry of Tourism, Culture and Environment 
(Lesotho), 2002)10. Most KZZNB delegates had no intention of causing offence, 
however, or to snub their neighbours. Perceiving the invitation purely in practical 
8 This is particularly true for the informal aspects of co-operation, where as opposed to formal 
negotiations or 'the official programme', expectations surrounding behaviour and activities tend 
to be unarticulated and unstructured. The development of good informal contacts between the 
parties involved is, however, a crucial ingredient in successful transboundary co-operation, 
including in Peace Parks (Griffin et al., 1999: 35). 
9 Especially those coming from Pretoria, such as DEAT representatives. Many other South 
Africans participating in the Maloti-Drakensberg are provincial delegates from Kwa-Zulu Natal, 
the Free State and the Eastern Cape, South African provinces bordering Lesotho. 
10 The majority of the KZN delegation consists of white British South Africans. 
218 
terms, the delegation from adjacent KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) had been oblivious to 
the hidden message the invitation contained. 
The impact of conflicting cultural expectations and mindsets towards co-operation 
can profoundly affect the relations of the participants in a cross-border context. 
Problematically, one cultural misunderstanding is likely to lead to another. When 
the cultural misunderstanding is not resolved or clarified, there may be a 'domino 
effect', with the 'aggrieved actor' seeking to 'retaliate' to reassert their position. 
Unaware that there is a problem, the party at which the retaliation is aimed is in 
turn likely to feel puzzled and angered, further increasing alienation and mutual 
distrust. 
Co-operative processes in the Maloti/Drakensberg seem to have suffered from just 
such a 'domino effect'. During the next two-day workshop on the 
Maloti/Drakensberg TBPA held in Lesotho, most Basotho participants left the 
hotel where the workshop had been held, and where the South Africans would 
stay overnight, straight after the meeting, leaving their South African guests to 
'fetch for themselves'. This behaviour was considered rude by the participating 
South Africansil and indicative of 'disinterest'. To limit the effects of cultural 
misunderstandings it is hence essential that they are addressed as soon as possible. 
Especially in the early stages, before trust and mutual understanding have had a 
chance to develop between the co-operating parties, dissatisfaction may not be 
openly communicated and expressed by the 'aggrieved' party. This in turn 
increases the chances that the second party will not immediately recognise there is 
a problem, by not detecting their partner's resentment and anger. 
Cultural differences between South Africa and neighbouring countries in modes 
of communication may further complicate the detection and management of 
cultural conflict. South Africans tend to express and communicate their opinions 
rather directly. Used to conflicts being expressed 'on the spot' and in direct terms, 
11 Which now also included the K2N mission as overnight guests on the request of other South 
African parties in a bridging attempt. 
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South Africans may assume there not to be a problem if nothing is articulated. 
This dilemma is, for example, recognisable in the negotiations on the 
management plan for the Great Limpopo in 2001 between Mozambique and 
South Africa. Whilst unhappy with the policy position of the South Africans on 
issues such as the distribution of tourism revenue and security arrangements in the 
Great Limpopo, the Mozambican delegation did not express their dissatisfaction 
12 openly during the policy workshops leading up to the management plan . 
Feelings of disagreement were expressed in very polite and rather circumspect 
ways and not necessarily in formal settings. 13 Behind the scenes the Mozambicans 
frequently complained of being 'bulldozed' by their South African partners, 
however. The lack of fierce or direct opposition from the Mozambicans induced 
many South Africans to believe that the Mozambicans had agreed with the 
decisions and were as eager to implement these as the South Africans. The 
approval by the Mozambican Cabinet in November 2001 of the draft international 
treaty composed by Great Limpopo's Technical Committee in which all three 
countries have a seat (Braack, 2002b) reinforced this impression, as South Africa 
took it as confirmation that previously contested issues had been successfully 
negotiated. In reality, there was great resentment on the Mozambican side, with 
delegates complaining that they felt ignored and sidelined by their South Africans 
'partners'. Left unaddressed, this resentment eventually affected the policy 
process. 14 For example, the signing of the treaty for the Great Limpopo, which 
required a presidential signature and ratification by Parliament, was severely 
delayed by Mozambique for "no apparent reason" (Combrink, Interview, 2001 ). 15 
This had the effects, amongst others, that the Great Limpopo Park could not be 
12 Held in Skukuza (located in South Africa's Kruger Park) from 24 to 27 July 2001 and in 
Johannesburg on 14 August 2001. 
13 The lack of Portuguese-speaking translators during the workshops, held in English, 
furthermore limited possibilities for the Mozambicans to eloquently state their opinions. 
14 In this sense, Mozambican-South African co-operation in the Great Limpopo followed similar 
patterns as their earlier co-operation in the Maputo Corridor (Arkwright, Interview, 2001), where 
misunderstandings also arose as a result of these different cultural codes of communication. 
15 Mozambique only agreed to sign the treaty more than a year later, on 9 December 2002. 
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promoted and gather international accreditation at the international Earth Summit, 
which was held in South Africa (Johannesburg) from the 26th of August to 6 
September 2001, as South Africa had hoped for (Combrink, Interview, 2002). 
When Mozambique failed to sign within the expected time frame, many of the 
South Africans in turn felt cheated and trust in the Mozarnbicans wavered. 
7.5 Cultural differences and national divisions 
By highlighting the differences between participating countries and by promoting 
conflict, cultural misunderstandings can easily deepen cross-border divisions. 
This will be particularly the case when the cultural misunderstandings feed into 
the prejudices of the nationalities concerned. Problematically, the chances of this 
occurring are relatively high. The prevalence is because of two interlinked 
reasons. Firstly, as several of the examples outlined above indicate, 
notwithstanding the pan-African rhetoric, in Peace Parks national affiliation tends 
to override identification with a shared regional African identity with most 
participants in TBPAs first and foremost identifying themselves with the country 
they represent. As Brubaker (2004: 116) notes: "Nationhood is not an 
ethnodemographic or ethnocultural fact; it is a political claim". At higher levels 
such divisions are illustrated in the "often very hard and shrewd negotiations 
[that] accompany the drafting of agreements and treaties, equitable benefits and 
sharing of costs being the bottom line" for the participating governments (Braack, 
2002: 16). Nationalist feelings and loyalties often detern-iine the positioning of 
individuals involved in formulating and implementing policy in TBPAs at lower 
levels. 16 For instance, the Botswana and South African governments initially 
differed regarding the distribution of tourism income in the Kgalagadi Park, with 
South Africa opposing a division on the basis of a fifty fifty share, as demanded 
by Botswana (Van Amerom, 2002). This put significant strain on relations 
16 Naturally, representatives of a given Southern African country will also be frequently 
expected to pursue a policy line in Peace Parks that follows that of their government. Such 
limitations will particularly apply strongly to civil servants. This is not the sole reason, however. 
Even in areas where participants in Peace Parks can act relatively independently of the wishes of 
the governments or organisations they represent and compose policy in a given area in co- 
operation with their counterparts over the boundary, participants in TBPAs are often predisposed 
to act in line with the interests and activities of their fellow countrymen, rather than those of 
their counterparts. Nationalist considerations and sentiments play an important role in this. 
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between delegates from both countries (Modishe, Interview, 2002). In spite of the 
generally strong identification with the TBPA project and the existence of 
considerable goodwill and understanding between the delegates involved, for the 
duration of this conflict, participants from both countries strongly and 
increasingly identified themselves in terms of 'us' and 'them', implicitly putting 
the perceived interests of their country first and above those of their neighbours. 
The development of cross-border relations at ground level in TBPAs is therefore 
dependent on wider inter-governmental relations and vulnerable to fall-outs at this 
level. 
Bureaucratic loyalties may further strengthen divisions by national affiliation. 
Many participants in Peace Parks are part of and represent government 
bureaucracies, on the basis of which they tend to firmly base themselves on the 
side of the country they represent, even when they have a different nationality. It 
was furthermore notable that interviewed governmental officials who held the 
same ethnic identity as those of their colleagues across the boundary did not 
perceive themselves as belonging to a similar group with shared interests. Further 
hindering a demise of nationalist loyalties is that 'the other side' often holds the 
tacit expectation that the motives and behaviour of a given participant will be 
driven foremost by national affiliations even when a participant may actually feel 
connected to both countries involved. The experience of a former Sotho 
participant in the Maloti/Drakensberg TBPA who was born in Lesotho but grew 
up in and represented South Africa illustrates this phenomenon. Asked whether 
her Sotho origin had facilitated her dealing with the Lesotho delegation she 
indicated that this had been far from the case. Most Lesotho delegates had 
labelled her as 'South African' in spite of her Lesotho nationality and expected 
her to act first and foremost in the interests of that country. 17 (Ramoreboli, 
Interview, 2002). 
17 On the other hand, although, on the whole, they do little to challenge the dominant role of 
national affiliation in Peace Parks, shared ethnic origins between participants from different 
countries can make an important contribution to the process, making it easier to understand the 
way the Other across the boundary thinks. 
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The dominance of national affiliation in co-operation in Southern Africa's TBPAs 
increases in turn the chances of cultural conflicts occurring and evoking and 
strengthening nationalist sentiments. To understand this process it is useful to 
briefly consider the 'starting-point' situation in cross-border co-operation. As a 
means to function socially and make sense of their world, humans are predisposed 
to seeking and being influenced by membership of various social groups (Mead, 
1934; Goffman, 1959). Whilst identification and social cohesion with fellow 
group members tend to be strong, this is often far less the case with individuals 
belonging to other social groups, who tend to be perceived as markedly different 
and removed from the Self. Furthermore, in the course of this process those 
belonging to different groups, are frequently categorised as less valuable in order 
to preserve group identity. The greater the social distance between groups, the 
sharper the divisions between 'us' and 'them'. Stereotyping the Other is an 
important way to maintain such divisions (Wels, 2000: 46). In a transboundary 
context, national affiliation tends to be the most powerful way of distinguishing 
between Self and Other. Boundaries not only divide space but also people, by 
creating and reinforcing epistemological divisions between 'we and the Other' 
(Paasi, 1991). 0 Tuathail (1996: 15) aptly observes how: 
the struggle over geography is also a conflict between competing images and 
imaginings, a contest of power and resistance that involves not only struggles to 
represent the materiality of physical geographic objects and boundaries but also 
the equally powerful and, in a different manner, the equally material force of 
discursive borders between an idealized Self and a demonised Other, between 'us' 
and 'them'. 
Transbounda. ry co-operation requires rapprochernent and integration between 
groups. However, due to the previous conditioning, participants in TBPAs are at 
the start of the co-operation likely to be endowed with considerable prejudices 
and distrust concerning their 'partners' even when they accept the need to 
cooperate (Wels, 2000; Fall, 2003a). Persistent cultural misunderstandings and 
conflicts increase the distance between the Self and the Other, making it more 
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difficult to 'build bridges'. This will in turn reduce the willingness or ability to 
successfully negotiate cultural differences. 
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Figure 7.2 Identity construction in relation to the 'Other' 
Source: Peyo, 1978, Schtroumpf vert et Vert Schtroumpf, Paris: Dupuis, Marcinelle-Charleroi, p. 
22.18 
7.6 Cross-border co-operation in a context of past conflict and 
disparate development levels 
7.6.1 Introduction 
The development of co-operation will depend to a considerable extent on the 
historical and economic contexts in which it takes place (Wels, 2000). TBPAs are 
no exception. Problematically, the history of conflict between South Africa and 
many of its neighbours in the 1990s, coupled with the economic inequalities and 
power disparities between South Africa and neighbouring countries negatively 
affect collaboration in Southern Africa's Peace Parks. Wels (2000) notes how co- 
operation in natural resource management between relatively powerless and 
relatively powerful actors is likely to be characterised by considerable distrust on 
the side of the weaker actors. This is particularly likely when the relatively 
18 Free translation from text: (approaching Smurf, first picture) "Listen! From now on I am a 
Smurf from the North and you're one from the South! Tell me if ...... (departing Smurf, second 
picture). "Personally, I don't really talk with Nor-them Smurfs! " This source was brought to my 
attention by Fall, 2003a. 
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marginalised partner has been exploited or threatened in the past, and these 
feelings prevail. Consequently, the impact that inequality in economic position 
and political power between countries can have upon their co-operation in Peace 
Parks will not just be shaped by the nature of their interactions in the present, but 
is also likely to be at least partially informed by the nature of past interaction. 
Remaining antagonism will increase the chances that the parties "look and judge 
each other with a value-laden perception" (Wels, 2000: 46). On the other hand, 
Peace Parks are often set up with the objective of "healing" these "wounds of the 
past" (Koch, 1998: 54). However, the overall inequality in working relationships 
between South Africa and neighbouring countries coupled with the fact that South 
Africa is perceived to benefit the most, means that co-operation on this basis is in 
itself not a guarantee for rapprochement. Altogether, distrust of the stronger 
party's intentions by the weaker party and associated nationalist sentiments and 
fears of loss of sovereignty are likely to feature particularly strongly in 
transboundary co-operation in a post-conflict situation. Rather than smoothing 
over existing antagonisms, co-operation may be used as a forum for the weaker 
actor to reassert its power vis-a-vis its stronger counterpart or even as a means to 
settle 'outstanding scores'. 19 Such tendencies can easily hamper collaboration. 
Co-operation between Lesotho and South Africa in the Maloti/Drakensberg 
reflects just such a situation. 
7.6.2 Old antagonisms and nationalist sentiments in the Maloti/Drakensberg 
Lesotho's actions in the Maloti/Drakensberg have arisen in response to its past 
experiences with South Africa and its marginal power position vis-a-vis its larger 
neighbour. Lesotho, sometimes jokingly called 'South Africa's tenth province', 
has traditionally been dominated by South Africa, both in economic and political 
terms. The previous apartheid regime often embarked on raids in Lesotho to 
pursue ANC fighters or stolen cattle from the Free State (Coplan, 2001) and 
eventually promoted the establishment of a pro-South African regime (see 
footnote 14, chapter 2). The demise of apartheid did little to improve relations 
between the two countries. The ANC was initially not favourably disposed 
19 A good example of the latter is Namibia's attempt to link its demands over the position of the 
boundary to the creation of the Ai-Ais/Richtersveld (see Chapter 6). 
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towards the Lesotho government, which it perceived as a traitor to the black 
liberation struggle. Furthermore, a South Africa led invasion of Lesotho in 1998 
to prevent a coup, made Lesotho "awash with anti-South African sentiment" 
(Mail and Guardian, 1998). Violent encounters in the Lesotho-South African 
borderlands during which South African soldiers and tourists were killed illustrate 
this phenomenon in its most extreme form (Sumner, Interview, 2002; Coplan, 
Interview, 2003). Although South Africa has in the meantime adopted a 
reconcilatory approach, Lesotho continues to be very wary of domination by its 
larger neighbour, and this can be seen reflected in the negotiations over Peace 
Parks 
. 
20 The Maloti/Drakensberg's management model bears witness to these 
concerns. Contrary to the management model employed in the Great Limpopo, 
both sides have their own fixed co-ordinator. Whilst this management model is 
partially dictated by organisational. considerations (Zunckel, 2002), an important 
reason for this choice was that a rotating approach as in the Great LiMPOP021 was 
rejected by Lesotho. For the Basotho it was unacceptable to stay under South 
Africa's leadership, even if only temporarily (Groenewald, Interview, 2000). 
In spite of these 'institutional safeguards', asserting and protecting its position as 
an independent state have remained prime motivators informing Lesotho's actions 
in the Maloti/Drakensberg. 22 This is reflected in the difficulties and delays which 
preceded the signing of the MoU between Lesotho and DEAT on 11 June 200 1. 
20 Furthermore, the length of Basotho-South African co-operation in the Maloti-Drakensberg, 
dating back more than a decade, has done little to counter the effects of the more problematic 
aspects of Lesotho's relations with South Africa. Most of the trust and friendly relations built up 
in the course of this co-operation have been lost, as a result of personnel changes on both sides 
(Sandwith, Interview, 2002). 
21 See footnote 5 in Chapter 2. 
22 In the light of historic developments and the organisational set up of the TBPA, this is perhaps 
not surprising. Peace Parks will increase South Africa's involvement in Lesotho's borderland. 
This is however politically sensitive. South African troops were dispatched to the Katse Dam in 
the Maloti Mountains during the South African invasion of Lesotho in 1998, allegedly to protect 
South Africa's water supply from the area. In this process several Basotho were shot (Bremmer 
and Gilmore, 2000). Furthermore, institutions on the South African side involved in the TBPA 
greatly outnumber those on the Lesotho side. Coupled with more expertise and resources on the 
South African side, this could give South Africa a comparative advantage in decision-making in 
the Maloti/Drakensberg. 
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While the outlining of the goals of and strategies for the co-operation in the 
Maloti/Drakensberg and the responsibilities of each country in this area was an 
important aim in itself, another important objective of signing the MoU was to 
enable Lesotho and South Africa to start receiving the GEF funding allocated to 
the project (Groenewald, Interview, 2002; Warner, Interview, 2002). 
Concern over loss of sovereignty and nationalist sentiments on the Lesotho side 
complicated the signing of the MoU at two intervals. Because co-operation in the 
Maloti/Drakensberg had been largely between Lesotho and KZN, it had initially 
been planned that Lesotho would sign another, updated MoU with K2N for which 
a preliminary date had already been set at the start of 200 1.23 Rather unexpectedly 
Lesotho changed its mind and held that the MoU be signed with DEAT instead. 
As "a fellow sovereign state" it was felt that signing a treaty with 'just' a province 
insufficiently reflected Lesotho's status, requiring that the treaty be signed in 
South Africa at central government level as well. This required, however, that 
negotiations between DEAT and K2N had to be initialised and completed, 
causing major delays. 
Sovereignty concerns on the Lesotho side also endangered the signing of the 
subsequent MoU with DEAT (Government of the Kingdom of Lesotho, 2001), 
the ceremony of which was to be held in Pretoria. A few days before the 
ceremony was to take place the Basotho delegation decided against going to 
Pretoria, since it was felt that it was not in the interest of Lesotho "as an 
independent state" to travel to South Africa for the MoU to be signed 
(Groenewald, Interview, 2002). South Africans who had been co-operating 
closely with the Lesotho delegation requested Lesotho's prime minister to 
intervene, who complied with this request. Paradoxically, whilst it is precisely in 
a context of tense international relations that the peace-building potential of 
TBPAs can make its biggest impact, it is arguably in this context that reaching 
this objective is the most difficult. 
23 In 1998 an MoU was signed between the Lesotho Ministry of Environment, Gender and 
Youth Affairs, the predecessor of today's Ministry of Tourism, Environment and Culture, and 
the KwaZuIu-NataI Nature Conservation Services. 
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7.6.3 Economic inequalities and cultural misunderstandings 
Economic inequalities, together with political inequalities between South Africa 
and neighbouring countries increase the chances that past conflicts will continue 
to cast a shadow over present day co-operation. Moreover, the significant 
economic inequalities between South Africa and neighbouring countries also 
increase the likelihood of cultural conflict. While the nature of stereotypes and 
prejudices is influenced by multiple factors, disparities between countries seem to 
be an important shaping factor. In a context where a country is militarily, 
economically and politically stronger than its neighbours, citizens of the stronger 
state may be easily perceived as arrogant' by the citizens of weaker, neighbouring 
states. For example, citizens of both the United States and South Africa, both 
regional 'hegemons', are frequently labelled and perceived in precisely these 
terms by citizens in neighboring countries (Schmidt, 1997; Mabuza, Interview, 
2001; Vieira, Interview, 2002). Conversely, citizens of the more developed state 
may be inclined to perceive and label their neighbours as 'weak', 'undependable' 
and 'inefficient' (Schmidt, 1997; Munthali and Soto, 2001: 23-24). Where 
cultural stereotypes and prejudices between inhabitants of adjacent countries have 
their roots in uneven capacities, transboundary co-operation may increase cultural 
clashes and prejudice by highlighting or reinforcing these different cultural habits. 
The cultural prejudices outlined above can be easily reinforced during the process 
of co-operation between 'stronger' and 'weaker' states. Firstly, the values and 
expectations of participants of a given country will be shaped by the existing 
modus operandi in 'doing business' in these countries and by available resources. 
Because business practice tends to differ between 'developed' and 'less 
developed' states, the likelihood that the co-operating states have different 
cultural mindsets towards co-operation increases. 
For example, it is notable that societies that are still very much agricultural tend to 
have more flexible interpretations of time and deadlines than industrialised ones, 
where strict adherence to time frames is often considered to be of pivotal 
importance. In the context of co-operation in Southern Africa, disparate 
expectations of the manner and time frame may be aggravated by racial 
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influences. As a society whose economic and political structures were for long 
dominated by WhiteS24, South Africa is generally identified as being rather more 
'Western', especially in its business practice, than neighbouring countries 
(Warner, Interview, 2002). Still largely controlled by whites, the conservation 
sector in South Africa can be seen to be particularly informed by 'Western' 
approaches and attitudes towards business, which centralise a rational approach in 
which effective planning and time-keeping is seen as crucial (Jang and Chung, 
1997: 64). Non-Western or less 'westernised' societies, which tend to be less 
individual-oriented and more 'collective' in outlook, usually do not allocate such 
a central place to efficiency, the basic principle of organisations being 
'relationships'. This principle may mean that rather than fulfilling their work 
'targets', a given individual's priority is to maintain his or her position in the 
collective by maintaining high quality and 'appropriate' relationships with fellow 
members in the organisation (Globokar, 1997; Jang and Chung, 1997: 64). In 
more hierarchically organised societies, seniority tends moreover to occupy a 
pivotal role in organisational relationships, whereby respect for or acting out of a 
position of seniority may sometimes be more important than 'professionalism', 
"knowing and doing one's own task to the best of one's ability" (Globokar, 1997: 
79) and within set time limits. In 'traditional' Southern African societies, by 
whose norms South Africa's neighbouring states tend to be still more informed 
than 'modernist' South Africa, professionalism and keeping to time schedules 
may be less of a concern than ensuring that seniority is respected and that all 
interested parties have been consulted before undertaking any action (Ross, 2004: 
12-15). Figure 7.3 contrasts these different outlooks on 'doing business'. 
When operating from these two different starting-points, South Africans and 
citizens of a neighbouring state may follow a very different 'logic' and 
6reasoning' in undertaking -business, that can easily generate misunderstanding. A 
good example can be found in the Maloti/Drakensberg. To be able to access the 
remaining $5 million of their $6 million GEF grant, it was required that Lesotho 
finish an audit before a certain point in time. However, due to various unforeseen 
24 Who although residing in Africa often "tend to represent themselves as First World-oriented 
and even actually belonging to the (European) First World" (Wels, 2000: 41). 
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factors, including the departure of an accountant, missing papers and so on, the 
audit did not get completed on time. In order to stay eligible for the remainder of 
their $5 million grant Lesotho had to approach the World Bank, which had been 
appointed as the facilitator of the GEF grant, and ask for an extension as soon as 
possible. If this request were not handed in on time, Lesotho would have lost the 
remainder of its $5 million grant after which the project as a whole would have 
had to stop. 
Western-style ways of conducting 
business 
Rationality driven Management 
Planning, efficiency and adherence to set 
time frames central 
Principle of seniority pivotal 
-courtesy, good manners and respect 
more important than immediate time 
pressures 
-extensive consultation before acting 
'Traditional' African belief systems 
I 
Dominating factor in South 
African expectations and 
perceptions 
I 
Important factor in less 
'Westernalised'Southern African 
countries 
Figure 7.3 Different cultural outlooks on 'doing business' in Southern Africa 
Two days before the deadline the Lesotho delegation attended a policy workshop 
on TBPAs where various South Africans working on the Maloti/Drakensberg 
were also present. In informal chats, South Africans enquired how the audit was 
coming along, but the Basotho mentioned that they had not really had time to 
complete it. Subsequent pressure from the South African World Bank co- 
ordinator to receive the audit/or a request for extension was furthermore perceived 
by the Basotho as 'intrusive' and he was reminded that 'Lesotho is a sovereign 
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state'. In the end, an extension was filed in time, by two South Africans involved 
in the project. 
From a 'Western' perspective the delays on the Basotho side may appear illogical, 
as access to the grant was in Lesotho's interest. On the Basotho side other issues 
played a role, however. To secure the papers needed for the audit the fired 
accountant had to be contacted, and pride on the side of his former superiors 
prevented action for long (Anonymous Source Peace Parks Foundation, 2002). 
Furthermore, Lesotho experienced the pressure from the World Bank in South 
Africa as 'inappropriate' and 'intrusive'. Far from understanding the motivation 
of the World Bank, it made the Basotho distrustful of the intensions of this agency 
(Maloi, Interview, 2002; Warner, Interview, 2002). An important underlying 
reason is that the Basotho felt that the decision-making power was vested in them, 
and the World Bank was merely providing them a service. Therefore, over- 
running the dead-lines did not appear a major problem, but something that could 
be relatively easily fixed. Similar attitudes played a role in Swaziland, where the 
responsible government officer refused to contact the World Bank office in 
Washington over the grant possibility, feeling that "if they are genuinely 
interested, they can contact me" (Anonymous Source Swazi National Trust, 
Interview, 2001). The World Bank co-ordinator in the Lubombo TBPA had to 
personally phone the Washington office to ensure that Swaziland obtained its 
funding for a TBPA project (Anonymous source World Bank, Interview, 2002). 
Secondly, in a multicultural context, tensions related to economic and political 
power struggles are easily "superimposed" upon another (Dahrendorf, 1959) and 
may reinforce cultural biases and nationalist sentiments. For this reason, tensions 
that arise as a result of imbalances in capacity and prioritization of policy items 
between co-operating parties may, in a transboundary context, be translated into 
nationalist sentiments and reinforce existing cultural prejudices. Uneven 
development levels between countries will often mean that the 'weaker' country 
has less capacity to follow up agreements. Stronger countries can furthermore 
often be seen to prioritise transboundary co-operation more than their weaker 
counterparts, possibly because the latter has more outstanding and urgent policy 
areas to attend to. The weaker country may also feel that it will benefit in the first 
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instance far less than its stronger counterpart from the arrangements and therefore 
will be less motivated (see Chapter 5). Relatively high disparities in capacity and 
resources between countries increase the risk that one country may slowly start 
driving the agenda (or being perceived to do so by its partner(s)), which will 
quickly lead to "resentment and loss of true collaboration and co-operation" 
putting policy objectives at risk (Braack, 2002: 16). Where these different 
capacities and prioritisations result in the weaker partner 'lagging behind', the 
stronger country will often be inclined to interfere. This pattern was, for example, 
visible in co-operation between South Africa and Mozambique (see Chapter 5). 
However, by taking the lead, the stronger country may be perceived as 'arrogant' 
and 'aggressive' by its weaker neighbouring country, especially when the latter 
feels pushed. Vice versa, confronted by slow delivery rates and broken promises, 
the stronger party will easily see its existing prejudices of its neighbour as 'weak', 
'ineffective' but also 'mercenary' confirmed (Schmidt, 1997). For example, when 
Mozambique and Zimbabwe failed to follow up agreed preparations, South Africa 
took it upon itself to draw the final version of the Strategic Integrated Tourism 
Plan for the Great Limpopo in February 2002 (Anonymous Source DEAT, 
Interview, 2003). This action was, however, perceived by Mozambicans and 
Zimbabweans as yet another sign of South African domination of the process and 
of "South African arrogance". South Africans, for their part, expressed 
disappointment over the lax attitude and "unreliability" of their partners 
(Anonymous Source DEAT, Interview, 2003). 
7.7. The evolution of cross-border contacts and communication 
On the basis of the examples outlined above, thus far cultural misunderstandings 
and nationalist sentiments have hampered co-operation in Southern Africa's 
TBPAs. On the other hand, proponents of transboundary co-operation maintain 
that cultural misunderstandings and tensions will vanish with time when the 
parties involved learn to better anticipate and understand each other's needs 
(Hamilton et al., 1999; Fall, 2003a). Indeed, co-operation is a learning process. 
Testifying to how co-operation improved over time, a former key representative 
of Zimbabwe in the Great Limpopo remarked that his relationship with the South 
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African co-ordinator had markedly improved over time as mutual needs became 
more apparent: 
I feel we have come a long way. Don't know about Leo [South African co- 
ordinator], but I feel we have become friends. But initially there were tensions. 
For instance Leo would compile a report in which Zimbabwe's share was not 
explicitly mentioned. So I would then say to him: "Why is our contribution 
ignored? ". But now everything goes much better, we've really learnedfirom each 
other. 
The potential for similar developments in less advanced TBPAs seems great. 
Relations between participants from Botswana and South African in the 
Kgalagadi Park are reported to have gone through just such a process of 
confrontation and reconciliation (Modishe, Interview, 2002). An overwhelming 
majority of the interviewees believed that participation in TBPAs can stimulate 
better international relations and build bridges between countries. The willingness 
to do so was particularly strong on the part of the South African respondents. 
However, whilst increased exposure to the Other may help reduce initial tensions 
and misunderstandings and foster a sense of shared interests and understanding, 
this outcome is by no means fixed. or a given. The social outcomes of co- 
operation will depend on contextual factors such as the compatibility of the 
personalities involved and the history of co-operation in a given TBPA. These 
factors are difficult to control and tend to be highly dynamic in character. 
Furthermore, when not addressed, the vast inequality between South Africa and 
neighbouring countries is likely to remain an important constraint to 
rapprochement in Southern Africa's Peace Parks. The opportunities for a 
settlement of differences and, following this, the building of international 
friendship in a post-conflict context will not just depend on historical interaction 
and present interaction, but is also shaped by expectations regarding the future. 
Differential power between South Africa and neighbouring countries increases the 
chance that benefits and costs are unevenly distributed to the advantage of South 
Africa or that this is perceived to be the case. This will make it harder for tensions 
to be healed and resolved, there being less incentives to do so. This point becomes 
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clearer when comparing Botswana-South African interaction in the Kgalagadi and 
Mozainbican-South African interaction in the Great Limpopo. In both cases, 
negotiations with South Africa over the distribution of tourism revenue were 
tough and relatively conflict ridden and caused divisions between the two 
delegations. While South Africa did not want to share eco tourism benefits 
equally, this was a key wish for Botswana and Mozambique. Mostly because 
power differences are less pronounced for Botswana and South Africa, compared 
to South Africa and Mozambique (Van Amerom, 2004), Botswana eventually 
succeeded in its wish, unlike Mozambique. Partially as a result of this, relations 
between the Botswana and South African delegations quickly recovered, in spite 
of previous rifts. In the Great Limpopo however, perceptions and dissatisfaction 
on the Mozambican side that South Africa was playing 'Big Brother' deepened, 
causing further resentment. 
Problematically, where co-operation in TBPAs does bring the various participants 
closer, the impact of this generated 'international friendship and trust' is likely to 
remain relatively limited and to do little to incite better cross-border relations on a 
wider scale. This is for two reasons. Firstly, the generated 'social capital' may be 
short-lived, considering that the turn-over in key jobs in TBPAs is relatively high. 
Reasons include high work pressure and demands coupled with relatively low 
salaries, fierce competition for jobs within organisations, stress and especially at 
provincial levels in South Africa, replacement of white personnel by blacks or 
newcomers from other disadvantages groups. For example, the two interviewees 
cited on co-operation in the Great Limpopo no longer work on this TBPA. When 
frequent and high in number, such replacements of participants in TBPAs are 
likely to mean that the process of getting to know the Other, recognise the needs 
across the boundary and negotiate cultural differences has to start from scratch. 
This is, for example, visible in the Maloti/Drakensberg. As illustrated, cultural 
tensions play a considerable role in this TBPA, despite co-operation dating back 
more than a decade. Relations with the previous team and the then South African 
co-ordinator had developed into warm friendships and mutual appreciation. 
However, personnel changes on the South African side meant that relationships 
with the South Africans had to be built almost from scratch again, increasing the 
likelihood of cultural tensions and distrust. More recent personnel changes in the 
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Maloti/Drakensberg are likely to compound this constraint. The South Africa SDI 
co-ordinator was laid off and the South African co-ordinator replaced, whilst on 
the Lesotho side, a new co-ordinator was also in the process of being appointed. 
The second reason why friendship and co-operation at a wider level is likely to be 
limited is the top-down nature of decision-making in TBPAs meaning that 
friendly inter-personal ties at the ground level have little influence over 
governmental relations through an envisaged 'trickle up effect'. Co-operation in 
the Ai-Ais/Richtersveld illustrates this point. Hostilities at inter-ministerial level 
over the position of the boundary (see Chapter 6) did not negatively affect 
relations on the ground. In fact, some interviewees in South Africa expressed 
considerable sympathy for the policy position of the Narnibians, whilst a 
Namibian delegate blamed the Namibian government for the delay. Based on the 
co-operation with their counterparts, interviewees from both sides furthermore 
expressed a strong belief in the notion that TBPAs can build bridges across 
boundaries. However, decision-making power was vested at ministerial levels and 
in spite of the great willingness and motivation to resume co-operation at lower 
levels, it was only after higher political levels had calmed down that this became a 
possibility, which seemed related to 'higher' political considerations. The fact that 
the ministerial level influences the ground level more than conversely may 
furthermore limit prospects for the development of friendly relations at the ground 
level, thereby further limiting the possibility of a 'trickle up' effect. For example, 
during the two policy workshops on the Great Limpopo in July and August 2001 
several new issues were raised and it became clear that the search for consensus 
between the various factions would require further deliberation. Realising this, the 
co-ordinator pleaded for additional time. However, there was great ministerial 
pressure, especially from South Africa, to complete the composition of a 
management plan in time, regardless of the situation. This pressure not only made 
it difficult to reach a compromise supported by all three parties, but also to 
recognise and successfully negotiate conflicts that arose due to cultural 
misunderstandings (Braack, Interview, 2002). 
At the same time, TBPAs in Southern Africa allow for direct contacts between 
ministers through the Inter-Ministerial Conmittees in TBPAs, as well as directly 
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between presidents. As such, it could be argued that the contribution that co- 
operation in TBPAs can make to improved international relations would be far 
greater than in any other regional context. Although not easy to establish, since 
ministerial contacts usually take place behind closed doors, the outcomes of these 
contacts seem have had mixed results at best. For example, given the tensions 
surrounding the signing of the treaty of the Great Limpopo, it seems doubtful that 
the co-operation in TBPAs has contributed to better inter-ministerial relations 
between Mozambique and South Africa. Recent accusations by Mozambican and 
South African tourism ministries that Zimbabwe was "scuppering" development 
on its side of the Great Limpopo, also hint at emerging tensions between these 
two ministries and the Zimbabwean one (Chikanga, 2004). On the other hand, in 
the Maloti/Drakensberg TBPA the friendly and close relationship between the 
then South African Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism, Valli Moosa, 
and Lesotho's Minister of Tourism, Culture and Environment, Lebohang Nt9inyi, 
was notable (see also Figure 7.5). This ministerial friendship is likely to have 
facilitated the transboundary co-operative process (Anonymous Source DEAT, 
Interview, 2003). It is notable that the many unexpected delays on the Lesotho 
side related to its sovereignty concerns were not met by increased South African 
pressure and irritation, which contrasts sharply with DEAT's stand in the Great 
Limpopo. DEAT furthermore employs an understanding approach towards 
Lesotho's sovereignty concerns (Jones, Interview, 2003). The high quality inter- 
ministerial relations are likely to have played a role in this. On the other hand, the 
impact of high quality relationships at the ministerial level upon the creation of 
TBPAs should not be overestimated. For one thing, their duration is limited, with 
most ministers changing office after four years. 
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Figure 7.5 Ministers Valli Moosa and Lebohang Nt9inyi return from a walk 
I- during a break in one of the bi-national policy meetings on the 
MalotMrakensberg TBPA. 
Source: Kevin Zunckel, Program Co-ordinator MalotifDrakensberg TBPA (for South Africa), 
Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife, 2003 
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7.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has critically assessed the social dynamics of co-operation in Peace 
Parks. Contrary to the expectation that co-operation in TBPAs will create 
consensus between actors and promote better understanding between them, it has 
been suggested that the co-operation in Peace Parks may also generate 
considerable tensions, misunderstandings and friction. Particularly in its early 
stages, co-operation in a cross-border context is easily complicated by cultural 
differences in work patterns and communication. The uneven capacity and power 
distribution between South Africa and its neighbours furthermore significantly 
increases the likelihood of cultural conflicts occurring. On the other hand, with 
the passing of time, increased cross-border friendship and understanding might 
develop, depending on such factors as the ability of the participating parties to 
resolve conflict and the personalities involved. The historical and economic 
context in which the co-operation takes place may furthermore shape outcomes. 
Even when the cross-border contacts of TBPAs do result in increased cross- 
border friendship and understanding, the effects upon inter-govemmental 
relations at the highest level are likely to be limited due to the top-down nature of 
decision-making in Southern Africa's TBPAs and because the individuals in 
TBPAs are frequently replaced. 
The findings of this chapter indicate serious limitations to the popular notion that 
the transboundary contacts in TBPAs will almost by definition promote 
proponents' claim of increased cross-border friendship and understanding, 
demonstrating that they can also generate considerable conflict. The previous two 
chapters discussing co-operation in TBPAs in the area of development and the 
redesigning of boundaries likewise indicated that co-operation in Peace Parks may 
easily generate conflict between the participating parties. Rather than assuming or 
hoping that TBPAs will by nature work as vehicles for increased cross-boundary 
friendship and understanding, it seems therefore more constructive to actively 
anticipate that they will also generate conflict and consider how this conflict can 
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best be resolved and mediated. The next and final chapter of this thesis considers 
this issue in more depth, after a summary of the main findings of the thesis. 
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8. General Conclusions 
8.1 Introduction 
This PhD has examined the political aspects of TBPAs in Southern Africa, with a 
focus on the ways in which TBPAs affect regional politics. An important wider aim of 
the research has been to establish if and under what circumstances TBPAs can act as 
vehicles for peace. In researching this issue, developments in the Great Limpopo have 
been particularly concentrated upon. Altogether, the findings indicate that the 
Southern African Peace Parks Project has become increasingly characterised by 
tensions and conflicts. Peace Parks both create new and add to existing regional 
conflict, as a result of which the environmental, socio-economic and political aims of 
TBPAs are increasingly difficult to achieve. At the same time, TBPAs have laid some 
important institutional foundations upon which future activities in TBPAs can build 
and which could promote the course of regional integration. The future course of 
TBPAs will greatly depend upon wider political developments in the region as well as 
institutional developments in TBPAs. Problematically, in their current set up TBPAs 
reinforce regional power inequalities, making them sites of domination and resistance. 
In addition, the vulnerability of TBPAs to political instability and violence is 
increased by the fact that such developments are rarely anticipated, and are met by 
management strategies that seek to contain the negative impacts of such developments 
as much as possible. Several policy measures can be developed to aid the 
development of more equal power structures and limit the negative impacts of wider 
political developments. Academic research can fulfil a supporting role. 
The chapter starts off by linking the findings back to the questions and aims 
underpinning the research, thereby providing an insight into the scientific and social 
relevance of the findings. After this, the possible implications of the findings for the 
future -performance of Southern Africa's Peace Parks is assessed and the wider 
consequences of the parks for conservation and international relations in the region. 
The final two sections are more practice oriented; listing respectively policy 
recommendations and the ways in which future academic research could play a 
supportive role in promoting more effective and balanced policy-making in TBPAs in 
Southern Africa and elsewhere. 
240 
8-2. Scientific and social relevance of the findings 
To provide an insight into the scientific and social relevance of the findings this 
section relates the generated findings back to the research questions and goals (see 
section 1.6). Reflecting their mutual cohesion, the areas of inquiry concerning the 
research questions and goals are closely interlinked and may overlap. To avoid 
repetition, issues that could be discussed under several questions or goals will be 
outlined at the first opportunity. Later research questions/goals touching upon similar 
issues will then further build upon and refer back to the earlier discussion. 
8.2.1 Addressing the research questions 
1) To what extent is the fulfilment of the policy goals of TBPAs facilitatedlhampered 
by economic and political processes at higher political levels and the interests 
deriving from these with regard to the spatial organisation and usage of land in 
borderlands? 
The research indicates that TBPAs are simultaneously facilitated and hampered by 
economic and political processes and interests at higher levels. It would appear, 
however, that over time economic and political processes supporting the creation of 
TBPAs in a way that supports a realisation of their policy goals have become 
increasingly outweighed by economic and political processes constraining these 
objectives. Chapter 2 indicated that the quest for regional integration in post- 
apartheid Southern Africa coupled with the growing economic interests of Southern 
African states in ecotourism considerably facilitated the acquisition of high-level 
governmental support and goodwill for the creation of TBPAs in the region. 
Furthermore, the available financial support and push for TBPAs from the side of the 
NGO and donor communities was a crucial element in the acquisition of high-level 
political support for TBPAs. There are, however, various interests and processes at 
higher political levels which hamper the pursuit of the policy goals of TBPAs and 
increasingly outweigh the beneficial influence of the factors outlined above. Such 
problematic processes and interests are often related to wider struggles over economic 
power and territorial control between South Africa and neighbouring countries and 
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the fierce competition for land between landless black farmers and conservationists in 
Southern Africa. Table 8.1 offers additional details. 
Table 8.1 Interests and processes at higher political levels undermining TBPA 
policy objectives 
Politicatleconomic process Translated into Peace Parks Affected policy objective 
Economic neo-liberal approach Privatisation of land - CBNRM compromised by 
to development acquisition and free increasingly forcing 
competition regarding communities off their 
exploitation of tourism market land/denying them access 
- Poverty reduction limited 
by giving comparative 
advantage to already 
wealthy partners in terms of 
land access 
'Non judicial' and drastic land Land invasions, rise in Effective wildlife conservation 
reforms poaching and ecotourism 
Importance of 'shadow Peace Parks targeted by Removal of border fences 
economy' and smuggling for criminal syndicates as 
both local economies and some convenient 'transit corridors' 
officials and politicians 
Low prioritising of Peace Parks Involvement in Peace Parks No progress in connecting 
goals compared to other de facto stopped (Zimbabwe) separate National Parks, damage 
economic or 'higher' political to wildlife in region 
interests 
Competition between South 'Big Brother' syndrome Co-operation hampered by 
Africa and neighbouring affects co-operation in Peace conflict and distrust 
countries over economic and Parks 
political domination of region. 
Struggles for land between Competing interests in land Hampers CBNRM 
landless black farmers and use, Peace Parks' supporters 
large-scale and usually white often seek to relocate local 
landowners, including communities. Latter reluctant 
conservationists to co-operate. 
Differing economic interests and South Africa seeks greater Harmonisation of laws and 
priorities in regional control over borderlands in policy between South Africa and 
development and competition neighbouring countries where neighbouring countries with the 
between 'stronger' and 'weaker' problematic flows of people latter reluctant to accede 
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states. and goods threaten its sovereignty/territorial control 
interests and seeks to use 
economic superiority to its 
advantage. 
National governmental interest Governmental factions Undermines safety and security, 
in and tacit support for illegal opposed to Peace Parks a prerequisite for successful 
cross-border activities and/or stricter security ecotourism development 
measures in borderlands 
Preservationist lobby relatively Limitations on sustainable Hampers CBNRM 
strong, especially with regard to use. In relation to this, move 
influence on strongest player, away from TFCAs in favour 
South Africa of parks concept 
Limited citizen rights due to Reflected in lack of ability to Hampers CBNRM 
mismanagement, corruption, exercise land rights 
intimidation. 
The above-outlined economic and political processes and interests result in 
considerable strife over the spatial organisation and usage of borderlands, by creating 
many colliding interests between the collective of stakeholders in Peace Parks. These 
interests relate both to the ways in which the land is used and the desired approach to 
border management. Bearing witness to the multi-layered character of states, different 
state agencies are moreover likely to hold different interests. Table 8.2 provides an 
overview of the types of land use and border management desired by each interest 
group. 
Table 8.2 Competing interests regarding spatial organisation and land use in 
borderlands 
Stakeholder Desired land use Desired approach to border 
management 
Conservationist groups Setting land aside for conservation, Dismantling of boundary fences 
either in core zones only or through where these are perceived to stand' 
a core and buffer zone combination in the way of wildlife migration 
corridors, removal of customs posts 
to outskirts of park, dissolving of 
internal border 
Local communities Sustainable usage of natural Free cross-border access 
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resources, ability to live and harvest 
from land 
National security agencies Keep land free from local Removal of boundary fences only 
communities in areas with security where no security threats, 
problems/important for national maintenance of internal park 
defence purposes boundaries if necessary 
DEAT/SANPs Remove local communities in Removal of boundary fences in 
neighbouring parts of TBPAs to interest of free wildlife migration 
prevent poaching and/or and tourism traffic, but need for 
environmental degradation. security acknowledged 
Respect rights to land of own local 
communities where these are legally 
protected, however with 
reservations on land use (limited 
detrimental effects to conservation) 
where possible 
PPF Buy more land for conservation Removal of boundary fences in 
interest of free wildlife migration 
and tourism traffic, but need for 
security increasingly acknowledged 
Private sector (involved in Acquire land most suitable to Removal of boundary fences to 
ecotourism) tourism development allow for free tourism traffic 
Private sector (interest in Lobby government for mining or Ensure more easy customs 
exploitation of 'hard' natural other economic activities or procedures facilitating cross-border 
resources, like diamond mining). continuation of these activities in trade, however ensure high security 
areas now part of TBPA levels to prevent theft and 
(Richtersveld case) smuggling of industrial output 
Non-preservationist oriented Mixed viewpoints: Generally in favour of removal of 
governments (Mozambique, Agree with removal of local border fences unless high chance of 
Zimbabwe, to lesser extent communities on premise of foot and mouth disease outbreak 
Lesotho) tourism benefits 
resist South Africa's attempts 
to control borderland 
look after interests of own 
people 
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2) What are the tensions between environmental and political goals of African states 
in their borderlands? How are the resulting policy objectives influenced and mediated 
by the involvement of non-state actors in the process, including NGOs and local 
communities? 
Tensions between environmental and political goals of African states in their 
borderlands may take various forms. Firstly, where boundary fences fulfil an 
important barrier function in preventing transboundary crime and/or veterinary 
diseases from entering the country, a state's security interests will often act against the 
removal of boundary fences. This can undermine a state's environmental interests by 
hampering the creation of a 'bio region' within which wildlife can roam free. Given 
that natural areas in borderlands often constitute ideal sites for guerrilla welfare, states 
may also feel reluctant to remove boundary fences out of fear of strengthening armed 
dissidents by giving them greater opportunity to flee over the border or be provisioned 
from a neighbouring state. Secondly, a Southern African state's interests in securing 
public support for its policies may hamper its environmental interests in borderlands 
for example by making the allocation of farming land to landless farmers a greater 
priority than reserving land for conservation or by selecting economic activities that 
cause environmental degradation, such as mining. Even the goals of states to 
economically develop borderlands by attracting more ecotourists to the area through 
the creation of Peace Parks may clash with their environmental interests, for 
expansion of tourism may undermine the carrying capacity of the environment 
(Bennett, 2000). Thirdly, fears of loss of sovereignty may deter a state from pursuing 
its environmental interests in borderlands through inter-state co-operation in TBPAs. 
The pursuit of transboundary conservation requires a relatively drastic harmonisation 
of land use and law and policy frameworks across boundaries. Such adaptations could 
harm or conflict with a state's internal policy priorities. This risk seems especially 
great for relatively 'weak' states co-operating with a 'strong' state (Van Amerom, 
2002). Stronger states may also seek to use TBPAs to extend their presence and say in 
borderlands of neighbouring states, to secure protection of their wildlife or access to 
other valuable natural resources (Van Wyk, 2000). Whilst in such a scenario the 
environmental and security interests of the stronger state would coincide and be 
mutually reinforcing, the weaker state may not want to pursue its environmental 
interests in TBPAs to protect its territorial interests in its borderlands. 
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The ways in which the various non-state actors mediate these interests is complex and 
diverse. Not only do the various non-state actors pursue very different interests, as 
outlined in Table 8.2, their political leverage also greatly varies. The impact of 
moneyed preservationist oriented NGOs and aid agencies like the PPF or the KfW 
upon the process seems the greatest. The lobbying and funding activities of these 
agencies constitute a key reason for the interest of Southern African states in the 
concept of Peace Parks (Ramutsindela, 2004: 70), in spite of the above-identified 
constraining political interests of states upon the pursuit of transboundary 
conservation. The relative influence of these agencies tends to be particularly strong 
in relatively poor and weak states, where their financial position buys them influence 
(Clapham, 1996: 257; Duffy, 2002b). This is for example reflected in Mozambique 
and Lesotho whose governments are planning a removal of people inhabiting areas 
now destined for TBPAs. Pressure exerted by environmental NGOs has Played a not 
insignificant role in this (Grossman, Interview, 2003). On the other hand, this 
influence is partially undone by more development oriented NGOs and aid agencies. I 
These organisations also support the pursuit of a state's environmental interests, in 
Peace Parks, but only where these do not significantly undermine the welfare of local 
communities. Whilst NGO influence in the area of sustainable development is 
considerable, it is fairly limited in the area of border management. States are the 
ultimate decision-makers in this area and have great territorial and economic interests 
tied up in borderland management (Van Amerom, 2002). As Ch apter 6 suggested, the 
strategic and security interests of states generally structure their borderland 
management practices far more than their environmental interests. The postponement 
or cancellation of the removal of boundary fences in borderlands dominated by illegal 
transboundary flows and/or by boundary disputes bears witness to this phenomenon. 
Whilst Peace Parks have been initiated and pushed by NGOs and donors, states are far 
from passive players and Peace Parks have been "appropriated by the state and the 
region" (Ramutsindela, 2004). 
The postponement or cancellation of the removal of boundary fences in borderlands 
also bears witness to the limited ability of borderland communities to influence 
1 The World Bank's refusal to support plans for the removal of Basotho communities in the 
Maloti/Drakensberg as long as no proper community consultation has taken place and compensation 
mechanisms planned is a case in point. 
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policy-making regarding TBPAs and wider border management. The transnational 
ethnic groups inhabiting areas destined to be TBPAs generally strongly favour the 
removal of boundary fences and customs facilities and consequently seek to influence 
their respective national governments in that direction. Transboundary crime 
syndicates, which often operate with the tacit support of high government officials 
(Gastrow 2001; Duffy, 2002b) seem likewise not to have played an influential role in 
the negotiation of the environmental and political interests of states, given the 
prioritisation of security interests of states over their environmental goals in 
2 borderlands as reflected in the postponed removal of boundary fences . 
The influence of the private sector on the negotiation of environmental and political 
interests in borderlands is difficult to measure, partly because they have thus far been 
relatively little involved in TBPAs and, where they have participated, been little 
consulted by the governments involved (Munthali and Soto, 2001: 4). On the other 
hand, the PPF is a highly influential player in Southern Africa's TBPAs and has 
considerable linkages with and the support of South African and to a lesser extent 
international businesses. The PPF may therefore constitute an important channel of 
influence for private sector stakeholders from especially South Africa, even when this 
is not immediately visible. Nevertheless, the impact of private sector stakeholders on 
the negotiation of environmental and political interests in borderlands, including 
through connections with the PPF, seems thus far to have been limited. For example, 
companies interested in exploitation of the ecotourism potential of Southern Africa's 
borderlands generally favour a removal of boundary fences to create free cross-border 
access for tourists 3 and have sought to influence Southern African governments -to 
date in vain- in this regard. On the other hand, the activities and business interests of 
private sector companies in TBPAs differ considerably. Private companies involved 
in the management of game reserves may for example not necessarily favour a 
removal of boundary fences in borderlands where there are risks that this may lead to 
the spread of wildlife diseases and increased poaching (Reilly, Interview, 2002). 
2 On the other hand, delays in following up MoUs and treaties and the low prioritisation of TBPAs in 
many of South Africa's partner countries may indicate the influence of this interest group, especially in 
areas where TBPAs would significantly increase security controls and could interfere with existing 
smuggling routes (as would be the case in the Maloti/Drakensberg for example). 
3 As argued by Andrew Nicholson (KPMG) in charge of outlining business opportunities in the Great 
Limpopo (GKG Policy Workshop, 14 August 200 1). 
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Finally, the role of Transhex in the Ai-Ais/Richtersveld (see section 6.6) also 
indicates that powerful private sector companies may exercise considerable influence 
on the mediation of environmental and political interests in borderlands. On the one 
hand this company supports the creation of this Peace Park financially. On the other 
hand, it has also used its leverage to influence or strengthen the decision of the South 
African government not to change the location of South Africa's boundary in favour 
of Namibia. Together with the environmental degradation in the Richtersveld caused 
by its mining activities this decision poses considerable risks to the pursuit of a TFP 
with Namibia, as conflict over the location of the boundary continues to pose a risk to 
their co-operation in the Ai-Ais/Richtersveld. 
3) What are the goals and interests of the various stakeholders in transboundary 
conservation and how are these mediated? 
Table 8.2 provides an overyiew of the highly diversified goals and interests of the 
various stakeholders in transboundary conservation. The mediation of these goals and 
interests is an ongoing process that has not yet reached completion. However, thus far, 
the mediation of interests in TBPAs has both reflected and reinforced existing power 
imbalances in the region, at both the inter-state and intra-state levels. This pattern 
becomes apparent when considering the ways in which TBPA planning and policy- 
making has developed since the introduction of the PPC in Southern Africa in the 
early 1990s. In line with the linkage of TBPAs to the goals of regional integration and 
socio-economic development in the early post-apartheid years, the 'park approach' 
was increasingly dropped in favour of TFCAs and other models allowing for the 
sustainable use of natural resources. Furthermore, it was stressed in policy documents 
that TBPAs could and should benefit the lives and livelihoods of borderland 
communities, by providing them with free cross-border access within TBPAs and 
employment and jobs from ecotourism (see section 2.8). 
However, as outlined in Chapter 5, reflecting the growing influence of the DEAT-PPF 
coalition upon the process, a more preservationist approach has taken hold, as 
illustrated by the conversion of planned TFCAs into TBPs often to the dismay of 
neighbouring countries and, linked to this, an abandoning of the notion of sustainable 
usage of natural resources. Chapter 6 furthermore demonstrated how decision-making 
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in TBPAs has been increasingly shaped by the interests of South African security 
stakeholders seeking to maintain boundary fences and maintain or even increase 
border controls to contain illegal migration and the activities of cross-border crime 
syndicates. Within this framework, local communities, particularly those that reside in 
countries neighbouring South Africa, can be identified as the parties that have thus far 
been least able to influence decision-making. As a direct outcome of the precedence 
of South Africa's preservationist and security interests in TBPAs, local communities 
in neighbouring countries living in areas now designated for TBPAs are increasingly 
threatened with removal, to secure animal and tourist safety within the TBPA. As 
such, TBPAs could be said to enforce "a new form of apartheid" (Grossman, 
Interview, 2003) based on nationality (Metcalfe, 2003: 9-10) rather than race. Whilst 
the participation of South African local communities has also proved difficult to 
achieve, these nevertheless often have a much stronger legal position, especially when 
they have attained land rights after successfully launching a land claim against 
SANPs, as for example the Makuleke and Nama communities have in the Great 
Limpopo and the Ai-Ais/Richtersveld respectively. Whereas community rights in 
South Africa can be partially reinforced or further developed through TBPAs, in 
neighbouring countries the opposite occurs, creating "disenfranchisement at large" 
(Dzingirai, 2004). 
4) To what extent and under what circumstances do the social processes involved in 
the creation and management of, TBPAs stimulate amicable bi-lateral relations, 
thereby furthering regional stability and peace? 
The findings of this thesis indicate that the contribution that social processes involved 
in the creation and management of TBPAs make towards more amicable bi-lateral 
relations is extremely limited, and in many cases non-existent. There are three main 
and interlinked reasons for this. Firstly, existing regional tensions and conflicts tend to 
penetrate and affect co-operation in Peace Parks, more than the other way around. 
Secondly, partially as a result of the preceding issue, co-operation in TBPAs is most 
likely to stimulate amicable bi-lateral relations in situations where bi-lateral relations 
are already cordial. Although in this scenario TBPAs do stimulate amicable bi-lateral 
relations thereby furthering regional stability and peace, the effects of this 
contribution remain relatively limited, there being no major changes between starting 
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point and end result. Finally, co-operation in TBPAs, at the ground level, may not 
necessarily generate consensus, but can also create additional tensions or add to 
existing conflicts between states as a result of cultural misunderstandings. As Chapter 
Seven outlined, this risk is particularly present during the early, crucial stages of 
creating and consolidating a given Peace Park. 
Where co-operation at the ground level does deliver positive social outcomes, the 
hierarchical structure of decision-making in TBPAs often prevents the effects of these 
from taking hold at the inter-governmental level. The social processes in TBPAs are, 
however, far from static and may change over time. The findings on social processes 
in the Great Limpopo indicate, for example, that prolonged acquaintance and 
experiences with negotiations may stimulate the development of friendly relations, 
increase mutual understanding and build trust and confidence. The peace-building 
potential of TBPAs will furthermore depend upon changes at the level of macro 
politics. Great power imbalances and disparities in capacity between the participating 
parties, both at the inter state and intra state levels currently constitute major 
constraints upon the peace-building potential of TBPAs. Were the nature of power 
division to change at a regional level, TBPAs could increasingly bring their potential 
for peace building into practice. 
8.2.2 Addressing the research goals 
The information for this thesis was also collected to increase knowledge in the 
following six subject areas: 
1) Contribute to knowledge of the peace-building potential of TBPAs 
The answer to Research Question 4 (see above) already demonstrated that the 
envisaged positive social aspects of co-operation often do not come about or lack the 
envisaged capacity to 'trickle up' to the level of international relations. The findings 
of this thesis also indicate great limitations to the other ways in which TBPAs have 
been envisaged to build peace, including by reducing international tensions over 
boundaries and by providing improved cross-border access for communities in 
borderlands. This is displayed in Table 8.3, contrasting the notions of the PPC with 
the findings of this research on the political operation of TBPAs. 
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Table 8.3 Political aspects of TBPAs in Southern Africa (predicted versus reality) 
Area of Focus Claims of PPC Reality 
Tensions over border TBPAs will reduce/eliminate TBPAs may become vehicles to 
claims conflicts over borders reinforce border claims on South 
African territory in exchange for co- 
operation over TBPAs 
Community TBPAs will empower local TBPAs undermine rights of local 
fights/welfare communities economically and communities (esp. in countries 
politically neighbouring Southern Africa) 
Positive spill-over Co-operation in TBPAs will enhance This has been the case, especially in the 
effects into other policy willingness to co-operate in other areas of security and veterinary disease 
areas policy areas control. On the other hand, tensions and 
conflict in TBPAs decrease enthusiasm 
for and trust in the cause of regional co- 
operation, on the side of South Africa's 
neighbours. 
Regionalisation TBPA co-operation will enhance Possibly, by building more experience 
regional integration in capacity-building and instruments for 
co-operation. On other hand, tensions 
may act against regional integration 
Economic interests Joint economic interests in TBPA TBPAs increase economic 
and increased interdependence will interdependence and economic interests 
work as incentive for states to work constitute important incentive to co- 
together in TBPAs operate. However, the clashing views 
over sharing of revenues cause conflict. 
Cross-border access Enhanced Limited for local communities 
International relations Improved In many cases, growing tensions 
Security in borderlands Improved In the short term, considerable risk of 
less security 
The findings on the political operation of TBPAs in Southern Africa show great 
overlap with the results of studies on the operation of TBPAs in Central America (see 
section 1.7), indicating the difficulties of creating and managing TBPAs in contexts 
with high conflict potential, limited institutional capacity and funding. In the context 
of co-operation in Southern Africa, the relatively high disparities in capacity and 
economic and political power between South Africa and neighbouring countries can 
furthermore be identified as an important constraining factor by increasing the chance 
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of conflict and power struggles. The findings also point to the importance of less 
structural factors, however, such as 'personality clicks' between participants (see 
Chapter Seven). 
Finally, the research findings also indicate that the available time to meet TBPA 
requirements is an important factor influencing the potential of TBPAs to stimulate 
high-quality international relations (section 7.6.3). Where time frames are flexible, 
there is more room to attend to newly emerging concerns regarding the creation and 
management of TBPAs. This is likely to put less pressure upon co-operation at a 
micro level (section 7.4 and 7.7). Where stronger parties do not use their leverage to 
force agreements, cross-border relations have a greater chance to prosper. This is for 
example reflected in relationships between South Africa and Zimbabwe in the Great 
Limpopo. Although there have certainly been feelings on the Zimbabwean side that 
South Africa plays 'Big Brother', these are far less intensive than in Mozambique, 
most likely because the very limited progress made on the Zimbabwean side has 
received a rather understanding and tolerant attitude in South Africa. Conversely, 
Zimbabwe has been an easier partner to work with than Mozambique regarding the 
signing of the Great Limpopo Treaty. On the other hand, absence of any pressure 
upon countries to adhere to the agreements could result in no TBPA being established 
at all, especially where these delays are due to political unwillingness. In that case, the 
trust and friendship that was build up in the course of TBPA co-operation could easily 
be lost. 
2) Improve policy insights on TBPAs 
In researching the creation and management of Southern Africa's TBPAs, this study 
has provided an insight into the effectiveness, constraints and opportunities of existing 
policy practice in TBPAs. The last section of this chapter, listing policy 
recommendations illustrates how the findings of the research could be used to create 
new avenues for policy. 
3) Effectiveness of Peace Parks as development tools 
The insights that this thesis can provide into the developmental potential of TBPAs 
has to remain limited, given that most TBPAs are not yet operational and running. 
Impressions thus far paint, however, a bleak picture. It is increasingly recognised that 
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initial estimates on the income that can be derived from ecotourism were overly 
optimistic (Katerere et al, 2001; Spenceley, 2003; Schoon, 2004). The 'trickle down' 
effect, required for equitable development that can truly tackle rural poverty 
(Critchley et al., 1998) is likely to remain largely absent. With in most cases no legal 
entitlements to a set percentage of the income generated from tourism and with an 
increasing number of communities being faced with forced relocation, the chances 
that economic benefits will trickle down to the poor seem limited. Sustainable usage 
of natural resources could help local livelihoods. However, this option has been 
increasingly abandoned in favour of more preservationist models. Where it is 
envisaged that local communities will abandon their agricultural activities in favour of 
more environmental friendly ecotourism activities there is a risk that TBPAs may 
undermine local livelihoods and food security, rather than improving them (Katerere 
et al, 2001: 19-20). "Tourism does not increase overnight" (Schoon, 2004: 19), 
meaning that the cash for the "purchase of outside food" (Schoon, 2004: 19) might be 
scarce. Furthermore, tourism is a fickle industry, easily affected by political unrest or 
changing travel preferences amongst tourists (Katerere et al., 2001: 20). Finally, 
within the regional framework of states, it appears as if the poorest states have the 
most limited ability to profit from economic benefits derived from TBPAs. There is 
therefore a considerable risk that local economies across the border from South Africa 
"stagnate" (Schoon, 2004: 19). It is essential that poverty reduction becomes a more 
important policy aim, not just in theory or as a means to generate funding, but also in 
practice if TBPAs are to gain any momentum. An important step to achieving this 
objective could be the allocation of a set percentage of TBPA funding or revenue to 
popular and successful local developments projects. Furthermore, measures in TBPAs 
allegedly taken to combat poverty and funded for this purpose, such as mine clearing, 
should be more critically assessed, by checking how many people benefit from such 
an action (given that many parts of TBPAs are inhabited) and how this compares to 
alternatives for development. To further increase the contribution which TBPAs could 
make to development in Southern Africa, it would be useful if policies for 
development might consider the ways in which TBPAs could aid in combating the 
HIV-AIDS crisis and aid those hit by it, as a major strain upon development. 
In addition to the research goals directly associated with the working of Peace Parks, 
this research also facilitated the creation of knowledge on the linkage between 
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globalisation and environmental action, regionalisation processes and on the 
applicability of borderland theories. 
4) Insight on globalisation -environment interface 
This study on TBPAs indicates that management of the Southern African environment 
is determined to a considerable extent by global actors, most notably in the form of 
international conservation and aid agencies and corporate organisations. Although 
states can be identified as the most important actors in TBPAs, as the ultimate 
decision-makers on boundary and other territorial changes, foreign NGOs and capital 
play important roles. The 'global influence' of NGOs may be greater than expected: 
Western conservation and development agencies have to adapt their programmes to 
the needs and perceptions of Western 'audiences', despite their geographical 
dislocation from the areas of concern (see also Duffy, 2000). This influence is not 
uncontested or without problems. One area where conflict potential is particularly 
prominent is in the area of elephant culling. Local communities may resort to the 
introduction of trophy hunting as a lucrative source of income. However, Western 
conservation agencies are likely to have a hard time 'selling' their assistance to 
projects in that case, especially if radical animal rights groups, with a proven ability to 
influence public opinion take up the issue (Koch, Interview, 2001; Reilly, Interview, 
2002). At the same time, it is difficult to determine the extent of this influence as 
South African conservation agencies tend to work along similar lines. Moreover, it is 
important not to generalise, with a great diversity of views amongst Western aid 
agencies. Even the involvement and influence of one specific agency can differ 
according to the TBPA in question. 4 
Whilst highlighting the impact of globalisation on the African environment, this 
research simultaneously points to the limits of such an approach. Where growing 
influence of Western NGOs and agencies seem to work against or undermine 
governmental interests, governments will increasingly intervene (Bratton, 1990; 
Ramutsindela, 2004). Local resistance or the very threat of it poses similar constraints 
to the ability of global forces to shape the African landscape. The more pressure or 
4A good example is the World Bank. The World Bank has monitoring power and a highly influential 
say in the Maloti/Drakensberg, in its capacity as facilitating agency for the GEF, which currently 
largely funds the project. In the Great Limpopo its role is merely supportive, and limited to the 
Mozambican side. 
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far-reaching the proposed changes, the more difficult these will be to implement. In 
that sense, this research confirms Duffy's "paradox of globalisation" notion (Duffy, 
2002b, see also section 1.7). 
5) Insights on regionalisation 
Developments in Southern Africa's TBPAs illustrate how as a result of increased 
interconnectedness and economic inter-dependence between countries, political 
developments seemingly confined to one country can have major consequences for 
policy-making in adjacent countries. Because of the interlinked nature of TBPAs, the 
Zimbabwean government's declining interest in conserving wildlife (Sharman, 2000) 
and in protecting its national parks from human encroachments (see section 5.2.5) did 
not just affect protected area planning in this country. Because it delayed the planned 
incorporation of Zimbabwean protected areas into the Limpopo/Shashe TBPA and 
into the Great Limpopo TBPA, these developments also affected protected area 
planning in neighbouring countries Botswana and South Africa. Spill-over effects of 
the political crisis in Zimbabwe in the form of increased illegal migration into 
Botswana and South Africa have furthermore had implications for the border 
management strategies of these countries and put severe strains upon Botswana- 
Zimbabwean relations (UN IRIN, 2004) which may complicate future co-operation in 
TBPAs. These developments have had a profound effect upon TBPAs, delaying the 
creation of both TBPAs involving Zimbabwe, due to a reluctance of Zimbabwe's 
neighbours to open their borders to try and contain refugee flows, and a de- 
prioritisation of TBPAs in Zimbabwe itself. 
Conversely, this analysis of TBPAs has indicated how cross-border projects can have 
profound political implications for a state's borderland territory, especially where 
there is a discrepancy in power between countries, resulting in a de facto extension of 
power of the stronger state over the borderland of its weaker neighbour, in terms of 
spatial and social organisation. 
6) Borderland studies 
Although TBPAs visibly contribute to increased physical linkages in borderlands, the 
effects of these upon contracts and economic transactions between populations in the 
borderland in question have been relatively difficult to determine thus far. As a result 
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of their co-operation in TBPAs, the level of coordination and contacts between state 
agencies and other organisations involved in TBPAs in one country with those in 
another certainly increases. In many cases these also involve local political structures, 
although in some TBPAs the involvement of these has declined due to the 
increasingly important role of central governments in TBPAs (Munthali and Soto, 
2001; Braack, 2002b). So far, TBPAs have done little to foster contacts between the 
various peoples or ethnic groups in a given borderland, however. This is because 
contrary to initial planning, the populations in borderlands have not been given 
improved access to the road networks and other physical infrastructure linking up the 
various parts within a TBPA. Admittedly, community forums in TBPAs offer a good 
opportunity to develop institutional structures and contacts between borderland 
populations. However, the impact of these contacts is likely to remain limited as long 
as border procedures for borderland populations are not relaxed. This is, however, 
difficult to achieve due to security reasons. In fact, TBPAs might undermine the 
prospects for increased trade and social contacts between borderland populations in 
the long term, particularly if the resettlement of people living in parks adjacent to 
South Africa goes ahead. In many borderlands economic and social contacts between 
populations on both sides of the border are frequent and relatively intensive, 
especially where similar ethnic groups inhabit the borderland in question (such as 
Shangaan people in Great Limpopo and the Sotho in the Maloti/Drakensberg). There 
is a need to gain a greater understanding of the negative and positive contributions 
that TBPAs can make to the social and economic welfare of the populations in 
Southern Africa's borderlands, which often belong to some of the region's most 
marginalised groups. Research establishing the access needs of borderland 
populations and possible economic and political advantages and disadvantages of 
increased cross-border access would be useful in this respect. 
8.3 Trends & future scenarios: major obstacles and opportunities in 
Southern Africa's Peace Parks 
8.3.1 Introduction 
It is extremely difficult to predict how TBPAs in Southern Africa will develop and 
their political outcomes, given that most TBPAs are not yet operational. This does 
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not, however, lessen the need to actively reflect on what might happen and what and 
where problems might emerge. One of the most important conclusions of this thesis is 
that TBPAs are endowed with considerable conflict potential. This is not surprising. 
National territory and 'sovereignty' are involved, politicians are often reluctant to 
compromise and the concept of TBPAs is relatively new to Southern Africa. 
Furthermore, TBPAs involve competition over relatively scarce land. The ways in 
which TBPAs may create conflict in the Southern African region have, however, been 
little discussed thus far. As one participant in an InwenUIUCN policy workshop on 
TBPAs put it: 
Thus far, expectations surrounding the political outcomes of co-operation 
in TBPAs in Southern Africa have been mainly informed and shaped by a 
handful of positive examples from TBPAs overseas. There is little 
information available on problems, conflicts and potential bottlenecks in 
TBPAs in Southern Africa. 
This is highly problematic. As a result, the creation of Peace Parks is being pursued 
without much thought to the conflict that might follow. Another negative consequence 
of the neglect of the conflict potential of Peace Parks is that the means of managing 
and settling conflict have been little studied, which further increases the likelihood of 
the development and persistence of conflict. To increase the relevance of the findings 
of this thesis, it would therefore be useful to consider which lessons can be leamt 
from the political patterns and trends in Peace Parks as observed in this thesis and 
how these might relate to future conflict in TBPAs. To be able to gauge future 
directions in Peace Parks, including their conflict potential, it is useful to consider the 
constraints to, and opportunities for, their development more closely. 
8.3.2 Common obstacles 
When considering all TBPAs together the Kgalagadi Park and the Great Limpopo 
Park arguably stand out, as respectively the most positive and most problem ridden 
cases. Whilst community involvement features as a main problem in the Kgalagadi, 
bi-lateral relations in this TBPA are of high quality, environmental management runs 
relatively smoothly and the park has witnessed a rise in ecotourism and attracted 
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donor funding. The Great Limpopo, on the contrary, is not only characterised by 
great(er) problems regarding the implementation of CBNRM and local land access, 
but unlike the Kgalagadi is also affected by security issues due to the prevalence of 
various illegal cross-border flows and crime, bi-lateral tensions over the distribution 
of economic benefits and political power, and land alienation of local communities. 
Last but certainly not least, the political crisis in Zimbabwe and radical land 
redistribution programmes have prevented the planned connection of the Gonarezhou 
Park, now increasingly invaded by local communities and poaching. On the other 
hand, the Great Limpopo also offers great potential, in terms of ecotourism potential 
(partially thanks to the inclusion of the Kruger Park) whilst as the TBPA with the 
greatest profile it has attracted substantial donor funding. 
Problematically, on the whole the four TBPAs next in line after the Kgalagadi Park 
and the Great Limpopo are already considerable hampered by similar constraints as 
those evident in the Great Limpopo and the Kgalagadi whilst being relatively less 
endowed with their comparative advantages. Six main constraints to Southern 
Africa's designated Peace Parks can be distinguished: 
1) Limited or disappointing economic benefits 
Problematically, the ecotourism profiles of the remaining four TBPAs in the Southern 
African Peace Parks plan are limited, because of their location in relatively remote 
areas, landscape with less tourism potential (Limpopo/Shashe) and absence of the Big 
Five (Maloti/Drakensberg, Richtersveld-Ai/Ais), whilst the number of participating 
parties that can claim income is relatively high. On the other hand, the Lubombo 
TBPA with its varied landscape (see also Appendix 1), the Big Five and already well 
developed nature reserves has high tourism potential, which may further increase if it 
is linked to the Great Limpopo as planned. The number of 'claimants' in this TBPA is 
relatively high however. It is also important to keep in mind that the market for 
ecotourism has its limits and one TBPA's prosperity may be to the detriment of 
another, posing limits to the income that the Southern African Peace Parks plan can 
generate as a whole. There is also the risk that tourists will overwhelmingly stay on 
the South African side of the border, as the most developed country in Southern 
Africa. As outlined in Chapter 5, were economic disparities to widen between South 
Africa and neighbouring countries as a result of the creation of TBPAs, relationships 
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between South Africa and neighbouring countries are likely to "worsen" (Schoon, 
2004: 19). The lack of financial benefits of TBPAs for local communities is likely to 
increase resistance from this interest group against TBPAs. 
2) Problematic cross-borderflows of goods and people 
With the exception of the Kgalagadi Park, the borderlands covered by the Southern 
African Peace Parks plan are the scene of problematic transboundary flows, either in 
the form of smuggling networks for drugs and arms (especially in the 
Maloti/Drakensberg and Lubombo TBPAs), diamonds (Ai-Ais-Richtersveld), stolen 
cattle (Maloti/Drakensberg and Lubombo TBPA) or stolen vehicles (Lubombo 
TBPA). Human trafficking and illegal migration towards South Africa constitute 
problems in all TBPAs. Due to the crisis in Zimbabwe and the informal job 
opportunities offered by commercial farms in South Africa's Limpopo Province 
illegal migration features particularly highly and is considered to be highly 
problematic in the Limpopo/Shashe. Chances of veterinary disease transmission are 
high, especially in the Lubombo TBPA, the Great Limpopo and the Limpopo/Shashe 
TBPA, where the highly contagious Foot and Mouth disease has already repeatedly 
crossed boundaries even before boundary fences and veterinary disease checking 
points have been removed in the context of TBPA creation (Rogues, Interview, 2002; 
BBC, 2003; Agencia de Informacao de Mocambique, 2004). Problematically, where 
cattle in one country are infected with a disease due to contacts with the wildlife of an 
other country because these can roam across the boundary, conflicts as to who has to 
pay for the costs of the loss of wildlife and cattle vaccination might easily erupt (see 
Chapters Five and Six). 
3) Implementation of community based conservation is problematic 
All TBPAs are beset with problems related to insufficient community participation. 
Furthermore, partially as a result of South Africa's dominant position in TBPAs and 
its preference for a preservationist course, especially in neighbouring borderlands, 
communities are under threat of being displaced from their land in countries where 
their land rights are not legally or de facto protected (Mozambique, Lesotho). In other 
cases, communities cannot claim back land in TBPAs at all, as a result of national 
legislation. Whilst in these cases TBPAs do not cause land alienation, indirectly they 
perpetuate this colonial practice. 
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4) Political instability, mismanagement and anned conflictlcrime 
in addition to the Great Limpopo, the political instability in Zimbabwe has brought 
co-operation with Zimbabwe in the Limpopo-Shashe to a standstill. Whilst the 
Zimbabwe crisis has clearly and very directly affected TBPAs involving this country, 
it is by no means the only constraining political influence. Extremely high crime 
levels in South Africa constitute an important constraining factor upon TBPAs. In 
spite of an estimated 6.5 per cent rise in tourism to South Africa and the wider region 
between 2002-2003 (SAMP, 2003), it is undeniable that many potential tourists avoid 
the country, out of fear of being robbed, hijacked or raped, following various press 
reports on the high occurrence of these crimes. As an important gateway to tourism in 
the wider region this also affects tourism levels in Southern Africa as a whole. 5 As 
indicated in Chapter Six, there is also a risk that the conservation areas included in 
TBPAs, now relatively crime free, will become penetrated by international crime 
syndicates should security levels drop. Finally, although Southern Africa is currently 
relatively peaceful, with the exception of certain areas in Zimbabwe, conflict potential 
in the region remains high, due to growing resistance against autocratic regimes 
(Swaziland) and tendencies towards autocracy and violent land reforms such as those 
already evident in Zimbabwe (Williams, 2002; Cornish, 2003). In more remote areas, 
such as the Maloti Mountains which is de facto ruled by local chiefs, armed conflict 
against Peace Parks might occur if local communities are forced to abandon their 
agricultural practices and their land (Interview, Sandwith, 2002). 
5) Tensions due to disparities in economic capacity and power between South Africa 
and neighbouring countries 
The 'Big Brother' syndrome already affects negotiations in all designated TBPAs. 
With no arrangements in place for procedures to share ecotourism equitably, it seems 
likely that this will continue to be an issue. 
' Crime levels are now said to be declining in South Africa but this is difficult to confirm since crime 
statistics are no longer available to either press or public. 
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6: Cultural clashesInationalist sentiments 
Relatively little is known regarding the volume of cultural clashes in TBPAs other 
than the Kgalagadi, Great Limpopo and Maloti/Drakensberg. However, given the 
difficulties raised by different cultural attitudes across boundaries in TBPAs world- 
wide it seems unlikely that such issues would not play a role in the remaining four 
designated TBPAs. This is the more likely since in the Southern African context there 
are not only considerable cultural differences between countries, but also within 
countries, due to racial and ethnic variation. Where relations between ethnic groups 
across boundaries, such as the Swazi and the Zulu in the Lubombo TBPA, are 
historically tense, this might also introduce tensions in co-operation (Anonymous 
Source, Swazi National Trust, 200 1). 6 
As a result of the problematic trends outlined above, co-operation in the four 
scheduled TBPAs has become increasingly characterised by conflict, resulting in 
delays and in some cases outright political unwillingness to continue 
8.3.3 Opportunities in Southern Africa's TBPAs 
Nevertheless, and despite the above-outlined difficulties discussed, co-operation in 
Southern Africa's TBPAs has laid important foundations from which the development 
of TBPAs could benefit in the future. Furthermore, the creation of TBPAs is a 
learning process. Mechanisms and institutional measures for co-operation developed 
in the course of the process could prove valuable in other TBPAs/areas of 
conservation. Lessons from the Kgalagadi Park and Great Limpopo could be 
implemented in other TBPAs as a means of avoiding or solving conflict. 
Consequently, future problems in TBPAs might be more quickly resolved. Whilst co- 
operation and policy-making in TBPAs has been far from exemplary, particularly in 
the area of CBNRM, and especially in the Great Limpopo, several useful mechanisms 
to deal with thorny policy issues, such as the inclusion of security working groups in 
TBPAs to try and check cross-border crime have been developed. Moreover, a 
growing number of foreign NGOs and bi-lateral development organisations have 
taken to sponsor bi or tri national meetings and events organised by local 
6 On the other hand, it is important not to generalise: Relations between Afrikaners and Basotho in the 
Maloti/Drakensberg -which have been historically tense- are on the whole surprisingly good. The 
appointment of an Afrikaner as Lesotho's TBPA facilitator is an illustration of this. 
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communities from different countries involved in TBPAs (Agencia Informacao de 
Mozambique; African Resources Trust, 2003). Such initiatives could assist these local 
communities in exchanging relevant information and in jointly putting pressure on 
states to recognise their rights in TBPAs. In addition, the exchange of expertise and 
technical material between South African park authorities and that of neighbouring 
countries can make valuable contributions to wildlife management, given that in most 
neighbouring countries facilities and know-how for conservation are relatively limited 
(Jones, Interview, 2002). Finally, the growing number of policy workshops organised 
by SADC, InWent, the IUCN and other agencies aimed at improving TBPA 
performances and sharing valuable information provide a good means to build 
expertise on TBPAs (see for example Petermann and Braack., 2002; Braack et al., 
2003). 
Although Southern Africa's TBPAs are likely to attract less ecotourism than initially 
expected, the income and jobs generated by Peace Parks may still make an important 
difference in marginal border regions, especially in those areas where due to severe 
aridity there are few options for alternative land uses. Moreover, the investments in 
TBPAs may have important economic spin-off effects. The international press 
coverage of the Southern African Peace Parks project has advertised Southern 
Africa's wildlife and scenery all over the world, making for valuable PR. Although 
insufficient to finance each TBPA, TBPAs have also attracted considerable funding 
from foreign donors, which can and has been used to provide valuable infrastructure, 
such as road networks and better and faster customs facilities. Investments in the 
Great Limpopo were for example used to upgrade the road to the Giriyondo border 
post between South Africa and Mozambique. 
As a result of the lessons drawn from the Great Limpopo, the social aspects of co 
operation might over time become more positive. South Africa's relatively patient and 
understanding attitude towards Lesotho for example already contrasts with its 
treatment of Mozambique, even though Lesotho constitutes an even weaker partner 
than Mozambique. As less prestigious projects, less South African pressure might also 
be brought to bear in other designated TBPAs. Economic conflicts are, however, 
likely to remain prominent in cases where each country keeps its own park revenues, 
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rather then sharing them, as this makes South Africa the perceived economic 
6winner'. 
Altogether, the working of TBPAs can be said to be highly complex. TBPAs are 
likely to create simultaneously both co-operation and conflict. Hocknell's findings 
apply: 
As a developing international norm, the process of managing transboundary 
resources represents a significant opportunity for the advancement of peaceful 
cooperation through equitable and sustainable means - and yet, paradoxically, 
this management process has the power also to create new tensions and 
reinforce pre-existing divisions amongst interested parties (2001: xiii). 
Which of these two dual forces will eventually prove to be the dominating one 
determining the course of Peace Parks, is difficult to forecast. To gain more 
understanding of the possible implications of the identified problems and 
opportunities in TBPAs it is useful to explore two potential scenarios that TBPAs 
could follow, one negative and one positive. 
8.3.4 Worse-case and best-case scenarios 
eA 'doomsday scenario' whereby Peace Parks perish in the light of the 
constraints and pressures facing them (see Figure 8.1). 7 
eA 'victory scenario' whereby TBPAs manage to overcome current obstacles, 
fulfil their policy goals and become a force for peace and prosperity in the 
region (see Figure 8.2). 
7 It is important to highlight that these scenarios are extremes and that, given the great variation 
between TBPAs and political developments in the region, some TBPAs might move more towards the 
Doomsday Scenario and others towards the Victory Scenario. Furthermore, both scenarios are far from 
static, given the dynamics of political factors and policy-making. For example, developments in 
accordance with the 'victory' scenario might in the long term introduce new problems, by stimulating 
migration to a park from adjacent, poorer areas (Scholte, 2003). Naturally, altogether unforeseen or 
different scenarios would also be possible, including a 'worse-case scenario' on the basis of economic 
setbacks (Schoon, 2004: 19). 
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Considering that political unrest and violence alongside the continuation of a highly 
unequal power division within TBPAs can be identified as key constraints influencing 
the creation and maintenance of TBPAs, it would seem as if relatively equal power 
relations and an absence of political unrest and violence are two key conditions that 
need to be in place for TBPAs to be able to deliver their wide and coherent range of 
promises. In order for Peace Parks to succeed it is essential that they are not halted by 
unfavourable political developments. Furthermore, an equal division of power in 
TBPAs seems necessary to ensure continued support of the actors involved. 
Occurrences in regional politics and the organisational set up of TBPAs therefore play 
8 a pivotal role in both scenarios (see Figures 8.1 and 8.2). Whilst the doomsday 
scenario can be sparked by each of the two factors highlighted in Figure 8.1, i. e. an 
unchanged organisational set up of TBPAs or unfavourable political developments, it 
is especially likely to come about where these exist in mutually reinforcing 
relationships, with the development of TBPAs feeding into existing regional and 
national economic and political tensions and difficulties and vice-versa. 
It is crucial that the Southern African Peace Parks project does not go the way of so 
many other large-scale regional development projects in Africa (Kawango, 1998)9 and 
avoid the doomsday scenario. Project failure would mean that valuable financial 
resources that could have been used to alleviate poverty would have been wasted, just 
as the developed social capital and expertise in the area of regional co-operation 
would go unused. TBPA failure is moreover likely to have serious implications for the 
areas it is supposed to contribute to the most: conservation and regional economic and 
political development. 
8 Within each scenario several phases or steps can be identified. Please note that these do not 
necessarily have to occur in the order presented here. 
9 Southern Africa's SDI's, the form of regional co-operation preceding and sometimes underpinning 
TBPAs (see Chapter Two), are already seemingly going in such a direction, with an increasing number 
of policy objectives remaining unfulfilled. Many of the underlying causes are similar to those causing 
delays and tensions in TBPAs, such as the 'Big Brother syndrome', political intransigence and 
precedence of national over regional interests (Arkright, Interview, 2001; Cousins and Kepe, 2004). 
Furthermore, the channelling of economic benefits to the poor is often difficult as is the acquisition of 
private sector investment (Mabuza, Interview, 2001; Rogerson, Interview, 2001). 
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ROUTE 1: INTERNAL CONFLICTS 
UNDERPERFORMANCE 
PHASE 1: The issue of equality between 
stakeholders remains unaddressed 
Tensions and conflict at bi- and intra- state level 
ROUTE 2: MACRO POLITICAL 
CONFLICTS AND VIOLENCE 
PHASE 1: Rise in autocratic regimes, 
provoking armed resistance. Competition 
over land and other economic resources 
rises, and inflames racial and ethnic 
tensions 
Rise in political instability and 
violence 
PHASE 2: Failure to deliver objectives, e. g. 
in area of infrastructural requirements. 
Reduced willingness to compromise. Increased 
passive resistance. 
PHASE 3: Resistance by marginalised 
borderland stakeholders 
(E. g. criminal cross-border syndicates and local 
communities seek to sabotage TBPAs process 
through bomb attacks or by occupying parts ol 
designated TBPAs). 
PHASE 2: Increased armed conflict in or 
around TBPAs 
Armed resistance against autocratic regimes 
takes form of guerrilla struggle in 
borderlands as sites for refuge and hiding. 
Crime levels in borderlands rise dramatically, 
with central governments increasingly unable 
or unwilling to protect TBPAs. 
PHASE 3: Widespread poaching 
Wildlife protection diminishes as 
result of lack of state interest, armed 
conflict or land invasions. 
PHASE 4: Diminished income and political support 
Tourists stay away. 
Socio-economic and other objectives fail. 
Donor support dries up. 
Governmental support for TBPAs being considerably an outcome of donor pressure 
and support, governmental support for TBPAs dwindles. 
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Figure 8.1 Causal linkages in the 'Doomsday scenario' 
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Better biodiversity protection 
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PHASE 5: Peace Parks 
PHASE 4: Ecotourism takes 
off 
PHASE 3: Removal of boundary 
fences for wildlife, tourists and 
local communities 
Cross-border infrastructure in 
place 
PHASE 2: Successful 
harmonisation of laws, land 
use and Dolicies 
CONFLICT REDUCTION 
- Sustainable use of resources bý 
local communities 
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plans 
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Figure 8.2 Causal linkages in the 'Victory scenario' 
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Possible effects upon conservation 
'TBPA failure' may reduce the popularity of integrated conservation and development 
projects. Having tried the 'sustainable development option' and found it to be 
unsuccessful, central governments are likely to want to embark on other types of 
borderland development, including environmentally unfriendly ones such as mining. 10 
Conservation in general may even be abandoned as a governmental priority, which is 
likely to spark an increase in or return to overgrazing and other less environmentally 
friendly land options given the great pressures on land in Southern Africa. The 
converse, a return to preservationist fort- and-fortress models could also happen. The 
failure of CBNRM programmes has been increasingly used by neo-preservationists to 
plead for greater and stricter conservation measures, regardless of affordability and 
local circumstances. Even apart from the question of how such militarised 
conservation 'islands' could be financially maintained and receive political support, 
(especially in light of the region's turn towards more radical forms of land 
distribution) they are unlikely to be successful or sustainable, given that the causes 
leading to the overall failure of the fort and fortress approach would not have been 
removed. 
International relations 
Given that TBPAs have been claimed to be tangible representations of the African 
Renaissance (Van Arnerom and BUscher, forthcoming 2005) and to a lesser extent of 
the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), failure of the Southern 
African Peace Parks project could negatively reflect upon or diminish support, both 
financial and political, for both. Failure of the Southern African Peace Parks project 
could also diminish opportunities for economic growth in the region by undermining 
trust of international business in the stability of Southern Africa's regional market. 
Finally, especially in situations where the 'Big Brother syndrome' is a main factor in 
causing the decline of a given TBPA, unsuccessful co-operation in TBPAs may 
reduce incentives for regional co-operation in other areas as well. 
10 Successful local resistance against or sabotage of TBPAs could moreover work as engine for 
increased resistance of conservation efforts outside the borderland environment, highlighting that 
participation in conservation poses great risks to land tenure and does not guarantee viable income, 
even in very big projects. 
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Problematically, in the current situation, TBPAs are arguable closer to the doomsday 
scenario than the victory one. For one thing, rather than stimulating more favourable 
political developments in line with the predictions of the PPC, TBPAs in their current 
set up feed into the existing conflict potential in the Southern African region, by 
increasing demands upon land and by often being undemocratic in character, rather 
than constituting a force for positive change. Already, resistance against perceived 
South African dominance has led to reluctance to follow up agreements and 
introduced delays. Secondly, as a result of the token community participation and the 
thus far limited economic benefits in Peace Parks, the commitment of local 
communities, many of which were reluctantly drawn into the TBPA process in the 
first place (Duffy, 1997), is diminishing. Breaking out of this impasse is vital. This 
raises the question of how Peace Parks could be more effectively managed, including 
in such a way that their peace-building capacity can be improved. 
8.4 Policy Recommendations 
Several solutions have been suggested to diminish common problems and constraints 
in the development of TBPAs in Southern Africa, for example during policy 
workshops on TBPAs given by the SADC, InWent and in BSP and IUCN/ROSA 
publications. Recommendations produced by SADC and InWent during a workshop 
in 2003 display some of the most common problems in TBPAs and possible solutions 
(Table 8.4). 
Table 8.4 Recommended solutions to main shortfalls in TBPA implementation 
CORE SET OF SOLUTIONS HOW TO 
PROBLEMS INSTITUTIONALIZE 
Inadequate resources (finance, Effective funding strategy Negotiation and development of a 
personnel). TBPAs tend to be Capacity building strategy for funding and capacity 
donor-driven building. SADC should set up a 
Trust Fund. 
Conflict situations and poor Effective conflict resolution Negotiations 
inter-governmental relations 
Although there are national Formulate within-country Utilize existing mechanisms at 
strategies for TBPAs in some strategies and then expand to various levels 
countries (e. g. South Africa), regional level 
there is no regional strategy 
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Insufficient or ineffective Undertake an aggressive Through the media expose and 
marketing and communication promotion of TBPAs promote successful TBPA case- 
regarding the achievements studies 
and benefits of TBPAs 
There is a lack of recognition Forge an agreement between Negotiation and acceptance of the 
and co-ordination of NGOs government and NGOs protocol 
There is no coordination of Use existing structures e. g. Establish a Unit/Sector at the 
TBPAs at a regional level SADC SADC Secretariat level 
There is sometimes a lack of Develop a Protocol/Code of For each TBPA, develop a 
adherence to Memoranda of Conduct. Have joint, integrated Protocol/Code and KPIs. 
Understanding planning with key performance SADCAUCN should do annual 
indicators. monitoring 
There is still inadequate Develop guidelines for Appoint task force to prepare 
community participation in community participation guidelines. Undertake social 
the establishment of TBPAs impact assessment. 
Definite need for a Develop a regional hub for Recommend at WPC that an 
networking mechanism TBPAs IUCN or SADC team should 
undertake a feasibility study. 
Also additional workshops 
similar to this one at least twice a 
year. 
There is no mechanism to Record and share Best/Worst Institutionalize within the 
address or accommodate Case Practise examples. transboundary network and 
differences between countries Enhance capacity through publicize through the hub. 
training. 
There is a need for guidelines Develop a generic operational Appoint a Task Team within 
on planning and establishing manual on the subject of IUCN Task Force to take 
TBPAs establishment and maintenance responsibility and to co-opt 
of TBPAs required expertise. 
There is no regional structure Establish a regional structure This will need to align with 
for TBPAs for TBPAs existing SADC structures. TBPAs 
must be part of local plans and 
structures (and will require 
capacity building within existing 
institutions) 
Weak TFCA co-ordination Strengthen co-ordination TBPAs must have a focal point 
mechanism currently mechanisms for co-ordination (could be an 
individual or an institution). 
Different situations may require 
different co-ordination 
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arrangements. 
Absence of monitoring and Establish a regional TBPA SADC to undertake monitoring 
evaluation framework for monitoring and evaluation and evaluation 
TFCA performance framework 
Lack of tested TBPA models Develop TBPA models Document case studies and 
promote research 
Source: adapted from Braack et al. (2003: 12-13). 
The remainder of this section seeks to add further to these guidelines and 
recommendations. Given that unfavourable political circumstances and unequal 
power relations within Peace Parks can be identified as particularly problematic 
constraints, this section seeks to explore how these factors can be contained. 
A) Actively anticipate and incorporate detrimental impacts of political and social 
trends upon TBPAs in policy-making 
It has been increasingly recognised in conservation studies that, far from constituting 
isolated islands uninfluenced by the wider social and econornic context in which they 
operate, conservation areas are shaped by social and economic factors (Hulme and 
Murphree, 2001). In the wider arena it would be good to recognise the geo-political 
environment in which TBPAs operate. Many of the problems in TBPAs outlined 
above can be traced back to the fact that Peace Parks in Southern Africa operate in a 
relatively problematic context, characterised by power inequalities, struggles for land, 
autocratic tendencies, political instability and economic scarcity. Therefore, TBPAs 
could and should become forums for discussions as to how such political 
developments could affect TBPAs and how negative impacts can be curbed as much 
as possible. However, although the need for 'political impact assessments' has been 
increasingly highlighted in studies on TBPAs (Van der Linde, 2001; Sandwith et al. 
2001) in practice TBPA policy continues to be constructed in isolation of wider 
political developments. The treatment of the Zimbabwe crisis is a case in point. 
Instead of actively anticipating possible impacts of the political crisis in Zimbabwe 
upon TBPAs and seeking solutions to contain possible detrimental effects, the topic 
was all but ignored in cross-border meetings between policy-makers and during 
policy workshops. It is, however, imperative to follow and anticipate problematic 
political developments and other threats to security and safety so that management 
mechanisms can be developed to curb the negative side effects of these upon TBPAs. 
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Figure 8.3 shows an example of the ways in which such anticipative conflict 
management and planning could occur. To facilitate STEP I security files of the 
institute for Security Studies discussing political and other threats to security for 
Southern African countries could be used 
(http: //www. iss. co. za/AF/profiles/afrimap. htrnl). In areas where boundary conflict 
potential features highly, border expertise groups (such as for example the 
international Boundary Research Unit, www. ibru. dur. ac. uk) could also be consulted 
to anticipate and prevent border conflicts. 
Alertness to political Monitoring of 
threats to TBPA in situation 
form of emerging 
political conflict, 
instability and 
violence (including 
violent crime) 
STEP I STEP 2 
ut: notify/consult relevant organs within SADC 
."-t'--ý., 
I.. " .- 11 .ý., -, ý-II 
anlis or cash' campaigms. 
C'Ir I. 
" 
D 14 
Q'I'vp r% 
- Identify possible 
cons, uences/threats for 
TBPA process 
- Consult ground 
personnellother policy - 
makers of country in 
question on implications 
ITI 
As 
r 
Figure 8.3 Conflict anticipative planning and management in TBPAs 
B) Stimulate meaningful participation and constructive dialogue 
The need for more meaningful participation is especially important with regard to the 
involvement of local communities. To truly make the say of local communities count 
it is necessary that their consultation prior to the project implementation is secured 
and legally binding. Furthermore, more research into legal frameworks that can be 
used to address conflicts between citizens and their state is necessary, litigation being 
extremely limited as a mechanism for resolving conflict in this area (Mohamed- 
Katerere, 2001). 
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There is also a need to promote improved participation and dialogue during policy 
workshops between the various participating parties. Investing in professional 
interpreters where not all participating parties can fluently express themselves in 
English (the language used during workshops) could be a great help, stimulating 
effective communication and enabling all participants equal access to information and 
the chance to make a contribution. At the individual TBPA level, it would be 
worthwhile to invest more in teambuilding and allow 'the other side' a say in the 
choice of key contributors to the process such as co-ordinators, where these are not 
jointly elected and only work for one country (as in the Maloti/Drakensberg, see 
Chapter Eight). 
Q Slow down! 
Whilst arguably necessary in the early stages to get the process underway, high-speed 
processes of implementation forced by South Africa have created considerable 
resentment. Continued political pressure by South African actors on neighbouring 
states is likely to result in even more resistance. Whilst signing all the treaties, 
countries might not necessarily follow up agreements when dissatisfied with their part 
in the process. In that sense it is important to not only focus on the end result, but also 
on the process. Furthermore, as the parties most aware of potential risks on the 
ground, it is imperative that the voices of actors directly involved in and responsible 
for planning and implementation are heard and acted upon. 
D) Prioritise quality over quantity 
Even amongst the advocates of Peace Parks there is a growing unease over the speed 
with which land is being appropriated for TBPAs (Groenewald, Interview, 2002), 
conflict over land being the biggest trigger of conflict in Southern Africa. The 
ongoing identification and announcement of new Peace Parks in Southern Africa by 
competing conservation NGOs is likewise worrisome. Whilst this creates new 
opportunities for TBPAs and keeps the 'funding bandwagon' going (Wolmer, 2003), 
these opportunities are unlikely to be translated into viable TBPAs so long as they 
lack comprehensive funding and political support. The same is true for plans for an 
extension of existing parks into TBPAs without proper consultation and before the 
parks are operational. Less incorporation of land would make Southern Africa's 
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TBPAs seem less spectacular but might prove easier to manage and to sustain. Instead 
of going on identifying new TBPAs, it seems wiser to invest in existing TBPAs and 
learn from and use expertise built up in these TBPAs to the benefit of other, later 
TBPAs. More generally, rather than assuming that the creation of TBPAs will be 
beneficial and applying the concept as a blueprint for conservation and development 
regardless of local and national circumstances, there is a need to assess from the 
outset whether costs are likely to outweigh potential benefits. Considering that TBPAs 
may not only incur costs in a financial sense, but also by increasing conflict at local 
and regional levels, such a cost-benefit analysis should also include social and 
political parameters. 
E) More monitoring, transparency and accountability 
There is a need for the development of guidelines by which the level of progress and 
standard of performance in TBPAs, including with regard to safeguarding social 
rights, can be assessed. This would increase the extent to which key decision-makers 
in TBPAs can be held accountable for their actions. The establishment of a regional 
TBPA monitoring and evaluation framework would offer a good starting-point, 
although it seems important that, given the great variations in needs and opportunities 
across the region, that this should be tailored according to individual TBPA needs and 
opportunities. The creation of a SADC TBPA unit has been recommended (Braack et 
al., 2003). On the other hand, the SADC is a non-elected organ comprised of national 
government representatives. This introduces the risk that a SADC TBPA unit would 
merely reflect and pursue the needs of governmental players. As a means of 
ameliorating this issue, the SADC could be combined with the appointment of a third 
monitoring organisation representing or explicitly seeking to support citizen needs. 
The Legal Resource Centre in Johannesburg might, for example, fulfil such a role. 
F) More realistic outlook on the potential of TBPAs to stimulate peace 
The findings point to a need to be more realistic about the peace-building potential of 
TBPAs. This need features particularly with regard to TBPAs in post conflict areas 
with a continued relatively high conflict outbreak potential, such as the Great Lakes 
region. As noted by Schoon (2004: 21), the "creation of Peace Parks to create peace 
where non exists... is radically optimistic". Although Peace Parks could help to re- 
establish security in borderlands, this is a long-term process and requires considerable 
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funding and capacity, as well as trust between participating governments, factors that 
are currently all lacking in the Great Lakes region. The chances of success seem, 
therefore, to be low whilst, due to the proneness of borderlands to become bases for 
guerrilla-activities, the chances that more open borders and connecting infrastructure 
might increase the impact of armed conflict are relatively high. Furthermore, the 
notion of Peace Parks could be used as a tool for forced resettlement of local people 
or refugees, in the name of conservation. Several documents promoting TBPAs 
already hint in that direction. With this in mind, instead of promoting TBPAs under a 
false cloak as vehicles for peace, it would be more honest to be realistic about their 
peace-building potential and discuss their potential merits alongside other and 
potentially more viable options that could help protect wildlife from the devastating 
effects of war. 
8.5 Emerging Research Needs 
A) Alternative institutional models and conflict resolution mechanisms 
Considering the obstacles that the prevalence of unequal power structures at the 
regional level and different cultural perceptions within TBPAs and associated conflict 
pose to the advancement of the goals of Peace Parks, more research into alternative 
institutional set ups for TBPAs and into conflict resolution mechanisms is desirable 
(see also Van der Linde, 2001; Schoon, 2004). The following areas of research would 
constitute good starting-points: 
e Research into the potential and limitations of the organisational. set ups that are 
currently used in TBPAs to try and ensure an equal or more equal division of 
power. For example, the advantages and constraints of the Great Limpopo's 
'rotating co-ordinator system' could be compared to those of ihe 
Maloti/Drakensberg's 'one country-one co-ordinator' system. 
9 Research into collaborative decision-making models promoting 'solution-based 
thinking' and open discussion of feelings and emotions, rather than having these 
influencing positions and arguments in a covert way (De Bono, 2004: 105). De 
Bono's 'parallel thinking model' (2004: 89-106), which has been increasingly 
adapted in the corporate world and within education institutions as a conflict 
resolution model seems worth investigating for example. 
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B) Contribution of SADC 
It is often seen as desirable that SADC plays a more active and co-ordinating role in 
TBPAs. However, the precise role and contribution that SADC could make and to 
what effect has been little thought through, requiring additional research into how 
SADC's mandate in TBPAs should best be extended, if at all. 
C) Barriers to effective TBPA participation in neighbouring countries 
Perhaps because of its leading role in TBPAs, South Africa's role in TBPAs has been 
scrutinised and extensively criticised. In contrast, the policies and actions of 
neighbouring countries have been little assessed, even though most countries have a 
4slow delivery record'. It is important to gain more insight into the stumbling blocks for 
TBPAs in South Africa's neighbours. For one thing, it is this lack of initiative or 
fulfilment of earlier made promises that induces or allows for greater South African 
pressure, which as reported earlier constitutes a source of tensions. More generally, it is 
critical to find out more as to the possibilities and constraints in each country to create 
TBPAs, as a means to gain more insight into the feasibility and timeliness of the 
establishment of a given TBPA. For development to work, good governance and external 
political stability, which in the case of TBPAs includes sufficient safety standards at the 
local borderland level, are required. Depending on the nature of the identified constraints, 
additional requirements for support could also be identified to help overcome such 
obstacles, possibly in the form of donor assistance. 
D) Alternatives to economic neo- liberalism 
In line with mainstream sustainable development thinking (see section 3.1), neo-liberal 
economic principles underpin TBPAs, as reflected in a strong preference for 
privatization, private land ownership, free enterprise and open markets as a means to 
boost regional development and individual liberties. In practice, the neo-liberal 
development model often "enhances inequalities, perpetuates human deprivation and 
offers a scaled down version of liberalism and democracy" (Richardson, 2001: 2). These 
very issues have been identified as significantly hampering TBPAs throughout this thesis. 
There is hence a need for more engagement with alternative economic models that could 
be used for TBPAs. Social liberalism, as an ideology which "insists that liberal freedoms 
and rights extend to all, not just the advantaged" (Richardson, 2001: 205) and which 
could combine market needs with the need for social welfare is a potential alternative. 
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There is also a need to explore the options for non-violent 'radical' land reform (Lahiff 
and Scoones, 2001). At a regional level the introduction of capital controls (Epstein, 
2003) could possibly help create more economic equality and lessen competition over the 
revenues of ecotourism. More research into such alternatives would be needed before 
their implementation could be seriously considered however. 
E) Biological claims 
Proponents of Peace Parks tend to present the need for bigger parks to incorporate more 
complete ecosystems and the creation of biological corridors as facts. However, Burnett, 
(1998: 4) notes how "some biologists question the whole premise of biological corridors 
because so little science explains what actually happens inside them". "They are only an 
idea now, an act of faith" he quotes a prominent ecologist. Instead of uncritically 
accepting the necessity for wildlife corridors it seems worthwhile to take a more critical 
stand. Likewise, the potential pitfalls and risks of wildlife translocation need scrutiny. 
The unexpected return of the Kruger elephants into South Africa (see Chapter Five), 
wasting millions of US dollars that could have been used for local development, 
illustrates that the translocation of wildlife is less straightforward than it tends to be 
presented. The severe health risks that transportation through 'air lifts' might pose to 
animal welfare also needs more consideration. Apart from ethical considerations, 
resulting animal deaths could easily spark negative publicity, resulting in a decline of 
ecotourism to TBPAs (Hall-Martin, Interview, 2001). There is also a need to critically 
assess more generally the contribution to biodiversity that TBPAs can make and whether 
these are substantial enough to justify the considerable costs of creating a TBPA, 
especially where economic, social and political benefits are relatively small (Reyers, 
2003). 
F) Inter-disciplinary approach 
Combining social science and natural science approaches and insights, would make it 
easier to assess how developments in the 'natural realm' relate to or influence 
developments in the social realm and conversely, thereby creating a more holistic picture. 
Such knowledge would be helpful in gaining more insight into the risks and possibilities 
surrounding sustainable use of natural resources in TBPAs. Situated in both the social 
and natural sciences, Geography would be ideally predisposed to engage in or organise 
such inter-disciplinary research. 
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G) Broader research outlook 
So far most academic research on TBPAs in Southern Africa has concentrated on 
conflicts in the Great Limpopo. There is a great need for more studies on processes in 
Southern Africa's other designed TBPAs, which are also endowed with considerable 
conflict potential. " It is also important that academic research does not confine itself to 
the most 'striking' or 'dramatic' cases. Although academics have an important function 
in highlighting frictions and constraints it is equally important to explore where Peace 
Parks do work and why. In this respect, more research on the state of bi-lateral relations 
in the Kgalagadi Park is desirable. Bi-lateral relations in this TBPA appear to be of high 
quality, but the underlying causes have received surprisingly little attention thus far. 
H) Hidden geo-political agendas 
This research has indicated how through participation in TBPAs strong states can extend 
their influence in their neighbour's borderland, by influencing its physical and social 
organisation. Whilst thus far protection of environmental interests seems to underpin such 
actions, it is not unthinkable that states might want to seek to increase their presence in its 
neighbour's territory through TBPAs to safeguard hidden geo-political or economic 
interests. For example, a state whose economy depends upon access to particular natural 
resources located in the borderland of a neighbouring country, might want to use TBPAs 
to ensure closer proximity to those natural resources, out of economic and security 
considerations (Van Wyk, 2000). The pursuit of such geo-political agendas could 
aggravate regional tensions and negatively affect the operation of Peace Parks. It is hence 
important to stay alert to the possible use of TBPAs by states to pursue hidden political 
agendas (see also Ramutsindela, 2004: 70). 
I) Border claims 
In Chapter Six it was indicated that not only may TBPAs be unable to reduce tensions 
over borders; TBPAs may add to these when used as a mechanism to re-introduce 
existing grievances over boundaries. With most of South Africa's neighbours holding 
claims on South African territory, it is not unthinkable that similar patterns could emerge 
11 As the first findings of Jones' (2004) PhD research on the emerging conflict between local resource 
access and conservation in the Lubombo TBPA indicate for example. 
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in other TBPAs. To optimise the possible contribution that TBPAs can make in resolving 
border conflicts and to niinimise the chances that they might become vehicles for conflict 
over boundaries, it is essential that the relationship between TBPAs and border conflicts 
is studied in more depth. 
J) Create a more realistic research model from which to assess the peace-building 
potential of TBPAs 
Although often halted by international tensions, TBPAs do have the potential to make a 
significant contribution to peace. Rather than fully abandoning the PPC it would be 
useful to change its scope and underlying premises. To gain more realistic and accurate 
knowledge of the peace-building potential of TBPAs a first requirement is that the 
constraints on the peace-building capacity of TBPAs are recognised. Firstly, the notion 
that TBPAs work as vehicles for peace should not be assumed to be a general 
phenomenon, but rather as a highly context dependent one. Secondly, the quality of 
existing relations between participating governments needs to be actively acknowledged 
as an important influencing factor. Thirdly, the very requirements posed to TBPAs in 
developing countries, whereby they have become vehicles for development, coupled with 
an often problematic and chaotic political context significantly affect the potential for 
peace-building. More thought is required as to how the peace-building potential of 
TBPAs is affected by these factors, and how solutions can be found to constraints in this 
area. Concepts used in critical academic research on the presupposed peace-building 
aspects of tourism could possibly be used as starting-points for more critical reflection on 
the PPC. 
There is also a need to assess in more depth the ways in which TBPAs can build peace 
and under what circumstances. For example, and especially in the Southern African 
context, in studying the peace-building potential of TBPAs it would be useful to consider 
if and to what extent Peace Parks could stimulate peace within countries, by bringing 
people from a wide range of racial and ethnic backgrounds, and from different social 
groups and classes to the 'negotiation table'. 12 
12 For example, in Zimbabwe co-operation in TBPAs played an important role in bringing parties to the 
negotiating table, such as white commercial farmers and war veterans (Verhoef, Interview, 2002). Whilst 
thus far this social capital cannot be used due to wider political circumstances in Zimbabwe, it might have 
laid important foundations/networks for dialogue in the future. 
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Appendix 1: Southern Africa's established and proposed Peace 
Parks' 
1) Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park 
The first Peace Park to be established, the Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park comprises 
the Botswana Gemsbok National Park (75% of land surface) and the South African 
Kalahari Gemsbok National Park (25%). A bilateral agreement between the 
Botswana Department of Wildlife and National Parks and South African National 
Parks signed on 7 April 1999, paved the way for the Transfrontier Park's formal 
opening on 12 May 2000. The borders being only demarcated by white washed 
stones, game could already cross the national boundaries without impediment. Since 
2000 the Transfrontier Park has been further extended with the addition of the 
Mabusehube Game Reserve, in southwest Botswana. The park attracts about 50,000 
visitors annually. 
Size: The TBPA is 37,991 kml in extent. 
Natural characteristics: Dry savannah, desert and sand dunes. Rivers are seasonal 
(Peace Parks Foundation, 2004). Reflecting its and desert conditions (with lack of 
surface water and an average of 200 mm of rainfall a year) wildlife is sparsely 
distributed in this area, but includes lion, cheetah, leopard, springbok, raptors, 
weavers and gemsbok (DEAT, 2003: 47). 
Status of the land: On both the South African and Botswana side land is state 
owned. On the South African side the Bushmen successfully launched a land claim 
against the South African State 2 and were granted several farins in the area. They are 
for the main part banned from hunting, which has led to resentment and conflicts 
' This Appendix lists the main characteristics for each of the six (planned) Peace Parks in Southern 
Africa (see Chapter 1). The TBPAs are ranked according to the level of progress made. Most 
numerical data were taken from Hall-Martin and Modishe (2002), whilst descriptions of the Parks' 
natural features are largely based on data from the PPF website (www. peaceparks. org) and to a lesser 
extent on Speet's dissertation (2000). Where information is also based on other sources these are 
explicitly mentioned in the text. 
2 Upon the proclamation of the Kalahari Gemsbok National Park in 193 1, Bushmen previously 
resident in the area were forcefully evicted from the Park. 
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with the park authorities. The Botswana Bushmen also have an interest in the area, 
but have no legal means to claim back their land. 
2) The Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park 
Formerly known as the Gaza-Kruger-Gonarezhou Park, the Great Limpopo 
Transfrontier Park comprises the Mozambican Limpopo National Park 3, South 
Africa's Kruger National Park and Zimbabwe's Gonarezhou National Park, as well 
as the adjacent Manjinji Pan Sanctuary and Malipati Safari Area. The Sen-we 
Communal area in Zimbabwe is to be opened as a wildlife corridor between Kruger 
and Gonarezhou. The international treaty was signed in December 2002. The planned 
co-exchange of "technical, scientific and legal expertise" (DEAT, 2003: 47) and the 
opening of wildlife migration corridors has so far merely taken place between South 
Africa and Mozambique, partially as a result of the political crisis in Zimbabwe. In 
October 2001 a start was made with the translocation of 25 Kruger elephants into a 
35 000 ha sanctuary on the Mozambican side, for which some openings in the border 
fence were made. The Great Limpopo has not been opened officially yet. On basis of 
the existing excellent tourism infrastructure of the Kruger National Park, the great 
variety of wildlife hosted in the area and the fact that it would constitute the world's 
biggest game Park, the Great Limpopo is generally recognised as the TBPA with the 
greatest eco tourism potential. The Great Limpopo Park is the only TBPA with its 
own up-to-date website: www. greatlimpopopark. com. Originally developed as a 
Transfrontier Conservation Area, the Great Limpopo was turned into a Transfrontier 
Park under South African pressure .4 The 
long-term objective is still to turn it into a 
TFCA or 'Resource Area', totaling almost 100,000 kM2, allowing for sustainable use 
and multiple land uses. In this set up several more areas would be added to a by then 
existing Transfrontier Park, including the Kruger-to-Canyons Blosphere Reserve, 
and Mozambican beaches, further raising the Great Limpopo's profile as a tourism 
destination. 
Size: 35 000 kin' (nearly the size of The Netherlands 
3 Previously known as the Coutada 16 Hunting Area. 
The reasons for this are explored in Chapter Five. 
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Natural Characteristics: 
Tropical and moist, temperate and dry savannah types. Great variety of wildlife, 
including the Big Five 
Status of the Land: All National Park areas are government- owned, apart from the 
Makuleke's land area in the Pafuri Triangle in the north of Kruger. Their land will 
not be cultivated or inhabited by people, but used for tourism development. The 
Mozambican Limpopo Park is also government owned, making local communities 
residing in this park vulnerable to eviction. The Sengwe corridor is community 
owned. Whilst the Sengwe community is interested in joining the TBPA, delays on 
the side of the Zimbabwean government to engage in formal consultations prevent 
them from doing so. 
3) Ai-AislRichtersveld Transfrontier Park 
This Transfrontier Park comprises the Namibian Ai-Ais Hot Springs Game Park 
(69%) and the Richtersveld National Park (31%) in South Africa. A treaty was 
signed in August 2003. As with the Great Limpopo, there are plans to further expand 
the area into a Transfrontier Conservation Area. 
Size: 6,222 kM2 
Natural Characteristics 
The area is famous for its floral diversity, which manifests itself during the spring. 
Other distinctive features include the Fish River Canyon (frequently compared to the 
Grand Canyon in the US) and the Ai-Ais Hot Springs. The Orange River separates 
the Park's two national components. The area is also of significant geological 
interest. 
Status of the Land 
The Richtersveld Park is a contractual National Park, i. e. the land Is owned by the 
11 local Nama communities. Land on the Namibian side is state owne, 1. 
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4) MalotilDrakensberg Transfrontier Conservation and Development, 4rea 
Covering a mountain range on Lesotho's northeastern border with South Africa, this 
Transfrontier Conservation Area links several provincial nature reserves and national 
protected areas in South Africa (including the uKhahlamba Park, the Golden Gate 
Highlands National Park and the Natal Drakensberg Park) with the recently 
proclaimed Sehlaba-Thebe National Park in Lesotho. On i August 2003 the 
international Treaty was signed. A US $ 16 million Global Environmental Facility 
Grant, facilitated by the World Bank, finances the development of the Transboundary 
Programme. Reflecting the important role of provincial bodies in South Africa and 
the role of the World Bank, these partners are linked to the MoU through subsidiary 
agreements. Transboundary activities aim to tackle alien plant invasion, over- 
grazing, drug smuggling, stock theft and to improve fire management (DEAT, 2003: 
48). Linked to this, activities encompass "strategic conservation planning, 
establishment of protection measures for priority sites, enhanced management of 
existing Protected Areas, community involvement, nature-based tourism, economic 
development and institutional development for effective nature conservation 
management" (DEAT, 2003: 48). Remains of prehistoric Bushmen paintings in the 
area constitute important cultural assets. 
Size: 13,000 kml 
Natural Characteristics: The area constitutes a major watershed, which supplies 
water to both Lesotho and South Africa. Constituting the highest areas in Southern 
Africa, the mountain range hosts unique mountain and sub-alpme ecosystems. Parts 
in South Africa have been proclaimed Ramsar sites. (Ramsar, 2004) 
Status of the Land: Land in the area is largely government owned, either at the 
national or at the provincial level. Nonetheless, some nature reserves on the South 
Africa side such as the Qua Qua Park have been 'invaded' by local communities 
(Collins, Interview, 2002) whilst parts of the Maluti area in Lesotho are de facto run 
by local chiefs (Sandwith, Interview, 2002). 
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5) Lubombo TFCA 
Located on a plain between the Indian Ocean and the Lubombo Mountains In the 
west, the planned Lubombo TFCA straddles the borders between southern 
Mozambique, Swaziland and South Africa's Kwa-Zulu Natal province. It aims to 
link the Maputo Elephant Reserve in Mozambique through the Futi Corridor with 
South Africa's Tembe Elephant Park and Ndumo Game Resen, e. Furthermore, 
Swaziland's Hlane Wildlife Sanctuary, Mlawula Nature Reserve and the Ndzinda 
Reserve will be added as well as communal areas. A Trilateral Protocol was signed 
on 22 June 2000. The Lubombo TFCA is part of a wider Spatial Development 
Initiative between the three countries. In the long term the plan is to connect the 
Lubombo TFCA with the Great Limpopo Park. 
Size: 4 195kml (66% in Mozambique, 26% in South Africa and 8% in Swaziland) 
Natural Characteristics: Wetlands, including in South Africa's St Lucia, a World 
Heritage Conservation Site, the Lubombo mountains, coastal and marine natural 
areas. High animal variety, including in big game. 
Status of the Land: The Lubombo Conservancy in Swaziland has some community 
owned, some privately owned and some state owned land; land on the South African 
and Mozambican side is largely state owned. 
6) LimpopolShashe TBPA 
Positioned at the convergence of the Limpopo and Shashe Rivers, this planned TFCA 
comprises the Botswana Northern Tilu Game Reserve (28%), South Africa's 
Limpopo Valley/Vhembe Dongola National Park as well as various privately owned 
ranches (53%) and the Tull Circle Safari Area in Zimbabwe (10%). 5 It includes 
Mapungubwe Village, recently proclaimed a World Heritage Site, an important 
archeological site where the famous Golden Rhino and other archeological treasures 
were discovered. Reflecting the political difficulties in Zimbabwe, Botswana and 
5 The Maramani Communal land, the River Ranch Resettlement areas and various game ranches 
might be further added on the Zimbabwean side. 
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South Africa are currently taking the lead in the process of establishing this 
Transfrontier Park. A Draft Memorandum of Understanding is still under discussion. 
Size: 4872kM2 
Physical characteristics: Savannah and riparian forests. Hosts the Tull elephants 
and a wide range of other wildlife. 
Status of the Land: This TFCA includes both privately owned, community owned 
and state owned land. The South Africa parts hosts numerous Zimbabwean illegal 
immigrants working on commercial farms. 
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Appendix 11 Overview of Interviews 
Interviews 2001 
Name interviewee Position Organisation Date 
Anonymous Poacher N/A 
!! E 
22/07 
g 
Anonymous Poacher N/A 22/07 
Anonymous Shangoma (witchdoctor) N/A 22/07 
Awkright, David Deputy CEO Maputo Corridor 
Company 
24/08 
Baillie, Alexandra Earth Summit Organisor IUCN 23/10 
Braack, Leo (Dr. ) Gaza Kruger Gonarezhou 
Coordinator 
SANPs 17/08 
Braack, Michael Foriner SANPs employee N/A 14/08 
Chitepo, Kule (Dr. ) Co-ordinator African Resources 
Trust 
09/07 
Clifford Makuleke Makuleke Community 
member 
N/A 12/07 
Collins, Steve Officer GTZ-Transforrn 7 15/08 
Culverwell, James. Lubombo Coordinator DNFFB 30/08 
Da Cruz, Paul Ecologist/Geographer N/A 19/07 
Dlamini, Sikumbuzo Researcher Swazi National 
Trust 
28/08 
Freddy Riri Project manager African Wildlife 
Foundation 
(AWF)F 
16/07 
Grossman, David (Dr. ) Ecologist, independent 
consultant. Representative for 
Bushmen Community 
Mafisa 
Consultancy/David 
Grossman & 
03/07 
6 All of the abbreviations for the listed organisations in this category can be found In the 
Abbreviations & Acronyms section of this thesis. Where the names of organisations have not been 
mentioned in the main text of the thesis, organisational names are given in full. Where respondents 
held various positions, the first position is the one held in the organisation mentioned under 
torganisation'. . 
Training and Support for Natural Resource Management. 
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(Kgalagadi Park), and Associates- 
Makuleke community (Great 
Limpopo). Involved in drafting 
of management plans for 
Limpopo, Zinave and Banine 
National Parks. 
Hall Martin, Antony (Dr. ) Elephant specialist/ N/A 17/08 
retired SANI's officer 
Hanks, John (Dr. ) Director TFCA Unit-CI 17/10 
Jones, Muleso Kharike TFCA Coordinator DEAT 10/09 
Kanju, Rest Tourism expert African Resources 09/07 
Trust (ART) 
Koch, Eddie Director Consultant Free lance Mafisa 06/07 
contributor/ former journalist Consultancy 
for Mail & Guardian 
Koetzer, Oubaas Inspector South African 07/09 
Police 
Lamson Makuleke Community leader AWF 20/07 
Mabuza, Sindi Lubombo SDI coordinator Ministery of 19/09 
Finance & 
Planning 
(Swaziland) 
Makuleke, Lamson Consultant/ AWF 17/07 
Tribal Head Makuleke 
Community 
Manning, Ian Chief Technical Advicer CITES 31/10 
Mbengashe, Maria Chief Director Biodiversity DEAT 05/07 
and Heritage 
Mdluli, Musa Director of Tourism Ministery of 19/09 
Tourism, 
Environment and 
Communication 
(Swaziland) 
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Nkatini, N. (Prof. ) Head Community Forum N/A 27/07 
Great Limpopo 
Monadjem, Ara (Dr. ) Lecturer Biological Sciences University of 28/08 
Swaziland 
Mtele, Jonathan Swazi Tribal Head N/A 20/07 
Mtsambiwa, Morris Director of Parks, former Swazi National 28/08 
Zororai delegate for Zimbabwe as its Trust 
Director-General of Parks and 
Wildlife Management 
Authority 
Muleso, Jones Kharika TFCA coordinator DEAT 05/07 
Munthall, Simon (Dr. ) Officer Transfrontier DNFFB 29/08 
Conservation Areas Project 
Secretariat 
Myburgh, Werner Project Manager PPF 23/10 
Oliver, Willeen Assistant to Chief Director DEAT 05/07 
Biodiversity and Heritage 
Pheko, Motsoko (Dr. ) Deputy president Pan Africanist 10/10 
Congress of 
Azania (PAC) 
Pienaar, Dame Head of Scientific Services Kruger Park 04/09 
Reilly, Ted (Dr. ) Owner Big Game Parks 28/09 
Rogerson, Chris (Prof. ) SDI expert Wits University 02/07 
Rogues, Kim Project Manager Lubombo Swazi National 28/08 
Conservancy Trust 
Seelig, Leonard Conservation Consultant TFCA Unit- 17/10 
Conservation 
International 
Shole, Khepsi Eco tourism specialist UNDP 09/07 
Simbine, Caetano Head Refugee Research IUCN/RRF 17/07 
Programme (RRF) 
Spenceley, Anna PhDstudent/Tourism Institute of Natural 30/10 
Consultant/ Resources (Natal 
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University)/ Pro 
Poor Tourism 
Steenkamp, Conrad Anthropologist University of 10/08 
Witwatersrand 
Storm, Martijn. Owner and director Uitkyk Holidays 12/09 
Themba, Solly Assistant-manager Community Social Ecology, 05/09 
Facilitation SANPs 
Twayne, Wayne (Dr. ) Coordinator Wits Rural Facility 01/07 
Van Riet, Willem (Prof) Executive vice chairman PPF 16/08 
Verhoef, Johan (Dr. ) TFPA Program Co-ordinator SANPs 14/08 
(Limpopo/Shashe) 
Warner, Chris Senior environmental World Bank 23/10 
specialist/Task Manager 
Maluti/Drakensberg 
Informal conversations held during GKG policy workshops (Skukuza, 24-2 7 
JulylJohannesburg 14 August) and GKG Elephant Translocation Ceremony (4 th of 
October 2001) include: 
Bartolomeu, Sotho (TFCA Project Manager, DNFFB); Chidziya, Edson (Acting 
Deputy Director (M &Q Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management, 
Zimbabwe); De Vletter, Rod (Consultant, World Bank (Mozambique)); Dube, 
Nokuthula (Tourism Specialist, KPMG Hospitalitz, Leisure & Tourism); 
Kumagwelo, Guilhermina (Forestry Officer, DNFFB); Jones, Patricia Smith 
(Officer, Home Affairs (South Africa); Matsule, Salomdo (Project Manager Limpopo 
Corridor Programme); Nicholson, Andrew (Manager, KPMG Hospitalitz, Leisure & 
Tourism); Peddle, David (Colonel SADF); Tarmamade, Paulo (Project Manager, 
Maputo Development Corridor). 
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Interviews 200212003 
Name interviewee Position Organisation 8 Date 
Combrink, Judie Assi stant- director: International DEAT 16/09/02 
Liaison and Co-ordination 
Braack, Leo (Dr. ) Independent Consulent in N/A 13/09/02 
TBPAs/former Great Limpopo 
co-ordinator (SANPs) 
Collins, Nacelle Wetland Ecologist Free State 27/11/02 
Nature 
Conservation 
Collins, Steve Officer GTZ 11/12/02 
Transform 
Coplan, David (Dr. ) Antropologist University of 12/02/03 
Witwatersrand 
De Vletter, Rod Consultant World Bank, 25/09/02 
Mozambique 
Fakir, Saliem Country Programme IUCN 19/01/03 
Coordinator 9 
Gastrow, Peter Researcher ISS 30/12/02 
Gilfillan, Durkje Lawyer Legal Resource 04/09/02 
Centre 
Groenewald, Gideon Project Facilitator PPF 27/11/02, 
Maluti/Drakensberg Transfrontier 05/12/02 
Conservation and Development 
Arealo 
Grossman, David Ecologist, independent Mafisa 12/02/03 
(Dr. ) consultant. Representative for Consultancy/ 
8 All of the abbreviations for the listed organisations in this category can be found in the 
Glossary of 
the this thesis. Where the names of organisations have not been mentioned in the main text of the 
thesis, organisational names are given in full. Where respondents held various positions, the 
first 
position is the one held in the organisation mentioned in this Interview Overview. 
For South Africa. 
10 For Lesotho. 
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Bushmen Community (Kgalagadi David 
Park), and Makuleke community Grossman & 
(Great Limpopo). Associates 
Hanks, John Executive Director Conservation 9/10/02 
International 
Jones, Muleso TFCA Co-ordinator DEAT 15/01/03 
Kharika 
Lane, Patrick Chief Control Warden/Regional Ministry of 29/11/02 
Manager Environment & 
Tourism 
Look, Louis Regional Manager Lowveld Mpumalanga 26/11/02 
Parks Board 
Maloi, Mabatlokoa Senior Planner Ministry of 29/11/02 
Tourism, 
Culture and 
Environment 
(Lesotho) 
Mayoral-Philips, Business Development Ebony 21/01/03 
Andrew Consultant/PhD student Consulting 
International/ 
University of 
Pretoria 
Matolong, Tebogo Senior Environmental Officer N/A 15/01/03 
TFCAs 
Modishe, Sedia Co-ordinator Limpopo/Shashe PPF 27/11/02 
TFCA 
Mpasa, E. K. Director-General of Tourism Ministry of 05/12/02 
Tourism, 
Culture and 
Environment 
(Lesotho) 
334 
Muhanga, John Assistant Director Kenya Wildlife 26/11/02 
Service 
Munthali, Simon Officer Transfrontier DNFFB 25/09/02 
(Dr. ) Conservation Areas Project 
Secretariat 
Mwanauta, Abdallah Game Officer (Project Wildlife 26/11/02 
Coordinator) Division 
(Tanzania) 
Myburgh, Werner Project Manager PPF 09/10/02 
Potgieter, De Wet Journalist Rapport 05/09/02 
Ramoreboli, Lebo Foriner SDI Co-ordinator for N/A 09/12/02 
Maluti (through DEAT) 
Reilly, Ted (Dr. ) Owner Big Game 02/10/02 
Parks 
Rogues, Kim Project Coordinator Biodiversity Swazi National 01/10/02 
& Tourism Corridors Trust 
Ross, Robert (Dr. ) Reader in African History University of 16/12/ 
Leiden 
Rupert, Anton Chairman PPF 09/10/02 
Sandwith, Trevor Task Force Coordinator IUCN-WCPA 27/11/02 
Transboundary Parks/ Ex- 
Project Officer 
Maluti/Drakensberg 
(KZN/IUCN)/ 
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Stemmet, Andr6 Senior State Law Advisor Department of 13/12/02 
Foreign 
Affairs 11 
Sumner, Paul Lecturer Geography University of 12/09/02 
Pretoria 
Theron, Piet Great Limpopo Co-ordinator SANPs 22/08/02 
Van Wyk, Arrie Limpopo Park Project Manager PPF 20/01/03 
Van Wyk, Jo-Ansie University Lecturer in Political UNISA 29/09/02 
Science 
Verhoef, Johan Limpopo/Shashe Co-ordinator SANPs 29/09/02 
Vieira, Fatima Journalist Vertical, 25/09/02 
Mozambique 
Van der Walt, Peet Project Co-ordinator Ai- SANPs 25/11/02 
Ais/Richtersveld Transfrontier 
Conservation Park 
Warner, Chris Senior environmental World Bank 04/09/02 
specialist/Task Manager 
Maluti/Drakensberg 
Zunckel, Kevin Programme Coordinator Ezemvelo 30/11/02 
Maluti/Drakensberg KZN Wildlife 
Transfrontier Conservation and 
Development Area 
11 Of South Africa. 
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Informal conversations held during the In WEnt-IUCN-EUROPARC Workshop on 
Transboundary Protected Areas (in Southern and Eastern Africa): Guidelinesfor 
Good Practices and Implementation (25-30 November 2002) include: 
Gcabashe, Busi (Head Social Ecology, SANPs); Jonga, Charles (Director, Campfire 
Assiciation); Khoza, Bhekikisa (General Manager, KwaZulu Natal Wildlife); Kwape, 
Daphne (Consultant, Ministry of Agriculture (South Africa)); Mapolesa J. Mosenye 
(Director, Lesotho National Parks); Motsamai Damane, John (Director, National 
Environmental Secretariat); Mtsambiwa, Moms Zorora (Director of Parks, Swazi 
National Trust); Stein, Roland (TBBR Coordinator Palatine Forest and Northern 
Vosges, EUROPARCS). 
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Appendix III: Major participating organisations - First Fieldwork 
period 
State agencies 
South Africa 
" Dept. of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 
" South African National Parks 
" South African Defence Force 
" South African Police Service 
Swaziland 
e Swaziland National Trust 
e Ministry of Tourism, Environment and Communication 
Zimbabwe 
e Dept. of National Parks and Wildlife Management 
Mozambique 
e Direccao Nacional de Florestas e Fauna Bravia, Minist6rio da Agricultura e 
Desenvolvimento Rural 
NGOs & Donors 
" African Wildlife Foundation 
" Peace Parks Foundation 
" Conservation International 
9 Gesellschaft fuer Technische Zusammenarbeit: (German NGO) 
United States Agency for International Development 
* World Wide Fund for Nature 
European Commission- Aid Division 
Danish Cooperation for Environment and Development 
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e InWEnt 
9 World Bank 
Tourism Businesses/Organisations 
" Nature Group 
" Uitkijk Holidays, Karino 
" KPMG, Johannesburg 
" Swazi Trails, Mbabane 
Big Game Parks (BGP) 
RETOSA 
Community-based organisations 
" Community Forum for communities bordering Kruger 
" Makuleke Community Forum 
" Shangaan ommunity Festival Organisers 
9 Shewula Community Trust 
Universities 
University of Johannesburg 
Institute of Natural Resources, University of Natal 
University of Pretoria 
University of South Africa 
Other 
Legal Resource Centre 
Information Resource Centre (Parliamentary Office) 
Institute for Security Studies 
. &-C- I. - . 
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